

Homelands and Diasporas

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Homelands and Diasporas

Greeks, Jews and Their Migrations

Edited by Minna Rozen

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Και ψυχή
ει μέλλει γνώσεσθαι αυτήν
εις ψυχήν
αυτή βλέπτεον:
τον ξένο και τον εχθρό τον είδαμε στον καθρέφτη.

“ΑΡΓΟΝΑΥΤΕΣ”

Μυθιστόρημα του Γιώργου Σεφρη

And if the soul
is to know itself
it must look
into a soul:
the stranger and the enemy, we've seen him in the mirror.

“The Argonauts”

Myth of our History

By George Seferis (1935)¹

1 E. Keeley, *Modern Greek Poetry: Voice and Myth* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 18.

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REMARKS ON THE METHOD OF TRANSLITERATION

The book presented complex problems for both the academic and language editors. The assortment of languages employed in both the text and the references was rather large in comparison with other works of this type: Greek, Hebrew, French, Italian, Turkish, German, Yiddish, and Judeo-Spanish. This confronted us with several problems:

- A. How to treat languages that use alphabets other than the Latin;
- B. How to treat place names that changed during the period of time in question;
- C. How to treat proper names and words derived from Greek, Hebrew, Turkish, or Spanish sources that were misspelled or distorted when cited in other languages.

The solutions that we found for these problems are explained below. Throughout the book we attempted, as much as possible, to adhere to these solutions in a systematic fashion, in order to make it easier for the reader to navigate within the text.

A. All bibliographical entries in Hebrew and Greek appear in the original spelling, aside from the names of authors, which are presented in Latin characters in order to enable readers who do not have a command of these languages to find the material in general bibliographies and catalogues. In Greek titles the monotonic system has been applied. All proper names, and terminology in Greek and Hebrew are transliterated into Latin characters. All items in Turkish appear in the original language, and always in modern Turkish. All bibliographical entries in Greek and Hebrew are provided with an English translation at the first mention.

With respect to the transliteration from Hebrew, the *dagesh hazaq* was ignored, while the silent "heh" is represented by the letter "h" at the end of the word. The *sheva n'a* is designated by the letter "e" following the consonant. The letter 'ayin is indicated by an inverted apostrophe (') preceding the vowel, while an upright apostrophe (') separates two regular vowels. Articles and prepositions appear in lower case with a hyphen separating them from the noun, verb, or adjective they precede, except for surnames, and titles. The letter *bet*, when accented, is designated by the letter "b," and when not accented, by the letter "v."

The letter *het* is represented by the letter "h". The letter *kaf* is rendered as "kh" when it is not accented and "k" when it is accented. The letter *tzadi* is represented by the letters "tz", while the letter *quf* is indicated by the Latin letter "q." No distinction is made between the letters *tet* and *tav*.

With respect to transliteration from Greek we maintained the exact Latin equivalents of the Greek fonts, thus adhering to the Greek pronunciation.

B. With regard to place names that changed over time and as a consequence appear in different forms in various articles — in accordance with the relevant period — the following method was adopted: Place names that have entered the English language are presented in their generally accepted English form; for example, Jerusalem and not Yerushalayim. However, in one case the reader will find two versions of the same place name, Thessaloniki and Salonika. All Greek authors used the Greek name Thessaloniki. All the Israeli authors used the English name Salonika, which is closer to the term used in Judeo-Spanish: Saloniki. The editor decided to leave this inconsistency which entailed in it more than what may be perceived at first sight.

C. First and last names originally in Hebrew were transliterated according to the guidelines presented above, unless these are names of widely known personalities, which have an accepted English version, such as Maimonides. When such names are cited from sources written in Latin characters, the original form is retained.

Citations from Yiddish were transliterated into Latin characters in a way that best reflect their pronunciation by Jews from the Pale of Settlement.

Citations from Judeo-Spanish were rendered into modern Spanish, however, the special pronunciation of Judeo-Spanish speakers was tendered phonetically in case it differs from the modern spoken Spanish. Non-Spanish words in various languages that were integrated into the Judeo-Spanish text, or original creations of Judeo-Spanish speakers which were combinations of several languages, were transliterated phonetically.

Names and designations and entire texts in Greek that became distorted while transliterated by non-Greek speakers were returned to their original form and presented, transliterated accordingly. Outstanding distortions were retained, and the correct transliteration was placed in parentheses following the erroneous one.

D. Names and terms in Greek appearing in the body of the articles were transliterated phonetically and appear in Latin characters. Terms and texts in Greek were brought in the monotonic system unless classical Greek was mandatory. Names and terms in Yiddish were transliterated in a way that will best reflect their pronunciation by Jews from the Pale of Settlement. This rule was kept also in cases in which we thought it right to bring the term in its original language.

It is our sincere hope that any errors we may have overlooked are few and far between.

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The seeds of this book were planted in long conversations I had in the summer of 2000 with my friend and colleague, Prof. Maria Efthymiou, from the University of Athens. These discussions evolved into a conference that took place at the University of Haifa in March 2001. Most of the papers presented at the conference are included in the current book, together with several other articles we thought necessary to provide a complete picture of the subject. I would like to express my deep gratitude to colleagues and friends who contributed their papers to this book, and to apologize for the length of time it took to prepare it for publication. I owe special thanks to several friends and colleagues who gave of their time and energy to read the manuscript of the chapter I wrote, and who offered invaluable comments and insights at various stages of its evolution. Their comments helped me avoid pitfalls and improved the book in many ways. Naturally, anything written by me is my own responsibility and in no way reflects their views and opinions on historical, linguistic, and archeological or other issues. Throughout these years I was fortunate in having the devoted assistance and support of Maria Efthymiou, who liaised between me and our Greek colleagues, located books and articles, sent them over to Israel, and patiently answered all my questions on a culture to which I was a mere visitor. In the end she practically forced me to sit down and write the introductory chapter "People of the Book, People of the Sea: Mirror Images of the Soul." She read it, commented on it, and was gracious enough to let me make my own mistakes. I am also indebted to Dr. Angelique Koumanoudis from the University of Haifa, for having read the paper and offering her invaluable insight and comments. Prof. Pantelis Lekas from the University of Salonika also read this chapter and offered his comments. Dr. Simona Rodan from the University of Haifa was generous enough to give of her time and energy to answer my numerous questions concerning the cults of Philistine cities. Prof. Gershon Galil from the University of Haifa shared with me his knowledge of the biblical world. My life-long friend, Rachel Ben-Dov, an archeologist from the Hebrew Union College in Jerusalem, contributed her first-hand knowledge of Tel Dan.

Any mistakes that were overlooked are my own doing and my sole responsibility.

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Minna Rozen
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PREFACE

MINNA ROZEN

From a historical perspective, the concept of diaspora is inextricably bound up with the fate of the Jewish people after the destruction of the Second Temple. The term diaspora is used to describe population groups with certain common features, that live among majority groups with different characteristics, and preserve a real or symbolic tie to the place they consider their physical and spiritual homeland. The formation of diasporas is almost always related to voluntary or enforced emigration.

The above notwithstanding, the recognition that the diasporic situation was, and is, the heritage of many diverse population groups throughout history is not new. In recent years, there has been an upsurge in studies dealing with specific diasporas, or proposing diaspora theories. The research on this subject focuses on the motives for the formation of diasporas, and on the behavior of their members, and gives much room to the classification of the various types of diasporas. The reason why this branch of research has become so popular is because, in the Age of Globalization, the diasporic experience has become a global reality. In view of the above, it has become necessary to identify the common denominators between the various diaspora populations, and in particular, the options that the future holds for them. The tension between the problems emigration created, and the solutions it offered was a major factor in the upsurge of interest in diasporas and emigration.

A comparison between the Jewish and Greek diasporas is particularly significant in terms of their antiquity and length, their common existential space, and the feedback and clashes between them, but especially because of the different way in which they perceived their origins. These opposing perceptions may indicate that not all types of diaspora can be examined under the same microscope.¹ However, a detailed study of the history of these two diasporas shows otherwise. Perceptions and conventions exist on one side of the scale, while reality exists independently on the other

side of the scale. These two nations, despite their differences, still share much in common.

This book is an attempt to take a step further toward the interpretation of one of the most ancient historical social phenomena — emigration and diaspora.

For about a thousand years, from Alexander Macedon's conquest until the Muslim conquests, the Jewish people in Israel and the diaspora formed an integral part of the Hellenistic world, and adopted its language and many of its social perceptions [Kasher, "The Jewish *Politeuma* in Alexandria"]. And yet, paradoxically, from the Hellenistic period on, the Jews perceived the Greek way of life as the polar opposite of their way of life, and this perception survived throughout Jewish history. A Jew who adopted behaviors or thoughts of another group, be it a religion or any system that challenged the contemporary fundamentals of normative Judaism, was termed a "Hellenizer," irrespective of the ethnic origins of the group in question. This internal contradiction had its own internal logic. The more the Jews integrated into Hellenistic culture, the more they needed to assert their separate identity, before it was swallowed up totally in the Greek one. At the same time, Hellenistic culture absorbed many elements from the eastern world it had conquered. In the final analysis, it rejected the pagan religion on which it was based, and adopted a religious formula that was based on the Jewish monotheistic heritage. It, too, felt a need to separate from the culture whose treasures it had absorbed, before it lost its distinctiveness. Even metaphorically, these two nations were considered polar opposites: The Jews were perceived as the "People of the Book," while the Greeks were perceived as the "People of the Sea." Although these metaphors evolved only in the nineteenth century, they are based on a certain historical reality [Rozen, "People of the Book, People of the Sea"]. More importantly, the Jewish diaspora was perceived in Jewish culture, and later in Western culture in general, as a punishment for sin: "Because of our sins we were exiled from our land." [from the Jewish festival liturgy]. The Jewish diasporic condition was considered, therefore, a temporary condition that would end once the sin that caused it was atoned for and the age of divine redemption had been ushered in [Oded, "Exile — The Biblical Perspectives"]. The Greek diaspora, on the other hand, was perceived by its culture as a great settlement initiative, an act of renewal and adventure that brought with it prestige and honor, and that was commanded and blessed by the gods. From an ideological perspective, it was not a temporary condition but rather a process that aimed to spread the Greek way of life and culture throughout the world. Nor was there any need for divine intervention to bring it to an end. Rather, its end was contingent on human choice [Doukellis, "Between Greek Colony and Mother-City: Some Reflections"; Rozen, "People of the Book, People of the Sea"].

A deeper study of the evolution and history of the Jewish and Greek diasporas shows that they had as many similarities as differences. The

biblical account of the formation of the Jewish people opens with a story that is, if anything, redolently "Greek." God orders the patriarch Abraham to leave his home and land of his birth and go to another land, where a marvelous fate awaits him! The earliest Jewish emigration from the Land of Israel was that of Jewish soldiers who went to serve an Egyptian king. It predated the destruction of the First Temple, was not entirely an enforced diaspora, and was certainly not a punishment for sin. Indeed, this diaspora through the ages was not always a product of need, but also of choice. Conversely, the Greek diaspora was not simply the decision of brave adventurers whom the gods sent on perilous journeys, but also the result of banishment from their cities for various, mostly negative, reasons. In both cultures, a tension exists between the pull of "the old country" and that of the new. Both cultures experience this tension as painful, irrespective of whether the emigration was inspired by positive or negative reasons. The intensity and duration of this tension is what effectively determined the length of the diaspora. The antithesis of *diaspora*, which is a Greek term invented by the translators of the Bible into Greek (the Septuagint), is the Greek term *khora*, **the** place, homeland. When the emigrant's feeling of foreignness (*xeniteia*), evaporates, and he is no longer overwhelmed by nostalgia for the old world, but rather considers it as more symbolic than real, the diaspora begins its transition into *khora*, until the "old country" is totally absorbed into the clouds of distant memory [Rozen, "People of the Book, People of the Sea"].

The above is true both for Jewish and Greek diasporas, and for all other diasporas, too. The Samaritan exiles exist only in the Jewish historical memory. Anyone who may have inherited their genes would be currently living in Iraq without any inkling of their connection to the Kingdom of Samaria. Similarly, the Poseidonians of old exist only in the Greek historical memory. The inhabitants of Sicily and southern Italy know nothing about them, unless they studied archeology or classics at university [Rozen, "People of the Book, People of the Sea"]. My friend D. S., who lives in a green suburb of Philadelphia, is the great grandson of a rabbi from Gallipoli. Although he is very interested in investigating his Jewish and Sephardic origins, he is a dyed-in-the-wool American. He has never visited Israel, Turkey or Spain, and I doubt he ever will. His grandchildren will have no recollection of anything other than their American way of life. They may possibly belong to a local reform community that may have some kind of link with the State of Israel, reminding them of a remote, very remote, past that almost certainly will be entirely irrelevant to them. If my friend D.S. represents the metamorphosis of the Jewish diaspora, then A.D., whom I met at Moscow airport in the winter of 1993, represents the metamorphosis of the Greek diaspora. At the sound of his very Greek-sounding name, I questioned him on his Greek past. He informed me that his great great grandfather had indeed moved from Izmir to Odessa when Catherine the Great founded the city and welcomed anyone who wished to settle

there [Kardasis, "The Greek Diaspora in Southern Russia"]. He did not know any Greek, he admitted, and what little he knew about his Greek identity was from family traditions only. As far as he was concerned, he was a Russian from Odessa. Of course, the descendants of D.S. from Philadelphia may well discover a link between their Jewish roots and the State of Israel if drastic changes in the United States force them to, provided the State of Israel continues to be a viable option, just as happened with Argentinian Jewry under the Colonels' Regime [Zadoff, "Center and Diaspora in the Struggle for Human Rights"]. Similarly, Greece's entry into the European Union and the relaxation of its immigration laws may encourage A. D. from Odessa, or his children, to emigrate to Greece and rediscover their Greek roots — a not uncommon phenomenon in the history of diasporas [Weiss, "Breaks and Continuities in German-Jewish Identity"]. Diasporas — rather like amoeba — evolve, mutate, take on different forms, live, die, and are resurrected — depending on the needs of those who use them as survival tools. For diasporas are social survival tools.

Diasporas are the product of emigration. Theoreticians of emigration have developed the "push-pull" theory, whereby the emigrant is either "pushed out" of his country for negative reasons or "pulled in" by the new country for positive reasons (the lure of economic and professional opportunities, freedom of religion etc.). In actual fact, as is so often the case in human behavior, the two motives may coexist. The four horsemen of the Apocalypse and their associates have always been a driving force behind diasporas. A systematic analysis of the migratory patterns of Greeks and Jews throughout history shows that, the aforementioned ideological disparity notwithstanding, they were effectively guided by the same motives, albeit at different times. Famine and food shortages have always been primary motives for emigration, creating in their wake a cluster of subsidiary motives that may be defined in different ways. Classical Greece, like modern Greece, has always found it hard to feed its citizens from its homegrown produce. Therefore, food shortages were the main impetus behind the migratory movement in classical Greece, as in modern Greece, at least until the late 1960s. This picture is no less true for the Jewish diaspora. The story of Jacob and his sons who went down to Egypt to buy food has been reenacted throughout Jewish history. Jewish settlement in the Greco-Roman world was not only prompted by the attraction of living in a vast cultural space that provided a comfortable "existential climate," but also by the population growth in the Land of Israel, that made it hard to earn a living. The large late-nineteenth-century emigration of Jews from Eastern Europe to the New World was motivated by hunger, as was the emigration of other ethnic groups from Eastern Europe to America. This hunger was linked, in the case of the Jews, to a strong sense of existential pressure anchored in political and cultural factors. However, pressures of this sort alone, which had been their heritage for centuries, had not, hitherto, been sufficient to drive out

millions of East European Jews. The horsemen of the Apocalypse were riding together.

Natural disasters were another common motivation for mass emigration, although the impetus to emigrate was always accompanied by other, related, motives. The decline of Minoan culture in Crete is attributed to a volcanic eruption that took place in the early seventeenth century BCE in the island of Thera (Santorini). This event made it possible for Mycenaean culture to replace Minoan culture in the mid-fifteenth-century BCE. But what made the Mycenaeans set sail for Crete, Cyprus, and Cilicia in the first place? Was it the same impetus that led Greeks to migrate throughout the generations, namely, shortage of food? Or perhaps a foreign invasion? And why did the Mycenaeans set sail from the Mediterranean islands and Asia Minor to the shores of Canaan in the twelfth century BCE? Trying to steer a path through the labyrinths of these remote and obscure periods, over which various schools of scholars argue, can be extremely frustrating to those seeking unambiguous answers to human motivation. Even a comparative study of the recent or immediate past presents a very complex and varied picture that does not easily lend itself to analysis, let alone systemization.

Skipping to the Middle Ages, the extension of the Jewish diaspora from the Mediterranean basin to western and central Europe is usually attributed to persecution, discrimination, massacres and expulsions. A comparative study calls for a broader perspective that may include environmental factors, such as climate changes. The warming of Europe in the ninth to eleventh centuries created a favorable climate for people who were used to a warm climate. The pleasant weather triggered an immense population growth in these regions. Conversely, the extreme cooling down of the European continent from the twelfth century on, as well as its overpopulation, rendered Europeans less tolerant toward foreigners as well as to their compatriots. This was almost certainly one of the contributory factors to the Crusades — an event that was particularly traumatic for the Jewish communities of France and the Rhineland, propelling their surviving populations eastwards.

While such factors have been inadequately addressed in the research literature, others, such as political instability, have been stressed time and time again. Although political instability was a contributory factor to migration in both cultures throughout their history, ironically, political stability was also a cause of migration. The existence of large empires (the Roman, Ottoman, Austrian and Russian empires) that remained politically stable for centuries encouraged the internal migration of Jews and Greeks, simply because this proved easy. On the other hand, even large empires suffer periods of instability that serve as catalysts for the migration of minorities from them. Greeks emigrated from the Ottoman empire long before the classical age of migration in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, because of a feeling of oppression and insecurity in their places of residence, as did their brethren who lived in the

Venetian Republic [Papadia-Lala "Collective Expatriations of Greeks in the Fifteenth Through Seventeenth Centuries"].

The disintegration of the large empires in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries placed tremendous pressure on their populations, but mainly on populations that were identified by the majority population as having foreign ties. This pressure was reflected in discriminatory legislation, persecutions, and finally actual expulsions.

Pleasant weather was not the only positive force that led people to leave their homes and countries for foreign pastures. The promise of job opportunities (labor migration) was commonplace in both the old and new worlds, for Jews and Greeks alike. Jewish mercenaries who served the kings of Egypt in the seventh century BCE were not expelled from their country, but simply found Egypt a pleasant place to work. Greek merchants who settled in Odessa in the late eighteenth century were not expelled from Izmir, but were lured by the economic opportunities offered by the recently opened free port of Odessa, and its potential as a trade link between the Ottoman Empire and Czarist Russia (a potential they exploited) [Kardasis, "The Greek Diaspora in Southern Russia in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries"]. Their brothers who settled in the same period in Vienna, serving as a link between Vienna and Istanbul, were governed by the same motives [Katsiardi-Hering, "Central and Peripheral Communities in the Greek Diaspora"; Serenidou, "The 'Old' Diaspora, the 'New' Diaspora, and the Greek Diaspora in Eighteenth through Nineteenth Centuries Vienna"].

Sometimes, the push-pull forces operate simultaneously, as in the case of the mass immigration to the New World — the land of unlimited opportunities. Europe pushed its citizens out, while America pulled them in, with promises of prosperity and freedom.

One of the by-products of emigration and diasporas is the transmission of goods, means and ideas. Since emigrants usually perceive themselves, and are perceived by their hosts, as inferior, the fact that emigration is one of the most powerful means for the distribution of goods, inventions, ways of life and ideas throughout the world and for the cross-fertilization of human cultures, is often overlooked. The emigrant always has something new to offer his host environment, something it has not yet encountered, and for which it will henceforth find new uses, thereby enriching its culture immeasurably. Jews and Greeks are no exceptions. Indeed, they more than any other diaspora, have been "responsible" for the distribution of goods, material culture, ideas, innovations and inventions throughout the world, perhaps simply because they preserved their culture so much longer than others. The arrival of the sea peoples on the shores of Canaan brought with it a new, hitherto unknown, culture — one that built cities, made clay and iron tools, and embraced new myths and new patterns of thinking. The armies of Alexander Macedon disseminated Greek taste, culture and thought wherever they went, throughout the world. When they returned to their country of

origin, they brought with them new gods, new ways of life, and new attitudes toward life and death, that transformed the world from which they had set out to conquer the east. Similarly, the Returnees to Zion, who may be considered emigrants of sorts, brought with them a wealth of revolutionary ideas garnered from Zoroastrian culture: a dialectic perception of the world, evil as an immanent force, eternal life, the next world, reward and punishment, and similar ideas that in turn were taken from Judaism and transmitted through it to Christianity. The Jewish diaspora in Syria and Asia Minor was the conduit whereby Christianity advanced northwards and westward, while the Greek monks brought it to the Balkans and Eastern Europe.

In a similar vein, the intellectual treasures of Greek philosophy that might have been lost when Justinianus closed the Academy of Athens (529 CE), were preserved through their Arabic and Hebrew translation. Aristotle's doctrine was preserved thanks to the commentary of the Muslim philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes) (1126–1198), who used the Hebrew translation of excerpts of Aristotle's doctrine. And so on. In the court of Ferdinand II (1194–1250) of Naples Ibn Rushd's commentary was translated into Hebrew by Jacob Anatoli (1194–1258) and at the same time and place, perhaps in collaboration, it was translated into Latin by Michael Scotus (1175–1235). Subsequently, Aristotle's doctrine penetrated Judeo-Christian western culture.

Another by-product of emigration and diaspora was the creation of trade networks, that were first and foremost ethnic-based, and in many cases, also family-based. This was an extremely common characteristic of the Jewish diaspora from the Muslim conquests on, and of the Greek diaspora after 1453. From the sixteenth century on, following the globalization of international trade (as a result of the Great Discoveries, and later, of European colonialization), Greek and Jewish trade networks penetrated all corners of the globe.

These networks created groups of extremely affluent people, who understood that in order for their businesses to succeed, their manpower required an education that was suited to their needs, and that was not provided by standard education until the eighteenth century. The main requirement was a knowledge of foreign languages — the key to acquiring new ideas. This paved the way for educational reform and nationalism [Exertzoglou, "Reconstituting Community: Cultural Differentiation and Identity Politics in Christian Orthodox Communities during the Late Ottoman Era"].

An issue that acquired added significance with the growth of nationalism was that of the relationship between center and diaspora. This problem was not new. Already in antiquity, the relationship between center and diaspora was ambivalent, a push-pull dichotomy of yearning and rejection, that usually turned the center and the longing for it into a symbol, if it had not yet been forgotten. In the interval between emigration and the total loss of ties with the "old country," the emigrant

feels a range of different emotions of varying degrees of intensity toward his place of origin. Economic and spiritual prosperity in the place(s) of emigration in both diasporas created a multitude of new centers of ethnic-cultural existence, so much so that one wonders if there was actually a center and a diaspora, or rather a scattering of centers and secondary centers. The Jewish diaspora turned Jerusalem into a symbolic center that had no practical significance until the age of nationalism. The Greek diaspora never had an acknowledged center. It was an entire world, with a solid hub in Asia Minor and in the Middle East, and ever broadening margins toward North Africa and the Danubian states, and ultimately to all reaches of the world. A Greek was someone who spoke Greek, and led a Greek — originally pagan, and then Greek Orthodox — way of life. He was first and foremost defined by his place of birth. The architects of the Greek national movement were forced to relate to the question of “center,” and it was they who metaphorically resurrected the two-headed eagle. This time, one of the eagles represented Athens — the classical heritage that was absorbed by Western Europe and re-exported to the disintegrating Ottoman empire — and the other, Constantinople — the symbol of Christian Greece that became the capital of that empire. At a certain historical moment, the Jewish and the Greek diasporas intersected at a point where each had to turn an imaginary idea into an earthly capital.

The fall of Constantinople into Ottoman hands, and its transformation into the center of the subject Greek nation, bestowed upon it several of the features of captured Jerusalem. There was one enormous difference, however. Constantinople, unlike Jerusalem, was a real metropolis (albeit the Greeks lacked sovereignty over it), while Jerusalem remained an imaginary one. Although the Greeks, like the Jews, would, theoretically, have liked to turn the wheels of history back, they accommodated themselves to the reality of the times. Interestingly, both diasporas devised extremely similar theological and moral justifications for this accommodation [Rozen, “People of the Book, People of the Sea”; Ravitzky, “A Land Adored Yet Feared: The Land of Israel in Jewish Tradition”].

Modern nationalism rendered the problem more acute. It demanded identification of a center, loyalty toward it, and action on its behalf. The process of “reinventing” a center followed similar patterns in both diasporas: The incubation of the national idea in the diaspora, far from the center it recreated; the role of the bourgeoisie, first in fostering the idea, and later, in financing it; the process of recreation, that included, as with other nationalist movements, the revival of traditions and memories, with an emphasis on memories that served the idea; and, finally, a phenomenon that was unique to the national revival of these two cultures, “the adaptation” of the language to the national idea. In the case of the Greeks, this was extremely difficult because the language had evolved in different places in different ways, so that a compromise had to be

found between the linguistic present and the classical past to which the Greeks sought to harness their heritage. In the Jewish case, this was simpler, since Hebrew had been a dead language for many generations, in certain cases probably since the Hellenistic period. The language was resurrected on the basis of written literature, biblical language, and Mishnaic language. In both diasporas, and in the two nation-states they established, a deliberate effort was made "to reeducate" a population that was too poor or too ignorant to constitute "suitable material" for the national project. In both cases, a dab of democracy was stirred into the nationalist brew, despite the fact that both were bourgeois projects.

In both cases, the diaspora was a survival tool, and in both cases, the national idea represented a different kind of survival tool. The Greek national idea was mainly an attempt to exploit a window of opportunities — an idea that seemed feasible given the decline of The Ottoman Empire. Like many human endeavors, it cost more money and blood than its architects imagined, and produced fewer results than they had hoped. Although the Jewish national idea was also a dangerous venture, it was not an attempt to exploit a window of opportunities but rather a rescue venture. As long as there were other survival options, the idea was controversial. When all other doors were closed, it became the only option.

The two new nation-states entertained the illusion that they could resurrect their idyllic pasts in all their glory. The Greeks paid the price of this illusion in 1922. We are still paying the price, on a daily basis. And the ledger is still open and the hand still records...

The two new nation-states entertained certain aspirations concerning those they considered a legitimate target of the national project. The State of Israel was created as a refuge for all persecuted Jews, although it aspired, for quite a significant period of its history, to absorb as many Jews as possible, even if they came from places where they were not persecuted. This was a function of its need to create a Jewish majority in a state with a significant Arab population. In Greece, there were no such initiatives. Until the 1990s, Greece was always a place from which people emigrated, rather than one to which they immigrated. Nevertheless, the two states undertook identical measures to place obstacles in the way of population groups they identified as incompatible with the national project, or, at the very least, to force them to be part of it. Both states have a "Law of Return" that awards citizenship to anyone who "is compatible" with the nation-state, without the obstacles others face.

At this juncture, the issue of center and diaspora resurfaces. Even before the establishment of the Greek and Jewish nation-states, the subject of center and diaspora was problematic. Despite and along with the consolidation of the national idea, at least until the 1960s, any Greek considered himself simply a member of the place, village or city where he was born. In most cases, his Greek identity was determined by this place. If he emigrated, he emigrated from that place, which then became "the

center" for which he yearned. The Jewish nineteenth-century emigrant, however, did not emigrate from Jerusalem or from Eretz Israel. He emigrated from one diaspora to another. Like the Greek emigrant, who did not identify with Athens or Constantinople (unless he came from one of these cities), the Jewish emigrant did not focus on the symbolic center to which he had prayed for generations, but to the actual place from which he had emigrated [Refael, "Spain, Greece or Jerusalem? The Yearning for the Motherland in the Poetry of Greek Jews"; Rozen, "People of the Book, People of the Sea"]. The loyalty and affiliation of the Greek and Jewish diaspora to their new nation-states, even as they emerged, created new and awkward problems. The Greek communities of Alexandria, Istanbul and Izmir, for example, were ten times larger, and materially and spiritually richer than Athens, the capital of the new nation-state. They had independent interests that were not always compatible with those of the nation-state. Although they rallied to the national cause, this could not always be taken for granted, and for a long time their centers competed with the young state. In a certain sense, the complex relationship between the nineteenth-century Greek diaspora and the emergent nation-state is comparable to the relationship between the large Jewish centers of Eastern Europe before the Holocaust, and of England and the USA, during and after it, to the Zionist enterprise. Before the Holocaust, the assumption prevailed in Eastern Europe that it was possible to maintain an autonomous Jewish nationalism within the geographical space of another nation — an assumption that grew into the idea of diasporic nationalism [Silber, "The Metamorphosis of Pre-Dubnovian Autonomism into Diaspora Jewish Nationalism"]. This idea is in some way reminiscent of the assumption that prevailed in some Greek communities in the Ottoman Empire in the course of the nineteenth century, that it was possible to exist as a national group within a state that was not necessarily the Greek nation-state.

However, even when this illusion was dashed, for the Greeks in the First World War, and for the Jews in the Second World War, the nation-state was not at the center of the collective experience. The Greeks emigrated from their state en masse in the years following the Second World War. Today, their descendants are returning to it, in order to study their grandparent's language, and to get to know "the old country". Their true homeland, however, is in the USA, Canada or Australia, as the case may be. In such a situation, it is hard to distinguish between center and diaspora. As for US Jewry, currently the largest and most affluent center of the Jewish diaspora, the establishment and existence of the State of Israel was important as a potential place of refuge, and also as a source of pride and self-esteem, but its attitude toward it has always been patronizing. The main focus of interest was in the new center that was set up in the USA, the New Babylon, in both senses of the word [Segev, "Does Money Talk? The Struggle between American Zionists and the Yishuv in the Early 1940s"].

The world at the end of the second and the start of the third millennia is a new world of new diasporas in which the flow is from poor countries to rich ones — a world I have termed “The West and the Rest.” These diasporas are transforming, and shall continue to transform, the image of the nation-state of these two ancient diasporas, and even the image of their diasporas. Although it is too early to mourn the passing of the nation-state, one might venture to say that it will, in the future, face some extremely trying ordeals. Sparsely populated Greece, with its negative natural increase and high standard of living is absorbing a growing number of immigrants of all colors and creeds. It needs them to do work that its well-fed citizens are not prepared to do. It needs them in order to survive. The monolithic picture that the Greek nation-state sought to create is becoming increasingly fractured. The Greeks rely, and to some extent justly so, on their culture that always excelled in assimilating foreigners, but this cannot always be the case. The Greek Orthodox Church, which, throughout its dominion, annexed masses of people who had no connection with Hellenism to the Greek culture, has almost completed the process of becoming Greece’s national church. In other words, Greek civilization has lost the tool (the church) whereby it expanded its spheres of influence [Roussos, “The Greek Orthodox Church Networks in the Near East (1899–1947) and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism”]. Greek identity is contingent on the Greek nation-state and those who feel a tie with it. When those in the Greek state who are not Greek Orthodox are not considered Greek, and when being Greek is still contingent on embracing the Greek Orthodox religion, assimilation will not succeed. Only the removal of this interdependency will allow such assimilation, but that would mean the emergence of an entirely new Greek, a being different to all Greeks since Constantine the Great (324 CE).

Unlike Greece, the State of Israel has no tradition of assimilating and absorbing foreigners (other than Jews). On the contrary, Jewish culture has, throughout history, repeatedly banished any “deviant” it feared might influence “normative” behavior. Like Greece, Israel too is undergoing a process of adaptation to the new millennium. The ongoing conflict with the Palestinians, that Israel’s continued sovereignty over Judea and Samaria has exacerbated, has created a state which, although national in definition, legislation, and behavior, in practice, will soon evolve into a binational state, barring an apocalyptic scenario that will reshuffle the cards. Already today the Israeli Law of Return enables thousands of non-Jews to obtain Israeli citizenship. Like in Greece, it serves as a magnet for thousands of foreign workers and illegal immigrants who wish to partake of its bounty. Some of these processes cannot be halted.

The Holocaust and the establishment of the State of Israel turned the diaspora into something negative and loathsome. The State’s consolidation and prosperity, as well as its rapid demographic growth

that has hardly left any green belts, and its economic and cultural integration into the postmodern space, have created two parallel and complementary trends. The first is the trend toward privatization. The State that was the supreme value, and that set itself up as the supreme value, is fast turning into (in fact has already turned into) a loose network of interest groups, each of which cares for its own interests [Gutwein, "Jewish Diaspora and the Privatization of Israeli Society"]. The second trend is taking place in the diaspora. The collapse of the Soviet Empire gave the State of Israel a massive demographic infusion, but this very infusion hastened the collapse of the monolithic cultural picture that the architects of the State had aspired to create. On the other hand, the collapse of the Soviet Empire allowed the resurrection of Jewish communities that had been wiped off the face of the earth. Although these communities feel a tie with Israel, many of their members consider them their natural place. This can hardly be termed exile [Weiss, "Breaks and Continuities in German-Jewish Identity"].² US Jewry, for its part, "is discovering itself" and creating a Jewish culture which, generally speaking, is radically different from that of the State of Israel, in the religious sense, too. Although its commitment to the State of Israel is extremely strong, it — like other ethnic groups in the USA — is increasingly directing its efforts toward consolidating its identity in the United States. In the best-case scenario, the proposed formula is one of "partnership of equals," rather than a mandatory center to whose existence the diaspora is committed at any cost, because it depends on it for its survival, or an absolute center that can impose its values, interests and wishes on the diaspora.³

In conclusion, diasporas are human inventions that can be understood only if studied along the entire time axis of their existence, or at least, as far back as we can go. We have no guarantee that we will ever completely understand this fascinating phenomenon. However, in order to approximate such an understanding, we must go from the particular to the general, sift through the generalizations, analyze them, and assess and reassess them, with extreme circumspection. Diasporas needs a center, whether fictitious or real, but the connection between them and the modern nation-state is a modern invention that is not necessarily viable. Thus, Kitromilides' article [Kitromilides, "Diaspora, Identity and Nation-building"] provides a fitting conclusion to this work.

INTRODUCTION

PEOPLE OF THE BOOK, PEOPLE OF THE SEA: MIRROR IMAGES OF THE SOUL

MINNA ROZEN

1. People of the Book, People of the Sea

In April 1991, the cruiser *Spiro*, Argentina's contribution to the Gulf War paid a courtesy visit to Piraeus. There was naturally certain puzzlement in Greece as to how an Argentinean ship came to be bearing a seemingly Greek name. There was considerable interest when it became known that the ship was en route for the island of Hydra, the birthplace of Spyros Petrou, one of the greatest heroes of the Argentine navy. Born in 1784, Petrou had migrated to Argentina where he had come to command an Argentinean ship in the war of independence against Spain. In 1814, rather than submit to the Spanish, Petrou had preferred to blow himself up with his ship... Moreover, Petrou was not the only Greek to have distinguished himself in the service of the Argentinean military. When, at the end of the Falklands War, general Galtieri, the leader of the Argentinean junta, was deposed he was replaced by General Nikolaidis, who had actually been born in Greece and who had an aunt still living in Kavala.¹

The sea has always played a key role in the history of the Greeks — both in the diaspora and in their homeland. The centrality of the sea is reflected in their way of life as well as in their beliefs and traditions.² However the importance of the sea for the inhabitants of the Aegean and Anatolian littoral and the nearby islanders can be traced to the distant past, long before the classical age. The way Aegean and Anatolian migrations of the thirteenth-twelfth centuries BCE are depicted in the historical memory of the ancient Egyptians and Israelites, shows that long before the emergence of classical Greek culture, migrants from these areas were strongly associated with the sea. From the fourteenth through

twelfth centuries BCE the Hittite and Egyptian empires — the greatest empires of the period — began to decline. One byproduct of this process was the emergence of newcomers from the north and west who threatened the Hittite³ and Egyptian empires.⁴ As time went by, some of these newcomers were absorbed into the Egyptian army,⁵ and settled within Egypt and on the Canaan coastline. Already in this early period, one of these groups, the Sherden, were referred to as a seafaring people.⁶ Nineteenth-century Egyptologists labeled the nine groups specified in the Egyptian sources as “Sea Peoples.”⁷ On the walls of his mausoleum in Medinet Habu, Rameses III (ca. 1182–1167 BCE)⁸ boasted his victory over a coalition of ferocious warriors who lived on ships, and excelled in naval warfare.⁹ A document dated late twelfth, or even early eleventh, century BCE, designated by scholars the *Onomasticon of Amenope*, cites a list of places and peoples in Canaan that link three of the biblical Philistine pentapolis — Ashkelon, Ashdod, and Gaza¹⁰ — with two of these peoples, the Sherden and the Peleset.¹¹ During the reign of Rameses XI (eleventh century BCE) an Egyptian priest named Wen-Amon was sent to Canaan to buy material for ship-building. In a document recounting his adventures, he mentions a stay in the city of Dor, south of present-day Haifa. At that time, Dor was a harbor of one of the “Sea Peoples,” the Sekel (also known as Sikila,¹² or Tjekker,¹³ depending on how one interprets the document and the theories on the origins of each of the “Sea peoples”) — nowadays Sicily or western Anatolia. The provenance of each of the nine “Sea Peoples” became the subject of long and heated scholarly debates. The theories varied from 1. Illyria via the Balkans; 2. The western Aegean region; 3. The eastern Aegean region; 4. The eastern Mediterranean, or various combinations of the above.¹⁴ Most scholars agree that whatever the origins of these groups, they picked up Mycenaean culture or, at the very least, Mycenaean culture in the broader sense (i.e., Aegean culture) before their arrival on the shores of Canaan.¹⁵ The most renowned of the Sea Peoples were the Peleset or Philistines, who gave their name to all the other northern tribes who settled in the coastal plain of Canaan, and eventually to the entire non-Jewish population of the area,¹⁶ as well as to the country. They were notorious for their enmity to the Kingdom of Judea. The royal scribes of the Kingdom of Judea saw fit to immortalize them, as opposed to other “Sea Peoples,” such as the Sekel (or Tjekker) and Sherden, who were of less interest to Judea, and who had lost their distinctive character by the time the Bible was written.¹⁷ According to the Bible, the Philistines came from Kaphtor.¹⁸ The enigmatic Kaphtor was identified by generations of biblical commentators and scholars as the island of Crete, a theory substantiated by the existence of two contingents of mercenaries — the “Cheterites and Pelethites” (הכרתִי והפלתי) — in King David’s army.¹⁹ Today’s scholars tend to identify it with Cyprus.²⁰ Whether Crete or Cyprus, Kaphtor may well have been their last, or one of their last, stops on their lengthy journey to the Canaan coast. Scholars often identify

the Philistines with the Pelasgians, a term designating “natives” in archaic Greek, i.e. those who inhabited present-day Greece, as well as the coasts of Asia Minor and Illyria, before the “Greeks.”²¹ While Dor was explicitly identified as a “harbor of the Sekel” (Tjekker), archeologists identify other sites of other “Sea People” who settled on the Canaanite coast as those of the Peleset and the Sherden,²² because their names appear in the Onomasticon of Amenope in connection with the Pentapolis. At the same time, the Denyen who are often identified as the Danaoi (Δαναοί), a Greek tribe living in the Argos plain, or possibly hailing from Anatolia,²³ do not appear in this list, or in any other written source of the period. Consequently, the textual arguments suggesting the possibility of a Denyen settlement along the Jaffa coast or plain, prior to the formation of the Hebrew tribal alliance, and the subsequent absorption of the Denyen within the Israelite tribal alliance as the tribe of Dan, were regarded as speculative.²⁴ However, the strong Aegean features of the Samson legends, his own ambivalent connections with the Philistines, and Dan’s biblical description as a seafaring tribe, remain an intriguing enigma. According to the Bible, the Danites, who were given land on the southern coast, were unable to settle there because of Amorite and Philistine pressure, and moved northwards. On their journey northwards they stole the sacred statuettes venerated by the House of Michah, and forced its priest to come with them. Eventually, they took over the peaceful city of Layish, and renamed it “after their ancestor, Dan.”²⁵ The cumulative evidence in favor of the Dan-Denyen theory, is challenged by the archeological findings at Tel Dan. These findings point to the destruction of a highly sophisticated urban civilization in the twelfth century BCE, a civilization that produced fine pottery, and imported pottery from Cyprus and from the Aegean. This refined civilization was replaced by a nomadic society that produced inferior pottery. The invaders’ culture lacked the sophisticated characteristics of the other “Sea Peoples” that settled along the Canaan coast. This society, with its nomadic and unrefined culture, resembled other Israelite settlements.²⁶ One explanation for these findings may be the possible deprivation the group had suffered in the past, when it had been challenged by its neighbors, and forced to move from its original area of settlement to the northern region of the country. During this transitional period, it may have lost its original leadership, as well as the means to produce the high-quality pottery that characterized this Aegean-influenced people. It may also have assimilated the physical traits of the Israelite mountain people. This is not the only problem to emerge from the archeological findings. The excavations of Tel Qasile, near the Yarkon River estuary in Tel Aviv, have revealed a Philistine port city, one stratum of which Yigael Yadin ascribed to the Denyen, in support of the Denyen-Dan theory.²⁷ However, further work on the site has revealed a settlement of “Sea People” dating from the twelfth to the tenth century BCE, when the city was captured by the Israelites.²⁸ These findings are not

consistent with the biblical Danite account of their forced emigration from their southern inheritance towards the northern Canaanite coast, unless one accepts the idea of a settlement of "Sea People" before the twelfth century.²⁹ At any rate, the Danites possessed two characteristics that did not typify other Israelites. They were, according to the Bible, a seafaring clan,³⁰ and the archeological findings at Tel Dan attest to their skill as iron-workers.³¹ The Philistines excelled in this occupation and made sure no Israelite engaged in it.³²

Why does the tribe of Dan so capture the academic imagination? The reason is that, even if the Denyen-Dan theory is mere speculation, the Philistines, Dan's biblical adversaries, left a distinct mark on this tribe's culture and, through it, on the entire Israelite historical memory.

Thus, the aforementioned scholarly debate comprises at least three levels revolving around: (1) The provenance of the "Sea Peoples"; (2) whether the "Sea Peoples," or some of them, "qualified" as "Greeks"; and (3) their imprint on their environment and vice versa.

The picture that emerges from these early sources is that of seafaring tribes hailing from the Mediterranean islands, the shores of the Aegean, and the shores of Southern Anatolia. The cults they preserved through the ages right into the Hellenistic period, whether original, adapted, or assimilated, had strong links with bountiful nature, especially with mother earth,³³ but at the same time were strongly connected with the sea and its powers.³⁴ Archeological findings show that they brought with them an entirely new civilization, one that had Aegean characteristics and which was closely related to the Mycenaean culture. These findings also show that they spoke a different language to the Canaanite vernacular, before adopting the local language and other aspects of the local culture. The language they spoke was certainly not a Semitic language, and recent studies substantiate the fact that they spoke Greek.³⁵ In the Bible, the Philistines (in the generic sense) are depicted as the archfoe of the Israelites, and their remote overseas origins and foreign culture are always emphasized. These "Sea Peoples" may not have qualified as "Greek" in the classical or modern sense, but they certainly originated from what would become the defined regions of Greek-speaking populations, as perceived by "others," i.e. Egyptians, Canaanites, and Israelites. Indeed, the Philistine settlement on the Canaanite coast should be considered an early example of later waves of Greek colonization.

Thus, the sea, the islands, and the mountains produced the "People of the Sea" long before anybody defined them as such, and long before they themselves began reflecting on the significance of their way of life. Much like the ancient Hebrews, the Greeks, too, had a glorified image of life before the reality they knew and had helped create. They imagined a mythological Golden Age in which people did not sail or trade, but rather, were attached to their land. In their imagination, it was "Argo" and the quest for the Golden Fleece that had changed all that, and turned the sea and seafaring into an integral part of their lives.³⁶

The ancient Greeks perceived the sea as a unifying and equalizing factor, merging people, rites, languages, beliefs, cultures, and goods.³⁷ At the same time, it was a degrading or corrupting factor (the “corrupting sea”),³⁸ which, by bringing people together, changed their original characteristics, fashioning and refashioning them time and again. It taught them the undignified business of trade instead of the noble calling of agriculture. For the Greeks, the sea had become a challenge they were used to confronting and felt proud to master and overcome, with all the trophies and dangers this implied. In a Demotic song from Karpathos, the North-Wind warns all ships and sailors on the high seas to find refuge from its fury:

But a Cretan ship answered him:
 I’m not afraid of you Mr. North-Wind,
 No matter how you blow,
 for I have bronze masts and steel antennas,
 for I have sails made of silk from Proussa,
 for I have cables made of blond maiden’s hair,
 for I have choice sailors who are all brave lads,
 for I have a young sailor who knows the elements.³⁹

It was Anaximander of Miletos (ca. 610–ca. 546 BCE) who first formulated the theory of an aquatic descent of mankind.⁴⁰ It was the Odyssey that first gave us our perception of the Mediterranean world, and the Greek historians of the fifth century BCE who depicted the past as a sequence of Thalassocracies.⁴¹ Finally, it was Plato’s *Phaedo* that likened the human species to ants and frogs living around the sea.⁴²

The Greeks, whether ancient or modern, did not invent the notion of the sea as an integral part of their common identity. Rather, it was the dantesque quality of the sea and land surrounding them that forced them to relate to it constantly in every conceivable way, weaving language, man and sea into a unique culture. By the mid-twentieth century — after decades of strife, violence and instability for modern Greece — its best poets found the sea a useful metaphor for describing how to cope with the anguish of the real world. Nikos Gatsos (1911–1992), for example, wrote of his wretched countrymen:

With their country tied to their sails and their oars hanging in the
 wind,
 The shipwrecked slept tamely like dead beasts on a bedding of
 sponges,
 But the eyes of the seaweed are turned toward the sea
 Hoping the South Wind will bring them back with their lateen sails
 newly painted.⁴³

On a more personal level, Odysseas Elytis (1911–1996) wrote:

— “I was given the Hellenic tongue
 my house a humble one on the sandy shores of Homer.
 — My only care my tongue on the sandy shores of Homer.
 The sea-bream and perch
 — windbeaten verbs
 green currents with the cerulean
 — all that I saw blazing in my entrails
 sponges, medusae
 — with the first words of the Sirens
 pink shells with their first dark tremors.”⁴⁴

On the other hand, for the Jews, both in the early Israelite period and later, the sea has rarely served as a spiritual or physical pivot of identification, and never as an object of intense activity.⁴⁵ Already Josephus Flavius stated: “As for ourselves, therefore, we neither inhabit a maritime country, nor do we delight in merchandise, nor in such a mixture with other men as arises from it; but the cities we dwell in are remote from the sea, and having a fruitful country for our habitation, we take pains in cultivating that only. Our principal care of all is this, to educate our children well; and we think it to be the most necessary business of our whole life to observe the laws that have been given us, and to keep those rules of piety that have been delivered down to us.”⁴⁶ This statement includes both the Jews’ recognition that they lived “with their back to the sea,” and the importance they attached to the transmission of tradition by way of education. In fact, the main historical references to extensive nautical activity within Jewish culture point to external influences, namely, to the adaptation of Jewish culture to a broader ultra-ethnic Mediterranean culture. Thus, the Israelite seafaring tribe of Dan was either a foreign tribe, possibly the Denyen of the “Sea People,” who assimilated among the Israelites while retaining their maritime traditions or, at least, an Israelite tribe that intermingled with its Philistine neighbors and adopted much of their culture.⁴⁷ The nautical activities of King Solomon are connected to his alliance with the Phoenicians.⁴⁸ The port of Dor that operated in the ninth century BCE under the Israelite government of the ‘Omri dynasty, is also associated with a period of strong alliance with the Phoenicians.⁴⁹ The Book of Jonah is undoubtedly a Biblical adaptation of an ancient, Mediterranean sailors’ myth.⁵⁰ Paradoxically, even the nautical activities of the Hasmonean dynasty were a consequence of its economic, political and cultural integration in the Hellenistic world against which it fought.⁵¹ The city of Jaffa became a center of Jewish maritime activity only after it was conquered by the Hasmoneans, a tradition it retained until the great rebellion against the Romans, and the *victoria navalis* Vespasian claimed for subduing it.⁵² Last, but not least, the involvement of Jews in maritime international trade in the early modern period was almost entirely the initiative of the descendants of the “New Christians” who returned to Judaism in various Italian principalities, Bordeaux and the Low Countries.⁵³

Indeed, the passage with which we began this chapter, cited from Richard Clogg's article in *The Greek Diaspora in the Twentieth Century*,⁵⁴ which he edited, could never have referred to the Jews and their diaspora. Nor could any of the other aforementioned citations transmit the Jewish concept of the word. Jews have frequently and more aptly been described as the "People of the Book." Much like the Biblical "Sea People," Jews won this "title" at a later stage of their existence. It was Islam that coined this term as applying to all monotheistic religions.⁵⁵ However, it was only in the early nineteenth century that this theological description metamorphosed into the popular notion of the Jews as "The People of the Book." Thus, although essentially each of these groups could have been identified by its ancient history, in actual fact the epithets describing them were coined in the nineteenth century. The advent of romanticism and nationalism — intellectual movements that called for clear designations of cultures and nations — gave added impetus to this process.⁵⁶

Although the exact dating of the emergence of the "Sea Peoples" in the Middle East is a subject for scholarly debate, clearly its identification as such is connected with their migration and resettlement in "foreign" lands. The same holds true for their successors, the classical Greeks. The more they dispersed, the more they were identified with the sea. Similarly, the identification of Jews as "The People of the Book" has its roots in the emergence of the Jewish diaspora, i.e. migration, dislocation and resettlement. The longer Jewish diasporic existence persisted, the greater the role of "The Book" in their lives. Thus, both Sea and Book may be considered as ancillary to the main survival tool: diasporic existence.

Until the Second World War, it was the Jewish bookcase that kept Jews together as a nation (albeit a dispersed one), and for many it still is. For religious Jews it was, and still is, a question of choice. Secular Jewish intellectuals inadvertently created for themselves a universal bookcase in their respective specialties, using the same tools created by generations of rabbinical scholars before them.⁵⁷ Some of these intellectuals persisted in their belief that this bookcase was their virtual homeland, while others became disillusioned. Both categories, however, built their images of nationhood on books, words, and texts.

It is no coincidence that both Heinrich Heine and George Steiner defined the written word as their homeland. Despite the time interval between them, and the different way they processed their disillusionment with the quest for a terrestrial homeland, they were both *bona fide* members of "The People of the Book." Heine was probably the first to crystallize in words the idea and problematics of "The People of the Book" in the modern sense of the word. Heine, so Jewish and yet so German, defined the Bible as the Jews' "portable homeland," and as the source of both their fortunes and misfortunes.⁵⁸ He himself converted to Christianity in order to escape the Jewish misfortunes and gain admission to German society, or rather, to the Prussian civil service. Alas, his conversion was of no avail. Rejected by Germany, the land to

which he had contributed some of its most famous and beloved poetry, he expressed his disenchantment in the terms of a rejected lover:

Oh, once I had a lovely fatherland
 The oaks grew tall
 Up to the sky, the gentle violets swayed.
 I dreamt it all.
 I felt a German kiss, heard German words
 (hard to recall)
 How good they rang? the words *Ich liebe dich!*
 I dreamt it all.⁵⁹

Heine succeeded in articulating how words defined his identity in both positive and negative ways. On the one hand, there was The Bible — eternal and always connected to Heine's Hebrew roots — and, on the other hand, German — the language of his adoptive homeland that proved to be unfaithful and elusive.

In the hundred and fifty years from Heine to Steiner, European Jewry became emancipated and reached unprecedented heights in every sphere of human activity, followed by equally unprecedented spates of hatred and persecution. Heine's books were burnt in Nazi Germany's town squares (though his famous poem "Lorelei" was included in German text books under the heading "a folk song") while European Jews, whether Orthodox, assimilated or Zionist, were butchered and cremated, exactly as he had predicted.⁶⁰ Although Heine's personal disillusionment was insignificant in comparison with the magnitude of the national tragedy, in nature, his disillusionment was no different from that of the twentieth-century child and "graduate" of its Jewish-European experience, George Steiner.

Although George Steiner transformed this disillusionment into something much more universal and all-embracing than did Heine, he reverted to the same intellectual sphere. His Bible — more symbolic than Heine's — is the crystallization of the written word expressing all that is exalted and noble in human creation. His rejection by Europe did not lead him to reject Europe and its culture, or any other place or culture for that matter. Nor did it lead him to choose another locus for his quest for truth. The "Bible," or the "Word," did not lead him to the Land of the Bible, since words have no territory. Because the locus debases the word, all loci are the same for him, and the only homeland is the text itself:

The locus of truth is always extraterritorial; its diffusion is made clandestine by the barbed wire and watch-towers of national dogma...Locked materially in a material homeland, the text may, in fact, lose its life-force, and its truth-values may be betrayed. But when the text is the homeland, when it is rooted only in the exact remembrance and seeking of a handful of wanderers, nomads of the word, it cannot be extinguished.⁶¹

Another person who takes the “Word” as a mirror of the diasporic condition to its furthest extreme is the French philosopher Jacques Derrida. Born in Alger to an assimilated Jewish family, Derrida used all the classic rabbinical tools of deliberation and debate in order to prove that written words do not have only one specific meaning. Since, according to him, words can be interpreted in a number of ways, any word and any of its interpretations have the same importance and validity as any other.⁶² It is important to recognize the origins of Derrida’s preoccupation with words. His autobiographical essay “Circonfession” (Circumfession) indicates the impact his self-styled non-existent Judaism had on his life and intellect. Despite being circumcised, he did not see himself as a confessant in the sense of believer. At the same time, he admitted that his most formative experience was being forced to memorize his Bar-Mitzvah portion without understanding it. This assault on his intellect set in motion his life-long quest for the meaning of words.⁶³ His assimilated background left him torn between three poles: Jewish, French and *piéd noir*. Steeped in an ancient tradition of the quest for the “Word,” but thwarted in this quest at a critical moment of his life, he devised his own theory of the impossibility of establishing a hierarchy of words. He thereby turned the “Word” itself into an eternal exile, in which, and from which, there was no possibility of finding a homeland. According to him, there was none. The diasporic condition, once again, was the only natural mode of existence. Such a grim conclusion could only have been reached by a member of the “People of the Book.”

Choosing the text as homeland, as both Heine and Steiner did, is the only Jewish way of reconciling the need for a home and the diasporic condition.⁶⁴ Denying the word or the text was the choice of one who, in his formative years, was denied the right to make sense of the word, after first having been taught its supreme importance. From the above it is clear that becoming the “People of the Book” was a survival tool for the Jews in much the same way as becoming the “People of the Sea” was a survival tool for the Greeks.

2. Questions of Terminology: Diaspora and Mekhorah

a. Word Games

Stemming from the Greek verb *diaspeiro* (διασπείρω = to sow), the term diaspora (διασπορά) was first used in the Septuagint:⁶⁵ “The LORD shall cause thee to be smitten before thine enemies: thou shalt go out one way against them, and flee seven ways before them: and thou **shalt be removed into** all the kingdoms of the earth” [Deuteronomy 28: 25].⁶⁶ The last part of this verse “thou shalt be removed into all the kingdoms of the earth” was the translation of the Hebrew expression “*hayita le-za’avah*,” which literally means “thou shalt become a horror to

all the kingdoms on the earth.” Thus, although the Greek word diaspora came to denote the Hebrew term *pezurah* (Jeremiah, 50:17), in essence it was a euphemized translation of another word altogether: horror. The term diaspora still encapsulates the horror of the original biblical expression. In Jewish tradition, diaspora sums up the idea of *galut* — exile — horror.⁶⁷ Since a human being cannot live indefinitely in a state of horror, the word diaspora was invented to render the exiled Jews’ condition more tolerable.

For the Jews, Diaspora signified a state of existence outside the ancestral land after having been exiled by the Assyrians, the Babylonians, and finally by the Romans, to all corners of the earth. Since our traditional knowledge of the emergence of the Jewish diaspora derives from the Bible, and the Bible relates history as a function of obedience or otherwise to the divine commandments, in essence the term diaspora denotes a negative condition forced on the Jews by sin.⁶⁸ Moreover, since the advent of Christianity, and especially since the adoption of Christianity by Constantine (324 CE), the diasporic condition was interpreted by the Christian world as the ultimate Jewish punishment inflicted upon the Jews for the specific sin of deicide and heresy.⁶⁹ Islam, too, borrowed the idea of Jewish exile as punishment, with suitable adaptations.⁷⁰ While from the Jewish perspective, the end of diaspora signifies the end of captivity and is totally dependant on God’s will, from the Christian perspective the end of the Jewish diaspora is contingent upon the Jews’ accepting Jesus Christ as the Messiah. Similarly, from an Islamic perspective, the adoption of the true faith (Islam) makes the believer an equal member of the community of Islam, thereby banishing the exilic condition. The obvious conclusion from the above is that the diasporic condition is a product of a power relationship in which the diasporic community finds itself in a situation of subordination vis-à-vis the ambient society.

If the word diaspora bridges both Jewish and Greek cultures, the word for homeland — a far more ancient word — suggests a much wider bridge between the two cultures spanning an immense geographical and temporal space which they shared both physically and, as we shall see, also metaphorically. The Hebrew word for homeland, *moledet* (מולדת), literally birthplace, from the root *y’l’d’* — to give birth), first appears in the Pentateuch (Genesis 1:4, 7). However, a synonym appears in the book of Ezekiel (16:3; 21:35; 28:14), namely, *mekhoratam* [מכורתם], “their birthplace.”⁷¹ The Hebrew philologist, Ibn Shushan, relates the word *mekhorah* [birthplace] to *kur* and *k’r’h’*. The Hebrew word *kur* means furnace, a place where different metals are melted together to produce an alloy — a substance that is different from each of its components. The root *k’r’h’*, on the other hand, means to mine, to dig to the bottom of a place in order to extract its innermost essence. Hence, *mekhorah* is a place where people are created, where they begin, from which they go forth. The Greek word *khora* (χώρα) means both city and country, or “the place,”

the ultimate place, my very own place. In *Timaeus*, Plato defines the word *khora* as the womb within which ideal forms or essences are created.⁷² The dual or even triple meanings of the word in Greek are beautifully exemplified by the early fifth-century CE Khora Church in Istanbul (the present-day *Kariye Camii*), built outside the walls of Constantinople, to the south of the Golden Horn. The full name of the church was the Church of the Holy Savior of the Country (Ἡ Εκκλησία τοῦ Ἁγίου Σωτήρος ἐν τῇ Χώρα), where the word *khora* simply means “extra muros,” or “the outlying area of the city.” Inside the church, however, the mosaics in the narthex depict Christ in the *Land of the Living* (Ἡ Χώρα τῶν ζώντων), where the word *khora* designates land, and Mary, the Mother of Jesus, as the *Container of the Uncontainable* (Χώρα τοῦ Ἀχωρήτου), where the word *khora* designates womb. In this context, therefore, the word *khora* means, variously, “outside the walls,” “land” and “womb.” The connection between the various meanings of the Hebrew root and Plato’s understanding of the word — both heavily imbued with female sexual connotations — might not be fortuitous. It might date back to primeval times plunged in the miasma of millennia, to cultures that preceded those of the Hebrews and Hellenes. The Sumerians were an Indo-European civilization that flourished in southern Mesopotamia during the fifth through third millennia BCE. The Semitic civilizations of the Akkadians, Assyrians, and Babylonians that succeeded the Sumerians adopted the Sumerian orthography and pantheon, as well as many other elements of their civilization, as did the Hittites, another Indo-European civilization that flourished in Asia Minor in the second millennium BCE. The Sumerian word **URU**, for example, was a term denoting a city or city-state. In both the Akkadian and Hittite languages, it denoted a city. Another Sumerian word, **KI**, denotes earth, place, area, location, ground, and grain (‘base’ + ‘to rise, sprout’). **KI-ÚR** in Sumerian denotes territory, residential area (‘place’ + ‘roofs’), and the kingdom or territory controlled by a city or city-state.⁷³

The Akkadian language, albeit Semitic, assimilated many elements from the Sumerian language, including the nuances of the word *ki* combined with *uru*, denoting the area and natural vegetation surrounding a city. These nuances can be traced back to the Akkadian terms *kiriū*, *kirû*, *kirîtu* (orchard, garden), which of course bring to mind the Arabic القرية (little village), or الكرة (sphere), and the Hebrew קריה, (meaning town, suburb or zone), all of which resemble one of the meanings of the Greek *khora*, i.e., outside the city, countryside, area, territory. The Hebrew word also resembles the Greek word *khora* in its sense of city. Jerusalem, for example, is called קריית מלך רב (the town of a great king).⁷⁴

Bearing in mind that the Hebrew word *mekhorah* first appears in the Book of Ezekiel, which is heavily imbued with Babylonian culture, the assimilation of the term *khora* into the Hebrew through the Akkadian in this period is highly plausible. Its assimilation into Greek is not surprising either, in view of numerous cases of such loans in the Greek language.

The common roots of **URU**, **KI-ÚR**, *kariyah* and *khora*, designating land, place, city and city-state, are echoed in the Septuagint,⁷⁵ and in light of the above, are obvious. The question, however, still remains of how both the Hebrew and the Greek languages adopted the feminine connotations of this word. One possible explanation is that the feminine connotations of the word were already known to both cultures when the word was assimilated by them.

In search of support for such an explanation we must once again turn to Sumer. The Sumerian supreme god, Enlil, was once banished for raping his wife-to-be, Ninlil. Ninlil rejected him saying: "My vagina is too small, it knows not to copulate, My lips are too small, they know not to kiss"... Enlil, however, refusing to take no for an answer, "walked about in her **KIÚR** [Ninlil's private shrine]."⁷⁶ Walking about in Ninlil's "private shrine" was a euphemism for raping her. Thus, **KIÚR** becomes a euphemism for the female genital organ! Hence, **KIÚR** — *Khora-Mekhorah* became city, land, motherland!

It follows that in this case, the connection between *mekhorah* and the Hebrew *k'r'h'* and *k'u'r'* is an etiological one, that was created after the assimilation of the term, and molded it into the rather unique morph of *m'k't'l'h'*.⁷⁷

Even if we suppose that the striking similarity between *mekhorah* and *khora* is accidental, and that the above linguistic analysis verges on the far-fetched,⁷⁸ the existence of these words (the Greek *khora* and the Hebrew *mekhorah*), clearly signifies that the conditions of being at home or away from home were familiar to those who lived, sailed or migrated in the eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean in ancient times.

Thus, for our purposes, *khora* always signified the ultimate place, home. Its counterpoint, *xeniteia* (ξενιτεία) — living abroad or even in exile⁷⁹ — was an undesirable option only when its subjects were unable to convert it (the *xeniteia*)⁸⁰ into a *khora*. Thus, for the Greeks, living in foreign lands had not been a horrific experience. On the contrary, in many cases it had represented a communal victory and salvation.

A historical study of the Greek diaspora immediately leads one to the conclusion that the early, classical, and even part of the Ottoman Greek, dispersion was not about diasporism in the Septuagint sense at all. It was not about the dispersal of nuclei of Greeks all of whom were connected to a specific center. Rather, it was a network of people who spoke the same language and shared cultural values. Although the end result of this proliferation of Greeks in new places resembled that of the Jewish diaspora, and although both diasporas shared common features, the two experiences stemmed from different sources. The Greek diasporic experience was a complex phenomenon of a society in ferment that saw the diaspora as a solution to its internal political, social and economic problems. This quest was not, however, rooted in a negative, ideological soil. First and foremost, the Greek colonizers left their cities out of *stenochoria* (στενοχώρια), the sense of being cramped, overcrowded. There

were too many people in their places of origin, too many mouths to feed. Even before the emergence of the Greek diaspora in the eighth-seventh centuries BCE, the migrations of the Sea Peoples bore similar characteristics as those of subsequent Greek migrations from the same places. The *pentapolis* founded by the Philistines in Canaan were not settlements built by refugees or expellees, as was hitherto thought. They were large cities, built hastily according to plans brought with from the migrants' lands of origin. The inhabitants of these cities had a refined material culture, never seen in Canaan before, and introduced new cults and burial practices. These people founded new cities not necessarily because they were forced out of their places of origin by others. Indeed, the way they settled in their new places was in no way indicative of expulsion.⁸¹

The Greek cities from which the people who Hellenized a large section of the eastern Mediterranean hailed belonged to a different and much later stratum of Greek history. From the eighth century on, Greek cities sent out groups of citizens on colonization expeditions. After lengthy voyages, these sailors would disembark where the fancy took them, and set up colonies. These colonies ranged from Massalia (Marseilles) to Southern Italy and Sicily, and from Byzantium (Constantinople, nowadays Istanbul) to Odessa and Varna in the Black Sea, and Ephesus and Miletus on the shores of Asia Minor. These colonization expeditions received the blessing of the city's deities. Although the new settlers retained an emotional and physical affinity with the metropolis, eventually, their new polis turned into their *khora*.⁸² Greek they may have been in the cultural sense, but they were citizens of their new polis. Thus, in principle and ideologically the Greek colonial diaspora, unlike the Jewish diaspora, was basically a product of human choice which, as the ancient Greeks perceived it, had divine approval. It was not a divine punishment but rather a human accomplishment that did not require divine intervention to be reversed. In fact, there was no reason to reverse it. This attitude was transmitted to later generations of Greeks to this very day.

b. When Diaspora Turns into Mekhorah

The ideological differences between the two diasporas should not be taken at face value. They are sometimes more literary than real, and always reflect frozen moments in history rather than the complete diasporic experience of both peoples. This experience is far more fluid and diversified than what the aforementioned basic principles might lead one to believe.

While the basic concept of Jewish diaspora is traditionally negative, we tend to forget that the concepts of *khora* and *xeniteia*, and the transformation of *xeniteia* into *khora*, appear already in the founding text of the Jewish people, when the Patriarch Abraham was ordered by God: "Get thee out of thy country, and from thy kindred, and from thy

father's house, unto a land that I will show thee, and I will make of thee a great nation" [Genesis 12:1]. In this story Abraham did not abandon his homeland (*khora*) in favor of a diaspora, but rather he left his homeland for a foreign land (*xeniteia*) at a divine imperative, and then proceeded to turn this foreign land into a totally new *khora*. Thus, the origins of the Jewish people, as related by the Kings of Judea probably in the seventh century BCE, began with a typically "Greek" story!

Another shared facet of the two diasporic experiences is that the sense of superiority that should have safeguarded their unique identities within the foreign cultures in which they lived was not always present. The Philistines are a good case in point. They settled in the coastal plain of Canaan bringing with them an Indo-European language and worshipping Aegean deities, and ended up as a near-Eastern people who transformed their Aegean Mother Goddess, (mother of the earth and its bounty) into an Aramaic male deity, Dagon, God of wheat (*dagan* in Hebrew),⁸³ spoke the local Semitic vernacular, and abandoned Mycenaean pottery in favor of Canaanite pottery. This process lasted no longer than five hundred years,⁸⁴ and in many places of settlement appeared much earlier. Over the centuries, and especially following the Macedonian conquests, the majority of the Middle East and Anatolia became Hellenized. The Hellenized people of the first century CE in Gaza, some of whom may have descended from the original Philistines, never dreamt that, in fact, they were "returning to their roots." The coastal plain of Canaan had become their *khora*, and their original homeland had been forgotten. The fortunes of the Philistines did not differ significantly from those of the much later Greek colonists of Poseidonia⁸⁵ (Paestum) in the Tyrrhenian Gulf, immortalized by a modern Greek poet, the Alexandrian Costantinos Cavafy:

The Poseidonians forgot the Greek language
 After so many centuries of mingling
 With Tyrrhenians, Latins, and other foreigners.
 The only thing surviving from their ancestors
 Was a Greek festival, with beautiful rites...
 And it was their habit towards the festival's end
 To tell each other about their ancient customs
 And once again to speak Greek names that only a few of them still
 recognized.
 And so their festival always had a melancholy ending
 Because they remembered that they too were Greeks,
 They too once upon a time were citizens of Magna Graecia;
 And how low they'd fallen now, what they'd become'
 Living and speaking like Barbarians,
 Cut off so disastrously from the Greek way of life.⁸⁶

Cavafy, a great poet who could see through the cloak of time and

articulate the eternal reality it hid, ingeniously revived and captured a frozen moment in time — the moment when the old *khora* was on the verge of slipping into oblivion and the Poseidonians were still struggling to keep its memory alive although painfully aware of its inevitable disappearance.

This same process was repeated countless times in Hellenistic, Byzantine and modern Greek history.

The Roman Empire adopted most of what the Hellenized world offered, and its eastern territories remained Greek rather than Roman. The Hellenized world was not a replica of the metropolis, but rather a new entity that added a new stratum to the perception of “Greekness.” The Roman stratum was not the only one to be added; as time went by, additional strata, such as a polytheistic oriental stratum and a monotheistic oriental stratum, were added. This continued until the *khora* (by now a symbolic region) was so remote that there was no question of the “expatriates” being part of a *xeniteia* or even part of a diaspora. Whoever spoke Greek was Greek, and wherever he lived was his homeland. Once again, Cavafy, better than any historian, depicts the invention and reinvention of Greekness, and the emergence of the new *khora*:

Well, we’re nearly there, Hermippos,⁸⁷
 Day after tomorrow, it seems—that’s what the captain said.
 At least we’re sailing our seas,
 The waters of Cyprus, Syria, and Egypt,
 The beloved waters of our home countries.
 Why so silent — Ask your heart;
 Didn’t you too feel happier
 The farther we got from Greece?
 What’s the point of fooling ourselves?
 That would hardly be properly Greek.

Its time we admitted the truth;
 We are Greeks also — what else are we? —
 but with Asiatic affections and feelings,
 affections and feelings
 sometimes alien to Hellenism.⁸⁸

In this poem, Cavafy uses a historical theme to describe his own predicament. Although he was Greek, he was an Alexandrian, too, with all that that implied. The tension between the idea of his Greekness and the reality (*realia*) of his Alexandrian life was a leitmotif that ran through his poetry, and was reflected in a realism tinged with pain.

This constant reinvention of “Greekness” is not the only phenomenon relevant to our discussion. Another related phenomenon is the fact that the preservation of Hellenism has not always been successful. The

expansion of the Greek diaspora has not always been motivated by the urge to found new settlements, and bring civilization to the barbarians with the Gods' blessings. The many Gods became one God, and the dispersal was no longer simply a voluntary matter, but rather the result of coercion. Coercion sometimes resulted in the disappearance of Hellenism as it became subsumed in the dominant culture. This happened to the vast majority of the Hellenized, and later also Christianized, populations of what became, in the seventh century CE, the Muslim Mediterranean (the Middle East and North Africa). A large proportion of the Greek population of Asia Minor underwent a similar process after the advent of the Turkish tribes from the eleventh century on.⁸⁹ Thus, one way or another, diaspora turned into *mekhorah*. Indeed, a modern Greek idiom best encapsulates this idea: "Wherever there's soil there's a homeland" (ὅπου γῆς καὶ πατρίς).

The same was true of the Jews, albeit in the opposite direction. Although the punitive aspect (the horror) of *Galut* and dispersal has always been there, the reality (*realia*) increasingly showed examples of voluntary diasporism, supported by various kinds of ideologies. Voluntary diasporism supported by an approved ideology was exactly what the Greeks practiced over the centuries. Jewish examples of voluntary diasporism do not necessarily belong to the modern period (as in the case of Heine, Steiner, and Derrida) but can be found already at a fairly early stage of Jewish history. An example is the famous prophecy presented by the Deuteronomist, allegedly sent from Jerusalem to the exiles in Babylon:

Thus saith the LORD of hosts, the God of Israel, unto all that are carried away captives, whom I have caused to be carried away from Jerusalem unto Babylon;
Build ye houses, and dwell in them; and plant gardens, and eat the fruit of them;
Take ye wives, and beget sons and daughters; and take wives for your sons, and give your daughters to husbands, that they may bear sons and daughters; that ye may be increased there, and not diminished. And seek the peace of the city whither I have caused you to be carried away captives, and pray unto the LORD for it: for in the peace thereof shall ye have peace. (Jeremiah 29:4–7).

These verses have received only scant attention by the various commentators of the Bible, the Midrash (homiletics) or Jewish legal works. Jews throughout the world understood them as simply granting the exiles permission to continue with their day-to-day life, and even form an affinity with their new places, until the advent of the Messiah. The scarce attention given to these verses in Hebrew literature until the nineteenth century can only be understood as a reluctance to discuss the issue on a deeper level for fear that this might eventually undermine

the diasporic existence of the Jewish people, and thus deprive it of an important survival tool.

The polytheistic world, whether Semitic, Iranian, Hellenistic, or Roman, provided the Jewish diaspora with a comfortable soil in which to flourish. If diaspora is synonymous with Exile, then the invasion of the northern Kingdom of Israel by the Assyrian king Tiglath-pileser III and his successors, and the exile of the Jews to Assyria (733–701 BCE) marked the beginning of Exile.⁹⁰ This exile of the Ten Tribes (733–732 BCE), and some of the Judeans (701 BCE) considered lost in the course of time and the subject of many legends ever since, may serve as an additional tool in understanding how diaspora turns into *mekhorah*. No-one knows who the descendants of the Ten Tribes are today. The Ten Tribes themselves lost the memory of their exile long ago. Whoever they are today, they are part and parcel of the locality to which their ancestors were taken, namely, the biblical Halah, Habor, the Gozan River and the cities of Media,⁹¹ in Mesopotamia. They existed only in the memory of some Judeans whom the Assyrians had not exiled, and were thus preserved for posterity. A common thread unites the fate of the Ten Lost Tribes with the fate of the Hellenized world that assumed the mantle of Islam after the seventh century. Neither was exterminated. They were simply lost to those from whom they had descended, or whose culture they had assimilated.

The emergence of the Jewish military colony in Egypt further demonstrates the provisional and fluid aspect of diasporic existence. The evidence on this colony was revealed by the discovery of an impressive number of Papyri written in Aramaic,⁹² attesting to its unbroken existence from 495 BCE until 400 BCE.⁹³ The colony was made up of a community of Jewish mercenaries garrisoned on the island of Elephantine in southern Egypt, to protect it against the Nubian kingdom. Whereas the Egyptians stationed in the fortress had their own temple where they venerated Khnum, the God of the Nile, the Jewish soldiers had a temple of their own, where they venerated their god, YHW. Conflicts with Khnum adherents resulted in the destruction of YHW's temple (ca. 410 BCE). It was subsequently restored, with Persian permission.⁹⁴ In 419–418 BCE, the Jewish garrison gathered outside Elephantine information on the correct way to celebrate the Passover.⁹⁵ These documents portray a community that did not consider Jerusalem the only place of worship, and that did not excel in religious knowledge. The papyri do not reveal the date of the colony's establishment.

Biblical accounts of the years leading up to the Babylonian conquest of Jerusalem (597 BCE) and the destruction of the First Temple (586 BCE), describe the emigration of numerous Judeans, motivated by the volatile political situation, from Judea to Egypt. Many of these emigrants not only worshipped the God of Israel, but also the "Queen of Heaven."⁹⁶ This female deity was venerated by the the Assyrians and Babylonians as Ishtar, the counterpart of the Sumerian Inanna, the northwest Semitic goddess Astarte, and the Egyptian goddess Isis.⁹⁷ The cult of Astarte was

very common both in Israel and Judea,⁹⁸ and the transition to the cult of Isis would have been natural for Judeans who immigrated to Egypt.

A glimpse into the origins of this colony is provided by a letter of alleged Judeo-Alexandrine provenance from the third century BCE, ascribed by Josephus to Aristeeas and addressed to Philocrates.⁹⁹ In this letter the author describes how Ptolemy I (367–283 BCE) sent Judean captives to serve in his garrison. The same source mentions two previous occasions in which Judean soldiers were ordered, or chose, to serve as soldiers in the service of Egyptian kings prior to the Ptolemaic period. One was straight after the Persian conquest of Egypt (525 BCE), and the other before it, during the reign of Psammetichos, who was assisted by the Judean soldiers in his campaign against the Ethiopians.¹⁰⁰ Based on these sources, the debate in the world of academia oscillates between those who date the establishment of the Elephantine colony to 735–701 BCE, between the Syro-Ephraimite war and the Assyrian siege of Jerusalem,¹⁰¹ and those who date it to the mid-seventh century BCE, i.e., the period of Psammetichos I (664–610 BCE). The latter theory suggests that Manasseh, King of Judah (697–642 BCE), might have furnished troops to his Egyptian ally in the struggle against the Assyrians.¹⁰² Other scholars date the influx of Jewish immigrants to Egypt and the establishment of the colony to the reign of Josiah (640–609 BCE), the great reformer, who tried to purge Judea from idolatry and religious syncretism. These scholars assume that the Judeans who refused to renounce their time-honored polytheistic habits left for Egypt.¹⁰³ The thirty year period between Jehoiakim's accession in 609 and the flight to Egypt following Gedaliah's assassination has also been suggested as a possibility.¹⁰⁴ This last theory is supported by Greek graffiti left by mercenaries in the armies of Psammetichus II (595–589 BCE), on one of Abu-Simbel's palaces, ascribing the establishment of the colony to the reign of this Pharaoh. However, the graffiti may also suggest that the Psammetichus of Aristeeas' letter was Psammetichus son of Theocles, an Egyptian mercenary of Greek origin, who commanded an army of Egyptian and foreign soldiers in the service of Psammetichus II during the Nubian campaign of 593 BCE, rather than the Pharaoh himself. After the campaign, Psammetichus II remained in Elephantine, which may explain the settlement of foreign mercenaries, and according to this theory, also Judeans, in the fortress.¹⁰⁵ The scholars are unanimous regarding the influx of immigrants following the destruction of the First Temple in Jerusalem. However, what concerns us is the emigration that predated the destruction of the First Temple and the massive exile that ensued. Even if this emigration started only after the Babylonian conquest (597 BCE), it points to a Jewish diasporic existence as a voluntary, rather than as an enforced, state. Although, according to the Bible, this event was situated mid-way through the Jewish People's existence, it actually took place at a time when monotheistic religious rituals had not yet superseded polytheistic ones. Even after the annihilation of the northern Kingdom of Israel, Jerusalem had no monopoly over the Jewish rite. We

must not, therefore, interpret these events as meaning that Jerusalem ceased to be the “Center” for these mercenaries, or that they founded a new temple in which an alternative “Jewish religion” continued to develop independently. Rather, the correct interpretation is that all these events took place before the Jewish religion, as we know it, crystallized, at a time when a temple other than the Jerusalem Temple was commonplace, and people who identified themselves as Jews, venerated YHW, but also the “Queen of Heaven,” whether under the name of Astarte or Isis. The Jewish mercenaries of Elephantine continued to serve the Persians who invaded Egypt in 525 BCE, thereby reinforcing the pattern of a labor immigration that did not yearn for the “old country,” but rather founded a new settlement, a new *khora*. This new *khora* disappeared from the historical records in 400 BCE, either because the relentless pressure of the mercenaries, who worshipped *Khnum*, the God of the Nile, eventually forced the Jewish soldiers out of the fortress or else because they assimilated among the *Khnum* believers. They also might have left the fortress at some point and been absorbed into the Alexandrine community. At any rate, they ceased existing as a distinct entity, and are remembered only in the papyri they left in the sands of Elephantine.

The major impetus for the creation of a Jewish diaspora in its more conventional sense was the capture of Jerusalem by the Babylonians in 586 BCE, and the exile of the Jewish elite to Mesopotamia. Babylon was subsequently invaded by the Persians, and King Cyrus allowed the exiles to return to Jerusalem and rebuild the ruined temple (539 BCE). It was the reconstitution of the southern Kingdom of Judea, and the encounter of this mini-state, first with the local population (reinforced by population transfers by the Assyrians from other parts of their Empire immediately after the destruction of Israel), and later on with the Hellenistic world, that bestowed on Jerusalem its immortal status in the Jewish tradition. The necessity of contending with other cults and traditions in a place that, before the exile, had been declared by a heavenly decree as the only possible place of worship, strengthened the pre-exilic political impetus to enhance Jerusalem’s importance as a center, and lent it a more spiritual flavor, notwithstanding its modest size. On the other hand, many of the exiles took the prophetic advice given to them upon their displacement literally, and preferred to stay in Babylon until the advent of a heavenly Messiah, rather than a Persian king.

The Babylonian exile marked the beginning of the Jewish communities of Iraq and Iran, which have endured throughout history until only very recently. The creation of the Babylonian diaspora and its significance for Jewish diasporic ideology was repeated later in the settlement of the Jews in Ptolemaic Egypt. This chapter of Jewish history is described in a source known as *Hecataeus* or *Pseudo-Hecataeus*, depending on the scholar’s views on its authenticity. The different names given to this source reflect its use by Jewish historians throughout the generations to prove the Jews’ ability to legitimately thrive among the Gentiles, and its

use by gentile historians (especially in nineteenth-century Germany), to prove the opposite. Today this source is generally considered a narrative created approximately between the end of the reign of the Hasmonean king John Hyrcanus (135–104 BCE), and the era of Alexander Jannaeus (103–76 BCE) — a time of territorial expansion and great prosperity in Judea, and for Egyptian Jews, too. The letter is assumed to have been written by an Egyptian Jew who wished to portray the legitimacy of Jewish existence in Egypt, from within as well as from without. Thus, the anonymous author ascribed the beginning of the Jewish settlement in Alexandria to a deliberate decision by the High Priest Hezekiah to involve the Jews “in the affairs [of the kingdom]” (namely, the Egyptian kingdom) whereas, in actual fact, the Jewish settlement in Alexandria began with a forced migration initiated by Ptolemy I when he invaded Judea (301/2 BCE).¹⁰⁶ As indicated by the legal patterns of Jewish communal existence in Alexandria in later generations, the Jews became an integral part of the Hellenistic city, thriving in its multicultural and multi-organizational framework as much as other ethnic and social groups. This was true not only of Alexandria, but of other Egyptian cities, too.¹⁰⁷

According to Philo, a Jewish author from the early first century CE, about a million Jews lived in Egypt and Libya in his times (25–50 CE).¹⁰⁸ These Jews had to find a rationale for their diasporic way of life, and for the fact that they spoke Greek (even the Bible was translated into Greek). Thus, a story was invented that aimed at legitimizing Jewish life in Hellenistic Egypt — a story that became part of the Jewish mindset in the ancient world. It also served the needs of much later generations in other parts of the Jewish diaspora who wished to legitimize their own diasporic existence. In other words, already in those times, the Jewish diaspora unintentionally (or may be intentionally) adopted paradigms similar to those of the Greek diaspora regarding its origins (*origo*) and attempts to legitimize its existence.¹⁰⁹ Favoring a diasporic existence in these localities at those times did not necessarily imply severing ideological or temporal ties with Jerusalem. Members of the Jewish diasporic communities came on pilgrimage to the Temple in Jerusalem three times a year from all corners of the earth, and sent the yearly tithe to its coffers.¹¹⁰ Diaspora, therefore, did not imply total immersion in the Hellenistic world.¹¹¹ Diasporic existence seemed a natural state to them, but it did not destroy their affinity with Jerusalem. The concept of loyalty to one’s metropolis did not characterize Jews only, but was very compelling in the Hellenistic world in general.¹¹² Affinity to one’s metropolis was a symbolic tool for consolidating a diasporic identity in a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious world.¹¹³ It indicated the success and prosperity of the Jewish diaspora, in which Jerusalem had become a symbolic *khora*, and Alexandria the real *khora*.¹¹⁴

According to Chapter 8 of the First Book of Maccabees, Judas Maccabaeus, immediately after his decisive victory against Nicanor in 161 BCE, sent a mission to establish friendly relations with Rome. The

ambassadors were Jason ben Eleazar and Eupolemos ben Johanan, whose father had once represented his people at the Syrian court. They may have been the first Jews to reach Rome. Twenty years later, there were a substantial number of Jews in the city,¹¹⁵ and in the first century BCE, a permanent community already existed there, which owed its existence largely to the thousands of Jewish slaves sold and eventually emancipated, following the military campaigns of Pompeii (63 BCE). By the dawn of the first century, an estimated 40,000 Jews lived in Rome itself, and their number augmented following the military campaign of Titus (70 CE). The Roman expansion led to a concomitant expansion of the Jewish diaspora. The growing influence of Rome in the Middle East from the first century BCE encouraged Jews to emigrate to even its remotest corners. By that time, the Greek geographer Strabo could write: "These Jews have penetrated to every city, and it would not be easy to find a single place in the inhabited world which has not received this race, and where it has not become master."¹¹⁶ Just prior to the Great Rebellion, the same ability to become part of the surrounding culture while retaining a strong sense of identity characterized Roman Jewry no less than Alexandrian Jewry.¹¹⁷ It was as if the Jewish diaspora was a *fait accompli*, and from that point on its future would be determined by each nucleus' decision to become a new *khora* or to retain its symbolic and physical ties with Jerusalem as its metropolis.

However, the center of this diaspora, Jerusalem, was about to disappear, with the Great Rebellion against the Romans and the destruction of the Temple (70–73 CE). A series of rebellions in Mesopotamia, Kyrenaika, Egypt and Cyprus (115–117 CE), called in the Jewish sources the "Diaspora Rebellion," followed the Great Rebellion, and resulted in the annihilation of the Jewish settlements in Cyprus, the destruction of the impressive Jewish-Hellenistic center in Egypt, and the almost total destruction of Kyrenaika and Libya. This rebellion was soon followed by the last Jewish rebellion against the Romans, led by Shim'on Bar Kokhva (135–137 CE). Its failure marked the end of this era of Jewish existence.¹¹⁸

As long as the Temple in Jerusalem existed, the city's hegemony as a center persisted. This hegemony was both of a political and spiritual nature, as indicated by the tri-annual pilgrimage to the Temple, and the yearly taxes paid to it. Jews from every corner of the diaspora performed these commandments, and were actively involved in the country's political, economic and spiritual life. After the destruction of the Second Temple, centrality was no longer about political hegemony or a designated space. Spiritual activity was transferred from Jerusalem to the lower Galilee, where the *Sanhedrin*, the High Court, and academies in which Jewish law was studied, flourished. This was the period when the "Book" supplanted the locus. The study of Hebrew law became a goal in itself. Explaining and innovating the law became a substitute for political self-determination and replaced the terrestrial *khora*. This process culminated in the codification of the Hebrew Law in 232 CE

by Rabi Yehudah Ha-Nasi in Sephoris. This Code, called in Hebrew the Mishnah (study), was accepted all over the diaspora, thus maintaining at least the Land of Israel's centrality as a spiritual center. An interesting manifestation of this new kind of centrality was the necropolis of Beit She'arim, where Rabi Yehudah Ha-Nasi was buried. A whole funerary industry flourished around his burial site, and rich Jews from all over the Middle East were brought over to be buried alongside him. The tombstones' inscriptions in this necropolis, written mainly in Greek, but also in Hebrew, Aramaic, and Tadmorian, attest to the fact that people were brought there from Tadmor, Syria, the Phoenician coast, and Mesopotamia. This manifestation of centrality was something new. It revolved not around temporal power, since this was granted the Nasi by the Romans, nor around place, but around scholarship and its hidden promise to provide good fortune and eternal peace, both in this world and in the world to come. If so far the Torah had been the word of God, who also defined and empowered the holy place, from now on all that remained was the interpretation of its Sacred Law and its subsequent redaction by mortals. Since the new text was man-made, its continued study and preservation in writing were transferable. From then on, the center shifted with the text, its study and its development, and finally its preservation. From the Land of Israel to Babylon, from Babylon to North Africa, from North Africa to Spain, and then to France, Germany, Eastern Europe and South-East Europe, and finally to America and back to Israel. This process created a Jewish world with many parallel and competing centers, a reticulated world that resembled the Greek world, with one exception: The city of Jerusalem became a celestial, unreal, coveted, and desired homeland (*khora*), that existed only on a transcendental plane in the Messianic era, but not in reality.

From the third century until 1948, the main theatre of Jewish life unfolded in the diaspora. It was the annihilation of the physical center in Jerusalem and Judea that enabled it to be transformed into a spiritual and symbolic center, always yearned for, yet too holy to attain.¹¹⁹ It was precisely this transformation that enabled the continued existence of the Jewish diaspora for two thousand years. Without a physical *khora*, it was much easier to relate to Jerusalem as a spiritual center, to nurture it as a focus of yearning and longing, since it existed only on a spiritual plane and never challenged the premises of the diasporic Jews' life. Had such a *khora* existed in reality, the diasporic Jews would not only have had to aspire to return to it, but also attempt to realize this aspiration (since diaspora was a negative state). In other words, they would have had to make a choice one day, exactly like the protagonist in Cavafi's poem. Turning Jerusalem into a spiritual as opposed to a physical Center liberated them from the need to choose, and they could thus yearn freely and with a clear conscience.

3. More Terminology: Xeniteia, Nostos and Nostalgia

Diasporic existence and experience would be unintelligible without a clear understanding of several concepts indigenous to Greek culture. At the same time, it should be emphasized that these concepts are not specific to the Greek experience only. They are universal and eternal, as are many other concepts from the ancient Hellenic world.

One such term is the Greek word for *stranger*, or for *the one whom I host* — ο ξένος (*xenos*), related to η ξενιτειά (*xeniteia*), meaning *wandering abroad*. This in turn is derived from the deponent verb ξενιτεύω (*xenitevo*), *to live abroad*,¹²⁰ or, rather, *to leave one's homeland in order to live abroad*. In modern Greek, the word *xeniteia* or τα ξένα (*ta xena*) means foreign lands as opposed to homeland or birthplace. It is much more than that, however, designating estrangement of any kind, whether spiritual, mental, cultural, or familial.¹²¹ In our case, we shall study *xeniteia* resulting from a person's physical separation from his homeland.

The Greek word *xeniteia* generally describes a perpetual state, not a circumstantial one.¹²² Although in this respect it differs from the Hebrew *Galut*, with its strong circumstantial implications, it is this very aspect that in effect, and paradoxically, confers on it a flavor and color typical of the Hebrew *Galut*. It is a term describing the existential condition of someone living away from home against his will, simply because, whether he likes it or not, he has to stay abroad and cannot go home. Indeed, in respect of all other types of *xeniteia*, i.e., mental, spiritual, cultural and familial estrangement, there is no way back either. Thus, *xeniteia* can be used to describe a certain type of diasporic situation in both cultures, since in both, the power relationship with the ambient society is what determined whether they remained ξένοι (*xenoi*) or became fully-fledged members of that society. In the latter case, their foreignness would dissipate, and their diasporic characteristics would cease to exist. At the same time, in the long process of adjustment to the surrounding environment, gradual changes may take place in the existential state of *xeniteia*.

One of the main elements nurturing and feeding the sense of *xeniteia* is *nostos*. The Greek word — ο νόστος (*nostos*) means returning after a long absence, or, in a more poetical sense, returning to a place, situation, or person abandoned or left behind. However, from the classical age through modern times, the Greek idea of return has always carried the connotation of the impossibility, or futility of return. Thus, although literally *nostos* means return, in essence, it actually implies the opposite: the impossibility of return. The ideal return — Ulysses' return — was almost impossible to duplicate. All his mates perished in the course of the return voyage. Agamemnon was murdered by his furious wife, Clytemnestra, and she herself was killed by her children Orestes and Electra. Even Ulysses' return could not turn the clock back. To imagine that in the twenty years that had elapsed between his departure for the Trojan War and his return he and Penelope had remained unchanged,

required great powers of imagination. A study of the *Odyssey* shows that its author used this ideal return as a mold in which to cast the figure of the eternal returnee. It was Ulysses' fate to return over and over again.¹²³ Nor did the modern émigré, expellee or deportee experience a happy return. Although Greek tradition equips the potential returnee with the conceptual tools to enable him to "return" (he comes back rich and famous to a woman who kept her vows to him, and preserved his good name), these are artistic contrivances drawn from the Homeric imagination. In reality, a person leaving a person or place knows that he will not find the person or place as he left them. The person or place he left behind will never be the same, even if physically accessible. A person may chase the shadows of the past, but the past no longer exists.¹²⁴ The Greek word *nostos*, together with the word *algos* (ἄλγος) meaning pain, yields the word *nostalgia*, denoting the pain caused by the yearning to return to a beloved place, situation or person, without being able to do so. By extension, it means the pain of yearning for the distant homeland, sorrow at having had to leave, and the desolation for those who stayed behind expecting the beloved to return. All these feelings stemming from *nostos* create the existential condition of *xeniteia*.

Most Jews throughout their diasporic history were in a state of "alienation," a state of *xeniteia*. This was due not only to the negative connotations of diasporic life, but also to the advent of other monotheistic religions that claimed a monopoly and excluded them from ambient society. Driven from country to country, from principality to principality, from city to city, relying on transitory privileges or the simple good will of a sovereign, Jews had no reason to develop an affinity for the places where they settled. Having an imaginary *khora* to yearn for, they could indulge in this yearning, and express thereby their *nostos*.¹²⁵ The manifestations of Jewish *nostos* throughout the generations adopted literary forms, such as liturgy, poetry, legends, and popular songs. This tradition started in Babylon with the famous lamentation in Psalms 137:

By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down, yea, we wept, when we remembered Zion. We hanged our harps upon the willows in the midst thereof. For there they that carried us away captive required of us a song; and they that wasted us required of us mirth, saying, Sing us one of the songs of Zion. How shall we sing the LORD's song in a strange land? If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning. If I do not remember thee, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth; if I prefer not Jerusalem above my chief joy. Remember, O LORD, the children of Edom in the day of Jerusalem; who said, Rase it, rase it, even to the foundation thereof. O daughter of Babylon, who art to be destroyed; happy shall he be, that rewardeth thee as thou hast served us. Happy shall he be, that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the stones.

A series of fasts accompanied by lament and prayers was introduced into the Jewish calendar in order to preserve and commemorate the destruction of the Temple and related events. The Tenth of Tevet was designated as a fast day to commemorate the beginning of the siege by the Babylonian king, Nebuchadnezzar, on Jerusalem (the First Temple); The Seventeenth of Tammuz was designated as a fast day to commemorate several events, all of them connected with the cessation of worship in the Temple, the most important of them being the breach of Jerusalem's wall by the Romans. The Third of Tishrei was designated as another fast day to commemorate the murder of Gedalyahu Ben Ahikam, who was appointed by the Babylonians as governor of the remaining Jews in Jerusalem, after most of them had been exiled to Babylon. It was hoped that Gedalyahu would hold these people together, but his murder eliminated these hopes. Without him, the remaining Jews were assimilated among the people brought to Judea by the Babylonians, and eventually created a new sect, the Samaritans, thereby abandoning mainstream Judaism.

The last and most important fast is the Ninth of Av, designated to commemorate five events, all traditionally connected with the Exile: On that day, the spies sent by Moses to spy out the holy land came back with a negative report, thus questioning God's ability to give them the land. Both First and Second Temples were destroyed on that day. The town of Beitar, Bar Kokhva's last stronghold, was captured on that day. Finally, the site of Jerusalem was ploughed by the Romans on that day. This last fast day was strictly observed throughout the Jewish diaspora.¹²⁶ Thus, the Hebrew year had four milestones to remind the Jews in the diaspora that their diasporic existence was the result of ancestral sins, and that it was provisional and could end at any moment. The message was that these diasporic Jews should yearn and be prepared for an end to the diaspora.

There were other ways of fostering *nostos*. Worshippers in synagogues were supposed to face east, in the direction of Jerusalem, and special decorative plaques were created to designate this direction.

At the most dramatic point of the Day of Atonement, at the end of the service, after the Shofar is blown, the whole congregation proclaims: "Next year in Jerusalem!" Similarly, at the end of The Passover Seder, the entire family proclaims "Next year in Jerusalem!"

Similarly, on that most joyous occasion of the human life cycle, the marriage ceremony, the groom stamps on a glass, reciting the verses of Psalms 137: "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning. If I do not remember thee, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth; if I prefer not Jerusalem above my chief joy."

Likewise, when building a new house, a corner of the wall must be left unfinished to commemorate the destruction of the Temple. All the above ensured that the Jew never forgot, and constantly fostered a feeling of something missing. A corpus of poetry and legends expressing the

yearning for Zion grew up over the generations, from east to west, and from south to north. Amazingly, this literature continued until the mid-twentieth century. This painful yearning was expressed at different times and places, and in different words and styles. For example, Rabi Yehudah HaLevi wrote in eleventh-century Cordova:

My heart is in the East, and I am at the end of the west —
 How can I taste what I eat, how can it be sweet to me?
 How can I fulfil my vow of pilgrimage, while yet
 Zion is in Frankish bonds, and I am in Arab chains.
 I hold it light to leave all the bounty of Spain,
 As I hold it dear to see the dust of the ruined sanctuary.¹²⁷

In sixteenth-century Safed, Rabbi Shelomoh Elqabetz wrote the hymn which became an integral part of the Jewish ceremony welcoming the Sabbath:

Lekhah Dodi (Come out my beloved)
 Come out my Beloved, the Bride to meet;
 The inner light of Shabbat, let us greet.

....

Sanctuary of the King, city royal,
 Arise, go out from amidst the turmoil.
 In the vale of tears too long you have dwelt,
 He will show you the compassion He has felt.

Come out ...

Arise, now, shake off the dust,
 Don your robes of glory — my people — you must.
 Through the son of Jesse, the Bethlehemite,
 Draw near to my soul, set her free from her plight.

Come out..

Wake up, wake up,
 Your light has come, rise and shine.
 Awaken, awaken; sing a melody,
 The glory of God to be revealed upon thee.

Come out ...

Be not ashamed, nor confounded,
 Why are you downcast, why astounded?
 In you, refuge for My poor people will be found,
 The city will be rebuilt on its former mound.

Come out ...

May your plunderers be treated the same way,
 And all who would devour you be kept at bay.
 Over you Your God will rejoice,
 As a groom exults in his bride of choice.

Come out ...

While Heinrich Heine wrote in Germany in 1822:

A pine is standing lonely
 In the north on a bare plateau.
 He sleeps, a bright white blanket
 Enshrouds him in ice and snow.

He is dreaming of a palm tree
 Far away in the Eastern Land
 Lonely and silently mourning
 On a sun burnt rocky strand¹²⁹

The tension between the reality and the heart's desire is present in all these verses. I use the term "heart's desire" advisedly. Just as love songs provide the lover with an outlet for his passionate feelings, so did what we may term *xeniteia literature* afford a relief for the emotional tension of the exilic condition — a tension that was carefully preserved within the formal ritual. *Lekhah Dodi*, which bears the imprint of Messianic fervor, eventually became the most popular Jewish hymn precisely because it enabled generations of Jews to express the pain of subjugation, and the yearning for the imaginary return (= *nostos*), without having to take any practical steps toward achieving it.

In time, Jewish *nostos* found its partner — rejection. An entirely new ideology was invented to confine *nostos* to the theoretical realm, and prevent it erupting into the real world where it might urge people to physically "seize" the lost homeland. In this ideology, the Holy Land is depicted as being too sacred a place for mere mortals. Precisely because of its sanctity, the evil inclination was strongest in the Holy Land, and thus, only the truly righteous, who were strong enough to resist it, could live there. Since, however, no-one could claim to be truly righteous, the only way to enjoy the milk and honey of the Holy Land was to patiently await the advent of the Messiah.¹³⁰ In actual fact, this trend was yet another psychological tool to ease the tension between the religious requirement to consider the exilic situation as temporary, and the wish to ensure the continued diasporic existence of the Jews.

The Jewish version of *nostos* is not only about yearning for an idealized Jerusalem. In the course of Jewish history, Jews have wandered from one land to another for various reasons, most, but not all, of them negative. Jews were sometimes displaced even after centuries of living

in the same place which they already considered home.¹³¹ Abandoning or being expelled from such a place created an emotional conflict. As long as there was one unattainable *khora* to yearn for, things were simple, but now the diasporic Jew found himself committed to two unattainable homelands. How was he to handle this *ménage à trois*? Salonikan Jews seemed to manage fine. They nurtured feelings of loss and yearning for both Spain and Jerusalem. Whereas *nostos* towards Jerusalem continued to be nurtured in the traditional aforementioned literary and liturgical modes, the expellees' nostalgia towards Spain was not articulated verbally until the twentieth century, when the changing world forced them to consider themselves a nation with a (former) territory. Even then, explicit references to Spain or places in Spain were rare.¹³² The only time these were mentioned on a regular basis was in the names of the Sephardi Jewish congregations in their places of exile. Originally, they called themselves "Qahal Gerush" (Congregation of Expellees), but as their numbers grew in medium and large cities to ten or more adult males (a *minyán* or legal quorum) from the same city or region in the Iberian Peninsula, a new congregation, i.e., a new synagogue, would be set up and named after their former place of provenance. Thus one would find the "Holy Congregations" of Catalan (Catalunia), Castilia, Aragon, Cordova, Lorca, Toledo,¹³³ Portugal, Lisbon, etc.¹³⁴ They continued to speak Spanish, and to adhere to the customs created in specific places in Spain which gave their names to these customs, for example The Toledo Regulations,¹³⁵ The Customs of Andalusia, The Customs of Castilia,¹³⁶ etc. These congregations and their special customs retained their geographic names until the twentieth century. However, in time, the use of these names became a habit rather than a means of allaying the pain of displacement. Anyone seeking expressions of nostalgia for specific places in the folk songs of Spanish Jews will be disappointed. From 1492 to the age of nationalism, nostalgia was expressed in the preservation of musical and lyrical styles, of entire Iberian lyrics, or of Iberian lyrics adapted to the new environment. Specific places are not mentioned. There are no Sephardic "Odessa Mame"s¹³⁷ in the sixteenth through nineteenth century. Only at the end of the nineteenth century did such songs appear, as part of the "neo-Hispanism" that seized hold of the Sephardi intelligentsia in the Ottoman, and formerly Ottoman countries, as a reaction both to the nationalist movements of the times and, no less important, to their encounters with Ashkenazi Jews in various Zionist activities. For these reasons, they began invoking the memory of the expulsion and reinvesting it with meaning.¹³⁸ As we shall see below, this cultural tendency gained even greater momentum after the foundation of the State of Israel. Things became more complicated when the descendants of the Sephardi expellees began emigrating from the Mediterranean to the New World. At the height of this emigration there is no evidence of songs expressing the immigrants' *nostos* for the "Old Country," i.e., Turkey, Greece etc. It is, however, worth noting the

incredible similarity of one Judeo-Spanish song prevalent around the Mediterranean at the turn of the twentieth century to the Greek tradition. The song, "Porque llorax blanca ninya?" (Why do you cry fair maiden?), otherwise known as "La partida del esposo" (The husband's departure), is in the form of a conversation between the husband, a knight who is about to leave on a long voyage, and his anguished newly-married wife, at the end of which, he tells her to remarry if he does not return in eight years. The theme, of course, echoes Ulysses' departure, preserved for thousands of years in countless variations around the Mediterranean, only to resurface with fresh appeal during the great emigration to the New World.¹³⁹ It is the song of the wife who is left behind, Penelope's song. It does not express the pain of the person leaving, but rather of the person left behind. One is immediately struck by the similarity of this song to contemporary Greek songs of wives and mothers who are left behind.¹⁴⁰ Jerusalem, of course, has been long since forgotten.

But emigration is not the whole story. In April 1943 the whole Jewish community was deported from Salonika to Auschwitz. On Auschwitz they sang of their yearning for Salonika, not for Jerusalem or Spain.¹⁴¹

By the same token, although with an interesting variation, the 2.5 million European Jews who emigrated to America between 1880–1920 did not write or sing songs of yearning for Jerusalem, but rather for the places they came from. A whole industry of Yiddish theater and radio shows flourished in New York until the 1950s and even later. Borrowing from the musical world of the Jewish liturgy, as well as from Slavic (especially Ukrainian) and Gypsy folk music, Jewish musicians and entertainers worked lyrics into these tunes that catered to the emotional needs of the immigrant community. An important theme in this kind of folk song was the stress of displacement, or *xenitica*. Songs such as "Der ebiker vanderer" (The Eternal Wanderer) (1919), or "Dos Golden rendele" (The Gold Coin) (1908) flirt with the modern Zionist idea as a means of resolving this stress.¹⁴² Most of the songs though, praise the "Goldene Medine" (the Golden State = *El Dorado*) as opposed to oppressive Russia.¹⁴³ Of great interest are the nostalgic songs dedicated to specific places in the "Old Country." Interestingly, these songs emerged from the 1920s on.

These songs did not arise from disillusionment with the Goldene Medine. Such songs do exist,¹⁴⁴ but the majority does not belong to this category. Aron Lebedeff (1873–1960), a Yiddish poet, composer and performer ("a Klezmer"), recorded many songs that he wrote and performed for the Yiddish theater of New York, mainly during the 1920s and 1930s, among them "Slutsk — Mein Shtetele" (Slutsk — My small town) (1925) and many similar songs. His most famous song was "Roumenye Roumenye!" Although Lebedeff appears on the album sleeve as the composer, anyone hearing this song will immediately recognize the gypsy melody aptly chosen to express the comic and joyous words: "Ekh! Roumenye, Roumenye! Geven a mol a land a zise, a sheyne" (Ekh!

Romania, Romania! There was once a land, sweet and beautiful!). "Odessa Mame" was written in the 1920s by the famous performer Peysehke Burstein and was very popular in New York. The music adapted to these lyrics was originally written by the famous Russian composer Reinhold Moritzovich Glière (1875–1956), probably independently of the lyrics.¹⁴⁵ Another popular song was "Beltz, Mayn Shtetele Beltz" (Beltz, my little town! The little house where I spent my childhood!), the lyrics of which were written by Jacob Jacobs (1892–1972), and the music of which was composed by Alexander Olshanetsky (1892–1972). The song was written originally for the famous Yiddish singer Isa Kremer, in order to persuade her to participate in a New York production of the play "Ghetto Song" (1930). She did not participate in the production and never performed the song.¹⁴⁶ On the other hand, the Barry Sisters performed a very popular version of the song, which became almost a hymn after the Holocaust, when people understood that the *shtetl* was not merely remote, but actually extinct.

The interesting paradox about Jewish nostalgia in America before the Holocaust is the fact that these songs were not sad. The people who wrote and sang them looked back on their old cities and sometimes also countries with love, but also with resignation. These songs were not the product of a compulsory emigration, or of disillusionment with the new country, but rather, of a freely chosen emigration. Indeed, the immigrants were grateful to America, and continued to express their gratitude through the 1920s and 1930s in songs such as "America, du bist all-right!" (A. Lebedeff, 1928), and "Ich Dank dir Got far America!" (I thank you God for America) (Cantor Leibeke Waldman).

So, barring those who entertained the modern Zionist ideal (such people formed a minority of the Jewish immigrants in America of that period), the subject of *nostos* was not the formal and imaginary *khora*, i.e., Jerusalem. It was the real *khora*, the place where one was born and raised. In this the immigrants were obeying the universal and timeless rule that one always misses one's last place of origin, not the one that preceded it, and certainly not the one that preceded that. Nostalgia is also closely connected to the degree of contentment in the "new country." Contentment with the present breeds fond memories of the past. Any pain experienced when recollecting the past is the pain felt by all human beings when remembering their childhood and youth. Interestingly, but predictably, I found only a few songs from that period dealing with the longing and pain of those left behind. The most popular song of this genre was, of course, "Papirene Kinder" (Paper Children), written by a New-Yorker street singer, Morris Rund, and set to music by David Meyerowitz (1867–1943). Rund wrote this song in the years leading up to the First World War, and it reflects the guilt felt by the Jewish immigrants for having left their aging parents alone and helpless in a hostile Europe:

Many years ago you sent pictures

And wrote me in addition, that you were delighted,
 somewhere there, far away in the golden country.
 And then, children, I haven't heard from you anymore
 I look at the pictures and my eyes drop tears,
 Paper children, I have on the wall.
 When I lay down to sleep and when I wake up
 I look at the pictures and speak to myself,
 Paper children I have on the wall,
 Paper children — and I break my hand,
 Paper turns out of my flesh and blood,
 I complain, cry and scream and my shouting is in vain.
 The paper pieces, what they do feel?
 Paper children I have on the wall.¹⁴⁷

A few words on the musical aspect of these songs are in order. The use made of the musical heritage of the "Old World," i.e. Jewish liturgy, and Slavonic and Gypsy melodies, was also an expression of *nostos*. This was true even if the subject of the song was not yearning for the "Old Country." Although the immigrant could not return physically, or perhaps even mentally, he could still bring with him some elements from the old world that would ease the pain of separation and displacement. The use of melodies from the "Old Country" expresses the heartache of the composers, singers, and performers and helps define the unique cultural identity of this community as opposed to others.

Music and food were two elements that helped recapture the past.¹⁴⁸ Spanish Jews preserved these cultural elements around the Mediterranean for 500 years, while East European Jews did so not only in America but in Palestine, too. The vast majority of "Israeli" popular music during the first thirty years of the twentieth century are based on the melodies of Slavic folk songs.

Music and food are two ways of expressing nostalgia, but there is a third way — through literature. A number of literary genres, whose function was to numb the pain caused by the impossibility of recapturing the past, emerged throughout the Jewish diaspora, typically in "secondary diasporas," such as America, but not only. *Farewell to Salonika* by Leon Sciaky,¹⁴⁹ written in New York just after the Second World War, is one example of this genre. When the author realized that the world of his youth had disappeared and was about to be erased even from his imagination and memory, he made a last-ditch attempt to recapture it.

Out of Egypt by Andre Aciman,¹⁵⁰ in which the author laments his lost paradise (Alexandria), is another fascinating example. Both the above books are personal memoirs. Another type of literature that laments a world that no longer exists and shall never return, is fiction based on the past. Such literature is not necessarily written in a physical *xeniteia*, but may be written in a temporal one. An example of this genre is Isak Samokovlija's *Tales of Old Sarajevo*,¹⁵¹ a book of short stories written in

Sarajevo during the 1940s and early 1950s.¹⁵² Through the life stories of his protagonists, Samokovlija laments the destruction of Jewish life in Sarajevo while trying to eternalize its memory. Amnon Shamush's *Michel Ezra Safran & Sons*¹⁵³ is another example of this genre. Shamush lives and writes in Israel, to which he emigrated before the foundation of the State (1948) against his parents' wishes. In this novel, which has many autobiographical features, Shamush looks back on the Aleppo of his past with great affection. For him, it is no less a lost paradise than Alexandria was for Aciman, Salonika for Sciaky, or old Sarajevo for Samokovlija, despite the fact that his departure was prompted by ideological considerations!

A very different literary genre commemorating the past is the memorial book, written by Holocaust survivors' associations to immortalize the survivors' home towns — once thriving Jewish cities and villages — most of which currently reject all reminders of their Jewish past. In many of these places the local population actively participated in the murder of their Jewish neighbors, and in all of them, the local population benefited materially from the extermination of the Jews. This is the main reason why the Jewish past of these places has been recreated only through the memory of Jews who hailed from these places, or even their descendants, rather than through contemporary local authors and historians. Immediately after the Holocaust, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, commemoration was one way of processing the colossal loss. One would assume that, given the horrific background of these *memor-buchs*, they would be devoid of idealization and nostalgia. This is not the case. In many of the *memor-buchs* the reader will find nostalgic and idealized descriptions of the places, notwithstanding the fact that some of them eventually turned into appalling mass-murder sites.¹⁵⁴ Even the horrific events could not erase memories of the pre-war world, or suppress the tendency to idealize the past. The nostalgic descriptions in these cases serve not only as epitaphs or farewells, on the lines of *Out of Egypt*, *Farewell To Salonika*, and *Tales of Old Sarajevo*. They also serve to idealize the dead, of whom no evil could be written, especially when they died without rhyme or reason simply for being Jewish. These books idealize the past because remembering the past is therapeutic for the immigrant only if the past was pleasant. If it was not, it, or at least parts of it, must be embellished.¹⁵⁵ A past that was irredeemably evil had to be forgotten and completely erased.¹⁵⁶ Indeed, this last choice is evident in the behavior and attitudes of many Holocaust survivors,¹⁵⁷ and even Jewish immigrants to Palestine in the 1930s who left their families behind in Europe. The burden of guilt for having abandoned their families was so heavy that they preferred total amnesia to the effort of using nostalgia as a therapeutic tool. The literary world of the post-war period has attempted to deal with the possibility of *nostos*, in the sense of physical return. Without exception the outcome had been a realization of the futility of such an attempt.¹⁵⁸

History books may also serve to dress the wounds of *nostos*. Amos Elon, for many years “the chief chronicler of the Israeli story,” as Ari Shavit described him in an interview for *Ha’aretz* on the occasion of the publication of his book *The Pity of It All: A Portrait of the German-Jewish Epoch, 1743–1933*, is an example.¹⁵⁹

Since Elon’s case is both intriguing and significant, we shall discuss it in detail. In the interview, entitled “Yearning for the Yekke’s¹⁶⁰ Paradise,” Shavit explains that Elon, once a prominent journalist of the daily, *Ha’aretz*, “has ceased to register in the Israeli consciousness. He is much better known to readers of the New York Review of Books than to readers of *Ha’aretz*.” Elon, who was born in Vienna in 1925 and emigrated to Israel with his parents in 1933, currently lives in Tuscany. The book he wrote about German Jews is an ingenious and beautifully-crafted history of rich, educated, highly-cultured people, who for hundreds of years nourished and enriched German culture, and were nourished and enriched by it, until they were cast out of paradise. Elon, does not elaborate on the lot of those who failed to get out in time, and with good cause. His book, although entitled *a history*, is about a lost paradise no less than is *Out of Egypt*. Much like in Aciman’s world, poor, uneducated, lower-class Jews — “Ost-Juden”¹⁶¹ — do not exist in Elon’s Germany. His world is that of an elite that one day found itself undesirable, and could not understand why. Shavit criticizes Elon for omitting a large section of German Jewry from this last book of his. In another of Elon’s books, *The Israelis*, he likewise excludes half of Israel’s population, by focusing on Israelis of European descent residing in the “Gush Dan” (Tel Aviv) area — educated, well-traveled, secular and well-nourished Israelis. His “Israelis” do not include Jews from Muslim countries, poor Jews living in provincial towns, who are poorly educated and receive inadequate services, or religious Jews. Nor do his “Israelis” include Arabs, an omission strange for someone who, at his own admission, emigrated to Tuscany because of his aversion to post-67 Israeli politics.

Shavit, who shares many of Elon’s views, diagnosed him as a European Jew returning to Europe, while Elon saw himself as an exile seeking peace of mind. In fact, Shavit’s diagnosis was accurate. *The Pity of It All* is an idealized description of the role of the German-Jewish elite in the cultural history of Germany, written by an immigrant author whose *nostos* prevented him coming to terms with the reality in which he lived. Aware that he could not change this reality, or rather mold it to the shapes and forms he remembered from the “Old Country,” he clung to the past even more tenaciously, in an attempt to ease his inner conflict. The natural conclusion of this dissonance was his physical return to the continent of his *nostos*. Elon is an interesting example of someone who underwent a triple exile: first, the initial (and in his case, symbolic) exile from Jerusalem to Vienna, second, the personal exile from Vienna to Jerusalem, and third, the final exile from Jerusalem to Tuscany.

Elon's parents did not make aliyah for ideological reasons. They came to Palestine solely to escape the Nazi regime. Like most of their fellow immigrants from Germany and Austria who found refuge in Palestine, they felt they had been cast out of a civilized country into an Asiatic barbaric desert. For them, Palestine was exile, an idea they successfully transmitted to the young Amos. Although his eventual return to Europe should have resolved this dissonance, he now admits that, exile or not, seventy years of living in *xeniteia* (i.e. Israel) have left their imprint on his psyche. He may have felt as a stranger in the Middle-East, but the Middle-East had nevertheless planted its seeds in him, and these seeds demanded sustenance. Once in Tuscany, he found that Europe could not give him things he used to take for granted in Israel, such as an intense interest in life, true friendship, and human contact. *Nostos* began gnawing at him again. He may have detested Israel, but after seventy years of living there, and at the end of his life, it became his unattainable *khora* — unattainable because he would never be able to reach it in the sense he imagined. He, therefore, preferred to cut himself off physically. This physical detachment would allow him to cling to an imaginary *khora* without the dissonance created by reality.

Unlike the Jews, Greeks never had an imaginary *khora* in the sense of one eternal, transcendental, and metaphysical metropolis. If we consider anyone who spoke Greek or adopted the Greek way of life as Greek, then the pagan, and later on the Christian Mediterranean — indeed the whole Eastern Mediterranean and even beyond — qualified as a homeland for the Greeks, exactly as Cavafy implied in his poem "Going Back Home From Greece."

This Hellenic world had no specific center.¹⁶² Even the fall of Constantinople at the hands of the Ottoman Turks did not immediately conjure up the image of a lost *khora* in the sense of a unifying *locus*. On the contrary, the Ottomans, having adopted the apparatus of the Greek Orthodox Church as a tool for governing the *Romioi*, unwittingly built Constantinople's status as a metropolis of the Ottoman Greek-Orthodox community and, as such, even afforded it a much greater significance than it had enjoyed for centuries.¹⁶³

Like the fall of Jerusalem, the fall of Constantinople was attributed to sinful behavior. A common view among Greek Orthodox monks was that the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans was caused by the sins of the Orthodox community. This idea, that parallels the Jewish theological idea of national calamity as a punishment for sin, was further accentuated by the ongoing struggle with the Ottomans. A beautiful and evocative example of the use made of this idea can be found on the frescoes on the walls of the Moldovitsa monastery in Bukovina, commissioned around 1537 by the Moldavian *voivode*, Petru Rareș (1487–1546).¹⁶⁴ One of them is a depiction of the siege of Constantinople. Petru Rareș was engaged in a constant battle against the Ottomans, and his monastic artists took the opportunity to warn the people, through their art, that sin would

bring about their downfall, in the same way as it had brought about the downfall of Constantinople.

The idea of defeat as punishment plays an important part in the Eastern Christian tradition, and is echoed the Hebrew *Musaf* prayer for the Holidays: "Because of our sins we were exiled from our land, we were alienated from our soil."

Like the fall of Jerusalem for the Jews, the fall of Constantinople for the Christians was followed by the emergence of a series of laments. At least a hundred laments commemorating this event have survived. Although the genre of ritual lament for a destroyed city is an integral part of popular Greek poetry, the laments dedicated to the fall of Constantinople are still outstanding in their number and popularity. Most of these laments were collected and documented in the nineteenth century, following the 1821 war of independence, and in the course of this century. In some cases, the collectors obviously edited the text in order to adapt it to the needs of the national struggle. However, it would be far-fetched to deduce that these were all late nineteenth century inventions. In other words, such editing notwithstanding, most of these laments carry with them the echo of events from past generations¹⁶⁵ At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the trend of documenting this genre of folk song is in itself a product of national sentiment, and the documentation itself was meant to strengthen the national cause.¹⁶⁶ In the following lament, Ares, the god of war and bloodshed, bathes in the blood of Constantinople's people, while Aphrodite and Hermes, both deities of love, weep for the city, thus integrating the pagan past into the Christian present (1453):

Ares came along with glowering looks on Tuesday
by the Church of St. Romanos, all covered in blood,
bathed in the blood of Christians.
Aphrodite stood, her eyes filled with tears,
weeping for the fine young men, for the beautiful girls.
And Hermes, as if lamenting and comforting her, said:
— What is it, my Aphrodite, why are you sulking?
And the Moon keeps her distance and does not come near,
she sees and marvels, and she trembles from fear.
And the elements of Heaven weep and mourn for the City.¹⁶⁷

This anomalous weaving of pagan themes into a fifteenth-century lyric substantiates the theory of a later composition projected on to the past. A popular folk song from the early Ottoman period mourns the surrender of sovereignty to the Muslim foe, and nourishes the hope that this lamentable event will be reversed:

They took the City, they took it, took Salonica
They took St. Sofia, too, the great monastery
Which has three-hundred semandra and sixty

two bells...
 For each bell a priest, for each priest a deacon.
 Near the time the Sacred Vessels come out,
 and the king of all...

A dove came down from heavens: Stop the
 Cherubic, and lower the Sacred Vessels,
 Priests, take the Sacramental and you candles
 blow out...
 For it is the will of God the City should fall to
 the Turks...

Our Lady was disturbed and the icons tearful.
 Hush, Our Lady and you, icons weep not,
 With the passing of years and in time she'll be
 yours again.¹⁶⁸

Two points in this folk song are worth noting. The first is the use it makes of a lament commemorating the fall of one city (Salonika, 1430) to commemorate the fall of another, greater city (Constantinople).¹⁶⁹ The other interesting point is the statement "she'll be yours again," a refrain that is repeated in many laments of this kind in the Ottoman period. It has been argued that these two elements, among others, prove that the lyrics were compiled to lament the fall of Constantinople only in the years following the 1821 Independence War in order to serve the national cause.¹⁷⁰ Others claim to the authenticity of lyrics that were adapted to the fall Constantinople in the second half of the fifteenth century, and that originally, these lines were merely meant to provide the grief-stricken community with a ray of hope and consolation.¹⁷¹ Whichever school of thought is right, the net result is the same: In modern times, these lyrics held within them practical ideas.

In this same context, of great interest is the use made of the legend of the "King who was Turned to Stone" (Ο μαρμαρωμένος βασιλιάς). King Constantine Paleologos, who according to popular myth, "mysteriously disappeared" after the fall of the city, was allegedly turned into marble, to be resurrected when the city "will be ours again."¹⁷² This legend, which combines a patently Christian element (resurrection) with one derived from classic mythology (the king turned into stone), was infused with new life, and at times infused new life into the Greek national spirit in times of existential crisis. It was the inspiration behind Nikos Kazantzakis' play, "Constantine Paleologos" (1944), written at the height of the Greek struggle against the Nazi occupation. It is no coincidence, either, that Manolis Kalomiris began composing his opera based on Kazantzakis' play in 1957, two years after the expulsion of the Greeks from Istanbul — an expulsion that effectively put an end to Greek civic existence in "The City" (η Πόλη), as it was, and still is, called.¹⁷³

The theme of the fall of Constantinople and Constantine's death were used in another way in 1969. In that year, Odysseas Elytis wrote his version of "The Death and Resurrection of Constantinos Paleologos."¹⁷⁴ This poem was written and published (in 1971) amidst a great political and existential crisis in Greece. This time, Elytis did not use the theme of the king who was turned to stone and who would be resurrected when the city would become "ours again," since he had no consolation to offer. For him, Constantinos represented the "Last of the Hellenes."

An interesting angle to the story of Constantinos can be found at an internet site founded in 1996 that has, apparently, since ceased to operate. In an article dedicated to the fall of Constantinople, the anonymous author recounts the story of the king who was turned to stone, claiming that it was recounted by the older generations to the younger ones, along with other traditions of the city's Byzantine past, on the day after Easter, a day Greek-Orthodox families customarily spend outdoors, in nature.¹⁷⁵ The didactic value of such an activity cannot be over-emphasized. Even those who are convinced that nationalism is a modern invention must agree that the transmission of tradition, especially historical tradition, nurtures it. In the Greek case, assuming such transmission actually occurred, it took several centuries for it to come into its own, in the age of nationalism. The problem is that while the day spent outdoors after Easter is verified by many informants, and is still observed in certain places, no written or oral verification of the transmission of tradition on that occasion, throughout the generations, or at any point in time, could be found. The anonymous author of the Poseidon internet site may well have been describing a modern, personal family experience. In any case, the fall of Constantinople became an important element in the Greek national struggle against the Ottomans, an element that is still nurtured in certain circles of Greek society. Moreover, even if the custom described in the Poseidon article is a mere invention, it is a very telling invention that has been skillfully incorporated into the historical and cultural context. In fact, the suggestive similarity between this custom and Jewish Passover and spring rites grants the former more credibility than does an obscure internet site. The Mediterranean Jews have a similar custom of spending the day after Passover in the countryside with their families. Evidently, in both societies this custom dates back to some pagan, spring rite. For the Jews, as well as for the Greek-Orthodox, Passover is the holiday of commemoration. In the Greek-Orthodox Church, Easter, and the week preceding it, commemorates Christ's passion, death and resurrection. It is only logical, therefore, that the Greeks of Istanbul should transmit the traditions regarding the fall of Constantinople on the day after Easter. For the Jews, the transmission of tradition takes place during the festive meal on the Passover eve, at which the story of enslavement, liberation, and future redemption is narrated from one generation to the next, in an unbroken chain of transmission: "In every generation a person is obligated to regard himself as if he had come out of Egypt, as it is said:

'You shall tell your child on that day, it is because of this that the Lord did for me when I left Egypt.'"¹⁷⁶ The promise of future redemption, the equivalent of "it shall be ours again," is, of course, the refrain: "Next Year in Jerusalem!"

Unlike the fall of Jerusalem for the Jews, the fall of Constantinople was never marked by an official day of mourning, although today the anniversary of its fall (28 May 1453) is occasionally announced in Greek papers, or commemorated in a sermon by the occasional clergyman. The fact that the fall of Constantinople happened on a Tuesday may account for the Greek tradition of viewing Tuesday as an unlucky day.

Despite the fall of "The City" the Greeks were still in their homeland. They did not require an artificial tool to preserve their affiliation with a specific place. They did not lose their title to the place, only their sovereignty.¹⁷⁷ In fact, on a declaratory level, they still consider Asia Minor part of their homeland, and call it "Our East according to Us" (η καθ'ημᾶς Ανατολή). *Polites*, Greeks who had to leave Istanbul in 1955 and later, feel that Greeks living in their national state regard the small nucleus of 1800 Greeks who still reside in Istanbul as a *diaspora*.¹⁷⁸

For the Greeks, negotiations concerning the definition of their homeland became a major issue only in the nineteenth century. Before that, they identified with their specific birthplaces, be they a village in the Peloponnese, in Western Anatolia, on the Black Sea coast, or a bustling city such as Constantinople, Smyrna, Alexandria. They even identified themselves with places outside the Hellenistic and Byzantine spheres of influence, such as Vienna, Moscow, or Bucharest.

The emergence of a West-European topography of Hellenism with Athens as the center forced the Greeks to rethink their perception of homeland, a labor they are still engaged in to this day.¹⁷⁹ It was at this point that Constantinople was put forward as another Hellenic center, symbolizing the Byzantine and Eastern face of Hellenism, as opposed, but also as complementary, to Athens, the symbol of "Western" Hellenism as perceived by West Europeans.¹⁸⁰ It was only after the Catastrophe of 1922, and especially after the German occupation and the Greek Civil War, that Greek intellectuals articulated the idea of Hellenism as a cultural-transcendental locus, similar to that of Jerusalem in Jewish tradition.¹⁸¹

The main difference between these two imaginary *khora*s is that the Jewish one is a symbolic city, while the Hellenic one, albeit symbolic, occupies a negotiable portion of the globe. At the same time, it can safely be assumed that renegotiating the homeland's borders did not change the individual's attitude towards the idea of *khora*, and that, until the mid-twentieth century, the Greek immigrant's basic affinity was with his birthplace. This was his *khora* and this was the place he missed.

In light of the above, it is not surprising that the waves of Greek immigrants in South-Eastern Europe (especially during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) and the Greek emigrants from the Ottoman

Empire to the New World during the twentieth century, both prompted by negative reasons, produced a Greek musical and literary tradition that resembles that of the nostalgic Yiddish music and lyrics. Like the Jewish immigrant of modern times, who missed his *shtetl* more than Jerusalem, the Greek immigrant missed his birthplace, not the imaginary "Hellenic world" negotiated on his behalf by the intellectuals of his generation. Moreover, one might have assumed that since in early Greek history, *xeniteia* carried no negative connotations of sin and punishment, there would be no need for nostalgic literature in that period. This, however, is not the case. "*Xeniteia*, orphanhood, sorrow and love, have been weighted; *xeniteia* has proven to be the heaviest,"¹⁸² says a centuries-old Greek popular song, which dates back to the Ottoman period.

Greek society has, for centuries, lived with the sorrow *xeniteia* causes to those who left, and those who remained behind. Death on foreign soil was considered a great *malheur* in ancient, as well as in modern, times.¹⁸³ Leaving the place where one was born and bred, whatever the reason, is painful. An "unpleasant" past may cause the immigrant to conceal his pain, but will not eliminate it.

It is interesting to note the similarities and differences between the way the modern Greek diaspora expressed its nostalgia, and the way the Jewish diaspora did, especially during the period in which the two diasporas displayed the greatest similarities, i.e. the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Most of the Jewish folk songs of *xeniteia* were written in the diaspora, and in most cases, in a second or third diaspora, if these can indeed be counted. As already stated, the immigrants themselves wrote these folk songs. In most cases they were men, and in most of the songs the *nostos* expressed is for a specific place. These songs seldom express the hardships of immigrant life. On the contrary, they praise America. Songs written by those who stayed behind are rare. Even the *Papirine Kinder*, in which a Jewish mother left behind in Europe talks to her missing children, was written in New York by a man. The Greek folk song, on the other hand, mostly express the *nostos* of the women who were left behind by their husbands, fiancées, and sons, and most were actually written by women. Among the *nisiotika* (folk songs of the Aegean islands) is a centuries-old song, *Tzivaeri mou* (My Treasure), which the people of Kalymnos claim is theirs, but which is sung throughout the Greek islands:

Ach! Foreign lands enjoy my treasure.
My fragrant rose, softly, softly, softly and humbly.

Ach! It was I who sent him, my treasure,
of my own free will; softly, softly, softly I tread the earth.

Ach! Damn you foreign land!, my treasure,
you, and your good things, softly, softly, softly and humbly.

Ach! You took my child, my treasure,
and you made him your own; softly, softly, softly I tread the earth.

The theme of this song is the sorrow of a mother who sends her son away overseas, but also her immense love and resignation.¹⁸⁴ Although the theme is comparable with that of *Papirine Kinder*, the authors and locus of writing are not. There are different motives behind the two songs. In the Jewish song, it is the immigrant's guilt, in the Greek song it is the mother's sorrow. Besides this theme, in which the females who are left behind lament the departure of their beloved ones with resignation, the Greek songs contain other themes as well, such as the material and moral experience of life in a foreign land and the high price exacted by the riches *xeniteia* offers. Guy Michel Saunier, who studied these songs, claims that the negative picture of *xeniteia* they convey stems from descriptions by the immigrants in letters and on short visits.¹⁸⁵ This statement should be reconsidered. These folk songs were written by women, expressing their own feelings, but using well-screened information submitted to them by their husbands, brothers, and sons. The fact that most of these songs express the woman's point of view reflects the male character of the Greek emigration as opposed to the Jewish emigration from Eastern Europe, which comprised many young women and entire families. The melancholy mood of the Greek songs reflects the misery of those left behind, a misery they project on to those who left. It does not necessarily reflect the true mood of the immigrants themselves.¹⁸⁶ In the following song, the foreign woman with whom the immigrant consorts is portrayed as a witch, or an opportunist, whose love is never true. Obviously, this description is the product of the imagination of the womenfolk at home:

A foreign woman washes his clothes,
A foreign woman after his gold¹⁸⁷

The woman at home stresses how hard and demanding life is abroad, and draws the obvious conclusion that the man she is singing about would have had a far better deal had he stayed at home with her:

How is it, brother, over there
Where you are in the foreign land?

The foreign land demands
discipline, humility

The foreign land demands the pace
of a hare, the speed of an eagle.¹⁸⁸

In spite of the material advantages of life in *xeniteia*, the price is loneliness and insecurity, without the loving support of a mother, wife, or sister. Therefore, conclude the women, their menfolk should have stayed at home:

Damn you foreign land and all your riches!
 Greater is the grief than your rewards,
 To the foreigner give land, don't give him sickness;
 Sickness calls for a Mom to stand by,
 a woman at his headrest,¹⁸⁹
 Three thousand hourly services sickness demands!

These "female" songs spawned by the enormous wave of Greek immigration to America speak not only of the life of those left behind in the villages and life in America, but also of the journey and arrival in America and, last but not least, the return of the "Americans" in search of their wives, girlfriends, and children, and their rejection by the local society. These songs, just like their predecessors, are songs sung by the womenfolk left behind. It is these women, not the immigrants, who criticize America, as the following song, sung by a mother in Greece about her future son-in-law, the "American," indicates:

You, sixty-five years old man
 With dollars and liras,
 Our little girl you took.
 Boil your dollars to dye your hair!
 Damn a thousand times the son who didn't come younger!
 He returned gray-haired and asks for a young wife!¹⁹⁰

The second genre of folk song of this period is mainly the product of the 1922 Catastrophe, and the ensuing massive population exchange between Greece and Turkey. Here, for the first time in the modern era, Greeks shared the centuries-old Jewish experience of a massive forced migration, or rather, displacement, and even expulsion. They, too, expressed their misery in songs. The *rebetico* genre of Greek songs, as it evolved in the 1920s-1930s, is usually considered to be the expression of this misery. However, a careful reading of this genre suggests the following: If this kind of artistic expression is the product of *nostos*, then the longing for the "other" place is more frequently articulated in the musical style than in the lyrics. The *rebetico* lyric is an amalgam of old rural refrains and popular couplets composed by townsfolk and islanders, and finally by the Anatolian refugees. The refugees brought to *rebetico* music their own Anatolian flavor and adapted it to the style of the Piraeus underworld. It was, therefore, the musical traditions of the many ethnic groups with whom the *rebetes* shared their lives in the Ottoman space that gave the *rebetico* its unique character.¹⁹¹ Through this music, the Anatolian

refugees in Piraeus and Salonika created a vocal bridge between their new *khora*, forced upon them by powers beyond their control in places beyond their reach, and their former *khora* in Turkey. The recurring Turkish refrain, *aman, aman*, an expression of sorrow and pain¹⁹² that was incorporated into the *rebetico*, was yet another way in which the *rebetico* linked present to past. The popularity of these songs was so overwhelming that they were almost immediately recorded by European and American record companies through local agents in Salonika and Athens, and monopolized the records market.

The *nostos* expressed in the lyrics of this period is almost predictable. Andonis Dhiamandides ("Dalgas") (Constantinople 1892–Athens 1945) is an artist who expresses it beautifully in songs such as "Sousta Politiki" (Sousta from Istanbul, ca. 1933), which evokes Constantinople and the Bosphorus.¹⁹³ Another song of his, "Tis Xenitias O Ponos" (The Pain of Being in a Foreign Land, 1935), certainly expresses the feelings of alienation and loss caused by displacement:

It is for you I weep, oh mother dear,
And suffer in this land as one exiled
I beg you, mother, never shed a tear,
But light a candle for your child.

The melody is taken from a Turkish song in the same mood of inconsolable loss, *Her Yer Karanlık* (Everywhere Darkness).¹⁹⁴ The very same theme is the subject of Vassilis Tsitsanis' (1915–1984) "I Xeniteia" (In a Foreign Land, 1938), while Marika Kanaropulu, also known as "Turkalitsa," complains in her song "San Filo Marameno" (Like a Dry and Drifting Leaf, 1934):

How much longer will my fate condemn me
To drag myself through foreign lands like a withered leaf —

While these songs express the general theme of the pain of *xeniteia*, most of the lyrics of these songs, contrary to the preceding examples and to the usual scholarly assertions, do not express a yearning for a specific lost *khora*.¹⁹⁵ Rather, they focus on the misery of the individual, and mostly omit the fact that the displacement was what created this misery. The standard themes of these songs are: *mal amor* (unrequited love), orphanhood, loneliness, and poverty. They also focus on the lives of the underground subculture, such as drug addicts, criminals, and prostitutes. Most of them do not speak of lost worlds, or disparage the new land, but are simply an expression of personal deprivation.¹⁹⁶ Nicolas Pappas, who has researched the history of *rebetico* recordings, suggests that the thematic transition to the life of marginal people was the result of competition between the *mikrasiátes* (Anatolians) and the native artists of Piraeus, with whom they shared a low life, if not origins

and musical instruments. By adopting the local bouzouki and common themes, the *mikrasiátes* could compete with the local artists in their own field, while still maintaining their high self-esteem.¹⁹⁷

Thus, a comparison between the *rebetico* and folk songs of East-European immigrants in America in the 1920s and 1930s shows that they used radically different themes. Certainly, both groups of immigrants shared the pain and hardships of displacement, but each expressed it in a different way. Analyzing why this was so, not only has an academic value, but also may shed light on the differences between the two diasporas.

The first distinction is the following: Jewish emigration to America resembles Greek emigration to America only up to 1922 (The Catastrophe). The main Greek emigration of the 1920s was from Asia Minor to Greece. This emigration resembled that of the Holocaust survivors (despite the differences between the two events) far more than it did the Jewish emigration to America of the same period.

In other words, what we should be comparing are Greek lyrics of 1890 (the beginning of the Greek emigration to America) until 1922 (the year of the Catastrophe) and Yiddish folk songs from the 1880s through the 1930s.

One of the issues discussed above was that of the “voice” in the Greek songs as opposed to that of the Jewish songs. In the Greek songs, the voice is that of the women, or at best, of the families, left behind. In the Jewish songs, on the other hand, the voice is that of the immigrants themselves. The reason for this lies in the different character of the two emigrations. The Greek immigrants to America were normally young, single males. Jewish immigrants were of both sexes and included many families. The Jewish immigrants preferred to settle down in America rather than return home to find a bride. The Greek immigrants, on the other hand, had a homeland. They returned to Greece to get married, invest money, or visit their families. The Jewish immigrants, once they left Europe, usually never returned, and had no intention of returning. The Greeks, on the other hand, always carried the vision of Ulysses returning home victorious and rich, finding his beloved ones waiting for his return.

The fact that Jewish immigrants usually married shortly after their arrival in the New World, shortened their acclimatization to the New World, and gave them a support system in situations of sickness or hardship. This, coupled with the fact that they themselves — not family members who stayed behind — were usually the “voice” in these songs, is highly significant. What they saw from the perspective of “here” could not be seen from the perspective of “there.” From the “Old Country,” *xeniteia* seemed far worse than from *xeniteia* itself. The transition from *xeniteia* to *khora* begins the moment the immigrant steps down from the gangway on to the dock.

Unlike the Greek immigrants in America, the *rebetes* and *rebetisses* from Anatolia often lived among members of their families whom they brought over and who survived the war and the long journey, and in any

case were surrounded by their entire surviving community from the “Old Country.” In this respect, despite what we said above, they resembled the turn-of-the-century Jewish immigrants in America, rather than the Greeks who migrated there. They had another thing in common with the Jewish immigrants to America: Going back home, even for a visit, was out of the question — for the Jews, because they had decided not to, and for the Anatolians, because after 1922, it was no longer a viable choice. Herein lies the main difference between the two groups. The *mikrasiátes* population transfer, unlike the Jewish migration of 1890–1930 to America, was mandatory and not circumstantial. There was a huge psychological difference between the two. Those who chose not to return (i.e., the Jews) could afford to nostalgically reminisce about the landscape and scenery of the “Old Country.” Those who were deliberately severed from their roots without being asked (the Anatolian refugees) could not afford to cling to the old images. Doing so, in addition to their personal hardships, would have been too painful to bear. Their memories had to be eradicated as quickly as possible if they were to get on with the business of living. In the same way, no Holocaust survivor wrote lyrics glorifying his home town, or expressing his yearning for it. The following personal anecdote — albeit outside the purview of a scholarly paper — illustrates the point. My late father left his hometown in the Ukraine in 1933, at the age of twenty. He often told us stories about their house on the river, how they used to fish and swim, hold parties and listen to music, and how life was so good. I once asked him if he missed his hometown. His answer was: “I miss it exactly in the same way I miss my youth that will never return!” Places associated in ones mind with atrocities cannot be explicit objects of *nostos*, unless one is prepared to reinvent them. This is exactly what the *mikrasiátes* of Stratis Mirivilis’ “The Gorgon Madonna” did. Upon disembarking on the shores of the island, they glossed over the atrocities they had experienced, and portrayed at length what the natives knew to be a lie, i.e., the wonderful life they had led in Asia Minor. At first the refugees resisted any attempt at being resettled on the island, but in no time at all they all seemed to forget Anatolia. It took Mirivilis more than twenty five years to articulate this insight.¹⁹⁸

More than any other Greek population shift, it was the “Catastrophe” that invested Greek nostalgia with elements characteristic of the Jewish tradition regarding displacement, its reasons, remedies, and the future. Like Mirivilis’ insight into the nature of memory, it took at least two decades for these other insights, too, to be articulated in poetry and prose. For example, the Pontian-Greek playwright, Xenophon Akoglous, in his historical drama *Akritas* (Frontier Guard) about the last days of the Pontian guerrilla movement, put in one of his protagonists’ mouth a fifteenth-century folk song allegedly sung by his grandfather:

“At that time Christians were great sinners,” [my grandfather] used to say.

"For that reason alone God sent the Turks and they came and first took Constantinople, the great capital. Later they also took Trebizond and all of Romania was lost. But the time will come," he said, "when we will take them back." He also sang its song:
 Romania is dead, Romania is taken;
 If Romania has died, it will blossom and bear fruit again.¹⁹⁹

The above lines attribute the loss of the homeland to punishment for sin. As to the prognosis for the future, everything would return to its former state, the Greeks would return to Romania (with an emphasis on the Pontos) and the country would blossom and flourish again like the fulfillment of a biblical prophecy of hope and redemption in a perfectly Isaiahan manner. *Akritas* is the product of a number of cultural currents: The Judeo-Christian idea of sin, punishment and salvation, Byzantine elements from the Byzantine epic, *Digenis Akritas*,²⁰⁰ and western ideas of nationalism. At the same time the play is very much about *nostos* for a very specific place and region — the shores of the Black Sea, from which Akoglous' audience originally hailed. Himself a second generation citizen of the Greek nation-state, he has no "recollection" of his ancestors' lost birthplace, and thus must invent it in order to assuage his *nostos* for a place he has never seen. He could never have articulated this idea immediately after the Catastrophe. The expression of *nostos* in specifically geographical terms, *ad locum*, requires the passage of time to blur reality before it can be articulated, and in some cases even the passage of time is not enough. As already stated, when the past is irredeemable, there is no such *nostos*. The other reason why such literature could not have been written immediately after the Catastrophe is that the official Greek ideology strove to erase the differences between the various Anatolian refugees and to mold them into "ideal new Greeks."²⁰¹

The many novels and novellas written by Israeli authors, mostly by the second generation of Holocaust survivors or of European immigrants of the 1930s, testify to a similar process among the Jews. At first there was silence, and an attempt by the newly-born State to mold the survivors and immigrants into "new Jews." Recalling the past meant recognizing the diversity of the Jewish people — a factor that did not favor the establishment of a nation-state. The world of yesterday was discredited. It took twenty years after the end of the Second World War for some recognition of the past to begin seeping in.²⁰² It took some thirty years after the end of the war and the establishment of the State for literature on this theme to emerge. People who have never seen the places they wrote about, authors who had immigrated as children, as well as those who had only "air roots" in Europe, wove their plots against these imagined roots. However, the detail was missing. The territory they returned to was an abstract territory, that seldom assumed a real shape.²⁰³

Paradoxically, the only author to express a real *nostos* — Aharon Appelfeld — was not the child of a survivor, but rather a survivor

himself. Appelfeld miraculously survived the war as a child, living like a hunted animal in the forests, swamps, back-yards, and stables of the Ukraine. Appelfeld's writing always skirts round the horror without actually defining it. The horror is hidden behind many layers, which render it even more frightening, since it is left to the reader's imagination. His last two novels, *Poland — A Green Land* (2005),²⁰⁴ and *The Flowers of Darkness* (2005), both written after the age of seventy, testify to a change in his attitude to the past. This change was first noticeable in his autobiography, *A Life Story* (1999),²⁰⁵ in which he tried for the first time not only to remember the past in a very personal way, but also to understand the workings of his memory, and how it was molded by the filter of time. This autobiography enabled him to revisit his past. At first he did this in a roundabout way. In *Poland — A Green Country*, his protagonist, a second-generation Holocaust survivor, makes the imaginary trip to the imaginary village of his imaginary parents, exactly as many members of the second generation do at the same age of his protagonist (fifty to sixty). Assuming the role of a second-generation survivor, he permitted himself a "luxury" most of them cannot afford. He lovingly describes past scenes and landscapes which he (his protagonist) became acquainted with for the first time. He effectively made peace with a past that was not his. In *The Flowers of Darkness*,²⁰⁶ he went even further by dispensing with the role of intermediary between him and his *nostos*. He resurrected his own birthplace, his own *khora*, the city of Czernowitz in Bukovina, southern Ukraine, the lost paradise of his childhood, and a glorious cultural center, in which the Jews played a significant role. In this book he resurrected not only his lost paradise, but also the hell, and ultimately the salvation, he experienced there. The salvation he describes in this book takes the same form as the one he describes in *Poland — a Green Country*, namely, the persona of a woman who is half whore, half mother, whose love saves him. This woman is not simply a metaphor, but a real woman, a prostitute, who sheltered him for a long time during the war.²⁰⁷

Appelfeld always felt a stranger in Israel. As a young adolescent, and way into his adulthood, he suffered from the same alienation experienced by other survivors in Israel. This was because their personal experiences were not consistent with the image of the strong and invincible "new Jew" that was being nurtured in Israel until the mid-seventies. His writing was often criticized for being "alien," and it was only from the late 1970s that he gained literary recognition. Although by now he is an Israel Prize Laureate as well as holding other honors, he is not a popular author in Israel even today, and is more widely acclaimed in Europe than in Israel. His last novels revolve around the return to Europe. He did not make the choice Amos Eilon made, preferring to stay in his country of refuge, which he terms "an interesting human experiment that I very much respect."²⁰⁸ Although he doubts its cultural as well as physical viability, he stays on, still hoping to weave his imaginary Europe into the fabric of the Middle East. What he expressed artistically in his last two novels,

he articulated in a very direct manner in an interview he gave to Deror Mash'ani in Ha'aretz, on 29 September 2006: "...Most Jews lived in Europe for two thousand years. Europe molded them, and they molded Europe. Thus, you are talking about a Jewish-European symbiotic element. One cannot get rid of it."

Conclusion

Diaspora is an equation the factors of which are space, time and memory. The diasporic condition is by definition a dynamic state of affairs. It is a temporary situation, in which a group of people still remembers its migration or displacement. As long as the members of this group manage to hold on to the last shreds of their memory of the past, diaspora is still present, to a lesser or greater extent. When memory fades, diaspora ceases to exist. Instead, the migrants come to believe that they have always belonged to their place of residence, that its culture has always existed as such, and even that this culture has been their original creation. In a word, a new *mekhorah* emerges. Human memory and the way it evolves and constantly changes is but another example of the resourcefulness of the human spirit that enables people to survive coercion, humiliation, depression, war, loss, and displacement.

Overviewing thousands of years of what both Greeks and Jews choose to see as their history, it is obvious that two contradictory and yet intertwined elements exist: The ever-changing and the eternal. The first part of this contradiction was best expressed millennia ago allegedly by the Greek philosopher Heraclitus of Ephesus (ca. 535–475 BCE): "Everything flows on, and we cannot cross the same river twice." On the other hand, some particles manage to stay in the water longer than others. Just by immersing a foot in the water, we can feel some of these particles brought from far and wide. They were there yesterday, some of them have been there for thousand of years, some since time immemorial. Others will be swept away today, tomorrow, or in a thousand years. Sensing the particles that are here for a while is what makes us part of a nation. Sensing the particles that are immutable and eternal is what makes us part of the family of mankind.

PART I:
THE GENESIS OF DIASPORAS

CHAPTER ONE

EXILE — THE BIBLICAL PERSPECTIVES

BUSTENAY ODED

Introduction

Exile ("*Galut*") is a pejorative term, with opprobrious overtones in common parlance, while Diaspora has more neutral implications. Exile connotes deportation, banishment, expulsion, enforced relocation. Diaspora is associated with migration and voluntary residence outside "Homeland" with the permanent option to return to the Homeland.¹ Exile is "Old Babylon," Diaspora is "New Babylon."² From a subjective or ideological point of view, "exile," as enforced diaspora, has an end, but "diaspora," as a facultative domicile, represents "infinite exile."

In Jewish tradition, the common denominator for both Exile and Diaspora is the Homeland, the Children of Israel's emotional sense of living outside the ancestral land after having been deported by the Assyrians and the Babylonians and later on by the Romans. Both terms are based on the principles of a shared history (a national autobiography) and common ancestry (the ethnic bond), two basic elements that predicate self-identity, national survival, coherence, and collective responsibility, undergirded with heavy theological-ideological meaning. In both exists the awareness of being an ethnic minority among a foreign majority, hence the consciousness of "us" and "others," which is an unusually pervasive and persistent theme in the history of Israel. Distinctiveness is fundamental to the Jewish sense of identity. Both terms enshrine a belief about the enduring history of Israel/Jews from the biblical period — when Israel inhabited the Land of Israel and spoke Hebrew, the mother tongue — up to contemporary times, when the Jews are scattered and dispersed, speaking different languages. An uninterrupted historical line connects

the biblical past to the present, above and beyond the discontinuity, vicissitudes, and diversity of the political and socioeconomic realities that characterize the Jewish Diaspora.³

Historically, the diasporic nature and the diasporic experience of the Jews must be traced back to the Assyrian and Babylonian deportations.⁴ Referring to “Exile” as a conceptual topic requires a consideration of the relevant biblical texts and a reinterpretation of old traditions that reflect how biblical writers perceived the phenomenon of Exile. The mass deportations by the Assyrians and the Babylonians evoked a surge of theological contemplation on the moral significance of the Exile. Hence, this article will focus on a history of ideas rather than a history of events, real or fictional.

I mention the term “fiction” because the issue of whether the Babylonian Exile is a historical event or sheer literary fiction remains in dispute and in a state of flux or, to put it in a more positive light, of ferment. The literature on both sides is vast and growing rapidly.⁵ I believe that the theory positing that ancient Israel is a literary construct, an entity that never existed, and the Babylonian Exile is a fictional invention, a myth, is totally flawed and unfortunately not free of political insinuation.⁶ The Babylonian Exile is not a myth but a true historical experience (cf. Deut. 29:27). The biblical texts describing the crisis of exile contain manifest historical information, with dates and places that can be substantiated, even if it is insufficiently transparent as well as problematic. The genre of myth can be employed as a literary *topos* for the theological interpretation of historical episodes and realities such as deportation and restoration, but the reverse process, namely the transformation of a myth into an historic certainty, is less common, has to be deliberate, and as such, calls for proof.⁷

Exile is incised deeply into the consciousness of ancient Israel, as evidenced by the purported historiography of the Old Testament. Exile is a common topic, motif, and hyperbole appearing throughout many books in the Bible, from Genesis to Chronicles. The end of the story of the Babylonian Exile in Chronicles (Chron. 36:20–23) — a composition from the fourth century BCE at the earliest — corresponds to its beginning in Genesis, namely the words of God to Abraham: “Know well that your offspring shall be strangers (*gerim*) in a land not theirs, and they shall be enslaved and oppressed four hundred years” (Gen. 15:13). This match is certainly not coincidental, but intentional within the general framework of presenting the history of ancient Israel from a theological point of view.

Biblical perspectives on Exile emerge in a variety of ways, depending on whether it is being discussed in relation to Israel’s Past, Present, or Future.

1. Past: Exile as a Consequence of Sin and Punishment

“Israel and Judah were carried away to Babylon for their transgression” (1 Chron. 9:1)

In the biblical literature and in the writings of ancient Near Eastern civilizations as well, deportation to a distant, foreign land had theological ramifications. A king sets out on a campaign at the command of the furious god(s) to punish another ruler and his people who sinned against the gods. The prevailing view that deportation and life in exile is a severe judgment is seen frequently throughout the Bible (e.g., Lev. 26:33; Deut. 4:24–27; Jos. 23:12–16; 1 Kings 8:46; 2 Kings 17:17–20; 21:14; Jer. 7:15; 16:13). Exile is a result of Israel’s rejection of God’s word as it was mediated by the prophets (e.g., Jer. 26; 36).

Exile as punishment is mentioned frequently in royal inscriptions and treaties from the ancient Near East, and in various kinds of compositions including mythological literature.⁸ To mention one case from the Mesopotamian literature, in his fury, the god Irra vows to punish society with three inflictions: “He who did not die in *battle* will die of *plague*, he who did not die of plague will be taken *captive* by the enemy.”⁹ Compare to Ezekiel 5:12: “A third part of you shall die with the pestilence... and a third part shall fall by the sword,...and I will scatter a third part into all the winds.”

In biblical and non-biblical texts, deportation and life in exile serve as a substitute for death (e.g., 2 Kings 18:32; Jer. 21:8–9; 29:7). But what is the precise nature of this substitution? Here we come to the next facet, the Present.

2. Present: Life in Exile

“Judah has gone into captivity because of affliction, and because of great servitude: she dwelled among the heathen, she found no rest: all her persecutors overtook her between the straits” (Lam. 1:3).

The literary descriptions in the Bible of life in exile do not reflect actual life, the true situation in exile, but exemplify the attitudes and philosophy of the biblical authors regarding exile as an entirely negative state of being. In fact, there are biblical and extra-biblical texts referring to the last days of the Israelite northern kingdom and the kingdom of Judah, but little or no information exists about the everyday life of exiles in Mesopotamia.¹⁰ The biblical narrative vis-à-vis exile derives from the perception of exile as divine punishment and a demonstration of theodicy, hence the portrayal of exile in terms of darkness, slavery, suppression, inferiority, vulnerability, and strangeness. All the metaphors employed underline the severity of the punishment and the dreadful conditions of exile. Exile is wilderness (Jer. 31:1), a foreign and contaminated land far away from the homeland. Life in exile is compared to death. An

illustrative example is the vision of "dry bones" in Ezekiel 37. Indeed, exile is even worse than death, because of the curses embedded in this divine punishment, so vividly described in Deut. 28:64–67: "And the Lord shall scatter you among all people, from the one end of the earth even unto the other... and among these nations you shall find no ease, neither shall the sole of your foot have rest. The Lord shall give you there a trembling heart, and failing of eyes, and sorrow of mind. Your life shall hang in doubt before you and you shall fear day and night and shall have no insurance of your life..." It is the curse of Cain: "You shall become a ceaseless wanderer on earth" (Gen. 4:12).

In the biblical perspective, exile corresponds to slavery. Jeremiah threatens: "I will make you a slave to your enemies in a land you have never known" (17:4). It is no accident that the Egyptian experience of slavery appears as a metaphor for exile in many passages in the Bible (e.g., Deut. 28:68). Egypt is a furnace of slavery, a furnace of affliction (Exod. 13:3; Deut. 4:20; 1 Kings 8:51; Mich. 6:4; Jer. 11:4; 34:13; Isa. 48:10). Joshua, the high priest, who came up from Babylonia, "is a brand plucked from the fire" (Zech. 3:2) and that "fire" is Babylonian Exile (cf. Amos 4:11). Another metaphor for exile is "imprisonment," with bonds and fetters, and "prison," a place of darkness and constraint (Isa. 52:2; Nah. 3:10; Jer. 40:1; Ezek. 3:25; Zech. 9:11; Ps. 107:14).¹¹

Hence redemption signifies delivery from prison (Isa. 42:7; Zech. 9:11–12). The Lord ordered Isaiah "to proclaim liberty to the captives and the opening of the prison to them that are bound" (61:1). The exiles lose not only "the good land" but also the true God, the God of Israel. Exile in many passages in the Bible is connected to the adoption of the gentiles' gods: "The Lord will drive you and the king you have set over you to a nation unknown to you or your fathers, where you shall serve other gods, of wood and stone" (Deut. 28:36, 64; and cf. Ezek. 11:14).¹²

The delineation of Exile in dark colors is a result of the theological conception that exile is a harsh divine punishment because of a breach of the covenant with God. Here arises an intriguing question regarding the appropriate concept of exile: is exile the final verdict, or just a temporary situation? Many passages in the Bible are ambivalent and seemingly at odds on this question. The account of the release of king Jehoiachin is notoriously equivocal about the event's significance. Here is where the story of the so-called Deuteronomistic History ended (2 Kings 25:27–30). Does it reflect a hope for restoration, or is this the end of the nation in its homeland, since Jehoiachin died in Babylonia? On the other hand, in the book of Chronicles the Edict of Cyrus is cited immediately after the description of the destruction and deportation. In this way the Chronicler expresses his belief that redemption from exile after "seventy years" (36:21) is assured. There is no consensus among scholars.¹³ Yet I will briefly explain why I am at one with those who conclude that the basic attitude in the biblical pre-exilic, exilic, and post-exilic (Persian

period) literature is that exile is a temporary situation and not a warning of total doom for Israel.¹⁴

This position is based on several arguments: (1) Indeed, the divine promise to the people and to David is conditional on adherence to the *Torah* (Ps. 78) and on God's people fulfilling His will; it is not to be taken for granted. Nevertheless, the mighty and terrible God is also full of grace and compassion (Jer. 42:12; Isa. 54:8; 63:7), so He will forgive and redeem, exactly as a father does: "For I am a father to Israel and Ephraim is My first-born" (Jer 31:8, 19).

(2) The topic of the election of Israel and the Dynasty of David, and the basic belief in an *eternal covenant* with the Patriarchs, the people, and David are central to Old Testament historiography, and run throughout the Bible. Indeed, the people breached the covenant, but God keeps the covenant and *hesed* (Exod.15:13; 2 Sam. 7:15; Isa. 54:10; Neh. 9:32; Ps. 98:3). Hence, exile is necessary because of theodicy; yet redemption is likewise essential because of the eternal covenant (*berit 'olam*, Isa. 24:5; Jer. 50:5).

(3) All prophets who proclaimed mass deportation of Israel and Judah at once envisioned restoration (e.g., Amos 9:7–12; Jer. 16:13–15; 33:23–26). There is a hard and fast link between prophecies of tribulation, the "former prophecies," and words of salvation, the "new prophecies" (Isa. 41:22; 42:9). Words of judgment and words of promise mingle in a single utterance (Jer. 24:5; 27:22). The unrelenting combination of divine judgment and salvation is a clear expression of the notion that redemption will spring from exile, and a new Israel will grow from the exiles, not from the non-exiles (see also Deut. 29:27 – 30:10).¹⁵ This belief is also reflected in Ezra-Nehemiah. *Benei ha-golah* ("children of exile") and *qahal ha-golah* ("the congregation of exile") are identified with *zer'a ha-qodesh* ("the holy seed"), *Yisrael* ("Israel"), and *Yehudah* ("Judah").

(4) Verses that might be understood to define exile as the end of the nation in its land are accompanied by comments that intrinsically reverse this dire, even fatal, verdict. For example, Jeremiah, who predicted, "I will hurl you out of this land into a land which neither you nor your fathers have known, I shall show you no favor," adds in the same passage, "For I will bring them back to their own land which I gave to their fathers" (16:13–15). Jeremiah's firm belief in restoration after desolation, devastation, and exile is clearly reflected in chapters 31–32. In verse 32:42 we read: "For thus said the Lord: like as I have brought all this great evil upon this people, so will I bring upon them all the good that I have promised them".

(5) The biblical theological/ideological meaning of exile is not separated from the traditional and fundamental idea of the eternal link between three components, the *God* of Israel, the *people* of Israel, and the *land* of Israel. This is the inseparable bond (Deut. 11:8–9).

The idea of the chosen people and chosen dynasty, and the conviction that the covenant between Israel and God is eternal, are key components

of Old Testament theology, and as such, shape the biblical conception of exile. The punishment of deportation is only a means to the end of materializing the creation of a new future for humanity in general and for Israel in particular. The idea of exile as a precondition to restoration leads us to the third facet, the Future.

3. Future: Exile Is a Vital Transitional Period

“Behold, I will take the children of Israel from among the heathen, whither they be gone, and will gather them on every side, and bring them into their own land. And I will make them one nation in the mountains of Israel: and one king shall be king to them all” (Ezek. 37:21–22).

The old era of sinfulness yields to a new era of liturgical and moral purity, fidelity, and glory. Things should get worse before they get better. Exile is the appropriate punishment. Exile marks the end of the nation’s disobedience in its homeland and the beginning of the formation of a “new Israel.” This transitional exilic period, “seventy years,” is an absolute prerequisite for certain processes that the people and the ancestral land must undergo.

- 1) Exile is a furnace designed to cleanse and purify the exiles of the transgressions and sacrilege they committed in the homeland (Hos. 5:3; 6:10; Ezek. 23:30). For example, see Ezek. 22:22: “As silver is melted in a furnace, so you shall be melted in the midst of it.” This conforms to the metaphor of exile as a furnace. The purpose of exile is “to finish the transgression, to put an end to sin and to atone for iniquity” (Dan. 9:24). Isaiah (the so-called Deutero-Isaiah), who most likely lived in Babylonian exile on the eve of the conquest of Babylonia by Cyrus,¹⁶ comforted the people by asserting that their iniquity has been pardoned (40:1–2). Exile is resolved by the cleansing and purification of the people (Jer. 33:7–8; Ezek. 37:23).
- 2) Eretz Israel is an integral component in the covenantal relationship between God and Israel. The land had been contaminated by Israel through idolatry and wickedness (Lev. 18:24–36; Num. 35:34; Deut. 21:23; 2 Kings 16:3; 21:2; 2 Chron. 34:3–8; Jer. 2:7; Ezek. 22:24). It is purified when the inhabitants are deported, and the land lays uncultivated and wasted for a fixed period. This idea that the land can become unpolluted as a result of deportation is expressed in 2 Chron. 36:20–21: “He took into exile in Babylon those who had escaped from the sword ...until the land had enjoyed its Sabbaths. All the days that it lay desolate it kept Sabbath to fulfill seventy years” (cf. Ezek. 39:12, 16).¹⁷ The banishment of the people who polluted the land by their idolatry will subsequently heal the contaminated Holy Land.¹⁸
- 3) Exile has a didactic purpose: to know the true God through the distress of deportation and living far from the homeland (Deut. 4:30).

This is the ideal opportunity for self-examination and introspection, as Ezekiel says: “Then you shall remember your own evil ways...and shall loathe yourselves in your own sight for your iniquities...” (36:31). While in the homeland, the people of Israel refused to listen and behave righteously toward God and man because they were *beit meri* (“rebellious,” Isa. 6:9; Jer. 5:21; Ezek. 12:2–3). At home, God punished them but they paid no heed (Isa. 42:45). According to Isaiah, Israel went into exile for “lack of knowledge” (5:13), but in exile they shall know that “I the Lord am their God when having exiled them among nations” (Ezek. 39:28; 22:22). They will remember their God in the far countries where He had scattered them among the nations (Zech. 10:9). “There” (i.e., in exile) they will learn that attentiveness to God’s statutes is the condition for remaining in the Promised Land (Deut. 4:27–29).

Knowledge of the true God in exile as a prerequisite for future salvation will prepare the ground for several events:

(1) *Forgiveness*: The God of Israel is a devouring fire, a jealous God (Deut. 4:24) and “The exile is long” (Jer. 29:28). Nevertheless, the Lord is a God of compassion as well (Deut. 4:31). His mercy will be demonstrated by the exile and return (Isa. 54:7–8). Consequently, “I will forgive their iniquities and I will remember the sin no more” (Jer. 31:33; Isa. 44:22; 52:9).

(2) *Restoration*: God will gather the people, including “the ten lost tribes” (Jer. 31; Ezek. 37) into their own, purified, land (Ezek. 39:28; Jer. 29:14; 32:37–41). The restoration of the people is linked with the restoration of the House of David (Isa. 11:1–10, 55:3; Jer. 23:5–6; 30:9; 33:25–26; Ezek. 34:23–24).¹⁹

(3) *A new covenant*: God forsook his people but only temporarily, since He is *shomer ha-berit ve-ha-hesed* (“He who keeps covenant and mercy,” Neh. 9:32). The discontinuity between the Old Covenant and the New Covenant (Jer. 31:30–32) lies in the setting of continuity: the same God, the same people, the same land (Jer. 31:35–39).²⁰ The idea of the New Covenant is vividly described in the prophecies of Jeremiah and Ezekiel. Jer. 31:31–34 states, “Behold, the days are coming, says the Lord, when I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and the house of Judah...” In Ezekiel, we read: “I will make a covenant with them: it shall be an everlasting covenant with them” (37:26).

(4) *Vengeance*. The prophecies about redemption are stated in conjunction with visions about retribution and divine punishment against the nations,²¹ especially against Babylon and Edom (Amos 9:12; Micha 4:3; Ovad. 1:15; Jer. 25:14; 30:20; 50:1–5, 34–40; 51:24; Isa. 45:14; 47:1–3, 6–15; 52:14–15; 63:4–6; Zech. 1:15; Joel 4:4–9; Zeph. 2:5–7; see also Ps. 79:12; 137:7).

(5) *Universalism*. All these happenings have universal significance and far-reaching ramifications; as it is said in Ezek. 39:23, “And the nations

shall know that the house of Israel went into captivity for their iniquity," and 36:23, "And I will vindicate the holiness of My great name, which has been profaned among the nations... and the nations will know that I am the Lord...when through you I vindicated My holiness before their eyes" (see also Deut 29:23–26; Jer. 31:9; Isa. 49:7; 52:10; Ps. 87:4, 126:2). Idolatry will be completely exterminated and all the nations will worship the God of Israel (Isa. 2:2–4; 45:1–7; 56:7; Zeph. 3:9; Ps. 102:14–24).²²

Conclusion

All in all, it is clear that nowhere in the biblical literature is a utopian conception of exile given, according to which the true mission of Israel is to spread the knowledge of God among the nations.²³ The approach to exile is wholly negative. It is a grim, divine punishment meted out in response to sin; it is a synonym for slavery and imprisonment. The biblical perspective on exile entirely contradicts the notion of redemption and is the antithesis to restoration and good life. Exile is a curse, restoration a blessing (e.g., Amos 9:13–15). Nevertheless, exile is unavoidable that Restoration be possible.²⁴

Exile and Restoration are fundamental issues in the history of the Jews and of Jewish tradition and philosophy, but this is not the content of Judaism. It is disingenuous and misleading to maintain that "Diasporism" is the ideology or essence of Judaism, the basis for Jewish identity, as if Diaspora and being a minority under the aegis of foreign suzerainty mark the very true and unique nature of the Jewish people.²⁵ True, due to certain historical circumstances and developments, "Diaspora" came to typify the status of the Jewish people, and the history of the Jews is a world history (cf. "The World History of the Jewish People"). Nevertheless, the exiles, at that time, did not make Exile (or Diaspora) into an ideology or the essence of Judaism. They and their descendants fostered the idea of *continuity* during the Babylonian exile.²⁶ Ezra brought the Torah, the foundation of Jewish identity, from the Babylonian exile to Jerusalem (Ezra 7:6, 10; Neh. 8:1–2) because *Jerusalem* as the divine elected city is the essential constituent of Judaism, not "Old Babylon" nor "New Babylon."

CHAPTER TWO

BETWEEN GREEK COLONY AND MOTHER-CITY: SOME REFLECTIONS

PANAGIOTIS N. DOUKELLIS

Preliminary Remarks

How is “diaspora” defined? At first glance, the very phenomenon presupposes two different communities that fulfill the respective roles of metropolitan community and community-colony. The acceptance and assumption of the responsibilities involved in each of these roles could theoretically be both voluntary and spontaneous. Diaspora is, moreover, expressed through various levels and sectors, which are certainly related to each particular historical occurrence. Yet, at least when we refer to the experiences of the earliest Greek colonists, such an approach does not suffice. Until now, the study of ancient Greek colonization is achieved through the approach of three different focal points. The first of these is the relation between the metropolis and the colony, followed by the development of the colony itself, and finally, by the colony’s relations with neighboring peoples.¹

According to the mainstream scientific bibliography, the concept of diaspora mostly concerns the colonists, although the metropolis is involved as well. Moreover, it has a direct correlation to the relations that colonists develop with neighboring populations among which they aspire to settle.² These relations can be on an equal footing, or not. If not, discrimination is often expressed in racial, religious, cultural, economic or other terms. In fact, though any differentiation between natives and foreigners constitutes one of the initial presuppositions for the creation of a sense of return, of the *nostos*, and hence of a distancing from the homeland, the metropolis, the sense of the diaspora, and in some cases,

the creation of an imaginary return to the homeland, is often expressed through myths and poems.³

The main question posed in the following pages relates to the way in which the protagonists of history themselves, whether on the side of the metropolis or on the side of the colony, perceived the notion of diaspora. Various behaviors which ranged from absolute respect and concord to armed conflict between metropolis and colony clearly expressed how both parties viewed the relations between them. Therefore, beyond our own *a posteriori* characterizations, we are called upon to detect the explicit or implicit views of the ancient Greeks on the subject of the diaspora. The issue is not a simple one, of course, since perceptions of diaspora did not remain static throughout antiquity. The question is even more interesting when it refers to views that post-dated by many years the establishment of a colony, views that followed periods during which additional points of reference were created or developed, beyond the colonists' metropolis.

1. Between Colony and Mother-City: A First Reading

Let us focus on the issue of the relations between metropolis and colony. It is perhaps expected that these relations would be expressed mainly in the religious and political sectors, as well as in the area of commercial transactions. In terms of the colonies of Sicily and even Magna Grecia, colonies founded in the eighth century BC, it appears that from the outset, the colonists had the sense they were creating a settlement that would quickly evolve into an autonomous city-state with close, and most likely institutionalized, bonds with the metropolis.⁴ The sources indicate the existence of religious relations between the two states, although this does not mean that the colonists could not adopt new forms of worship, and they also suggest the transference of political institutions, although this does not mean that those institutions inevitably dictated the colony's future direction.

For its part, archaeology has not brought proof that commercial relations between the metropolis and the colony were monopolistic and furthermore, it cannot be assumed that the mother-cities were necessarily important export and trade centers.⁵ A second point concerns the colonists' expectations of their metropolis, namely to what extent did they anticipate that the mother-city would be able to respond to any of their future needs. We know that for various reasons, most of the cities of metropolitan Greece that founded colonies had been in decline since the sixth century BC. Therefore they could inspire neither respect nor fear in their old colonies, many of which were particularly prosperous and did not hesitate to defend their interests, even by battling against their own metropolis.⁶

These behaviors may explain why, when in the fifth century BC some

metropolitan Greek cities founded new colonies, they also instituted certain measures. The mother-city endowed its colonists with rights and obligations, but also set legal parameters for its own responsibilities; namely, the mother-city defined civil rights and tax obligations, delineated religious duties, and outlined assurances of support in case of war.⁷ These texts demonstrate that a powerful metropolis would have certain designs for its colony, and would strive to maintain close relations with it. Of course, the colonies founded in the fifth century served different needs than those served by the colonies established during the first migratory flow in earlier times. Still, what was common to both were the close and institutionalized bonds between metropolis and colony, particularly at the time of foundation and for at least the first stage of the colony's life.

During the period of fantasized return to the home country, the *nostoi* phase, the colonists' point of reference remained the metropolis. Gradually the newcomer colonists began to co-exist with the local culture, while formulating narratives that guided their mission to civilize the natives. One example of this phenomenon, which will be discussed below, was the appropriation of Hercules' labors. Myths and cults were focused on the metropolis: they may have reflected an idealized perspective of the homeland but on the other hand the same heroes, the mythical founder of the colonies, and of course, the gods, served to strengthen the position of the colonists over the indigenous population. François de Polignac sees in the use of these myths one of the major expressions of social constitution and cohesion in colonial society.⁸

Yet conditions in the new settlements were favorable. The colonists established their own cities, they made use of new lands, they managed to organize their city and by reducing, often to a great extent, their obligations to the mother-city, they defined their own interests and those of their city. The colonists co-existed with the locals as well as their chief rivals, the Carthaginians. In some cases, the different cultures even traded and shared other kinds of facilities. A Greek lifestyle was adopted by the locals in an atmosphere free of antagonism and hostility.⁹ Emerging from the *nostoi*, the "visions of return to the home country," the colonists entered a creative stage in which they founded new colonies of their own.¹⁰

As a consequence of the sense of power they exuded, some of the great colonial centers entered into disputes and warlike conflicts with their sister Greek colonies. The most notable case was that of Syracuse: During the years in which it was governed by Deinomenids (Gelon 482–478 and his brother Hieron 478–467) and later by Dionysius the First (405–367), the colony flourished and developed at the expense of its neighbors, either native populations or Greek colonists. Syracuse did not hesitate to confront local populations and even attempted to spread into Magna Grecia, thereby initiating conflict with another great Greek colony, Taras.¹¹ On the other hand, it is worth mentioning the decision taken by Dionysius the First's successors in 344 BC to turn to their

old metropolis, Corinth, for help in repelling the threat posed by the Carthaginians. Corinth responded by dispatching one of its generals, Timoleon, who arrived, according to Plutarch, to regain their old colony and to free Sicily, which he believed was falling under the influence of "barbarism."¹² We shall not dwell on the work of Timoleon, who departs after staying at Syracuse for seven years and reorganizing its regime.¹³ What we can derive from this example, however, is the interplay between the incidental and the continuous: the Syracuseans' ultimate solution was reunion with their metropolis four centuries after being founded (according to the conventional date of 734 BC). We also see Corinth's positive response, irrespective of its true motives.

A century earlier the same metropolis, Corinth, had warred with another of its old colonies, Corcyra. One can find additional examples that illustrate the contradictory and often incompatible relations between metropolis and colony. The only connection that appears to be more durable is that which developed in the religious sector. The colonists were accustomed to attending the metropolis's celebrations in one way or another, yet beyond this, the relationship was complicated. The two sides were engaged in a power struggle, apparently based on a specific *do ut des* between two city-states. Endangering this relationship was not something tangible, something specific. As it will become apparent, it had to do with the world of ideas, the world of mental representations.

The case of the decree of Cyrene may be illustrative, when looked at in context. The foundation decree discovered at Cyrene creates the impression that it was the metropolis which issued orders and determined how the colonists would live. Yet was this so? The colony was founded, circa 631 BC, by settlers who left the island of Thera due to the great drought there.¹⁴ Shortly after 580, the ruler of Cyrene, Batos II, tried to reinforce the Greek element of the new city by encouraging residents of all the Greek cities to come and settle in Libya with an offer of land.¹⁵ In the ensuing generations, during the reign of Batos III, the colony faced particular political difficulties and addresses the oracle of Delphi for advice. The oracle appointed an inhabitant of a third city, Mantinea, as an intermediary between the parties to the conflict.¹⁶ In all of these events, the interests of the metropolis Thera were not taken into consideration, despite the fact that the foundation decree clearly stated that the metropolis could also send new inhabitants to the colony.¹⁷ But what was the situation of the metropolis? Was it in a position to send new colonists? Did it have at its disposal a wise man, able to solve the problems of its old colonists? Landscape and archaeological data demonstrate that during the archaic era, the city of Thera was actually not in decline.¹⁸

The relations between metropolis and colony are peculiar, controversial, since the sense of a common heritage certainly exists and underlies the colonists' identity; this is manifested explicitly during religious celebrations. Nonetheless, when it comes to exercising political will, the defense of the colony's own interests prevails.

2. Between Colony and Mother-City: Words and Hierarchies

There are a great number of incidents that shed light on the issue of relations between metropolis and colony, which are at times characterized by submission and obedience to the will of the metropolis and at other times by independence or even arrogance on the part of the colonists. A chronological listing of these phenomena, cross-referenced with the development of social, military or other points of reference of the colonists, would be of interest. Yet, for the purposes of this article, which seeks to examine the experiential perception of the diaspora by the protagonists themselves, a discursive analysis of the philological and epigraphical sources appears especially challenging for the researcher.

To begin with, it should be noted that the Greek word “διασπορά” with the content that is attributed to it today, is apparently used in contexts which are directly and exclusively connected to Jewish history. The word is already encountered (“and you shall be ἐν διασπορᾷ to all the kingdoms of the earth”) in the Greek translation of Deuteronomy (28:25), as well as in other books of the Old Testament.¹⁹

It is also cited in texts of the New Testament, for example, when Jacob addresses his epistle to the twelve races found in the diaspora.²⁰ The word is used in the same way in early Christian texts: An interesting reference is found in the Scholiast of the Gospel of John, where the Jewish approach to the Greek diaspora is commented upon. As far as the meaning of diaspora to the Greeks is concerned, the Scholiast²¹ states that in this way the Judeans named the *ethne*, because they are dispersed all over the world and accept their literal and cultural miscegenation. The commentary continues with a criticism of the way in which the phenomenon of diaspora is treated by the Judeans, who characterize it as ignominy (*oneidos*). Thus, according to this commentary, the diaspora is not limited merely to the geographical dispersion of the members of a community but also to their lack of cultural and/or demographic purity.

This negative approach towards diaspora is not accepted unanimously, even during the centuries-long Jewish diaspora, in which there are repeated and, for the most part, forced, instances of emigration or exile from the homeland. In the Hebrew discourse, there are a range of reactions to and experiences of the phenomenon of diaspora. Flavius Josephus, for example, does not refer to diaspora in the same way as the Scholiast of the Gospel of John.²² The attitude, positive or negative, towards the issue of diaspora is defined by the social and cultural milieu of the respective Jewish historical source.²³

Certainly, the historical and theological circumstances under which Jewish thought processed and adopted these views are beyond the aims of this paper. Nevertheless, even a brief lexicological approach as a vehicle for introducing an elementary comparative analysis of the issue is useful. It is not necessary to repeat that the Greek equivalent of *colony* is *apoikia*. It seems that when the sources refer to instances and phenomena of

Greek colonization, they do not use the word *diaspora*. On the contrary, the words that reappear constantly are those that belong etymologically to the family of "*ktizo*" or "*oikeo/oikizo*,"²⁴ which reflect the positive aspects of sending the citizens from a mother-city to found or create an autonomous and new city. The lexicological approach to the Jewish and the Greek diaspora, through the filter of the Greek language of course, sheds light on differences in perceptions between Judeans and Greeks. The main difference between the Hellenic and the Jewish experience is that Greeks always had an *oikia*, which allowed for the creation of an *apoikia*; they always had a cultural, ethnic, geographical center which led deliberately to the foundation of new, peripheral settlements.

In fact, this analysis indicates that the term *diaspora* was not relevant to ancient Greek society, since there was a free, autonomous, and creative center, comprised of people who shared a common ethnic, cultural, or other form of identity while living in cities dispersed all over the *oikoumene*. In limiting this discussion to Greek colonization, it may be useful to repeat the conclusions of the aforementioned lexicological study of Michel Casevitz. According to the French scholar, the verb *ktizo* and its cognates refer, as a rule, to matters related to agricultural exploitation and can signify the formation of a territorial state that, from the start, is autonomous. The word *oikeo/oikizo* and its family, which refer directly to the notion of house, denote the creation of a new settlement, the establishment of a city in a known territory. It is indicative that the object most frequently connected with the verb *oikeo/oikizo* is the word *polis*. Semantically speaking, *oikeo/oikizo* often contains the idea of moving or displacement. The older family of *ktizo* gradually gave way to the subsequent lexicological family.²⁵

From the Greek perspective, the establishment of colonies was a source of pride for a city; under no circumstances was it perceived as ignominy (*oneidos*). If in the Jewish experience, diaspora was negatively correlated with the act of leaving the homeland, for the Greeks, it signified arrival in a new place, settlement, and the opportunity for creativity: "By nature, the village (*kome*) seems to be principally an *apoikia* of the household (*oikia*), namely the children and the children of children whom some call fellows of the same milk."²⁶ Settlement of new colonies was the act of spreading civilization par excellence, since the decision to live in the city implied, according to Plato's *Protagoras*, the passage from savagery to civilization: "So they sought to come together and save themselves by founding cities (*ktizontes poleis*)."²⁷ Greek thought could not conceive of human social activity taking place outside the framework of the polis. *Polis* was at the root of the basic civil notions of Greek thought. In the well-known passages of his *Politics*, Aristotle considered man to be a *politikon* animal by nature.²⁸

The city became the major representation of the Greek way of life. Moreover, it became the means and at the same time, the outcome of the act of civilizing. Much later, at the end of the pre-Christian era,

during the period when the Roman *Principatus* was established and the Italian peninsula was reorganized administratively by Augustus, the myth of Hercules as the exemplar of heroism and civilization appeared.²⁹ Hercules seemed to be the leader of Greek colonialism in the West.³⁰ The colonists exploited his capacity to civilize and his subterfuge towards the locals. Hercules' adventures at Sicily could function in their hands as an excellent tool of integration and power.³¹ Colette Annequin is right to point out a continuum between Diodoros of Sicily, who, during the time of Augustus, provided us with the most elaborate version of Hercules' adventures in Italy and Sicily, and Denys of Halicarnassus, who a century and a half later in his *Antiquitates Romanae* attempted to integrate a role for Hercules, who brought civilization to Italy first and then crossed the channel and arrived in Sicily, according to the Romans' account.

If Polybius and Poseidonius paved the way for Rome to be regarded as a civilized part of the Greek world, the works of Diodoros and Denys bestowed a particular Greek dimension on the character of Rome by using one of the heroes of Greek colonialism, Hercules. As in the past, this hero constituted a tool of integration and power wielded by the Greek colonists over the Sicilians; the hero operated in the same way during the Roman imperial period when Rome appropriated the assertions and justifications supplied by the Hercules myth.³²

Yet let us return to the epicenter of Greek colonialism. The cities that sent groups of their citizens to establish colonies elsewhere did not do so in a vacuum. Indeed, as it has already been mentioned, the metropolises would often, at least beginning in the fifth century, pass advance legislation to protect the interests of their colonists, and they would found new cities that, under their control, could offer many potential benefits.³³

For the Greeks themselves, the importance of establishing colonies and duplicating the city all over the *oikoumene* was demonstrated by the fact that this issue was included among those believed to be worth discussing and included in the collective memory, which itself was represented by the Chronicles — local or universal stories — that referred to memorabilia and which, at least during the Hellenistic period, were often recorded on stone tablets and posted in public places. For historians today, the act of public posting attaches a particular significance to these chronographies since, in contrast to the work of intellectuals and ancient historical authors, it is clear that the public records set down common beliefs regarding the historical past and memorable acts of previous generations in which the city's residents took great pride.

Among the most famous recordings of historical content are the *Marmor Parium* (IG. XII. 444) and the Lindian Chronicle,³⁴ both of which date to the Hellenistic era. The *Marmor Parium*, a universal chronography, began with the period of Cecrops, king of Athens, and records a series of events dating to the year 263/2 BC. Its main interests seemed to revolve around religion, religious ceremonies and celebrations. It often referred to political and cultural events which it considered important and which

demonstrated the accomplishments of the Greeks as a whole. Its long list encompassed key political leaders and Greek victories over the barbarians, as well as references to poetic and literary works. What is of interest to us is that within what the anonymous writer of the chronicle memorabilia registered were events such as the colonization of Cyprus and the cities of Ionia (v. 42–44), the foundation of the colony of Syracuse under the Corinthian Archias (v. 47), and even the establishment of cities such as Alexandria, Lysimachia, and Cassandria, and a πόλις ἑλληνίς in the Azophic Sea³⁵ during the Hellenistic period. The formation of cities therefore constituted a memorable event of which Greek readers should have been proud. It must certainly be noted that the writer did not refer purposelessly to the dissemination of cities; he discussed the founding of colonies whether they were famous, but remote places (for example, Syracuse) or major urban centers set up by the Hellenistic kings.

The Lindian Chronicle on the other hand, written in 99 BC, did not aim to present a universal chronography, but rather to list all time offerings to the temple of Lindia Athena, as well as the epiphanies of the goddess. These two goals constituted the canvas on which various pieces of information regarding myths and historical events were drawn. Thus, the process of mapping offers to the goddess gave rise to the main stages of Lindian mythology and history: the labors of Hercules, the Danaids, the period of colonization, Alexander and the Diadochoi. These stages were connected to the mythical foundation of the city by Danaus or by Telephus, son of Hercules, and to the period of the city's expansion; this expansion was marked by displays of respect towards Lindia Athena by colonists ranging from Sicily to the coasts of Asia Minor, including Cyrene, in whose colonization the Rhodians had also participated. Gela, Akragas, Phaselis — these direct or indirect colonies of the Rhodians gave their dues and votive offerings to Athena.³⁶

Lindians and visitors to Lindos, who read the publicly-posted chronicle of offerings to the city patron, as well as her epiphanies, were soon convinced that Lindos is a glorious state whose power extended everywhere. Its achievements were reflected in the active expressions of respect on the part of other states, tyrants, and potentates of important colonial cities, which were dispersed throughout the Mediterranean. In essence, the testimony of the Rhodian chronicle, as far as the interconnection of the colonial and the metropolitan worlds was concerned, was more inclusive and evocative than that of the *Marmor Parium*.

For the Greek city, religion and especially the worship of a patron deity was a state affair of prime importance. The offerings constituted a special act of communication with the gods of the city and at the same time, acknowledged the inferior position of the person making the dedication before the gods, as much as before the city where the temple was located. This was even truer when the person making the dedication was a citizen or an *archon* of another city, especially a colony.³⁷ Then this

gesture acquired a different meaning — it exceeded the boundaries of mere reverence to the gods and love for the homeland, and instead was perceived as a political act, aimed directly at testing power relationships.

"The Corinthians, partly out of pity for the Epidamnians and partly out of hatred for the Corcyraeans, since they were the only ones among the colonists who left Corinth and would not send the customary sacrificial animals to the mother city..."³⁸ This excerpt from Diodorus Siculus characterized how metropolitan Greeks might have perceived the residents of their colonies. Steeped in terms of politics and armed conflict, it expressed situations and assessments very similar to the Lindian Chronicle, the difference being that the inscription described a religious phenomenon. Let us first of all note the role of religion and the votive offerings to the city deity as a mechanism for recognizing the metropolis' supremacy over its colonists. A second point that arises from this excerpt, however, is that the metropolis-colony relationship was based on a hierarchy, a precise relationship of moral and political vassalage of the colonists towards the metropolis that was symbolized by the obligatory offerings to the patron deity. Diodorus' excerpt does not constitute the sole testimony on the issue, as Thucydides addressed it using identical terms: "For our part (Corinthians), we maintain that we did not found colonies to be insulted by them but to be recognized as leaders and receive the proper signs of respect. Our other colonies certainly honor us and we are greatly beloved by our colonists."³⁹

What is the basis for this sense of supremacy and contempt towards the colonists, a feeling reinforced by various literary testimonies? Though the Greeks may have been proud of their colonies, they obviously despised, at least to some extent, their colonists. Dio Chrysostom was explicit on this, in two different speeches of his, one being of a philosophical nature and the other political.⁴⁰ Due to their social origins and conduct, he did not regard the colonists as equal to citizens of the mother-city. Ancient literature often used metaphors to render the relationship between metropolis and colony more descriptive and active;⁴¹ one recurring tool was the evocation of family bonds between the mother-city and the colony⁴² (cf. the aforementioned passage of Aristotle), signifying that beyond the relationships of love that bound the members of a family, there were predetermined roles befitting the position and the hierarchy that prevailed in each home; the parents loved the children, but the latter were expected to exhibit submission and respect.

Behaviors that were expressed in terms of social deontology had the deepest political content. They expressed an aristocratic regard of matters which, as much as it prided itself on the expansion of its finest achievement, namely the *polis*, through colonialism, nevertheless despised the main element of the colonial phenomenon, namely, the allocation of land to citizens who would otherwise have been impoverished and without property.⁴³

Let us return to the issue of the bonds between metropolis and colony. A

dominant element that expressed this relationship was the demonization of the *oikistes*. He was a powerful personality, who was sometimes selected by the metropolis and sometimes not, but who generally had the personal recommendation of Apollo of Delphi.⁴⁴ He was a controversial public figure, one who often began his colonial activity after having murdered a fellow citizen. He would ask Apollo of Delphi to expiate his sin, thereby emerging more powerful than ever to proceed with the founding of a new city-colony.⁴⁵ He would often be identified with a king and as a rule he would be granted worship honors.⁴⁶ One example of this were the odes of Pindar in honor of the winners of the Pythian Games, who were descended from the hegemonic families of the colonial world (for instance, see the fourth and the fifth *Pythian* for Arcesilaos of Cyrene).

The founder exemplified most of the elements of colonial practice. The social conduct of the founder towards the metropolis prior to his departure articulated the colonists' social rejection by their fellow citizens who remained at home. Yet at the same time, he carried the Sacred Fire from the homeland to the new land,⁴⁷ making him the leader who would implement the laws of the homeland. If on the one hand he appeared to be the link between old and new, the metropolis and the colony, on the other hand, he might have personified a rupture: through his purification by Apollo, the murderer was reborn and proceeded through various trials (a journey) to found a new city,⁴⁸ thereby transforming a heretofore untouched area from a state of savagery to a state of civilization. The posthumous worship honors that he received, as well as offerings to the metropolitan gods, had special meaning for the colonists themselves, for these actions signified inclusion in a concrete metropolitan center within the colonial world. In fact, the colonists' collective identity was embodied by service to the *oikistes*. The founder, worshipped by the totality of the colonists, contributed to social cohesion and ultimately the disposition of the city, even after his death. By worshipping the founder, the colonists created their own past, their shared history.⁴⁹

Therefore, if a metropolitan center referred to its colonization and to the diaspora itself to signify its glory and its might, the colonists referred to their country of origin to signify basic elements of their identities and, therefore, their common pursuits. Nonetheless, this perception of diaspora encountered obstacles. If the metropolis's expectations of its colonists remained unaltered through the centuries, the colonists' view of the metropolis did not necessarily remain stable. External or internal factors influenced the colonists' outlook, and these factors created new and different points of reference in the colonists' way of life. If the notion of diaspora is directly related to the collective identity of a group, then we know that this identity cannot remain intact and static. The sense of power exuded by the metropolis led to the rift between the Corcyreans and the Corinthians. The sense of weakness led the Syracuseans to seek help from their metropolis four hundred years after the city was founded. Besides tradition, the specific historic period shaped content

and the way in which the collective identity of a city or group was perceived. Moreover, this identity was certainly related to the degree to which the group wished to differentiate itself from other groups, be they in close proximity or far away.⁵⁰

3. New Poles of Attraction: the Case of Tauromenion

Greek colonies in Sicily, during the period that the Romans appeared *ante portas*, provide us with a case study for the evolution of the notion of diaspora. Needless to say, despite the general change of atmosphere on the island beginning in the third century BC, and gradual limitations placed on the power of the Greek cities by the locals or even by the Romans, the Greek character of the old colonies remained strong.⁵¹ Yet there were new factors that created different points of reference in the old Greek colonies.

Firstly, the old Greek metropolises were already in an obvious state of decline. The Greek cities, the *koina*, the Hellenic monarchies, no longer inspired trust, mainly due to the failure of King Pyrrhus' venture in Magna Grecia and Sicily. Secondly, the forces in motion within the narrow geographical context of Sicily, as much as the events on the Italian peninsula as a whole, exceeded the powers and capacities of the old Greek colonies. Finally, the Romans appeared, and if we are still discussing the nature of Roman imperialism, what is certain is that in 211 BC, the Romans seized Syracuse following a long siege.⁵²

Herein lays the juxtaposition with the evolution of the notion of diaspora among the Greeks of the West. As we have already noted, the notion of diaspora is directly related to the vision or consideration of the other, be it native or other newcomer, in our case the Romans. What image was created for the Romans, which possibly influenced the intentions of the Greeks of Sicily and Magna Grecia? At the same time, what image of the Sicilians were the Romans developing? We know that beginning in the third century BC, two distinct and conflicting views were gradually formed among both Greeks and Romans: on one hand, a desire for cooperation and even more so, acceptance of Greek cultural models by some Romans, and on the other hand, rejection of Greek culture and the fear of new ideas and ways on the part of traditional Romans.⁵³ The Romans were being subjected to a similar dichotomy: they were at one point considered by the Greeks to be of Greek origin — Rome *ἑλληνικὴ πόλις* — and at other times, the Greeks believed the Romans were barbarians and therefore not a part of the Greek civilized world.⁵⁴

Within the general historical context of encounters between Greeks and Romans, which falls outside the scope of this paper, let us see what happened in Tauromenion, one small city on the eastern coast of Sicily. Tauromenion was not a "first generation" Greek colony. Rather, it was built in 392 BC by Dionysius the First of Syracuse, probably to

be inhabited mainly by Hellenized Sicilians and others of Greek origin. At any rate, the Greek character of the city and its inhabitants cannot be doubted.⁵⁵ The city passed through the Hellenic era under the rule of the Syracuseans, local tyrants, and even a quasi-democratic regime. During, or better by the end of, the Roman civil wars (36 BC), the leading families of the city were deported for supporting Sextus Pompey. Shortly afterwards, around 21 BC, Augustus apparently established a colony of his veterans within the city limits. We do not know much about the coexistence between the Tauromeneans and the Roman colonists, or the legal status bestowed by the Romans on the local population.⁵⁶

Tauromenion may be of interest in regards to the issue discussed here, due to an epigraphic file that listed magistrates from the Hellenistic period. In particular, it registered generals, gymnasiarchs and economic data of various associations, as well as magistrates of lower importance.⁵⁷ This inscription recorded the Tauromeneans' *fasti* over a long period. Beginning from about 270 BC, it covered an important part of the third and second centuries BC. A second important element of the inscription was that these *fasti* were not recorded while they were happening, but much later, possibly after the foundation and establishment of the Roman colonists there. What we have is a kind of historical inscription, an act of retrogression into the city's civil and state past.⁵⁸ The city proceeded with compiling, or rather copying, the *fasti* from the data of its records onto a stone column in order to display its past, especially so in a period when the political situation in the city was apparently changing radically, due to the foundation of the Roman colony.

Of course, this registering of historical data did not constitute a *unicum*. We saw earlier that, during the third and second centuries BC, this tendency among Greeks to record and publicly display either a local story or a wider composition on the Greek past was strongly reinforced.⁵⁹ This practice also continued during the imperial period⁶⁰ and was certainly related to the educational value they wanted to attach to the past. Furthermore, it did not cease to be an expression of the collective identity of the citizens who proceeded with taking such a decision. If such is true for the inhabitants of Tauromenion, then their collective memory seemed to be limited to facts of a political or administrative nature, which were explicitly expressed and posted in public view, opposite the new-coming Roman colonists.⁶¹ The point of reference used by the Tauromeneans to view their new neighbors was not Syracuse, their founder, but the very specific present, to which they responded with a catalogue of their own *archons* of the past.

Nevertheless, epigraphic evidence from Tauromenion does not stop here. The inscription of their own civil history has a kind of counterbalance. In this same city, fragments of another interesting inscription, dating back to approximately the same period as the dossier of the *fasti tauromenitani*, have been located. It contained the collections of lemmas, we would say of the city library, a building situated next to

the gymnasium.⁶² It must be imagined that the inscriptions written in paint on the stucco covering the surface of the library walls meant to synoptically present scrolls with the texts of the authors found by their side.

Let us then read from what was saved: *Kallisthenes from Olynthus became Alexander's secretary...Quintus Fabius, called Pictorinos, Roman, son of Gaius, narrated the arrival of Hercules in Italy as well as the journey of Lanoios, an ally of Aineias and Askanios. Much later after them Romulus and Remos came to the world and Romulus founded Rome and became the first king.* The lemma followed with the citation of another author, Filistos of Syracuse. What is important for our purpose in this inscription is the juxtaposition of both Greek and Roman authors, a fact that suggests a broad, cosmopolitan spirit among the Tauromeneans. Roman historians were cited on equal terms with and by the Greeks. The citation of Fabius Pictorinus⁶³ as a writer of the Roman version of Hercules' travels in Italy as well as of the Trojan hero Lanoios may mean that the writings on Roman history were of interest to the Greeks.⁶⁴

Whether under the weight of political, military or other circumstance, or as a result of mature and conscious political action, we observe that the Sicilian cities gradually integrated the Romans into their system for referring to the past. For example, Centoripa, around 25 to 20 BC, sought renewal of an old treaty of friendship with the city of Lanuvium, by reason of *συγγένειαν, ξενίαν, οἰκειοσύνην* (family relationship, hospitality, and familiarity/intimacy).⁶⁵ Lanuvium, a neighboring city to Rome, was founded by Lanoios, who, according to the myth, had forged an alliance with Aeneas during their meeting in Sicily. All these references were certainly not irrelevant to the undisputed preeminence of Rome, the new point of reference for the whole of Italy and gradually for the entire Mediterranean world. The Sicilians sought to validate the Romans' presence and the relations they had developed with them by projecting these in the world of myths and heroes but also in the world of the *nostoi*. The founder of the Romans, Aeneas, also came from the East.

I remain close to a selective documentation regarding discursive and mythical data. If I have presented some elements from the intellectual-conscious production, it is due to the fact that the notion of diaspora is an intellectual-discursive phenomenon. At the beginning of this paper I wondered about the meaning of diaspora in the ancient Greek experience. Was it an institutional, a sociological, a demographic phenomenon? Or was it merely the sense of belonging to a larger cultural community? As a first step, the term *diaspora* must be examined in combination with questions such as that of self-identity, the vision of the others or issues regarding integration, namely, how the Greeks viewed themselves and how they perceived others, be they locals or, for example, the coming power of Romans.

For Greek antiquity, metropolises and colonies did not extend the same content to the notion of diaspora. This was an idea which was thoroughly

political, connected with issues of power relationships and rankings among political entities, such as city-states. It is a notion which was expressed mainly in terms of kinship and through religious behaviors. At first glance, it constituted the framework within which collective and cultural identity was stated. Yet more specifically for each of the metropolises, it signified their might overseas about which they boasted eternally, while for each of the colonies, diaspora was a flexible idea which, according to historical circumstance, may have been active or laid dormant.

PART II:
PRE-MODERN DIASPORA:
PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR

CHAPTER ONE

THE JEWISH *POLITEUMA* IN ALEXANDRIA: A PATTERN OF JEWISH COMMUNAL LIFE IN THE GRECO-ROMAN DIASPORA

ARYEH KASHER

The Jewish Diaspora has played a constitutive role in Jewish history since its earliest days. The desire of Jews to maintain their national and religious identity while scattered among the nations gave rise to the establishment of semi-autonomous Jewish communities which, to a large extent, served as a barrier to assimilation and external radical influences. The Jewish community of Alexandria provides an excellent case study of Jewish communal life in the Greco-Roman Diaspora, due to the relative abundance of historical evidence, and also because of the fact that it served as a pattern for the civic organization of other Hellenic-Jewish communities.

It should be emphasized from the outset that most researchers believed that the Jewish community in Alexandria constituted a *politeuma*; this view is clearly stated in the *Letter of Aristeas* 308–310:

When the work was completed, Demetrius (of Phalerum) — i.e. the director of the Alexandrian library and one of the promoters of the Greek translation to the Torah — assembled the congregation of the Jews (τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Ἰουδαίων) in the place where the translation (of the Torah) had been made and read it over to all in the presence of the translators who met with a great reception also from the congregation (τοῦ πλήθους), because of the great

benefits which they had conferred upon them. They bestowed warm praise upon Demetrius, too, and urged him to have the whole law transcribed and present a copy to their leaders (τοῖς ἡγουμένοις αὐτῶν). After the books had been read, the priests and the elders (οἱ πρεσβύτεροι) from among the translators and from among the people of the *politeuma* (τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ πολιτεύματος) and the leaders of the congregation (οἱ τε ἡγούμενοι τοῦ πλήθους) stood up and said that since so excellent and sacred and accurate a translation had been made, it was only right that it should remain as it was and no alteration should be made in it. There was a common approbation of what has been said, and they made them declare a curse, in accordance with their custom, on anyone who should make any alteration (of the version) either by adding anything or changing words of the written text or by deleting.¹

The final sentence of the above quotation clearly indicates that the status of the Alexandrian Jewish community enabled its members to make public decisions (ψηφίσματα) and implement them with full authority and discipline. The very fact that such a decision was taken in the presence of the king himself and his courtiers conferred legitimacy upon it. In other words, it can be inferred with a significant degree of certitude that the community constituted a legal and political entity recognized by the Ptolemaic authorities. Our purpose now is to prove that the use of the term *politeuma* in the above citation confirms that inference.

It is well known that the term *politeuma* was also used to characterize the Berenice Jewish community in Cyrenaeca; this legacy from the Ptolemies is attested in two inscriptions from the end of the first century BCE and the beginning of the first century CE.² The analogy to the Alexandrian Jewish community is beyond a doubt, as seen in the following citation by Strabo (*apud* Josephus, AJ, XIV, 116):

And it has come about that Cyrene, which had the same rulers as Egypt, has imitated it in many respects, particularly in notably encouraging and aiding the expansion of the organized groups of Jews (τὰ συντάγματα τῶν Ἰουδαίων), which observe the national Jewish laws (τοῖς πατρίοις τῶν Ἰουδαίων νόμοις). In Egypt, for example, territory has been set apart for a Jewish settlement, and in Alexandria a great part of the city has been allocated to this nation (τῷ ἔθνει τούτῳ) and an ethnarch of their own (ἐθνάρχης αὐτῶν) has been installed, who governs the people (τὸ ἔθνος) and adjudicates suits and supervises contracts, just as if he were the head of a sovereign state (ὡς ἂν πολιτείας ἄρχων αὐτοτελοῦς).³

This paper will limit itself to an examination of the legal and political aspects of the term *politeuma* which applied to the Alexandrian Jewish community. It will focus, of course, on the religious and

ethnic implications of the community's organizational structure, without delving into other issues such as the *status civitatis* of the Jews.⁴ In other words, we shall examine our theme according to several criteria, which aim to prove that the self-contained Alexandrian Jewish community was legally recognized by the central authorities of Hellenistic and Roman Egypt, and that the term *politeuma* most aptly described it.

What precisely do we mean by *politeuma*? Among the common scholarly definitions of the term is H. Strathmann's words with respect to the Jewish communities in Alexandria and Berenice, as well as to other ethnic *politeumata*, particularly those in Egypt:

*Bei diesen πολιτεύματα handelt es sich nicht um private Vereinigungen, sondern um anerkannte völkische Körperschaften, Fremdenkolonien mit bestimmten politischen Rechten.*⁵

Many other scholars have devised similar definitions, the most instructive one being that offered by E.M. Smallwood, which for the sake of illustration will be quoted here verbatim:

*A politeuma was a recognized, formally constituted corporation of aliens enjoying the right of domicile in a foreign city and forming a separate, semi-autonomous civic body, a city within the city; it had its own constitution and administered its own internal affairs as an ethnic unit through officials distinct from and independent of those of the host city.*⁶

Other, less detailed characterizations, support both of those definitions:

- (a) Ein organisierter Zusammenschluss von Männern gleich politischen Rechts ausserhalb ihrer eigentlich ἰδιόα.⁷
- (b) Die nicht standmässigen politischen Organisationen.⁸
- (c) Politeuvmata liberae sunt civitates, sive Graecorum, sive aliarum gentium, in territorio cuiusdam urbis cum aliis incolis collocatae.⁹
- (d) Eine mit bestimmten politischen Vorrechten ausgestattete Gemeinde auf ethnischer Grundlage.¹⁰
- (e) A community which stands on an ethnic basis and which enjoys certain political rights.¹¹

G. Lüderitz, who conducted a thorough analysis of the various meanings of the term, noted in the opening passage of his study that it could also be interpreted as a *terminus technicus*, although this was seen less often. In his words: "it has also been used as a technical term to denote groups of people with various forms of organization... It can stand for an institution within the political organization of a Greek *polis* as well as for other groups of people — for example an organization of aliens

residing in a foreign city.”¹² Like many scholars before him, he was aware that understanding how the term related to the Jewish community of Berenice was key to grasping the intricacies of the phenomenon in the Jewish world at large.

The reservations expressed by Zuckerman with regard to the commonly-accepted legal and political meaning of the term *politeuma*, as well as to the very existence of a Jewish *politeuma* in Alexandria, were a forerunner to similar views expressed by other scholars.¹³ In fact, Zuckerman absolutely refuted the conventional opinion that the *politeuma* mentioned in the *Letter of Aristeas* actually pertained to the Jewish community of Alexandria, and he even ventured to refer to that possibility, rather sarcastically, as “an historiographic legend.” In his eyes, the reference there applied to the Jewish political entity of Judea, which was represented by Jerusalem — a city — as compared to a *polis*. Even Lüderitz, who doubted certain aspects of the legal and political meanings ascribed by many scholars to the Jewish *politeuma* of Alexandria, justifiably rejected this interpretation, claiming that there was no real supporting evidence in the treatise under discussion. He felt it would be preferable to equate the *politeuma* referred to there with the city authorities of the Alexandrian *polis*.¹⁴ Both scholars, each in his own way, apparently intended to resolve the contradictions raised by the linked (yet distinct) mention of τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Ἰουδαίων (*Letter of Aristeas*) § 308; cf. also οἱ τε ἡγούμενοι τοῦ πλήθους — op.cit. § 310) on one hand, and of οἱ ἄπὸ τοῦ πολιτεύματος (op. cit. § 310) on the other.

In fact, many scholars before them found no convincing explanation for this coupling of terms; I believe, however, that there is a satisfactory solution, which is that the first expression referred to the entire Jewish public in Alexandria, whereas the second designated the political associations of the more privileged Jews who represented the community before the central authorities.

This conclusion has considerable linguistic support, as the Greek term πλῆθος denotes the “greater number,” the “mass,” or the “multitude.”¹⁵ The distinction between two such sectors of Jews also applied, in much the same way, to the non-Jewish inhabitants of the city, in which the outer circle included “foreigners,” *metoikoi* (permanent residents without citizens’ rights), and *laoi* (Egyptian “natives”), whereas the privileged inner circle was comprised of full citizens (*politai*) of the *polis*. This parallel is quite significant, as it attests to the influence that Hellenistic norms had on the organizational structure of the Jewish community.¹⁶

An additional, more indirect, example may be found in the political situation which prevailed in Jerusalem following the Hellenizing reforms implemented by Jason in 175 BCE (*II Macc.*, 4:9; cf. 4:19). There too, a similar distinction can be made between two groups: the broader circle of “Jerusalemites” on one hand, and the narrower circle of privileged “Antiochenes (Ἀντιοχεῖς) in Jerusalem” on the other hand. The latter were seemingly organized as a *politeuma*, as may be inferred from

by Bickermann, who cited comparable cases from other cities.¹⁷ In my opinion, Stern's reservations, which were written in the spirit of Tcherikover's study,¹⁸ are not enough to undermine Bickermann's work. Coins inscribed with "the Seleucians at Gaza," or "the Antiochenes at Ptolemais" and the like, should rather be interpreted in support of Bickermann's theory, indicating the existence of a *demos* or a *politeuma* of "Seleucians" controlling and representing the city of Gaza, or the existence of a parallel association of "Antiochenes" controlling and representing the city of Acco-Ptolemais.

It is important to stress that Lüderitz aptly discerned the presence of two such circles with regard to the Jewish *politeuma* of Berenice.¹⁹ The famous Jewish inscriptions found there are in fact, as he claimed a key aspect of the entire issue. The broader circle encompassed the totality of Jewish residents there, whereas the privileged and narrower circle included members of the *politeuma* only. This seems to correspond precisely with the distinction between the "Jewish public" on one hand, and the *politeuma* of the Jews of Alexandria on the other hand, as described in the *Letter of Aristeas*.

Indeed, we should not wonder at the fact, since "it has come about that Cyrene, which had the same rulers as Egypt, has imitated it in many respects" (Strabo, *apud* Josephus, AJ, XIV 116). The above shows us rather clearly that the *politeuma* of Berenice (similarly to that of Alexandria) was the legal organization or political body which represented the local Jews as a whole, and thus enjoyed the status of a privileged aristocratic association. In other words: the *politeuma* was the political and juridical entity from which the community leadership (archons [ἄρχοντες], *prostatai* [προστάται], *gerousia* [γερουσία] scribes etc.) was elected (or appointed), and which fulfilled — on its own behalf, and on behalf of the Jewish public at large — administrative, judicial, notarial, and related functions. With regard to Alexandria, I have already suggested that the "Macedonian tribe," to which Josephus referred in CA, II, 36, was the aristocratic nucleus from which the leadership was chosen (or nominated). It appears that there were actually three distinct segments within the Jewish public in Alexandria: (a) the outer circle comprising all the Jewish residents, or, as it is called in the *Letter of Aristeas*, the "Jewish public" or the "Jewish people" (τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Ἰουδαίων); (b) the middle circle, comprising the organized privileged entity, namely the *politeuma* (*Letter of Aristeas* 310), which Strabo (*apud* Josephus, AJ, XIV, 115–117) called the "people" (τὸ ἔθνος) or the "independent *politeia*"; and (c) the innermost circle, which included the exclusive aristocracy — or the "Macedonian tribe", as Josephus (CA, II, 36) called it — from which the top leadership was elected or appointed. Unfortunately, in the absence of additional data, it is difficult to gauge how large any of these circles were in relation to each other.²⁰

Zuckerman in his study also sought to establish that the term *politeuma* implied no more than a private voluntary organization, and that,

therefore, it should not be attributed with an overstated political or legal significance. In contradistinction to his view, I shall refer the readers once more to Strathmann's description of the Jewish *politeumata* in Alexandria and Berenice: "*Bei diesen πολιτεύματα handelt es sich nicht um private Vereinigungen, sondern um anerkannte völkische Körperschaften, Fremdenkolonien mit bestimmten politischen Rechten.*"

Admittedly, Lüderitz was also influenced somewhat by Zuckerman's opinion to the effect that certain *politeumata* were private voluntary organizations; nonetheless, he did not ignore the fact that some *politeumata* enjoyed a special official legal status, which did not apply to others. For instance, Julius Caesar introduced a regulation which prohibited the organization of *collegia*, except for those of the Jews. As the official status of the latter was undoubtedly a special one,²¹ may we not consider this in some way attesting to the accuracy of the commonly-accepted definition formulated by Smallwood?

In my opinion, the organization of the Jewish community at Arsinoë-Krokodilopolis corresponded in all details with the pattern of the *politeuma*. This can be deduced from a legal report (dated 226 BCE) by the "Court of Ten," which mentioned the "civic laws" (πολιτικοὶ νόμοι) among the juridical principles that should be considered in the trial between a certain Jew and a Jewess (CPJ, I, no. 19). That legal code was applicable to the citizens of the Greek *poleis* and members of the *politeumata*²² and shows very clearly Jewish adherence to the law. The very fact that it was an official document recorded in a trial before a Greek tribunal speaks for itself and shows that members of the Jewish community at Arsinoë enjoyed the status of *politai*. Since only three *poleis* (Naucratis, Alexandria, and Ptolemais) were established in Egypt, not including Arsinoë, those *politai* could relate but to a local Jewish *politeuma*.²³

Another proof relies on Philo's testimony (*In Flaccum*, 53, 80; *Legatio ad Gaium*, 371) indicating "the participation (of Alexandrian Jews) in civic (or political) rights" (ἡ μετουσία πολιτικῶν δικαίων), which was explicitly reflected in the criminal code of laws with reference to penalties(!). Can there be any more conclusive legal evidence than that? Convicted Jews, according to Philo, were subject to scourges like "free men and citizens" (ταῖς ἐλευθεριωτέροις καὶ πολιτικωτέροις).²⁴

In fact, Engers was the first to go so far as to make a definitive statement, corroborated by the above-mentioned statement of Strabo's (Josephus, *AJ*, XIV, 117–118): "*in territorio urbis Alexandriae utique duas civitates liberas fuisse, quae idem valerent et aequo iure fruentur*".²⁵ Furthermore, Paul and Otzen adopted an identical position in defining the Jewish *politeuma* in Alexandria as "a city within a city" or "a state within a state".²⁶ Trebilco (*loc. cit.*) applied this conclusion, to some degree, with reference to the Jewish community in Antioch on the Orontes, as well as to the large Jewish communities within cities in Asia Minor and Ionia (e.g. Sardis). Troiani's illustrative study on the Jewish *politeia* also reinforces the above conclusions.²⁷

An addition to the E version in *AJ*, XIX, 284 (of the Claudian edict) sheds more light on the above issue, and therefore I shall quote it here (underlined): “the Alexandrians rose up in insurrection against the Jews in their midst, **who gained equal *politeia* with the other Alexandrians**” (ἴσης πολιτείας τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἀλεξανδρεῦσι τετυχηκότων). This unequivocal corroboration that Josephus was aware of the dual meaning of the term “Alexandrians” is reinforced in the passage immediately thereafter (op. cit., 285), which clearly distinguishes between two “parties” (ἑκατέρωθεν... τοῖς μέρεσι) — that is, between the “Jews of Alexandria, called Alexandrians” (op. cit., 281) and the “other Alexandrians” (cf. *CA*, II, 64). This rightly led Feldman to his sound suggestion that “the term ἴση πολιτεία may mean not ‘equal citizen status’ but equal status as a community (πολίτευμα).”²⁸

Philo, too, called the members of his community “Alexandrians” on several occasions.²⁹ He himself distinguished between them and “other Alexandrians,”³⁰ a fact which perplexed several scholars, especially those who discredited Josephus’ authenticity in that connection. Most of them have tended to claim that the term “Alexandrians,” as used by Philo, is devoid of any political or legal significance.³¹ Nonetheless, if we examine Philo’s writings a bit more thoroughly, we find that this attribute was simultaneously ascribed to the citizens of the Greek *polis*³² and to the Egyptian rabble in the city.³³ Moreover, on several occasions in his writings, he used the terms *πολίται* and *πολιτεία*, or their derivatives, to denote the status of Jews in the cities of the Roman Empire in general and in his own city in particular,³⁴ although he admittedly never went so far as suggesting that the Jews of Alexandria had the same *politeia* as the Greek *polis*, or were *politai* thereof. From his point of view, then, the Jews of Alexandria were both “Alexandrians” and *politai*(!). However, as he did not consider them to be citizens of the Greek *polis*, I do not see how we can avoid the only logical conclusion, first proposed by the British scholar H.S. Jones, that the term *politeia* actually denoted the set of rights applying to the Jewish *politeuma* within the city, and that the term *politai* referred to its members.³⁵ It is worthwhile noting here Ruppel’s notion that, linguistically, the word *politeuma* may refer to a corporation of *politai*, just as a *τεχνίτευμα* may refer to a corporation of *τεχνῖται*.³⁶ In brief, the term *politai* could be applied to members of a *politeuma* whose political and legal rights were assured by virtue of its independent organization (i.e., its autonomous leadership institutions).³⁷ According to Jones’ persuasive argument, the status of the Jews of Alexandria as *politai* (i.e., members of the *politeuma*), was distinct from that of the citizens of the Greek *polis* (i.e., *astoi*), and was halfway between that of the latter and that of the Egyptian “natives” (*laoi*).³⁸ A similar solution was proposed by Wolfson;³⁹ I feel, however, that it should be somewhat amended to read that the Jews’ status was halfway between that of the *astoi* and that of the *metoikoi*, assuming that the *astoi* were the full citizens of the Greek *polis*.⁴⁰

As I see it, we may summarize by saying that, from Philo's point of view, those Jews who were considered to be "Alexandrians" were also *politai*, namely permanent residents of Alexandria privileged with the right to maintain their own *politeia*. They were members of their own *politeuma* which was politically and legally independent of the Greek *polis*. Unfortunately, modern research has not adopted a similar interpretation with regard to Josephus, which is, in my opinion, a fundamental mistake.⁴¹

One of the main reasons that Josephus was suspected of using the term "Alexandrians" inaccurately was the famous papyrus document containing a legal petition to the Roman Prefect (governor) by a certain Helenos, son of Tryphon (CPJ, II, No. 151), in which his appellation "an Alexandrian" (Ἀλεξανδρεύς) was deleted and replaced by "a Jew from Alexandria" (Ἰουδαῖος τῶν ἀπὸ Ἀλεξανδρείας). This document, however, is a two-edged sword which can just as easily be used against those who suspect Josephus or seek to refute him; after all, the change in the papyrus's terms of reference was made as a result of the formal requirement for exactitude in registration, as the appellation "Alexandrian" was not in actual compliance with the law and not acceptable in court, and was therefore quite rarely used in official documents. The father of the petitioner in that document was expressly referred to as an "Alexandrian," without that term being deleted — apparently because, as he was not the petitioner, a lesser degree of precision was required in his case. Had Helenos, son of Tryphon, really been a citizen of the *polis*, it would have been necessary to state, in addition to the term "Alexandrian," the names of the tribe and the *demos* under which he was registered.⁴²

In her study on citizenship in Alexandria under the Principate, Delia was unable to free herself of the conventions dictating that the term "Alexandrians" referred exclusively to the citizens of the polis of Alexandria. In her discussion of the applicability of that term to Jews, she focused only on its use by Josephus, totally ignoring Philo's uses. Nevertheless, she herself admitted that, officially speaking, this was only a partial, and therefore deficient, designation, and that it was most commonly used in unofficial documents (tombstones, etc.).⁴³

Indeed, several pieces of epigraphic evidence have been found which attest to the fact that the use of the term "Alexandrians" with reference to Jews was not unheard of.⁴⁴ The famous burial inscription of the artisan "Nicanor the Alexandrian who made the gates" (i.e., the famous "Nicanor Gate" of the Temple in Jerusalem),⁴⁵ explicitly describes him as an "Alexandrian" (Ἀλεξανδρέως). Through the courtesy of Dr. Haya Kaplan, I have been able to inspect the photograph of another, as-yet unpublished burial inscription found in Jaffa, on which the words ἀπὸ Ἀλεξανδρείας describe the origin of the deceased in quite a similar way to the designation noted above which related to Helenos, son of Tryphon. In fact, more inscriptions connected to "Alexandrians" living abroad in

Macedonia, Thessaly, and Tiberias of the Galilee have been found.⁴⁶ In brief: the term "Alexandrians" was used in daily life to denote not only the citizens of the Greek *polis*, but also the *origo* of permanent residents of the city, and, in my opinion, especially those who possessed a *politeia*.

Furthermore, a certain papyrus (CPJ, II, No. 142, lines 9–11) proves that some Jews owned lands within the chora (χώρα), countryside, of Alexandria, a fact which is also confirmed in Philo's writings (*In Flaccum*, 57). Can we not, then, assume that at least those Jews were entitled to be called "Alexandrians"? At first glance, those mentioned in the papyrus might even be counted among the citizens of the *polis*, especially if we accept the common view that, due to the restricted dimensions of the urban *chora*, ownership of its lands was limited to citizens alone. This conclusion, however, is implausible, as, according to the papyri mentioned above, those Jews were clearly referred to as "Macedonians," a group that was separately organized and quite distinct from the Greek *polis*.⁴⁷

Moreover, their affinity with the legal institutions of the Jewish community of Alexandria cannot be doubted nor ignored, as one of the Jews mentioned there deposited his will in the "archive of the Jews."⁴⁸ All this certainly indicates that, like the dual and somewhat obscure usage of the term *politai* for the citizens of the Greek *polis* and the members of the Jewish *politeuma* alike, the use of the term "Alexandrians" was rather vague, as it referred both to citizens of the *polis* and to permanent residents of Alexandria, or at least to those who had their own *politeia* and could therefore be classified as *politai*.

It is quite probable that the leading citizens of the *polis*, such as Apion, desired to eliminate the complexities of this dual and obscure usage of both these terms, in order to limit them to citizens of the *polis* alone. This is the interpretation which should be given to Apion's provocative statement (II, 65 below: "Why, then, if they are citizens [=cives], do they not worship the same gods as the Alexandrians?"). There can be no doubt whatever that these words were intended to refute the Jews' right to be called *politai* (=cives) and "Alexandrians," since, as Apion saw it, both those terms should apply only to citizens of the *polis*.⁴⁹ In other words, Apion objected to the existence, within the confines of the Alexandria, of any *politeia* other than that of the citizens of the Greek *polis*, whose right to be called "Alexandrians" was unequivocal and exclusive, and who all subscribed to the city's ritual. It is therefore quite reasonable to believe that the statement included in the Claudian edict (AJ, XIX, 281) with regard to the Jews of Alexandria and their right to be called "Alexandrians" proves that the struggle between them and the citizens of the *polis* was also related to this matter.

As stated above, Claudius' famous *Letter to the Alexandrians* (CPJ, II, No. 153) has been interpreted by most scholars as proof that Jews were not citizens of the Greek *polis* of Alexandria, and were therefore not entitled to be called "Alexandrians." It appears that their reading was

based mainly on lines 94–95, in which the Jews were warned that they should “enjoy what is their own (τὰ οἰκία),” since “in a city which is not their own (ἄλλοτρία πόλις), they possess an abundance of all good things.” Admittedly, Tcherikover’s conclusion that the Jews were not citizens of the *polis* is correct;⁵⁰ yet the very fact that Claudius’ letter was addressed to the Alexandrians, while at the same time speaking to the Jews of the city directly, indicates that they could be considered “Alexandrians.” In brief, that appellation could be applied in practice to the permanent residents of the city as well, following the common usage often found in epigraphic sources. This, in my opinion, was true especially with reference to those who had their own *politeia*.

In addition, as it is generally agreed that the term ἡ ἄλλοτρία customarily applied to “a foreign country,” the designation “a foreign city” was used in connection with persons whose residence in the city was temporary. Yet even Tcherikover has admitted that Emperor Claudius could not have meant to ascribe such significance to the term, as he himself stated that the Jews had been living in Alexandria for many long years (line 84). Tcherikover therefore thought the Emperor to have meant that Alexandria was “foreign” to them in the juridical-civic sense (namely “a city which is not their own”), indicating that they were not citizens of the *polis*. Indeed, I am convinced that he was right with respect to the Jews’ non-citizenship in the *polis*, but not with regard to the designation “Alexandrians,” which I believe was not reserved solely for citizens of the *polis*.

Here we come back to Philo’s clear and explicit statement (see above), and it is important again to note that, in this matter, Josephus concurred with him entirely. Stern rightly believed that it was during the Roman era that the terms “Alexandrians” and *politai* became legally and politically confused and obscured.⁵¹ As he saw it, there can be no doubt that the Jewish *politeuma* in Alexandria existed and that the Jews enjoyed a broad set of legal rights, as testified to so well by Strabo (*apud* Josephus, *AJ*, XIV, 117–118) and Philo.⁵² On the other hand, the status of the Greek *polis*, which was subordinate to the unqualified sovereignty of the Roman administration and as such did not even have its own city council (*Boule*),⁵³ created a situation in which the legal rights enjoyed by members of Jewish *politeuma* were not much different from those given to the citizens of the *polis*. The broad-based autonomy of the Jewish organization may even have aroused feelings of frustration, envy, and jealousy among the Greek citizens, leading, of course, to general animosity towards the Jews. It appears that Cary was correct in asserting that “the Greeks of Alexandria were substantially on the same footing as the Jewish colony” (namely the Jewish *politeuma*).⁵⁴

The struggles of the Jews for equal rights in Alexandria were perceived by most scholars as struggles for equal citizenship in the Greek *polis*, as if this were the Jews’ greatest and most secret desire. Conspicuous among those scholars is Tcherikover, whose studies were and still are the most thorough and comprehensive with regard to this issue. By using the

method of historical projection, he sought to compare the Jews' struggle for equal rights in Alexandria to a "war of emancipation" whose objective was citizenship in the Greek *polis*.⁵⁵ According to Tcherikover and his supporters, the citizens of the *polis* were vigilant in ensuring that the undesirable Jews did not infiltrate into their midst. This, as they saw it, was the crux of the "Jewish question"; in this, there is scarcely any difference between ancient times and the modern era.

The disadvantage of this method is self-evident. The terms "war of emancipation" and "Jewish question" were actually coined in Western Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which was an entirely different, distant, and alien reality, from the standpoint of both place and time, and therefore, no backward projection can be made from that period onto ancient times. A study by Hoffmann on the term *Judenfrage* proves this in a most illustrative way.⁵⁶

Tcherikover built his theory *inter alia* on his commentary to one paragraph of Claudius' *Letter to the Alexandrians* (CPJ, II, No. 153, lines 73ff.), in which the emperor warned the Alexandrians "not to intrude (ἐπισπαίειν) themselves into the games presided over by the gymnasiarchs and cosmetes," namely, the gymnasium supervisors and directors of the games and competitions. For him, this was the main proof of Jewish efforts to obtain Alexandrian citizenship by gaining access to the city gymnasium.⁵⁷ Attractive as this interpretation might be, it is based on a wrong textual emendation of the word ἐπισπαίειν instead of ἐπισπαίρειν, as written in the original text and which means, in this context, "to oppose something or someone," or "to obstruct," "to resist," "to harass," etc. In fact, the emendation entailed the omission of the letter ρ(ρo) and the insertion of the letter ε (*eta*), and thus it led also to a syntactical error, created by the newly produced word ἐπισπαίρειν. But the latter requires the preposition ἐφ with the accusative case, and not the dative as suggested by Claudius' *Letter to the Alexandrians*.

Furthermore, there is no historical justification for the emendation, since it is highly unlikely that Jews could have "intruded themselves" into the city gymnasium presided over by such confirmed anti-Semitic gymnasiarchs as Isidorus and Lampo, the more so during the stormy years of 38–41 CE. Claudius' *Letter to the Alexandrians* had nothing to do with any surreptitious "infiltration" by Jews into the Alexandrian gymnasium in order to gain citizenship in the *polis*. It simply warned the Jews "not to harass" (μηδὲ ἐπισπαίρειν) the games arranged by the gymnasiarchs and cosmetes—a warning that shows the Jews' hostility towards that institution which had humiliated them not long before (e.g., Philo, *In Flaccum*, 34).⁵⁸ The late Professor Saul Lieberman also supported me in this presumption, in a personal letter written in the spring of 1981, which I have kept to this day.

Concluding this specific issue, it should be stressed that no historical source provides any explicit proof that the Jews really sought to obtain citizenship in the Greek *polis*. Their demand for equal political rights

should not, then, be interpreted as a demand for emancipation (in the modern sense), but rather, as a demand for equal status between their own (namely Jewish) *politeia*, and the politeia of the "other Alexandrians."

The concepts of equality in Josephus' writings are at times excessively general and obscure.⁵⁹ One of these is the term *ἰσονομία* ("equality before the law"), used by Josephus to describe the legal status of the Jews of Asia Minor and Cyrene (*AJ*, XVI, 160). The same holds true of the term *ἰσοτιμία* or *ἴση τιμή*, used to designate the "equal privileges" of the Jews of Alexandria and Antioch, relative to those of the "Macedonians" and the "Greeks" (*AJ*, XII, 119; *CA*, II, 35). In contrast to the above, Josephus also used more concrete terms of equality, such as *ἰσομοιρία* ("equal part" or "equal share", i.e., partnership in some asset), in reference to the Jews' right of residence within Alexandria (*BJ*, II, 487); and also *ἰσοτελεία* ("equal taxation") with regard to the fiscal rights of the Jews in Asia Minor and Cyrene (*AJ*, XVI, 161).⁶⁰

It is generally believed that the poll-tax (*laographia*) imposed on all Egyptian "subjects" (*dediticii*) or "natives" (*laoi*), also applied to the Jews of Alexandria, as only Roman citizens and citizens of the Greek *polis* were exempt from it.⁶¹ However, we have no clear-cut evidence attesting that this tax was imposed on all Jews in the city. It is my opinion that, although during the Roman era the Jews were theoretically considered "subjects" liable to the *laographia*, there are grounds to maintain that, at least those who were descendants of military settlers, such as "Macedonians", and members of the Jewish *politeuma* — both groups were considerable in number — were actually eligible for *isopoliteia* as were the citizens of the Greek *polis*. I believe this right to have been given to all those who enjoyed the status of *politai* and were entitled to be called "Alexandrians." This was, perhaps, the more practical and more concrete side of the struggle for equal rights (although one not devoid of symbolic significance).

The term *ἰσοπολιτεία* (*AJ*, XIX, 281), which is undoubtedly the most important in connection with the matter at hand, has been given the most attention in the literature, and provided the principal means of corroborating the notion that the Jews longed for "emancipation" and "equal civic rights" in the Greek *polis*. The commonly-accepted scholarly definition of the *isopoliteia* states that the reference is to a mutual exchange of civic rights between two cities, by virtue of a treaty between them.⁶² Was this what Josephus actually had in mind? The answer must be negative, as we have never found any evidence of a treaty having to do with the exchange of civic rights between a *polis* and a *politeuma*; moreover, the Alexandrian *polis* did not have the power nor the ability to decide this issue. Under the Ptolemies and the Roman Empire, the central authorities wielded the most stringent control over the granting of citizenship, so that this power could not possibly have been delegated to the Greek *polis* itself. Accordingly, it is difficult to imagine the possibility of an exchange of civic rights between the Alexandrian *polis* and the Jewish community.

But was Josephus, by using the term *isopoliteia*, really referring to the right of the Jews in Alexandria to citizenship in the *polis*, as Tcherikover and others believed? At first glance, it would appear that the answer is affirmative, especially as it can be confirmed (or so it would seem) by a comment made by Josephus on the Claudian edict, stated in direct correlation to a conflict in the city of Dora in Judea in 41 CE (*AJ*, XIX, 306). That comment mentioned “the edict of the Emperor which permits the Jews to follow their own customs, yet also, be it noted, bids them to live as fellow citizens with the Greeks.”⁶³

In my opinion, this passage expresses (albeit in a slightly different form) Philo’s familiar contention with respect to the Jewish *politeia*, which was based on two components: on one hand, the right to keep special Jewish laws and customs; and on the other, the right to an equal share in general civic rights.⁶⁴ The second component, as we know, was defined by the code of “civic laws” (οἱ πολιτικοὶ νόμοι, which applied to both citizens of *poleis* and members of *politeumata*, as opposed to “law of the land” (ὁ τῆς χώρας νόμος), which applied to the inferior “natives” (*laoi*).⁶⁵ We have already seen that the Jews’ affinity to this code of laws is proven beyond all doubt by a very old papyrological document dating from 226 BCE (*CPI*, I, No. 19), as well as by Philo’s testimony with regard to the penalties exacted from the Jews of Alexandria (*In Flaccum*, 78–80).

The term *isopoliteia* was apparently derived from the political lexicon commonly used in Athens, where democracy was referred to as “equal and similar *politeia*” (πολιτεία ἴση καὶ ὁμοία). This is extremely significant, if we note that the constitution of the Alexandrian *polis* was drawn up in the Athenian format.⁶⁶ The concept is not meant to indicate equal and identical citizenship but rather, equality between two separate and mutually-independent political entities, each of which has its own *politeia* defining the totality of its organizational rights.⁶⁷ Moreover, the claim that a Jewish *politeuma* was not expressly mentioned in Caesarea Maritima neither adds nor detracts, since the term *politeia* with regard thereto is systematically used throughout Josephus’ writings (and, as a matter of fact, in Philo’s writings as well) in a manner synonymous with and equivalent to *politeuma*.⁶⁸ We have already seen that Strabo expressly labeled the organized community of the Jews in Alexandria with the parallel term *politeia* (*apud* Josephus, *AJ*, XIV, 117). As the term *politeia* encompassed several meanings, understanding its use in Josephus’ writings, as in those of other authors, is, to a great degree, a matter of nuance, and accordingly requires strict attention and clarification in each individual case.

Let us summarize this entire issue: The members of the Jewish *politeuma* in Alexandria were considered by both Philo and Josephus to have been *politai* and “Alexandrians,” and to have enjoyed “civic rights” equal to those of the “Macedonians” and the “Greeks” in the following areas: (1) *isotimia* (“equal privileges” or “equal status”), stated principally with reference to the “Macedonians,” by virtue of military service under the

Ptolemies; (2) *isonomia* ("equality before the law") for members of the Jewish *politeuma* as *politai*, who benefited from a legal affinity to the code of "civic laws," as did the "Greeks" (namely the citizens of the Greek *polis*); (3) *isoteleia* ("equal taxation"), which exempted them from payment of the poll-tax (*laographia*) that applied to "subjects" (*dediticii*, namely "natives" or *laoi*), as well as the *metoikion* which applied to permanent residents (*metics*) who were not citizens of the *polis*; (4) *isomoiria* ("equal share"), which was the basic right to permanent residence within the city; and (5) *isopoliteia* ("political equality"), which enabled them to organize independently (of the *polis*) and maintain their own autonomous legal and religious establishments.⁶⁹

New papyri documents dated 144/3–133/2 BCE under the reign of Ptolemy VIII Eurgetes II clearly indicate the existence of a Jewish *politeuma* in Herakleopolis (τὸ ἐν Ἡρακλείου πόλει πολίτευμα τῶν Ἰουδαίων) in the Fayum under the leadership of archons (ἄρχοντες) and a *politarch* (πολιτάρχης). James M.S. Cowey (from the Institut für Papyrologie, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg) first presented these papyri at the International Conference of Papyrology held in Berlin in August, 1995.

In July 2001, these very papyri were published in a book by James M.S. Cowey and Klaus Maresch,⁷⁰ in which the editors connect the establishment of the Jewish *politeuma* in Herakleopolis with military service under the Ptolemies. Indeed, it is quite a well-known fact that most of the *politeumata* under the Ptolemies' reign were an outgrowth of the army,⁷¹ which is exactly the case here. When considering the place of origin and the date of new papyri, it appears that the editors are right in maintaining that the "*politeuma* of the Jews of Herakleopolis" was established as a military colony during the time of Ptolemy VI Philometor.⁷² Its military character is also confirmed by an archive (not yet published, but included in Cowey's Ph.D. dissertation)⁷³ dated to the middle of the second century BCE, which related to Dioskurides, the commander (ἡγεμὼν) of the place as well as the commandant of the garrison posted at its fortress (φρούραρχος).⁷⁴ From a strategic viewpoint, Herakleopolis must have been an important post, similar to the Jewish military colony and fortress in Leontopolis.⁷⁵ The fortress at Herakleopolis was located in the center of the so-called "harbor" ("ὄρμος" quarter," the inhabitants of which were accordingly designated "those from the harbor" (τῶν ὀπὸ τοῦ ὄρμου). It appears that the quarter was separated from other city quarters, so as to create a quite distinct geographic unit,⁷⁶ namely a *Landsmanschaft* neighborhood, which was then a familiar phenomenon among Egyptian Jewry, as well as among other ethnic groups.⁷⁷

The harbor itself was probably situated on the river banks of the western branch of the Nile, which stretched northward from the city of Ptolemaïs (Upper Egypt) to Arsinoë-Krokodilopolis (Middle Egypt) and the surrounding fertile region (today called Fayum). In other words,

Herakleopolis was located at the entrance of the most productive valley in Hellenistic Egypt, still justifiably considered one of the most famous granaries of the ancient world. I hope that I do not err in thinking that Herakleopolis was one of the main links in the “river guard” (*fluminis custodia*) security system, which, as mentioned by Josephus, controlled navigation on the Nile.⁷⁸ I have already assumed elsewhere that other Jewish military units were integrated into that very security system, as suggested, albeit indirectly, by inscriptions from Schedia and Athribis (Lower Egypt).⁷⁹

Worthy of note in this context is the fifth document in Cowey and Maresch’s book, which contains an appeal by a certain Jew called Poliktos son of Poliktos, addressed to the archons of the *politeuma*. The man’s title, “Macedonian of the Demetrios’ cavalry mercenaries” (Μακεδὼν, τῶν Δημητρίου ἱππέων μισθοφόρων), signifies his membership in a most prestigious unit in the service of the Ptolemaic army. Incidentally, this is another decisive proof for the existence of “Macedonian” Jews, as mentioned by Josephus (*BJ*, II, 488; *CA*, II, 35–36). The striking point here is that the new evidence predates by more than a century the proof at hand (i.e. *CPJ*, II, 142–143), which is dated 13–12 BCE (namely the Augustan era).

Almost all the documents from Herakleopolis are juridical appeals and petitions addressed to the local *politeuma* and its *archontes* (without mentioning their names). In two cases they are addressed to a *politarch* named Alexander, who probably was superior to the archons, or if to follow the editors’ view, was rather ranked as *primus inter pares*. The appeals deal with general juridical issues such as unpaid loans including interest-bearing loans between Jews (e.g., document 8), uncompleted works (document 10) and private quarrels (documents 1, 7, 10–12, 15). The very fact that appeals were forwarded to the *archons* and the *politarch* indicates that these magistrates wielded judicial powers similar to those seen in Greek ethnic entities in the Egyptian *chora*. In other words, they are depicted as influential leaders who exerted pressure on rival litigants to resolve controversial issues. They were also authorized to demand that the parties appear in court (documents 1, 7, 10–12, 15), and in difficult cases, were even empowered to imprison offenders, whether in dependent villages of the rural periphery or in the city-center of Herakleopolis itself (documents 2, 17).

Three documents (3–5), which deal with laws of matrimony and reflect the common Greek norms adopted by the Jews in Egypt, such as the giving of dowries, are especially interesting. However, the use of “Jewish oaths” in legal documentation, or the very reliance on “ancestral laws” (or “ancestral customs”),⁸⁰ is very significant and illustrative, since it proves that Jewish norms were seen as being legitimate by Ptolemaic law courts. To take this one step further, a certain case in which Jewish matrimonial law was invoked to settle a dispute confirms the fact that Greek and Jewish customs were followed simultaneously even if this

practice sometimes led to juridical contradictions (which could also have been caused by different judicial interpretations of these customs and laws).

Among the Jewish magistrates mentioned were also "elders" (πρεσβύτεροι), who were subordinate to the archons in both Herakleopolis or the dependent neighboring villages (documents 3, 6, 19, 29). Apropos these "elders", their very mention in the papyri strengthens of course the authenticity of the *Letter of Aristaeas* (310), which itself mentions the "elders" from Alexandria. There are also references to "judges" (κριταί), but it is not clear whether they had the same status as the archons or were of lower rank.⁸¹

The existence of a local archive (ὀρχεῖον), in which legal documents of the community and its members were registered for safekeeping (documents 3, 6, 8, 19, 20) corresponds to what we know about the Jewish community in Alexandria.⁸² Apparently, the very act of legal registration was performed by a "scribe" (γραμματεὺς), as was common in many Jewish communities throughout the Hellenistic-Roman Diaspora.

The office of *hyperetes* (ὑπηρέτης) is mentioned only once in the Herakleopolis papyri (document 9), but its nature and specific functions are not sufficiently clear. It would appear that the *hyperetes* was responsible for implementing the courts' decisions on behalf of the archons. Since this position has been linked in several places with military service,⁸³ I am inclined to consider such a possibility with regard to the Jewish *politeuma* of Herakleopolis as well. In other words: the ὑπηρέται (literally: armor-bearers) functioned as service providers (or rather operators) under the direct command of the archons, and were in charge of enforcing their decisions and verdicts.

The new papyri can prove the existence of minor Jewish communities in villages related to the Herakleopolite district, as well as in neighboring districts like those of Aphroditopolis and Oxyrhynchus. In their official capacity, their dealings in Herakleopolis were primarily in the nature of summoning offenders to the court of justice, either to testify at a tribunal presided over by the *archons*, or as part of an arbitration proceeding. The appeals addressed by people from the smaller communities may indicate, at least in some cases, that they were under the administrative jurisdiction of the *politeuma* of Herakleopolis as a result of their military service (a credible relationship between subunits and the supreme commander.)⁸⁴

As already mentioned above, the autonomous organization of the local community as a *politeuma* is a clear-cut fact accepted by the editors of this book. Furthermore, they even concluded that it functioned exactly as described by Strabo (*apud* Josephus, *AJ*, XIV, 116–117) in regard to the Jewish *politeia* (= *politeuma*) at Alexandria. Indeed, since the members of the Herakleopolis *politeuma* were designated *politai* (πολίται = fellow citizens) in one of the documents (document 1, lines 17–18) and they were distinct from the strangers and non-Jews (ἄλλόφυλοι), it is obvious that they constituted a self-contained body, well defined

and legally recognized by the Ptolemaic authorities. This is also totally consistent with Philo's description of the Alexandria Jewish community.⁸⁵ Quite a comparable situation was evident in the Jewish community of Leontopolis, where members were also designated *politai*, and their highest leadership similarly titled *politarch*,⁸⁶ facts which undoubtedly confirmed that they were organized as a *politeuma*.⁸⁷ One might get the impression, rightly so, that the local Jewish *politeuma* enjoyed the kind of autonomy which is described by Strabo (*apud* Josephus, *AJ*, XIV, 116–117) vis-à-vis the Jewish community of Alexandria.

The new papyri can verify the statement found in the *Letter of Aristeas* 310, which itself verifies the Berenice inscriptions, and therefore dispels all the reservations raised by Zuckerman and his followers.⁸⁸ The *politeuma* theory is quite real after all, and by no means a historiographic legend.

CHAPTER TWO

COLLECTIVE EXPATRIATIONS OF GREEKS IN THE FIFTEENTH THROUGH SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES

ANASTASSIA PAPADIA-LALA

The notion that there have been migrations of Greek populations throughout the span of Greek history is a generally accepted axiom. Scholarly research into particular cases, which at various times and places have demonstrated specific and quite dissimilar characteristics, has failed to invalidate this concept and in fact, has strengthened the argument that it is a distinct historical phenomenon.

Based on the above observation and within the context of the broader issue of the “diaspora,” our research will focus on one of the many aspects of the widespread migratory phenomenon which marks the history of modern Greece,¹ that is, the “collective expatriations” of Greeks from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century. The period under examination opens with the first defeat of the Byzantine Empire by the Frankish Crusaders and the Venetians in 1204, and ends with the creation of the restricted Greek State in 1828. During this period, traditionally Greek lands had fallen under the dominion of, on the one hand, various West European peoples (Franks, Venetians, Genoese, Knights of St. John), and on the other hand, the Ottoman Turks.

Furthermore, these territories were prized by both the Ottoman Empire and the Western powers, including those that were already established lords of the region, as mentioned above, or new contenders for power, such as Spain. Thus, we are referring to a long period of foreign domination and changing demographic trends, which required Greek populations to coexist with other groups of differing nationality or religion.²

While avoiding the great debate over “identities” in that early era, we can still define these Greek populations as being mainly, if not exclusively, characterized by the Greek language (or, in cases of bilingualism, Greek and Albanian), the Orthodox faith, and common cultural roots. These characteristics existed within a framework of an identity of belonging to a greater “Greek” community, comprised of other inhabitants not only of traditionally Greek territories, but also of areas outside its geographical borders; this identity remained strong, despite constant changes within the various elements mentioned above.³

Tumultuous political circumstances led to significant shifts in demography and massive, organized departures of Greek citizens from their ancestral homes. In fact, these “collective expatriations” were governed by official agreements negotiated between Greeks and various foreign powers.

The individual episodes that are encompassed by this phenomenon have complex and various characteristics, and their common denominator is not always self-evident. This analysis presents certain typical cases, which fall into two broader categories within the contemporary historical context:

- a. Greeks residing in Latin-held Greek regions, who accompanied their erstwhile Western rulers (such as the Venetians and the Knights of St. John) after the Ottomans conquered their homes.
- b. Greeks from Ottoman-held Greek regions who, under pressure from the Ottomans but also due to internal socio-economic problems, were forced to emigrate under the protection or at the invitation of other foreign powers.

This analysis will not concentrate on historical, factual evidence, for thorough scientific studies already exist. It purports rather to identify those factors which emerge consistently from an examination of related phenomena, and aims to classify them within a common typological form.

The case of Greek refugees from Latin-held Greek regions has strong similarities to that of refugees from the Byzantine Empire, who fled their homes as a result of the continual advance of Ottoman forces into Byzantine territories from the middle of the fourteenth century to the fall of Constantinople in 1453. This exodus, however, never became widespread and was generally limited to members of the upper classes, particularly scholars, to the point that many modern scholars have called that particular event an “aristocratic phenomenon.”⁴

In contrast, under the similar historical circumstances — the conquest of formerly Latin-held Greek regions by the Ottomans — the migrations discussed here involved vast numbers of people and were well-organized, as sizeable segments of local Greek populations linked their fortunes to those of their former Western rulers, who assumed responsibility for their subjects’ future. The most typical example is presented by the Venetian

State. From 1463 to 1699, over the course of five Veneto-Turkish wars, the Venetians lost substantial parts of their Greek lands: the island of Euboea (1470), the important trade bases of Coron and Modon (1503), as well as Nauplion and Monemvasia (1540) in the Peloponnese, and the large islands of Cyprus (1570) and Crete (1669).⁵ These losses resulted in large movements of refugees.

A similar incident happened in 1522, after the Ottomans captured Rhodes and the island's rulers, the Knights of St. John, retreated.⁶ In both these cases, the refugees' movements were dictated by international agreements; the subsequent collective exodus held out no prospect of return as the refugees carried away the sacred objects symbolizing their links with the fatherland. It should, however, be noted here that those refugees who expatriated did so voluntarily; they came from a certain segment of the indigenous population with which they shared common social traits. Most were inhabitants of fortified cities within the Greek regions: feudal landowners, nobles, and citizens, as well as lower classes among the urban population, who enjoyed special privileges and identified themselves in many ways, at least ideologically, with their Latin rulers.

On the other hand, residents of rural areas, who were much more numerous, had been subjected for centuries to the suppressive feudal regime of the Latin lords; they remained behind and often viewed the shifts in the political landscape with indifference or forbearance. Their decision to stay is likely a result of both the practical difficulties of leaving, due to their dependence on the land they had been cultivating, and a more general social displeasure with their rulers, even if this feeling had not yet been expressed as a conscious turkophile ideology.⁷ Hence, the refugees were, in most cases, a minority among the local populace. Nevertheless, they comprised a dynamic, socially distinct sector, and their migration affected the demographic, as well as the economic, balance of the Greek regions.

The final destinations of the refugees were determined by local economic conditions, as well as Venice's wider political strategies. After Crete was lost to the Ottomans, the island's mainly Catholic, noble families of Venetian origin settled in Venice itself. These families were rapidly assimilated into their new surroundings and accepted as members of the Venetian upper class. This is an interesting example of a collective settlement of refugees in an urban environment but is not fully characteristic of the Greek case, as the refugees were actually returning, albeit centuries later, to their ancestral homes.⁸ Venice was also home to a large number of Greek refugees, centered round the city's Greek Confraternity.⁹ While their settlement was not effected according to the strategy formulated by the Venetian State, such planned settlements were established in predominantly rural areas under Venetian dominance, either within the Greek regions or outside them.

In the Venetian-held Greek regions, the Venetians treated the Greek

refugees with particular kindness and supported them through the allocation of agricultural land and social privileges, in an effort not only to provide moral recompense, but also to increase productivity and maintain public order. Indicative of such policies were the early sixteenth century relocation of refugees from Coron and Modon, and later from Nauplion and Monemvasia, to the Venetian-held islands of Corfu, Zante and Cephalonia,¹⁰ as well as refugees from Nauplion and Monemvasia to the Lasithi plateau in Venetian-held Crete, where settlement had been forbidden for centuries following a series of earlier revolts by the native population.¹¹

Furthermore, refugees from Peloponnese and, even more so, the nobility and the bourgeoisie of Crete found themselves welcomed to the exclusive local councils (which were inaccessible to most natives), thus achieving a high social position as well as administrative privileges. In this way, the established social order of the refugees' former countries was duplicated through the corresponding social stratification of their new homelands.¹² Their common Greek Orthodox heritage facilitated such a rapid and thorough assimilation that a few generations later, only certain place names and surnames/nicknames recalled their geographic origins.¹³

The settlement of Greeks in Venetian lands outside the Greek regions followed different patterns. A typical example was the Istria peninsula in the northern Adriatic. This Venetian-held region, where the native population had been continually challenging their masters, witnessed successive settlements of refugee families from Nauplion, Monemvasia, Crete, Cyprus, and the Peloponnese from the middle of the sixteenth to the beginning of the eighteenth century. The Venetians' objective was to shape the demographic development of the area by introducing friendly elements. The settlements were basically rural; the refugees were allocated plots of land — varying in size according to their previous social position — that by and large had been expropriated from the native population. The reaction of the locals, along with pressure exerted by the Roman Catholic Church, prevented the refugees from making a smooth transition. Some of them returned to the Greek regions, some migrated to other foreign areas, while a smaller number were assimilated into the surrounding culture and subsequently lost their ethnic identity.¹⁴

A similar situation occurred when the Orthodox inhabitants of Rhodes followed the Knights of St John into exile once the Ottomans took over the island in 1522. After wandering for many years, the rulers and their former subjects came to settle together on Malta in 1530 as a distinct group of people, separate from the rest of the Knights and the native islanders. The Rhodesians were initially given, as recompense, substantial real estate assets, as well as the freedom to worship according to their Orthodox faith. The refugees observed the rudiments of their Greek heritage for a considerable time, but as time passed their sense of affinity to Greek culture faded. From the seventeenth century onward they gradually adopted the Western Church's dogma and were fully

assimilated, due to intermarriage and their long interaction with the local community. Today, there is a small number of Greek Orthodox and Uniates living in Malta, but they probably trace their origins to subsequent migrations.¹⁵

Our second category of Greek immigrants from Ottoman-held Greek regions is analogous in many ways. These migrations were usually the result of negotiated arrangements following the involvement of the local Greek population in anti-Ottoman revolutionary uprisings. In this context, from the sixteenth century onwards, the Venetians invited or welcomed on territories such as the Ionian Islands, not only individual refugees but also organized groups of Greeks of military and rural origin, together with their families. As in the previous examples cited above, these immigrants adapted easily to the social structure of the Venetian-ruled Greek regions and were quickly assimilated by the native Greek population.¹⁶ In some instances, other foreign powers approved the establishment of collective settlements outside the traditional Greek regions, as in Southern Italy and Corsica.

The case of Southern Italy is significant in the wider historical-cultural context, due to the centuries-long presence of Greeks in the region, from antiquity to modern times. During the Ottoman Rule of Greece, a good number of Greeks, as well Albanians, from Epirus and the Peloponnese settled intermittently at dispersed locations in Apulia, Calabria, Campania, and Sicily. Theirs was a diverse social origin: descendants of aristocratic Byzantine houses, soldiers, but mainly farmers. Their families had participated in activities against the Ottomans, and/or faced financial difficulties. They settled in areas that not only had had a Greek presence dating back to antiquity but were also imbued with a rich Byzantine cultural and religious tradition. These settlements were almost exclusively rural, so that the settlers' relationship to the land also determined their socioeconomic status: feudal land owners or free peasants, the latter including both owners of small holdings or landless sharecroppers. Most of the Greek settlements gradually lost their distinctiveness and were absorbed into the local environment. Their assimilation was facilitated by their gradual conversion to Catholicism, a fact which eliminated an important component of their ethnic identity. Within the most mountainous and inaccessible communities, however, the inhabitants spoke the "Grekanika" dialect, which had its roots in ancient Greece, and they preserved certain Greek cultural traditions. The Greek-speaking communities in southern Italy retained strong cultural ties with Greece, but represented themselves as "indigenous" Greeks, using their status as a tool for constructing an identity as citizens of the Italian South.¹⁷

The migration of the inhabitants of Mani, a mountainous and semi-autonomous region of Ottoman-ruled Peloponnese, is marked by the same historical context. Mani had developed a distinctive internal social structure based on family networks.¹⁸ The inhabitants made successive efforts at collective expatriation, in agreement with foreign

rulers; their course of action was spurred by a combination of their participation in anti-Ottoman groups, local economic difficulties, and internal strife between powerful clans, such as the Yatrakoi, Medikoi, and Stefanopouloi.¹⁹ The most important settlement of Maniates was the 1676 migration of the Stefanopouloi clan to Corsica, at the invitation of the Republic of Genoa, which ruled the island. The immigrants left their homeland under extremely emotional circumstances and settled together to cultivate the land in special areas that had been set aside for them.

Over the ensuing centuries, they have been allies of the Corsican rulers, first the Genoese and later the French, who purchased the island in 1768. Their loyalty to the regime brought them in violent conflict with the native population during the Corsican revolt against the Genoese in 1730 and later, during the French Revolution. Consequently, the Maniates — who remained isolated within their own communities, shut away from the hostility of the surrounding society — reincarnated the strict social hierarchy of the fatherland. Only later, in the nineteenth century, did the community start to reach outwards, as its members began to convert to Catholicism and intermarry with local residents. Today, the assimilation of the Maniates is quite complete; some elements, however, of the Greek language and cultural-religious tradition survive among their descendants, a mere echo of a distant homeland still living in the collective memory of the people.²⁰

The various examples we have examined illustrate the collective expatriations of Greeks between the fifteenth and the seventeenth century as a historical phenomenon with multifaceted, but common constituent characteristics. We are therefore able to formulate a particular typology of the Greek migratory phenomenon, which is distinct from the better-known and more extensively studied trend towards commerce-motivated migrations which appeared from the seventeenth century onwards and resulted in the establishment of strong Greek merchant communities abroad.

These expatriations were the consequence of the historical circumstances of their times. They were shaped by the relations of the Greeks living under foreign rule with various Western European powers, as well as local ideological and socioeconomic circumstances. In all cases, the expatriation was collective, involved entire families, and was organized by the foreign host or ruler; it did not involve entire communities and was not compulsory. The actual act of expatriation was quite dramatic in nature, since the expatriates were conscious of its permanence and irreversibility, yet this reality was made easier to accept by the fact that the new settlements were well structured. The political and economic role the Greek refugees were expected to play in their new lands was determined by their foreign protectors, who generally supported their ambition to live as soldier-farmers.

The very nature of the refugees' prearranged employment as farmers inevitably entailed a close attachment to their new land and discouraged

any contact with the fatherland, in contrast to the situation of Greeks who emigrated for mercantile reasons. Furthermore, emigration together with their entire family weakened their links to their land of birth, in contrast again to Greek merchants, who usually left their families behind.²¹ Their integration into their new environment was a complex process, that was sometimes achieved more rapidly and sometimes less. All these refugee groups initially functioned as closed societies of "foreigners" with particular characteristics of their own. Their evolution into full members of society was often determined by external factors such as the geographical terrain, local economic activities, and their acceptance by the native population.

Their absorption illustrates an interesting facet of their search for identity and the shaping of a broader national conscience during a period in which there was no Greek State. The refugees who moved into Greek regions created socioeconomic problems for the host communities and were often confronted with enmity. Their identification as "foreigners" was, however, limited to the notion that they were not native-born and their refugee status was basically recognized as the outcome of a migration within a notional, but identifiable, broader "homeland." These concepts helped pave the way for their acceptance into their new environment so that in a relatively short, if difficult, period of time, the population became quite homogenous.

In the case of settlements outside the Greek regions, however, the concept of "foreigner" symbolized multiple facets of diversity; this, and the fact that Greek communities deliberately maintained their differences, provoked confrontation with the surrounding populations and encouraged their exclusion. These groups of refugees safeguarded their identity by insisting on intra-marriage among their members. This, however, "fossilized" the groups and left them cut off from the social evolution that was taking place both in their land of origin, as well as in their new country.

Sooner or later, the refugees gained access to the local society, but this process often took on extreme overtones. For example, those elements of Greek culture that had been zealously upheld until then, such as the Orthodox faith and, in many cases, the Greek language were abandoned entirely. In contrast to the robust merchant communities, which played an important role in preserving Greek national self-awareness, rural Greek communities abroad were virtually wiped out. The few that have survived, however, as integral parts of the nation-states in which they belong, still retain elements of their linguistic and cultural tradition, which is now under the official protection of the states themselves. And, in parallel, they have created a forum for cultural dialogue with the Greek State in the context of a new, complex, multicultural Europe.

PART III:
THE DIASPORA IN
ITS VARIOUS GUISES

A. THE GREEK DIASPORA:
PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS

CHAPTER ONE

RECONSTITUTING COMMUNITY: CULTURAL DIFFERENTIATION AND IDENTITY POLITICS IN CHRISTIAN ORTHODOX COMMUNITIES DURING THE LATE OTTOMAN ERA

HARIS EXERTZOGLOU

That both the Greeks and the Jews have experienced periods of emigration, forced or otherwise, and can be found living today in many parts of the world, offers a legitimate perspective for addressing an issue of common interest and discussing it comparatively. These migratory movements, which have occurred in the past as well as in more recent times, are usually described as diasporic. If the concept of “Diaspora” is examined more closely, it appears to me that it rests upon two powerful foundations.

First, a diaspora is composed of peripheral networks dispersed around a center or point of origin. Be it a cultural matrix or a state, this center is the locus from which the Diaspora’s social networks emanate and radiate. Encompassing a broad spectrum of groups, such networks are the outcome of diverse factors ranging from political or religious persecution to economic or demographic pressure. Once formed, Diaspora networks create multiple relations with their point of origin, and whereas some networks never dissolve their ties with that center, others develop a strong sense of autonomy.

These differences, however, do not seem capable of undermining the characteristically strong sense of community, the second foundation of the Diaspora concept. Although Diaspora historians acknowledge

variations and fluctuations in the relations between center and periphery, the descriptive and analytical value of the community is never doubted. It is usually argued that — in spite of existing historical or cultural differences — the common ties joining center to periphery cannot be denied. In other words, the concept of Diaspora is based upon a sense of community that remains fundamentally unchanged. However much outside influences affect these networks, the community's inner self does not change but instead, adapts itself to new circumstances.

Undoubtedly, there is no reason to deny that the center and its Diaspora networks have something in common. More often than not, members of these networks speak the same language, belong to one faith, and share some cultural traits. But this understanding should not lead us to believe that the social and cultural relations between center and periphery remain static. In fact these relations have been historically (re)defined to such an extent that the original relationship between the center and Diaspora networks is sometimes turned on its head. Diaspora networks have not retained exclusive relations with their point of origin but rather sought out cultural encounters with their host societies. The outcome of these encounters and how it is deflected back to the center is an issue that invites many answers.

I do not claim that such encounters inevitably loosen and weaken the ties between Diaspora networks and their point of origin, although in some cases that might be the case. But I am claiming that the original and, presumably, strong relations between center and periphery evolve into an array of new ties that would not necessarily be of the same order of magnitude as before.

To my mind, conventional perceptions of Diaspora are anachronistic; they must be reconsidered because as they stand now, they underestimate diversity and difference while taking unity and coherence for granted, precisely because they are always embedded in the language of community. Of course, the word community is conveniently used to describe human relations, and virtually any human aggregate exceeding the size of the extended family can be classified as such. This word has been used in the context of different historical circumstances to convey the meaning of "something in common," something which the members of a given community actually share. In other words, the meaning of community, which has assumed universal proportions, refers to some sort of unity, identity and authenticity. As a consequence of nineteenth-century nationalist thought, identity and community became highly politicized issues. National communities were seen as being coherent entities with defined cultural and spatial boundaries. Objectified in this way, communities became components of the natural world and not descriptors of a particular social order or historical situation.

What I am arguing is that any notion of community resting upon such essentialist assumptions is not only denying the historicity of community itself, and thus the infinite political configurations of human

understanding or conflict, but is entirely inadequate to account for historical change and transformation. Processes of community making and identity shaping are the products of specific historical circumstances and power struggles, sustained by and entrenched within particular discourses about community, identity, and the self.

The above-mentioned issues will be examined through the prism of Christian Orthodox communities within the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These examples will serve as a point of departure for understanding the changes and transformations that took place during the nineteenth century, and which subsequently and drastically affected the process of community making. The Ottoman context is notoriously complicated and some initial explanations should be given at the outset of this discussion.

First, the use of the term "Christian Orthodox community" demands explanation because both of its components can be confusing. Students of Ottoman history are well aware that religion was a powerful mechanism of political and legal discrimination in the Ottoman Empire. During the last centuries of Ottoman rule, particularly in the nineteenth century, non-Muslim religious communities were referred to in official documents as *millet*. To the extent that religion commanded collective and personal allegiance, it was also a criterion of identity and community making. It goes without saying that, religion apart, the Christian Orthodox community, or any religious community for that matter, was widely fragmented in terms of language, culture, and geography. Hence the term "Christian Orthodox community" as employed here does not refer to a homogenous or original community, but rather to a loose sense of identity intersected by other local, professional, or familial affiliations.

On the other hand, the use of the word "community" (κοινότητα) in Greek could also be confusing, because it encompasses different meanings. First, it conveys a sense of belonging, however vaguely one may describe it. In addition, this word was used to describe local administrative units invested with specific responsibilities. In the seventeenth century, the Ottoman State granted the privilege of assessing and collecting direct taxes to the notables of a number of local Christian Orthodox communities.¹ Local communities were collectively responsible for tax payments, but the assessment and collection of taxes for each male individual liable to direct taxation became the responsibility of local administrative and fiscal units, known as communities (κοινότητες). Although not widespread, this fiscal system was used in various areas, particularly in the Balkan provinces and the islands of the Archipelago. Successful as it proved to be, this system was also a powerful mechanism for achieving dominance in local power networks, and hence, influential families strove to take control of it. Until today, the use of the word "community" as a form of belonging to a local institution has created confusion, particularly when the existence of local units of administration is pointed to as proof of the Greek nation's historical continuity.²

Semantic ambiguity becomes even more intense when the nationalist terminology is taken for granted. There is a strong tendency among historians to use ethnic or national categories, such as Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, and Turks to define community. Terms such as Christian Orthodox, non-Muslim, etc., still appear in historical works but they seem to represent a loose metaphor, an empty shell that is meaningless without national connotations. This tendency is not irrelevant to the picture of the Ottoman Empire drawn by nationalist narratives in which the Ottoman past was used as a context within which the neat trajectories of national groups could be easily traced.³ Key issues such as political modernization, nationalism, economic and financial empowerment were always discussed in relation to specific communities or, in the best case, to a more sophisticated inter-communal framework. Yet, the essential identity of national communities and their distinct and coherent nature and fixed characteristics were rarely, if at all, questioned.

I think that similar approaches share a basic weakness, namely a belief in the self-evident nature of the communities they address. Embedded as they are in the modern language of nationalism and ethnic connotation, they assume a linear continuity with previous forms of community centered on some basic core features. What I want to argue, instead, is that no kind of continuity and no form of community should be taken for granted and that instead, one should consider how communities were constituted in a specific historical context.

During the late Ottoman era, perceptions of collective belonging were radically modified and community boundaries shifted in new directions. The reconstitution of community represented an important process of cultural and social change, which cannot be reduced to other forms of transformation, presumably more material or structural in nature, in the areas of economics or demography. Although this process did not necessarily negate the existing religious underpinnings of collective belonging, it represented a completely modern phenomenon. Therefore, rather than assuming the existence of a linear continuity with the past, the crucial issue is to understand how communities were reconstituted in new ways. This was not simply an intellectual enterprise. The appropriation of new perceptions of community and the relocation of community boundaries led to the redistribution of power because, as I discuss in the following pages, they influenced the way in which modern communal institutions were established.

The reconstitution of the Christian Orthodox communities involved two different but closely interrelated processes. The first, which I call the process of institutionalization, was related to the creation of new institutional infrastructures in various areas, particularly in local administrative authorities, education, and social care. Secondly, it is impossible to understand this process without considering why it was meaningful. The establishment of new institutions reflected and reproduced new forms of identity that emerged during a period

of rapid change. In other words, the process of institutionalization involved a symbolic element that drastically affected the boundaries of the community. This element cannot be reduced to some kind of epiphenomenon but it was crucial, even vital, to the reconstitution of community. In fact, there was no sharp distinction between the institutional and legal status of the community and its symbolic content. On the contrary, as we see below, the institutionalization of the Christian Orthodox community was not a neutral process but involved a symbolic negotiation that generated processes of differentiation and shifted the social boundaries of the community.

The institutionalization of the Christian Orthodox community (*Millet-i Rum*) was a rather recent phenomenon, which can be traced to the nineteenth century. As noted above, the *millet* system was actually institutionalized during the Tanzimat period.⁴ Until that period non-Muslim religious authorities were invested by the Ottoman state with the privileges required for conducting their various spiritual and financial affairs. As far as the Christian Orthodox Church was concerned, these privileges were granted to each Patriarch personally and were renewed every time a new Patriarch came to the throne.⁵ Far from being standardized, the granting of these privileges was but one aspect of the web of relations that the Ottoman State spun around its Christian Orthodox subjects. Lack of standardization, however, was important and has given historians grounds to suggest that the *millet* system was a creation of the nineteenth century and not an older institution. What actually distinguished the arrangements of the Tanzimat period was the introduction of the General Ordinances of the *Millet-i Rum* in 1862, which formally established lay participation in the affairs of Christian Orthodox communities.⁶ Prior to this, lay participation in Church affairs was not unknown, but it was informal and tied closely to the internal conflicts of ecclesiastical circles.⁷

During the 1840s, a growing need was felt among various sections of the Christian Orthodox community to reform the Orthodox *millet* and its institutional foundation. The increasingly influential middle class, a major force in the movement to challenge the Church's power monopoly, was favored by the Ottoman government, which itself aimed to curtail the religious authorities. In 1862 and after a long period of internal debate and strife, the General Ordinances of the Christian Orthodox *millet* were finally drafted by an assembly of lay and ecclesiastical leaders held for this purpose in Constantinople.

The Ordinances regulated the election of the Patriarch by a General Assembly of representatives from all ecclesiastical districts under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. They also provided for the establishment of a Metropolitan Synod to advise the Patriarch on the religious and spiritual affairs of the Christian Orthodox population, as well as the appointment of a Permanent Mixed Council charged with the administration and supervision of finances and communal institutions in

Constantinople. It should be noted that, in spite of the institutionalization of lay participation in the administration of the *millet*, the actual balance of power was not radically altered; the Patriarch retained the largest share of power in relation to the other two bodies.⁸ On the other hand, the monopoly of ecclesiastical leadership had been irrevocably broken as lay participation effectively became entrenched.

Following promulgation of the General Ordinances, many Christian Orthodox communities throughout the Empire began drafting similar regulations and a number of local elected administrations appeared, almost exclusively in urban areas. In addition to their formal duties, these local administrative bodies assumed other responsibilities, such as those of school administration and social welfare. This process was long and contradictory; in each area, local conditions shaped the political domain, and there was no single pattern determining how local administrations were constituted. Nonetheless, within a period of forty years, a large number of established Christian Orthodox communities existed in the Ottoman dominion.

Although of crucial importance, institutionalization represented only one aspect of the reconstitution of community. What made the Christian Orthodox community — or any community for that matter — recognizable as a coherent unit was its symbolic content, which became available only through a very complicated process that generated differentiation and affected the boundaries of the community.

This process worked on two different levels. At the first level, the symbolic makeup of a community necessitated the radical reconsideration of that community's collective identity in relation to the "outside other" and it was deeply embedded in the Greek nationalist discourse. During the period under consideration, the Christian Orthodox congregation became the object of bitter nationalist rivalry. As has been well documented, nationalism and the diffusion of nationalist representations of community, which divided the Christian orthodox *millet* along neat national lines, was one of the major factors that changed the area's political and ideological landscape during the nineteenth century.⁹ Flourishing nationalist movements, attached to national states or aspiring to statehood, claimed their share of Christian populations and Ottoman lands, not in the name of Orthodox Christianity but in the name of "national rights," and carved niches for future national groups out of the body of the old religious communities.

Rival nationalist discourses were responsible for setting new boundaries among Christian Orthodox communities and establishing new languages of presumably self-evident significance. Labels such as Greek, Bulgarian, Serb, Romanian, Albanian, and Turk became common descriptors for community and self, appearing in official announcements, public speeches, and the press. This is not to say that the language of nationalism made an already complicated situation simpler. Criteria of national identification were cast and recast according to the dynamics

and conditions of nationalist strife, and language, history, geography, culture, and loyalty to the Orthodox Church were all used to establish claims on common identities.

Reshaping community along national lines was complex enough, but it was not the only domain affected by the symbolic reconstitution of community. In order to grasp this process fully, attention must be given to a less overt but equally important process: the establishment of symbolic boundaries within the "national" body itself. Apart from the national "other" there was the "other" *within* the community whose form and identity also required definition. It is my contention that defining "otherness" within a community was, and still is, an intrinsic part of community building.

Community building, an innovative process with a strong normative component, involves constructing a meaning of community and self and professing an ideal as much as latching on to an all-encompassing concept (such as community). The definition of "otherness," as the symbolic field reflecting unacceptable values and practices, and constant negotiations over it, was essential for constructing the meaning of community as a coherent unit. This definition was directly related to processes of differentiation not limited to national identity alone, but extended to every social and cultural domain.

Unfortunately, this issue is very complicated and cannot be discussed fully here. Suffice it to say that these processes of differentiation were discursive and involved new forms of social representation that allowed individuals or groups to make sense of their world. In a period of rapid social change and heightened confusion, particular discourses, or bodies of knowledge, such as nationalist discourses or medical and biological discourses, provided fresh approaches towards rationalization and established novel sets of values as criteria for social ascent. "Education," "literacy," "self improvement" and "social respectability" entered the vocabulary of the rising middle classes as social qualities representing civic virtue.¹⁰

This was not as simple as it sounds. In an era when the modern education system was just making its appearance, what constituted an educated man, much less an educated woman was open to debate. Social respectability was also difficult to define; new social and occupational groups emerged, while others irrevocably declined. Indeed, the meaning of such values became available through processes of differentiation: "literacy" and "respectability," for example, were juxtaposed or linked to other presumably antithetical social qualities such as "illiteracy" and "indecent." Binary opposites such as these offered a prism through which educated individuals could classify and interpret a rapidly changing environment in one way rather than another, most often at the risk of taking such categories as true reflections of social reality rather than as constructions of their own making. This also applied to other values and practices including "individuality," "labor,"

"discipline," "responsibility," "hygiene," etc., which found their place in the contemporary lexicon and fueled people's perceptions of society, community, and self.

This linguistic game, which tended to establish new meanings of words vis-à-vis rigid social connotations, was not irrelevant to the redistribution of power. It was an effective vehicle for deploying power, an influential mechanism of social representation that made possible new classifications of individuals, groups, and practices for putting everything in its "proper" place. In this context, particular social groups became meaningful and visible entities, described by specific cultural and social characteristics which presumably reflected their nature. As a consequence, community boundaries were reshuffled along specific lines; inclusion or exclusion in the community became conditional upon specific cultural qualities, which, presumably, represented the moral character of the community.

Beggars present, perhaps, the most illustrative example. During the nineteenth century, large numbers of beggars frequented the Ottoman cities, particularly the major port areas. Christian beggars in Constantinople usually came from the islands of Mytiline and Chios and were part of a mixed guild of beggars run by their own *kethuda*.¹¹ The members of this guild would roam around the capital and its periphery in search of their daily bread. From Tuesday to Friday, beggars visited the outskirts of the city, on Saturdays they wandered around the markets and other commercial areas, and on Sundays they surrounded the churches in search of charity.

In earlier times, the presence of beggars in public places was quite common and did not raise any serious problem. Their presence was accepted on the grounds that pious individuals, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, should fulfill their obligation of benevolence by giving charity. But in the nineteenth century, public attitudes toward vagrancy and loitering changed radically, and such practices met with an outcry. People were suddenly offended by the fact that beggars disdained society's "sound" work ethic. In fact, while begging was recognized as a suitable occupation for the seriously handicapped, it was also considered to be an easy way for the idle to earn a living without working. This rich but fluid context was mediated by new discourses, highly reminiscent of Victorian discourses regarding the undeserving poor, which argued that poverty, illiteracy, and moral corruption were inherently linked.¹² Viewed as a kind of social scourge, vagrancy was seen to be directly related to the rise of the urban poor, whose numbers seemed to swell as the result of rapid urbanization, immigration and the economic crisis among Ottoman guilds, which in itself was precipitated by European competition. The increasing number of poor people was often mentioned in the press, public speeches, and other accounts.

Yet the growing pockets of poverty in major urban areas, Istanbul in particular, were the outcome of different causes, not all of them economic; the influx of Muslim refugees after the 1870s was a case in

point. Ironically, there was no evidence to suggest a close correlation between an increase in the number of urban poor and the proliferation of beggars, whose numbers were difficult to count in any case. The absence of social statistics, at least of this type and magnitude, as well as the volatile situation in which the urban poor found themselves, made any comparison impossible. Regrettable as it was, one should also bear in mind that statistical classifications are not "objective" or "unbiased," but the product of a particular cognitive framework. Even if they were available, they would rather tell us less about the specific social situation they depicted than the criteria that governed their compilation in the first place.

On the other hand, the absence of statistics or accurate numbers did not impede public discussion on the issue. During the 1860s and 1870s, a strong connection was established between vagrancy and the poor to such an extent that both phenomena were believed to reflect the negative aspects of the changing urban environment. This particular representation of the social conditions of the urban poor, and their various connotations, was instrumental in addressing the issue of moral degeneration which was, presumably, related to the transformation of urban space.

Central to this discussion was the relationship between poverty and idleness. Under desperate conditions, the argument went, many unfortunate people disassociated themselves from the work ethic, became slothful and idle, and turned to begging as a result. They may have found a miserable way of supporting themselves, but their chances for finding a moral compass and exploiting potential professional prospects were lost. Because it challenged the middle-class work ethic, vagrancy provoked strong reactions. Menas Hourmouzis, an intellectual of some repute, argued in 1874 that most beggars were "worthy of flogging" because they stuck to this "degenerate profession" despite being able to perform manual labor. In addition, Hourmouzis suggested that beggars should be restricted from wandering the streets, and went even further, calling for the permanent expulsion of all beggars originating from the village of Vollisos of Chios, which he believed sheltered the worst of their kind.¹³

Peasants provide a second example for the process of setting community boundaries. During the nineteenth century, literate individuals of middle-class background became more aware of conditions in rural areas. Although not entirely irrelevant to nationalist considerations, contemporary notions of the peasantry directly influenced the self-image of urban middle-class groups. Rural conditions were perceived in relation to a number of moral and cultural deficiencies that supposedly stemmed from peasant "nature" itself. In contrast to beggars and the urban poor, however, peasants were not assumed to be devoid of a work ethic. On the contrary, the harsh conditions of rural living and various natural events that hindered agricultural production were readily acknowledged. In addition, peasant communities were romantically idealized as the last remnants of authentic communities

unspoiled by the influence of modern civilization. There were those who believed that peasant communities embodied the unconscious guardians of ancient Greek culture, some vestiges of which had been kept alive in isolated rural enclaves. In this spirit, the Greek Literary Association of Constantinople introduced a Prize Competition, sponsored by the wealthy banker Christaki Zografos, aimed at registering the Living Monuments [*Zonta Mnimeia*] of ancient Greek culture.¹⁴

On the other hand, peasants were directly associated with poverty, illiteracy, and intense linguistic fragmentation. This situation is described in detail in various sources, most notably in a series of reports prepared by the educational committee of the Greek Literary Association of Constantinople during the period between 1869 and 1885.¹⁵ In these reports, rural areas and peasant communities were described and classified according to specific information on their educational status. Compiled with the help of local educated people, these reports recorded the numbers of schools, teachers, and students, as well as the activity of local educational or literary societies in various Ottoman provinces, for the purpose of providing information to the Association board responsible for financing provincial institutions.

Since the Association had set itself the task of furthering education in rural areas, this step seemed necessary. Yet however useful this information was, it represented rural conditions in relation to the prospect of education *in situ*. Quite often, the reports underscored the perceived indifference displayed by peasant families vis-à-vis their children's schooling, and mentioned incidents of local animosity towards education in general. Rural poverty was considered as closely related to ignorance and superstition, and rural communities were classified according to their avowed interest in education. Save for instances in which peasant cultures were viewed as repositories of ancient Greek culture, they were generally debased and judged not on their merits as meaningful cultural entities that were simply different from urban culture, but on the basis of the urban cultural superiority.

Naïve as it may appear, black-and-white depictions of rural conditions were widely accepted in urban centers, particularly among educated individuals of middle-class background, who kept their distance from the people of peasant origins coming to the cities in search of employment. Alexander Paspatis, a well-known physician at the Christian Orthodox Hospital of Yedi Kule in Istanbul, included in his *Memorandum* a detailed description of the Christian guilds, designed to substantiate his hypothesis that unhealthy living and working environments and moral deprivation were responsible for the rapid increase in deaths among hospital patients.¹⁶

Working under the assumption that members of each guild were mostly of similar backgrounds, Paspatis developed three categories of local Christian Orthodox guilds, classified according to their members' place of origin. The first category was the Rumeliote guilds, whose

members came from the Balkan provinces of the Empire. The Anatolian section was composed of guilds with members originating from Asia Minor. The third section included the mixed guilds, whose members came from both the Anatolian and Balkan provinces. In addition to these broad headings, Paspatis referred to three subgroups of guild members whose origin was other than those mentioned above. These were the "Hellenes," that is, those holding Hellenic citizenship; the "Eptanysioi," who came from the Ionian islands, which were still under British rule; and the "Islanders," who had arrived from the Aegean islands.¹⁷

Paspatis was not unaware of nationalist terminology and various ethnic names such as Romioi (Greek-speaking Christian Orthodox), Bulgarians, Arvanites (Albanians), and Croatians, frequently appear in his writings. Yet, as he argues, the Yedi Kule hospital treated all Christian Orthodox patients equally as part of one community and for that reason the hospital administration did not maintain separate records based on ethnicity. This complicated classification system, which Paspatis himself found quite comprehensible, reflected the fragmentation of Christian Orthodox guilds in the Ottoman capital and confirmed the increasing role that kinship ties were playing in terms of providing a constant influx of prospective guild members from the provinces.

What is interesting in this case is how Paspatis distances himself from rural immigrants who found a precarious employment in guild production. That this was a result of his occupational status is not a sufficient explanation. Along with his medical colleagues, Paspatis adhered to a professional code that upheld specific values and practices presumably compatible with "sound" bourgeois morality and good health which he projected against the work habits and cultural practices of what he believed was characteristic in guild production. Not surprisingly he concluded that these habits and practices were wanting on every account and were the real cause behind the high mortality of guild members. His judgment was moral and ideological although it was concealed under the veil of a neutral medical language.

Similarly, peasant women coming to the city to work as nursemaids, wet nurses, servants, and housekeepers were also viewed with suspicion. According to the physician Panagiotis Salabantas, middle-class Christian Orthodox families had to be very careful when selecting wet nurses because, as he put it, "these nurses are of rural origin and with poor upbringing that is totally different from our own."¹⁸ He depicts the peasant nurse as a person of low or suspect morality, usually exploited by her husband or relatives, who connive to live off her income. According to the good doctor, peasant women should remain in their villages and not go to big cities, where corrupting influences destroy their moral fabric and affect their families as well. It might well be that professional antagonism regarding the provision of child care generated this and similar arguments. Physicians were struggling to exert their authority in both the medical and social spheres, but they were still distrusted by

many segments of the population. Be that as it may, misgivings towards peasant wet nurses reflected a wider prejudice shared by many urbanites and most definitely by middle-class families.

The cases discussed above suggest that the boundaries of the Christian Orthodox community were set according to a process of differentiation that imbued the community with symbolic content and allowed the systematic classification of social and professional values and practices. Far from being neutral, these classifications produced a new social domain that represented the "Greek Orthodox community" in terms of particular inclusions and exclusions. This process intersected with the institutionalization of the Christian Orthodox community during the Tanzimat period.

Political institutions in Christian Orthodox communities provide a strong case in point. Regulations introduced by reforms institutionalized a system featuring limited political participation, electoral processes, and political rights.¹⁹ There is no doubt that this system was more conservative than liberal in nature. The general assembly was summoned only for the purposes of electing a new Patriarch and no arrangement similar to that of the Armenian Regulations, which established a permanent assembly with extensive responsibilities, was ever introduced.²⁰ What is more important, though, is that the way in which the political domain in Christian Orthodox communities was constructed neither entailed mass participation in electoral processes nor expanded political rights. Highly fragmented as it was, the new political infrastructure relied on a number of mechanisms that made the functioning of broader elective and administrative bodies conditional on a series of social and political exclusions affecting all Christian Orthodox communities. What actually matters here is the widespread acceptance of the, presumably, self-evident nature of politics as an exclusive domain, which in turn concealed the processes of differentiation that (re)constituted community in the first place.

Two examples can clarify the foregoing discussion. The first is the election of lay members of the Permanent Mixed Council who were appointed by an interim body summoned to Constantinople every two years for that purpose. This procedure was specified in some detail by the General Ordinances, which instructed each parish in the major district of Istanbul to hold elections to select a specified number of representatives to this interim electoral body.²¹ They also stipulated that elected members represent their own parish exclusively, be Ottoman citizens of good social standing, be permanent residents of Istanbul, and enjoy the confidence of the Imperial government and the nation; in addition, they should be "honest and sincere and with a good reputation among their parishioners." A list of prospective Permanent Council members was prepared during the first meeting of the electoral body, and the final choice was based on that list.

As a consequence, this electoral procedure limited the political rights

of most ordinary Christian Orthodox male citizens of Istanbul, who were allowed to vote for members of the electoral body but were excluded from being members of that body themselves. Although there is much ambiguity as to what exactly constituted "honest citizens with good reputation," it seems that eligibility was tacitly conditional on the candidate's educational and social status. Available evidence suggests that those elected to the Mixed Council came from the most influential Orthodox families in Istanbul.²²

Furthermore, the prerequisite of permanent residence, however vaguely defined, was also discriminatory, as it excluded from the electoral process those recent Christian Orthodox immigrants who had arrived in Constantinople to search for employment. This issue was not of minor importance. While immigration to Istanbul had not been uncommon previously, its magnitude increased dramatically during the second half of the nineteenth century, as large numbers of immigrants, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, were attracted to the Ottoman capital.²³ Christian Orthodox immigrants from the interior of Asia Minor, the Balkan provinces, and the Aegean islands followed family members already established in Istanbul and worked with them or for them for unspecified periods of time. Some were fortunate enough to eventually establish their own businesses, but for the most part, immigrants worked in local guilds or joined the ranks of the urban poor. Information about these people is scarce, but from what we do know, it seems that they kept a very low public profile and spent most of their time with close relatives or other members of their profession, living almost in isolation from their co-religionists. Although the possibility should not be ruled out that some might have wanted to get involved in local politics, especially if they had some formal education, the electoral rules excluded them.

The case of Izmir presents a similar picture. During the period under consideration, there were two separate administrative bodies representing the Christian Orthodox population, each with distinct responsibilities and public duties. In fact, Smyrna's adoption of this system of administration was rather exceptional among the rest of the Christian Orthodox communities for reasons that cannot be fully explained here. Suffice it to say that this system was partly developed to accommodate the large number of Orthodox people who held Hellenic citizenship.²⁴ As a prominent commercial center during the nineteenth century, Izmir attracted large numbers of immigrants from the Aegean islands, the Anatolian interior, and the Greek peninsula.²⁵ Although precise demographic data are lacking, it is rather certain that a significant proportion of these immigrants were Christian Orthodox. Yet the number of immigrants in Izmir holding Hellenic citizenship appears to have been much higher than elsewhere.

In addition, the old elite groups were unwilling to abandon their share of power and insisted upon maintaining their hold over the *Demogerontia* (council of elders). This administrative body was officially

reorganized in 1864 and was composed of ten Christian Orthodox, "reputable" Ottoman subjects, who were elected by a small assembly of twenty merchants and twenty guild leaders from Izmir.²⁶ In 1877, a new regulation established a second administrative body, the Central Committee, whose members were elected by a different assembly from the one that appointed members of the *Demogerontia*.²⁷ Beginning in the 1870s, a violent disagreement between the two bodies broke out, which was not resolved even when the official regulation was revised in 1888; the crisis came to a head in 1903, and nearly divided the local community into two. Various attempts at reconciliation failed until a new law, redrawing the lines between the two bodies, was approved in 1910.²⁸

The 1910 regulation introduced only minor changes, including the establishment of a common general assembly and guidelines for the committees that ran local schools and churches. Committee members were elected at the parish level by an electoral body consisting of permanent residents of Izmir who had contributed at least 10 silver *piastres* to parish funds.²⁹ The body responsible for electing the members of the *Demogerontia* and the Central Committee was still rather limited: in comparison to the 1888 regulation; the only addition to this body related to "large donors." Since no other criteria were mentioned, it must be assumed that these donors had contributed large, though unspecified, sums of money to the community. Permanent residence and independent social status were conditions for being elected to either administrative body.³⁰

Ironically, the outcome of this conflict did not affect the scope of local political rights in Izmir. According to the 1888 regulation, members of the *Demogerontia* and the Central Committee were elected by separate Assemblies held every two and three years, respectively. These Assemblies were composed of members of the two administrative bodies, trustees of communal institutions such as schools and churches, and the members of the religious fraternity "Orthodoxy" (Ορθοδοξία). In addition, individuals who made annual contributions to communal institutions equal to the value of three Ottoman pounds or more, as well as local guild members who made donations of similar value to the community, were considered rightful members of these assemblies. Elective members in both bodies should be "distinguished members of the Orthodox community" and permanent residents of the city for no less than two years. Hellenic citizens were eligible for election to the Central Committee, whereas the *Demogerontia* consisted exclusively of Ottoman citizens.³¹

These cases demonstrate the influence that local conditions had on the political domain, and hence, the constant potential for conflict. Nonetheless, different local systems of administration shared certain features, particularly the belief that specific social and cultural values were in themselves necessary prerequisites in politics. The creation of a restrictive, or exclusive, system of politics³² did not necessarily reflect an

intentional or conscious ploy on the part of specific groups, though it does reveal much about the way that the working of politics was regarded at that time. The notion of exclusivity is further underlined by the fact that politics was considered to be a strictly male domain. It may well be the case that no mention of gender was ever made in official regulations, but this was because the totally male character of politics was considered to be self-evident.

On the few occasions when this issue was discussed, the "obvious" was stated; divine will and nature separated the duties and spheres of action of the two sexes. Men were destined for public responsibilities and politics, presumably due to physical and mental attributes that made them capable of dealing with conflict. Women on the other hand, were deemed unsuitable for public life due to their "delicate nature." This gender-based division of labor was not unique to Christian Orthodox communities. The Armenian Constitution, for example, which introduced a larger measure of lay participation than did the *Millet-i Rum*, made no mention of female participation at any level of administration, as if the exclusion of women were patently clear. In fact, the model of the *millet* regulations was adopted by contemporary European political systems, which excluded women on similar moral and biological grounds.

What I have argued so far is that the processes of differentiation, which made the perception of community imaginable in the first place, addressed the issue of "otherness" within the Christian Orthodox community itself. Particular social groups such as the urban poor and peasants stood on the edge of the community, marking its inner boundaries, while the introduction of political rights, limited as it was, was reserved only for male middle class individuals.

Two overlapping issues emerge from this analysis. The first pertains to the prospects the "lower classes" had for assimilating into the mainstream. I do not contend that the urban poor or the peasants were, for all intents and purposes, considered lost to the community. On the contrary, there is much evidence to suggest that the opposite was true. New institutions, such as schools and philanthropic establishments, were actually developed precisely to offer modern knowledge and respectable civil values to all Christian Orthodox residents of the Ottoman dominion. Spreading education and urban values was deemed a necessary measure for ensuring the dissemination of "civilization" and Greek culture to peasant communities.

Educational and cultural societies directly involved in the financing of provincial schools proliferated rapidly during the 1870s in both the European and Anatolian provinces.³³ Detailed questionnaires were prepared, and local priests and educated people in the rural areas were asked to record details of local cultural conditions and needs. The large number of provincial schools founded in the period 1870–1912 attests to the growing interest in delivering primary and to some extent, secondary educational services to residents of the Ottoman provinces.³⁴ However

noble this interest was, it was also fed by the desire to control and change the pre-modern and pre-national cultural environment of Christian Orthodox peasant communities to one that would foster nationalist definitions of community.

Poor and underprivileged urban groups were also integrated into the framework of a broader community through educational and philanthropic activities of a strong normative nature.³⁵ These measures included providing credit to people trying to establish themselves in a given trade or profession, financing education for poor children, and offering health care and welfare services. This modern phenomenon bore little resemblance to earlier practices, which considered charity to be a private religious obligation assumed by pious individuals, a perception that cut across all sectors of Ottoman society.

Until the nineteenth century the Ottoman state did not develop consistent welfare policies. The *vakıf* used endowments to provide charity to the poor but this practice was closely related to the pious duties of the benefactors.³⁶ The Orthodox Church was also involved in charity, also in an inconsistent and limited way, distributing alms to the poor every Good Friday and Christmas Day. This situation had changed slightly by the end of the eighteenth century, particularly in major port cities such as Istanbul and Smyrna, where the wealthy Christian Orthodox guilds set up special committees to collect and dispense charity; these programs met with only limited success. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, some local fraternities were founded to support religious and charitable work on the parish level.³⁷ However, exactly what these fraternities accomplished remains uncertain, as their charitable activities were never clearly demarcated from their religious duties. One known activity involved giving alms to the poor as part of the feasts held to honor local saints.

Philanthropic activity was reorganized entirely during the second part of the nineteenth century. Although some elements of the old system, such as the collection and distribution of alms, were preserved, an effort was made to establish a new philanthropic framework that would be administered according to objective criteria. This structure required official administrative bodies, such as the Permanent Mixed Council in Istanbul or the Central Committee in Smyrna, to be directly involved in the management of community institutions such as hospitals, orphanages, and corrections facilities. What is more, philanthropic activity was associated with a "new spirit," which called for inculcating the poor with an acceptable work ethic.

In Istanbul for example, the Philergos Association (Φίλεργος Εταιρεία) provided credit to poor people hoping to establish a small business for themselves. However, the financial assistance was accompanied by a moral lesson: honest living and individual respectability could be obtained only through productive work.³⁸ The Philanthropic Association of the Ladies of Pera established three shops, providing laundry, sewing,

and ironing services; the shops were designed to occupy poor women who had, until then, been living on Church assistance. Applicants were hired to work in the shops on the condition that they would forego any kind of charity in the future. As stated on at least one occasion, the shops had been founded to instill moral values in poor women who were now capable of earning a living without resorting to the humiliations of begging and charity.³⁹

What I have claimed above is that the processes of differentiation and the new social boundaries established between the community and its margins were not incompatible with social integration. The demarcation of social boundaries was integral to identity formation but did not exclude the possibility of social integration. This brings me to the final issue of this paper. The practices discussed above were part of a complex process of community building. Rather than assuming that the parameters of community are self evident, I have suggested examining how community is constituted and reconstituted, through particular discourses and institutional practices the purpose of which is to define, as much as control, a fluid and transitory environment. I have tried to demonstrate how these discourses and practices worked, using as examples "marginal" groups and their prospects for integration.

As the examples discussed above suggest, social integration, as a process of community building, infused identity politics with a strong normative component indicative of the power relations that this process involved. Intricately related to the development of modernization, identity politics neither reflected nor can be reduced to the new social structure, but rather were a constituent part of that structure. The desire to integrate the urban poor and peasants into a modern national community with little, if any, resemblance to the Christian Orthodox community of the past was not designed to abolish "otherness" as such. Identity politics not only exuded a strong sense of hierarchy, but also rearranged the boundaries of community by stating who was a member of that community and under what circumstances. In this respect, identity politics and the forms of power it conveyed were inseparable from emerging forms of knowledge about society and self, and provided the basis for representing community as a coherent unit.

This cultural construct was not simply a free-floating idea to be accepted or rejected by local agents; rather, it was the prism through which community was looked at in the first place, and thus it constituted a form of power that determined social relations and legitimized social hierarchies. Although these social and cultural confines did not go entirely unchallenged, they provided a new framework for considering politics, culture, and society in a way that took many things for granted, particularly the all-encompassing concept of community.

At this point, we may return to the questions posed at the beginning of this paper. The purpose of this discussion was to illustrate the mechanisms that made community possible. Community-building was

a complex process which occurred during a specific historic period, and established ties and relations that had not existed before. Can these insights be extended to the creation of Diaspora networks? I think that the answer is yes. To the extent that Diasporas rest upon the assumption of coherence and unity, they too can be seen in this light.

This is not just a point of historical interest. The diasporic phenomenon in today's "global village" is more pronounced than it used to be; the movement of people from particular points of origin to other places around the world has intensified to the extent that any comparison with the past, even if the population movements of the late colonial era are taken into account, seems impossible. These diasporic movements have also set in motion a worldwide process of negotiation and conflict that is articulated around strong notions of identity and directly associated with cultural encounters between diasporic movements and host societies.

I believe that in the end, both sides will be affected and new hybrid forms of identity will arise. But before we get there, it is also possible that these encounters will enhance the power and appeal of the totalizing and essentialist aspects of identity. In a rapidly changing world people will be living in the "comfort and familiarity" that only their "own" identity can provide, thus losing sight of the historical process that made this identity possible in the first place. The deconstruction of identities is a serious political undertaking in this diasporic world, because it allows people to understand that, despite appearances, they are basically the same.

CHAPTER TWO

THE 'OLD' DIASPORA, THE 'NEW' DIASPORA, AND THE GREEK DIASPORA IN THE EIGHTEENTH THROUGH NINETEENTH CENTURIES VIENNA

VASILIKI SEIRINIDOU

For millennia, empires and nation-states persecuted, tolerated, or welcomed the traditional diasporas: Jewish, Greek, and Armenian. Recently, new polities ranging from the African-American and Ukrainian-Canadian to the Chinese-American, the Quebecois, and the Palestinian have entered the semantic domain diasporas share with exile and ethnic communities, immigrants, expatriates, refugees, guest workers, and others.

Taking this statement as a point of reference, *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* made its public debut in the spring of 1991 as “a forum for the analysis of the contending ‘others’ that pose cultural, political, and economic challenges to the hegemony and homogeneity claimed by many nation-states.” This broadening of the study of “diaspora” was not new. For some time already, the term diaspora had stopped being used to refer exclusively to Jews, Greeks and Armenians. During the 1960s, within the context of anti-colonialism and the civil rights movement, various ethnic and racial groups saw in the Jewish paradigm a reflection of their own experience of expulsion and discovered their own diasporas. Diaspora became synonymous for submission; however, the trauma it evoked was transformed into the quest for political emancipation.¹

On the other hand, in the 1980s, sociologists and anthropologists saw

the Chinese, Indian or African trade diasporas as cultural mediators, that is, as the main agents of commercial interaction between different cultural groups prior to the total subordination of trade to the world capitalist economy.² The trade diasporas were listed alongside the primary Jewish diaspora and the *mobilized* and *proletarian* diasporas,³ while newly-minted categories of diaspora such as the *auxiliary* or *imperial* diasporas⁴ have enriched not only the predicates of the term, but also increased the number of groups that were encompassed by the latter's semantic field. In any case, and despite the variations, the core meaning remained clear: diaspora referred to a group of territorially dispersed people, defined as such through common origin, language, history, values, and traumas, which was deemed worthy of, but at the same time represented, the national state.

It is exactly this definition of diaspora that has been put into doubt since the 1990s, as attested by the journal's subtitle. The news from the diaspora front is not the diffusion of the term through the inclusion of new cases, but a shift in its conceptual framework. The rethinking of cultural identity and its articulations in the wake of the post-colonial experience has been crucial in giving new meaning to diaspora. Or rather, diaspora has become a precise term for describing the hybridity of post-colonial identities.⁵ From being an emblem of unity for a dispersed people with an extant or imagined homeland as a point of reference, diaspora has become an expression of fragmentation, of the multiplicity of affiliations and belongings.⁶ It no longer refers to groups of people,⁷ but to a social situation characterized by living in-between, in the age of transnational capitalism, media imperialism, and mass migration.

Within this context, the notions of "home" and "abroad" are no longer specific, and their spatial representation is no longer clear. The act of living between different borders and cultures is illustrated by the image of a "third space," not a space of meeting or of interaction between different cultures, but one in which they are renegotiated, given new meanings, and multiplied.⁸ Viewed from this perspective, the identities of migrants are not defined by the intensity of the relationship between their culture of origin and that of their settlement, but by the process of renegotiating the association between them.

Diaspora multiplies, acquires new meanings, and is transformed. What does this ultimately mean for the study of traditional diasporas? Moreover, how can they contribute to a debate on diaspora, such as the one described above, which in fact questions their fundamental narratives? I will try to examine this question based on the case of the Greek diaspora in eighteenth through nineteenth centuries Vienna.

The Greek diaspora in Vienna was a historical phenomenon linked to the trade migrations from the Ottoman Empire towards Central and East Europe that took place between the seventeenth and the first half of the nineteenth century.⁹ To be precise, it was a dynamic component of the Balkan trade diaspora which was active in the export and transit trade

of raw materials (cotton, cotton threads, wool, leather, animals) from the Orient to the Habsburg Empire and the import of manufactured goods to Ottoman markets.¹⁰ By organizing their enterprises on the basis of kin or local ties, the Orthodox Balkan merchants constructed a network of settlements which ran from Transylvania and Hungary to Vienna and Trieste.¹¹ The position of Vienna within this network was particularly important. The capital of the Habsburg Empire was the biggest consumer of Macedonian cotton in Europe as well as the financial center that regulated transactions between Central Europe and the Ottoman Empire.

The catalysts for migration to Vienna were primarily Orthodox merchants from mountain communities and small cities in Macedonia, Epirus, and Thessaly.¹² The initial core of traders among the settlers was augmented by the arrivals of women and children — especially beginning in the 1770s, when the transfer of entire families was required of Ottoman subjects seeking Austrian citizenship — as well as of priests, scholars, students and others. The rise of the Greek-Orthodox trade settlement in Vienna coincided with the period of the Napoleonic Wars and the blockade of Continental Europe. After 1815, trade migrations to the Habsburg capital continued with more or less intensity, only to stop in the middle of the nineteenth century, when commercial exchange between the Empires abated.¹³

Although there is no precise data, we can assume that the Greek-Orthodox enclave in Vienna numbered at its height, between 1780 and 1815, approximately 2,000 people.¹⁴ The Greek-Orthodox merchants constituted a small, wealthy immigrant group with its own quarters (in the northeastern part of the old city of Vienna),¹⁵ its own communities and their respective churches (St. George for the Ottoman citizens¹⁶ and Holy Trinity for those who acquired Habsburg citizenship),¹⁷ its own Greek school,¹⁸ its own charity fund, and its own cafés and recreational venues. Some members of this group distinguished themselves in the financial life of the city and attained social status: they were welcomed into the nobility, became important merchants, bankers, owners of real estate, industrialists and were appointed to high public office;¹⁹ in short, they were accepted as members of the multiethnic Viennese bourgeoisie.²⁰

The Greek diaspora in Vienna occupies an emblematic position in contemporary Greek national consciousness. Its history has been linked to the protagonists and the *topoi* of the national narrative: to Rhigas Pherraios, the "proto-martyr" of Greek independence, who in 1797 instigated a revolutionary uprising among the Greek community in the Habsburg capital, where he was arrested by the Austrian police along with his companions;²¹ to the blossoming of the Greek press²² and Greek publishing industry in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries²³ as well as to some of the most prominent scholars of the Greek Enlightenment, who flocked to the city to disseminate their work, very often with the financial support of the well-off Greek merchants;²⁴ and finally, to the national benefactors and "glorious sons" of Greece living

abroad, ranging from Simon Sinas and Constantine Belios to Nikolaos Doumbas, the patron of Austrian art, or the well-known maestro Herbert von Karajan, a descendant of the Karajannis family that emigrated to Vienna from Kozani in Macedonia.

The Greek diaspora in Vienna, like the entire Greek trade diaspora in the Habsburg Empire, did not consist exclusively of ethnic Greeks but also included members of various national and linguistic groups from the Balkans. The majority of these were the Vlachs of Macedonia and Epirus, who spoke a Romanic idiom similar phonetically and typologically to Dacorumanian, but did not have a written tradition. They were a mountain people — their largest demographic concentration being along the mountains of Pindos — with a history of migration, and they practiced inland Balkan trade, originally as caravan drivers and then as independent merchants.²⁵ At the close of the eighteenth century, Vlachs constituted the trade bourgeoisie substrata in many Balkan cities and were perhaps the largest group among the Orthodox Balkan merchants who established themselves in the Habsburg Empire.

The linguistic and even ethnic diversity among the Greek diaspora in Vienna is problematic, at least according to the traditional definition of diaspora as a sense of belonging shared by people who are otherwise geographically dispersed. This difficulty has at certain times been suppressed to prevent the “Greekness” of this diaspora from being questioned, while at other times, it has been highlighted in order to affirm the diaspora’s “non-Greekness”; in some cases, it has been pointed to as proof that the Vlachs were Hellenized.

What all of these claims have in common is their tendency to emphasize certain actions and behavioral patterns displayed by the migrants (schools, fields of study, donations, social interactions, financial and political alliances, and above all, spoken language of preference) and to attribute analogous national content to such actions.²⁶ However, this approach undermines its own arguments. If the language of the Vlachs epitomizes the “non-Greekness” of the Greek diaspora in Vienna, then what explains the fact that it was precisely the Vlachs who in 1804 were prominent among the founders of the Greek school in Vienna, and that furthermore, they financed the establishment of Greek schools in their places of origin and subscribed to Greek books?

Or, if all the above is meant to verify the Hellenization of the Vlachs, why was it that these same people were also subscribers to *Untersuchungen über die Romanier oder sogenannten Wlachen*? This work, written by Georg Rosa, a Vlach from Pest, accused the “new Greeks for daring to separate my people and those at the other side of the Danube,” reminded the Vlachs that the Romanians in Transylvania and Wallachia “are our own brothers,” and suggested that they cultivate their mother tongue, a Romanic dialect.²⁷ Moreover, how can one explain the fact that the Orthodox Habsburg community in Vienna was called *Community of Greeks and Vlachs*?²⁸ Or, finally, how could it happen that in Vienna,

where Greek-language books, newspapers, and journals were published and where scholars and subscribers to such publications lived, the pupils in the Greek school were found to be "terribly weak in the spoken Greek language" and that "the children of Greek inhabitants of Vienna learn not only Ancient Greek, but also their mother tongue, the actually spoken Greek, only at school, thanks to the blameworthy negligence and indifference of their parents, or at home, but then only by private tutors and not by their parents, save from very few exceptions"?²⁹

A historian's embarrassment at such questions is obvious. It results not only from the fact that these case studies belong to a period before state formation (or at least date to its very early stages), this being an objection often raised by serious researchers against the attempts of historiographies to nationalize historical subjects. It is also the attribution of exceptional importance to the nation state as a historical watershed and to its role in homogenizing cultural identities which compels us to conceptualize identities in a relationship of binary opposition to the "Other."³⁰

It is exactly at this point that the current debate becomes applicable to the study of the Greek diaspora in Vienna: by urging us to face the multiplicity of the migrants' affiliations no longer as a taboo or a problem requiring resolution. The perspective involves a shift in emphasis from a search for identity in the Greek diaspora to the study of different ways in which historical subjects adopt each identity for themselves. This in its turn demands that historians conduct a more sophisticated analysis: to examine particular and changing contexts, to analyze different social settings, to follow more levels of social relationships, to take into consideration economic and social differentiations as well as personal strategies. Despite its century-long national historiographical past, the Greek diaspora in Vienna appears to have a long ahead of it.

CHAPTER THREE

GREEK DIASPORA IN SOUTHERN RUSSIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH THROUGH NINETEENTH CENTURIES

VASSILIS KARDASIS

The study of world Hellenism — that is, the phenomenon of ethnic Greeks living outside Greece's national boundaries — its historical formation and development, are of increasing interest to the field of Greek historiography.¹ The existence of diaspora Greek communities in the Balkans and the Black Sea area, which spans several centuries, has been a particular focus of numerous researchers, both on the individual and institutional level, in Greece and elsewhere. Several colleagues abroad, particularly in Britain, France, and the United States, have delved into the Greek diaspora and its business activities as part of their inquiries into the economic history of Mediterranean lands. Moreover, the collapse of the former Communist regimes in Eastern Europe has certainly made a manifold contribution to furthering the study of Hellenism abroad. Communication with foundations and fellow historians from these countries, the joint organization of scientific meetings, as well as open access to archival material are just some of the factors that promise rich and rewarding research projects in the future.

This paper is devoted to an examination of the economic presence of Greek settlers in Southern Russia during the nineteenth century, an issue which is intrinsically linked to trade in the Black Sea ports. What is of crucial importance here is the fact that the economic development of New Russia was based almost exclusively on grain. Grain was the reason why Greeks stayed there and flourished. Grain was the basis of their powerful social and economic status among the settler communities

of this region.² In my view, any research on the Greek presence in New Russia must begin and end with the grain trade.

The beginning of this episode lies in the late eighteenth century, when Russia, following its victories in the 1769–1774 and 1787–1791 wars against the Ottoman Empire, annexed the southern territory lapped by the waters of the Black Sea. New Russia was established, defined as an administrative region consisting of the provinces of Cherson, Ekaterinoslav and Tavris (the Crimea). In the years prior to their annexation by Russia, these areas were inhabited by Tartar nomads who showed little interest in tilling the soil. Hunters and herders constantly on the move, their way of life was not conducive to the development of agriculture and the cultivation of the *chernozem*, i.e., the black earth that subsequently proved so fertile. The dark soil gave its name to the zone of land lying between the shore and an imaginary axis virtually touching Kiev, continuing eastwards as far as the left bank of the Volga and reaching to the Urals. This imaginary line also constituted a border with the vast forests of northern Russia.

Subsequently, after the subjugation of the southern part of the Russian realm, the authorities devised a plan for the settlement of new territories. Moreover, Catherine the Great, justifiably fearing future hostilities with the Ottoman Empire, realized that to combat this threat, a permanent population was needed, one that would be able to repulse potential invaders in more ways than one.

We may well ask: Why did the Imperial government choose to invite immigrants of other nationalities rather than supporting and encouraging the internal migration of its own subjects? The answer lies in the Russian system of serfdom, which dominated social and economic relations until 1861. This system prohibited the movement of serfs beyond the boundaries of the fief or estate to which they belonged.³ Moreover, the social power and economic substance of the landowners was determined precisely by the number of serfs who provided dependent labor within the fief.

Various ethnic groups settled in New Russia,⁴ including Germans, Bulgarians, and Poles, as well as Jews from Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Greeks from the Ottoman Empire. The latter came because Greeks from the mainland and the Aegean islands had fought in the 1770 and 1790 Russo-Turkish Wars. With the withdrawal of the Russian fleet, Greeks from the Peloponnesian and Aegean islands, fearing Turkish reprisals, preferred to emigrate to a friendly country. Their decision, of course, was also motivated by policies enacted by the Russian authorities to attract settlers. The immigrants disembarked at the Crimean peninsula and on the shores of the Sea of Azov. Most of them settled in Taganrog, a town on the north coast of Azov, while a wave of old Crimean inhabitants, who were of Byzantine descent, moved further north and founded Mariopol.⁵ After the second Russo-Turkish War, a new influx of Greeks from the Ottoman Empire settled in Odessa, the

city that had been founded by Catherine the Great. The refugees formed military corps in the new territories.

To entice them, the state offered all settlers generous tracts of land, fiscal exemptions, and favorable loans to build houses. Naturally, most of the newcomers applied themselves to farming; as mentioned above, the extremely fertile black earth of the South was ideal for the development and expansion of cereal cultivation. The Germans, especially those residing in the northern hinterland of the Sea of Azov, distinguished themselves in arable farming. The Bulgarians had a bent for stock-raising. The Jews were involved with all manner of occupations, from publicans to tradesmen, highway innkeepers, and farmhands. The Greeks, although starting out as farmers in the Crimea and the west shore of the Sea of Azov growing wheat and tobacco (indeed they were widely recognized as being skilled in tobacco growing), ended up engaging in overseas trade and eventually forming the most important commercial community in New Russia.

Truly, after Russia expanded its borders to the Black Sea, it found outlets for the abundant yields of cereals from its southern heartland in the Ottoman Empire, the islands of the Eastern Mediterranean, and thence Western Europe. As a result of its increasing industrialization, the West not only brought to bear a tremendous demand for industrial raw materials, but was also deficient in basic foodstuffs and thus emerged as the most profitable market for Russia's agricultural produce. In turn, the West was a prime supplier of industrial commodities to Southern Russia. Moreover, in the settler societies that developed in port towns and the neighboring hinterland, there was a great call for Western goods, especially those that represented conspicuous consumption and social prestige: furniture, clothing, building materials. As a consequence of all these trends, the merchants accrued wealth and were established as a dominant social group.

Trade was the key factor that shaped the towns and societies of Southern Russia. This was the age of the Enlightenment in Europe, and the development of these southern cities is an ideal example of how closely mercantile transactions were linked to the promulgation of modern ideas and intellectualism. Ships arrived in the ports, laden with cargoes from all over the world. Along with basic goods and luxury items, however, the seamen also brought with them the ideas, attitudes, and customs of other places. In this way, the southern cities, particularly Odessa, evolved into cosmopolitan and sophisticated centers of commerce and cultural exchange. These characteristics were reflected in the city's street plan, the Western architecture of the buildings, the tree-lined avenues, even the progressive form of government exemplified by the administrations of Richelieu and Langeron.⁶ It was not coincidental, therefore, that the Philike Hetaireia (Friendly Society), the Greek conspiratorial revolutionary organization, was founded in Odessa by the city's merchants. In contrast to the absolutist and despotic Russian

regime of the period, under which the interior cities were typified by closed societies and hierarchical social relations, the cities of the South were marked by a strong European influence at the same time as they were building economic relations with European port cities. Perhaps this explains the success that Skoufas, founder of the *Philike Hetaireia*, had in initiating merchants of Odessa into his organization, in contrast with his failure to do so among members of the Greek community in Moscow.⁷

The rise of the Greek class of master foreign traders can be seen as part of a natural progression. First of all, they possessed the technical wherewithal, having traded under comparable conditions in their places of origin; they understood how to deal with closed markets of limited ambit, the usage of traditional forms of transactions (pre-purchases), and the need to offer commercial credit. At the turn of the eighteenth century, the French merchant Anthoine confessed his ignorance of trading conditions in the southern heartland of Russia, a fact that obliged him to keep his capital idle.⁸ At that very moment, the Greeks were already patiently and adeptly setting up commercial networks that encompassed key strategic geographical points in the cycle of producing and trading grain. In the hinterland of New Russia (Bessarabia, Podolia, Poltava) where the grain was grown and harvested; in the ports of the South (Odessa, Nikolaiev, Taganrog, Rostov, Mariopol); in the mercantile centers of the Ottoman Empire (Constantinople, Smyrna, the Aegean and the Ionian Sea) and later in the commercial capitals of the West (Trieste, Leghorn, Genoa, Marseilles, London) — in all these places, Greek commercial agents kept abreast of yields and prices, ordered consignments of grain, and transported cargoes. The trading techniques developed by the Greeks were admired by contemporary consular authorities and travelers alike. Truly, the success of the Greek grain-trading houses was articulated by the operation of their branches in the Mediterranean and, more significantly, in Great Britain.⁹ The existence of this type of multinational company in the trading centers of the major grain-consuming countries sealed the success of the Greek firms established in Southern Russia.

A second reason for the predominant position of Greek merchants was the ease with which they exploited propitious circumstances. The Anglo-French commercial competition that came to a head during the Napoleonic Wars left the field open to the Black Sea grain trade. When, after 1815, British and French merchant houses showed an interest in penetrating the trade of Southern Russia, they came up against the robust commercial networks of the large Greek firms. Last but not least, it is noteworthy that, according to all the available sources, the Greeks, in contrast to merchants of other nationalities, were also involved in and controlled the import trade to New Russia,¹⁰ from the moment of their settlement until at least 1870, that is, before large-scale imports of machinery and rolling stock began. Proximity to the Balkans and Asia Minor, regions that produced wine and dried fruits,

and the existence of traditional trading relations with these regions facilitated their exploitation of the Russian market's demand for imported agricultural products. It should be noted here that for many Greeks, these areas in the Balkans and in Asia Minor were their place of origin.

Just how prosperous the Greek merchant communities of Southern Russia were is indicated by the following data. In 1800, the Greek merchants in Odessa, though representing just 34 percent of the total number of merchants in the city's first and second guilds, owned 62 percent of total merchant capital.¹¹ Later, after 1812, despite the installation of major Western trading companies, the Greeks did not relinquish their position as the wealthiest merchant community.¹² Specifically, in the period 1833–1862, for which analytical data is available on an annual basis, the Greek merchant houses conducted over 40 percent of the total export trade in Odessa. The firms of Rallis Brothers, Rodocanachi, Pappudov, Voutsinas, and Sebastopoulos led the field in Odessa's exports, and those of Zarifis, Iraklidis, Zizinia and Mavros also had a significant share.¹³

In Taganrog, foreign trade was already controlled by Greek merchant houses by the late eighteenth century. As early as 1783, businesses owned by Greek merchants accounted for 64 percent of the turnover in the export trade.¹⁴ The picture had not changed in the slightest even by the mid-nineteenth century. In 1851–1852, Greeks conducted over 70 percent of the value of all foreign trade in that port city. The principal firm in Taganrog was Vagliano, while there were branches of other Greek-Russian houses there as well.

It is self-evident that the great boom in Russian grain exports brought about the Emancipation of the serfs in 1861. Many researchers who have studied Russian economic history attach little importance to the Emancipation, in the sense that this event was insufficient on its own to rectify the backwardness of the nineteenth-century Russian economy.¹⁵ However, most scholars concede that the Emancipation had an important impact in terms of increasing agricultural yields and commercializing produce. The restructuring of social relations in the countryside, the presence of a labor force that was now a commodity, the possibility of at least limited movement (the constraints that the peasant community imposed on its members, just as in the past, are well known), the modernization of the means of production with the import of farm machinery, all these created the necessary conditions for the formation of capitalist enterprises for agricultural exploitation in Southern Russia towards the end of the nineteenth century.

The sole — but seminal — factor that managed to curtail the burgeoning export of Russian grain to the markets of Western Europe was competition from American agricultural produce. By using better technology and improving and reducing the cost of transporting grain from the United States to Britain, by the last three decades of the nineteenth century, American grain had won the lion's share of the London market. During

the concomitant recession in the Russian grain trade, several Greek companies changed their business strategy, choosing to invest in shipping to counterbalance the decline in the grain sector.¹⁶ Some — the Vagliano, Scaramangas, and Svoronos families to name but a few — even left Southern Russia. Yet the majority continued to live in Russia despite the reduced turnover in trade.

The diaspora Greeks spent time and money on establishing educational and welfare institutions. But they were not alone in this, for the Italian, Jewish, and Bulgarian communities did the same. In the final analysis, it is obvious that the political and social activities of the settler communities befitted the social status of their members. The lower classes, irrespective of ethnicity, lived and worked on the margins of public life, while the upper-class, wealthy merchants held prominent positions in local civic society.

In the Greek community, the directors of the welfare foundations, inspectors of the Greek schools, and church commissioners were drawn from a few leading merchant families. Their behaviors and mores were identical to those of prosperous merchants of other nationalities. In Odessa, for example, they built their villas in the same quarter, in Arcadia on the west coast of the city, an area that boasted the best climate and was far away from the hustle and bustle of the harbor. They had reserved pews in the Greek Orthodox Church of the Holy Trinity as well as boxes in the Opera House. Indeed at one point, the merchants tried to found a second church, in order to set themselves off from the masses of lower-class Greeks. They took an interest in the politics of Greece, kept informed through the foreign press of developments in the West, worried about political unrest that might affect their economic affluence. They forged close relations with leaders in the other communities and, it goes without saying, with the authorities in their place of settlement. For many, the natural outcome of their many years of foreign domicile was assimilation into the majority culture; intermarriage with locals heralded this process.

The Greeks' involvement in public affairs is debatable, despite the hitherto prevailing view to the contrary. With the exception of the case of G.G. Maraslis, or at least until his political rise, culminating in his election as Mayor of Odessa,¹⁷ it is very difficult to find leading merchants who assumed bureaucratic duties. Greek merchants from middle and lower socio-economic backgrounds sat on the committees of the Market Police or the Customs Agency, but expressed no interest in participating in the city council. However, the indifference of the upper classes was a more widespread problem, which in fact led to the 1863 reform of the municipal administration in the towns of New Russia. On the other hand, there was a manifest preference among leading Greek merchants to hold positions on the boards of charitable and welfare institutions, as these appointments allowed them to display social power and consolidate social authority.

It is clear from this analysis that any approach to the issues bearing on the presence and activity of Greek settlers in Russia can disregard neither the economic basis nor the social milieu of the host country. An investigation into the economic basis is essential for rationalizing how the Greek economic entity developed while study of the social milieu is crucial for interpreting collective behaviors and mentalities and for allocating the roles of different social strata among members of the Greek community.

CHAPTER FOUR

CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL COMMUNITIES IN THE GREEK DIASPORA: INTERLOCAL AND LOCAL ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND CULTURAL NETWORKS IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES

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This paper aims to explain why central and peripheral communities developed as they did in specific areas during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and to interpret the local/interlocal and economic/political networks and connections which developed in these areas. To date, both the general and specialized literature¹ on the Greek Diaspora has dealt satisfactorily with its underlying causes, periodization, and incorporation into international economic networks. Scholars have even ventured to stress the role of family networks² and certain communities in the development of commerce. Recent studies have gone some way towards a general acceptance that research into Greek Diaspora communities ("paroikiai") must go beyond the questions posed by Greek historiography to a realization that these communities comprise a key chapter in the historical development of the geo-political area in which they formed. However, the communities are still generally examined on the basis of present-day state boundaries (Greek communities in Italy, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, and Russia, etc.), without always taking into account the considerable level of political and geographic unity that existed among these areas during the centuries that concern us.

Since Europe's nation-states came into being much later, when most of these communities were already at their peak or in decline, it is perhaps useful to group communities on the basis of a geographical area which was for the most part politically united. Borders, in the present-day sense of political partitions and successive obstacles to communication, were unknown during this period, and multinational empires were the rule, at least in central, south-eastern, and eastern Europe. Geographical expanses, many of which were eventually incorporated into specific nation-states, were appended to the territories of one empire or another for shorter or longer periods of time (a good example of this being the area now covered by Hungary, Rumania, and Ukraine), as territorial and population problems remained unresolved after two world wars. For instance, Hungarian minorities are to be found in Serbia and Rumania, and vice versa, and while peaceful solutions to confrontations are sought, they are unfortunately not always easily found.

The physical geography of the area remains unchanged, however, and it is this issue that shall be dealt with here via an analysis of its unifying and divisive tendencies.

Studying the map of communities at the end of the eighteenth century, by drawing imaginary lines along the longitude and latitude of Vienna, we can make the following observations: to the west of Vienna, we find only central communities (e.g. Vienna, Trieste, Livorno, Venice, Ancona, Marseilles, Amsterdam and, from the third decade of the nineteenth century onwards, London). These communities will be classified as Group A. In contrast, to the east of Vienna, in the area covered by (a) modern-day Hungary, Transylvania, and Rumania; (b) Ukraine and southern Russia; and (c) Egypt in the south, we find scattered communities of varying size, incorporated on the axis of other central communities. These shall be referred to as Group B. The role of central community was played by Pest in Hungary, Banat in Temesvar, Zemun (Semlin) in Northern Serbia, Braşov and Sibiu in Transylvania, Galatsi and Iasio in the Danubian Principalities, Odessa in the Ukraine and southern Russia, and Alexandria in Egypt. There are both geographical and economic/political factors that differentiate these two groups.

A common feature of Group A communities (with the exception of Vienna, which is on the Danube and can be examined along with Group B communities) is that they were located in key seaports, most of which were free ports, defined as such by the mercantilist practices of the late eighteenth century. None of these communities were connected with other, smaller towns in the interior of the country. In most cases, the local churches and communal institutions in these ports enjoyed certain privileges, and the residents benefited from economic concessions which allowed them to operate within the contemporary international commercial, shipping, and banking networks. As a rule, residents did not establish themselves in a particular town as a result of settlement policies enacted by the host state, but rather found their way to new abodes via

international trade routes, economic networks, and commercial interests. Each of these communities was a natural maritime commercial center for great empires or states that had a tradition of economic competition in Mediterranean trade (Venice, France, Holland, England) or states intensely interested in engaging in such a trade (Vatican State, Habsburg monarchy). The movement towards these port cities was also part of a system of external migration, perhaps with the exception of Venice, where some residents came from Venetian territories in the Levant. The Greek communities in Group A were, as a rule, drawn from the coastal regions of the Greek peninsula, the Ionian and Aegean Islands, and the shores of Asia Minor, areas linked by the sea routes of the time.³

Common features connecting the three wide-ranging regions comprising Group B include:

- a) The fact that they are crisscrossed by rivers, most of which are navigable. This facilitated the transport of agricultural produce, which was considerable thanks to the fertility of the land along the banks of the rivers. In Hungary and southern Russia, the steppes comprised another notable geographic feature. The system of large and small rivers empty into central, natural sea harbors. In contrast, the port-cities of the Group A are not located on large navigable rivers.
- b) Since many areas in Group B were Ottoman provinces for a considerable length of time, some of the population movement must be attributed to internal migration, with all the positive elements that entails.
- c) At various periods between the late seventeenth and early nineteenth century, Hungary, Transylvania, New Russia, and, to some extent, Egypt, were incorporated into an extensive system of colonization by the emperors or governors of these areas for reasons of military defense and economic exploitation. From the end of the seventeenth century onward, some of these provinces gradually became vassal states of the Ottoman Empire on a temporary or permanent basis, or, as in most cases, withdrew from its boundaries and became integrated into other powerful empires (the Habsburg and Russian empires, the autonomous principality of Muhammed Ali Pasha of Egypt (1805–1848)). These empires and principalities sought in turn to enter the field of international economic communication, either by initiating a program of industrial development or by trading their goods (agricultural produce, foodstuffs, and raw materials) in the global market.

Similar privileges (land for cultivation and free settlement, reduced taxes, exemption from military obligations, trade facilities, and assistance to help whole communities move *en masse*) were granted in all three of these regions, leading to the development of a complex of smaller centers of Greeks and other foreigners (Germans, Slavs, Jews) around the central communities. Although also employed in cultivating the land, the

residents of these smaller centers were mainly involved in the commercial exploitation of products at a local, inter-local, and international level. It is precisely in these local and inter-local complexes that teachers moved from place to place, subscribers to modern books were collected, printing presses came into being, revolutionary ideas spread, and national consciousness formed and developed. The peripheral communities took their place within the international trade network via the central communities.

This brief list should also clarify relevant concepts and assumptions. To begin with, it is necessary to define the context in which the terms "central" and "peripheral" are used to refer to communities. The last quarter century has witnessed a great deal of discussion on the division of the world economy into peripheral and semi-peripheral areas,⁴ and on the issue of including the Ottoman Empire within the periphery or semi-periphery of the countries of northern Europe which proceeded along the capitalist route. No attempt will be made here to expand upon these debates. It should be stated here that, at least in Central and Western Europe, communities abided by the economic framework of the countries in which they settled, and perhaps played the role of intermediary between them and the Ottoman Empire. The terms "central" and "peripheral" are used here to describe the role each community played in the international trade going on in its area. As such the term "central" encompasses the Group A communities as well as those located in key port cities, which were usually commercial transit hubs. The theory of central places ("Zentraler Ort" Theorie) propounded by the geographer Walter Christaller might be useful here as it has stimulated a good deal of fruitful discussion and attempts to explain historical, economic, and social phenomena since its publication in 1932.⁵ Although for years, the historiography of Western and Central Europe cast doubts on its conclusions, Christaller's theories have recently been successfully applied in the context of mid-Byzantine Macedonia⁶ and South Eastern Europe.⁷ The immigrants of both Groups were led to their new places of residence by the profits to be made and the opportunities offered by the growing commercial, shipping, insurance, and banking enterprises, expanded their commercial networks throughout central and northern Europe and played a key role in Mediterranean transport as captain-carriers in the eighteenth century and affluent ship owners⁸ in the nineteenth. As a rule, they were integrated into the socio-political life of the cities in which they lived, where they took part in administrative councils (commerce chambers, stock exchanges)⁹ and founded maritime insurance companies.¹⁰ They contributed to the topographical development of the cities by creating closed neighborhoods and erecting decorative private and public buildings and churches; this penchant for elaborate architecture was characteristic of their mentality, which set great store by displays of wealth, inclusion into the social and economic environment, daring and innovation.¹¹ Many new inhabitants, generally motivated by

economic interests, acquired citizenship from the host state. However, to the extent that the city continued to play a role consistent with its historical past — which is to say, ensuring that these communities stayed on the fringes of society — most Greek residents retained their ethnic affiliation, especially after the foundation of the Greek State, which now played a visible role as their cultural, national, ideological and, to some extent, economic center. These communities, at least those in Venice and Trieste, were seats of intellectual activity (boasting printing presses, publishers, and schools)¹² and played another important role, both in terms of their relationship with other communities in Western, Central and Eastern Europe, and with Hellenism in general.

This role is particularly obvious in the spread of the Enlightenment among the peoples of the Balkans, the dissemination of revolutionary thoughts, and the formation of a national ideology. On an intellectual level, their impact goes beyond the Greeks, and extends to the other peoples of south-eastern Europe. It is in these communities that co-existence and/or collaboration with the other “foreigners” or *accattolici* (non-Catholic) residents of the host cities was established in the late eighteenth century, despite conflicts between Orthodox Serbs and Greeks over the management of ecclesiastical and community matters.¹³ The economically influential Greek and Jewish communities in Trieste, Venice, Livorno, and Marseilles kept to themselves for the most part, and there is no record of conflict between them, at least until the mid-nineteenth century, when they were forced to cooperate in raising additional business capital for certain sectors, such as the large shipping insurance companies.¹⁴

The Group B communities in central Europe, east of Vienna along the Danube, were made up of small scattered community nuclei¹⁵ which began forming into commercial companies in the seventeenth century, and sometimes developed into full-fledged communities in the eighteenth century;¹⁶ these communities exercised a peripheral economic role in comparison to the central communities of Vienna, Pest, or Braşov/Sibiu. A common feature often seen among the smaller communities was their close links with the immediate interior or with the agriculturally productive area around them, while at the same time, they fulfilled an intermediary transit role in relation to the central communities. The merchants and residents of the peripheral communities focused their attentions on central and peripheral trade fairs and markets, rather than the large corporate commercial, insurance, and banking enterprises of the Group A communities. Exploring the role of the local, inter-local, and international communities to which these enterprises belonged and taking into account certain geographical factors should serve to further illuminate this point. Examining the map east of Vienna as far as the Black Sea (for the central-eastern European group of communities) in conjunction with political changes which took place at two points in time, roughly a century apart, sheds some light on the development

of these many peripheral and central Group B communities.¹⁷ Hungary and Transylvania comprised an Ottoman province until 1699, and Banat of Temesvar until 1718. From the late seventeenth century onward, in the context of the Russian-Polish conflict in which the Ottoman Empire played a critical role, part of western Ukraine starting on the right bank of the Dneister became a vassal state of the Sultan, just as Moldavia and Wallachia had been since the sixteenth century.¹⁸ Intense confrontations between Russia and the Ottomans were to be the rule throughout the eighteenth century. Tauris, the Crimea, and the Azov Sea area became bones of contention between the Russians and the Turks, even though they continued to constitute the Tartaric Khanate of Crimea, a Turkish vassal state, until the end of the eighteenth century. The situation began to change with the Russian occupation of Kerch and then the Crimea and Tauris in 1774 and 1783, respectively.¹⁹

Thus, the whole area east of Vienna along the Danube as far as its estuary was essentially an Ottoman province until the end of the seventeenth century. The Danube and some of its navigable tributaries south of Szeged remained part of the Ottoman Empire throughout the eighteenth, and for a large part of the nineteenth, century. Eastern Moldavia, through which the Pruth, Dniester, and Bug rivers flow, and which is the site of the Dnieper and Don estuaries, was under indirect Ottoman rule. What we have here, in other words, is an extensive system of rivers and tributaries in central Europe, which creates the fertile, often steppe-like, plains of Hungary and Banat of Temesvar, which are in turn traversed by the Danube and its two principal tributaries, the Theiss and the Maros. This system is dissected by the Carpathian Mountains, and trade openings are created in the passes and valleys of the Maros and its tributaries, with central stations at Braşov (Kronstadt) and Sibiu (Hermannstadt). It continues eastwards along the wide "avenue" and fertile plain of the Danube, its tributaries, and its delta in the Danubian Principalities.²⁰

The literature on the Greek Diaspora communities and the role of the Orthodox Greeks in the commercial life of south-eastern Europe assigns great consequence to their contribution to trade in Transylvania, Hungary, Austria, and central Europe, principally via the Leipzig trade fairs.²¹ However, the far from insignificant role of trade in the Danube Delta and its northern tributaries, such as the Pruth and the rivers to the east which flow into the Black Sea, must also be taken into account. The importance of the routes connecting Poland to the Balkans via Moldavia cannot be overstated, as Fernand Braudel stressed in his classic work on the Mediterranean,²² but vigorous trade between Poland, Wallachia, and Moldavia, chiefly in Hungarian wine but also in livestock, has been recorded as early as the sixteenth century.²³ In the sixteenth century, the presence of significant numbers of Greek merchants in L'vov (Lemberg)²⁴ in present-day Ukraine, near the Dniester on the borders of Poland, was in part due to the Cretans and Aegean Islanders who traded in wine

there, but also to merchants — Greeks and others — from Moldavia and Wallachia, who crossed Moldavia with Malvasia wine destined for Poland.²⁵

It would seem logical to consider the area to the east of Vienna, stretching to southern Russia, to have common geo-political features and a common landscape dominated by rivers, valleys, and plains (apart from the Carpathians) which directed the flow of trade into central Europe primarily towards Vienna, Moravia, Bohemia, the German lands, or Poland, and secondarily towards Moldavia, Ukraine, Poland, and southern Russia. The whole Ottoman past until the end of the seventeenth century facilitated the movement of Orthodox merchants in the northern Balkans as far as western Ukraine. It is often Greeks who co-found the “companies”²⁶ as they were called, which operated roughly within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire. Those merchants who remained Ottoman subjects encountered few obstructions until after the mid-eighteenth century. Their numbers were swelled with merchants (Greeks, Serbs, Vlachs) following the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718, which enhanced Austro-Turkish economic relations, and the communities to the west of Braşov added their numbers to the complex of central and peripheral communities oriented towards trade with Moravia, Bohemia, Poland, and Prussia. Most of these communities developed in the so-called “knee” of the Danube (Pest, Szentendre, Gyöngyös, Eger, Győr, Komaron, etc.)²⁷ or in the plain between the Danube and the Theiss (Pest, Kecskemet, Miskolcz, Tokaj, Szeged, Novi Sad, Zemun (Semlin), Debrecen, etc.).²⁸

With the Danube flowing through Ottoman countries in the section south of Pest, it was Ottoman subjects — including, of course, Greeks — who enjoyed the right to navigate it. From the mid-eighteenth century onward, when Austrian commerce also increased, circumventing the hurdle presented by Greek Ottoman subjects who sailed the Danube was a constant thorn in the side of the Austrian authorities.²⁹ The loss of Silesia (1742) ended Austria’s unimpeded access to the north, which meant that the Ottoman trade in Russian goods (furs, leather, etc.) to Austrian territories via Moldavia remained in Greek hands.³⁰ Indeed, the Austrian authorities repeatedly complained that a good many Greek merchants in Vienna, who played a key role in the Danube trade, passed themselves off as traders from Moscow, despite never having been to Moscow or, indeed, Russia. The role of Theophil Catargar (the Rascal) (1763) — whose surname the authorities pointed to as proof that fraud was the “method” employed by the Greek merchant — and Apostolos Anastasios (1773), who traded in sickles throughout Styria in Semlin, the Ottoman Empire, the Danubian Principalities, and Russia, are stereotypical examples.³¹

It was precisely the residents of these scattered peripheral communities that were connected with local production who were able to expand beyond the transit trade between the Balkans and central Europe and the Ottoman products to which they were entitled under the Treaty of

Passarowitz, into the transportation of regional products from their main headquarters in Nježin, in Ukraine, and across Austrian and Hungarian territories into Moldavia, Poland, and principally the Ukraine. This infringement of the treaty incited the ire of Austrian and Hungarian merchants.³²

Nježin, built on the banks of the Ostior, a tributary of the Ntesna 125 kilometers north-east of Kiev, stood at the junction of the routes connecting the Crimea, Poland, and Russia.³³ After the mid-seventeenth century and the union of Ukraine with Russia, Nježin, with its local markets and trade fairs, was for an entire century the international trade hub where goods were gathered from Russia, Prussia via Poland, Poland, Venice via Hungary and Poland, and Austria via Moldavia and Wallachia.³⁴ The principal carriers were the Greeks, who made full use of their direct communication via the Black Sea, Moldavia, and the Danube tributaries. With a privilege granted by the Ghetman of Ukraine in 1657, they formed a fraternity which flourished in the spheres of trade, economics, and letters.³⁵ After 1774, and especially after 1783, with Russia's expansion towards the Black Sea, the Greeks moved to the newly-established cities, among them Marioupolis/Mariupol, Kerch, Taganrog, Odessa, and Theodosia.³⁶ The complex of rivers and tributaries which empties into the Black Sea would become the new natural area of development for many Greek communities. Moreover, in 1784, Austria acquired the rights to navigate the Danube and a year later, a Russian-Austrian³⁷ trade agreement was signed; meanwhile, the Friesische Handlungskompanie,³⁸ which included Greek members, was attempting to upgrade the autonomous role of Austrian trade in Danube navigation.

The geographic dispersion of Greek communities throughout Hungary, Banat of Temesvar, Transylvania, and the Danubian Principalities meant that there were numerous Orthodox Serb and Vlach populations, mainly in Hungary and Banat of Temesvar. Many of these groups owed their existence to Austrian colonization policies. Movements of Serbian populations to Kraina in southern Hungary are referred to from the fifteenth century on,³⁹ but became more frequent beginning in the late seventeenth century, as a result of Austria's keen interest in transforming the region into one of its Military Frontiers (Militärgrenze Gebiet).⁴⁰

This fertile region along the borders of the Ottoman Empire, deserted as a result of war, was distributed among Serbian farmers and livestock breeders, who moved north under the leadership of Bishop Arsenije Černojević. Given land to cultivate in exchange for their readiness to fight, they organized themselves into *zadruga* and enjoyed religious freedom, while Karlowitz, the seat of the metropolitan bishop north-east of Belgrade,⁴¹ became a focal point for Serbs residing in both the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire. This diffusion of Serbs also took place within Hungary, though not strictly within the limits of its Military Frontiers. Orthodox centers, with churches large and small,

were founded, and the Serbian bishopric of Szentendre soon became an important religious and intellectual center which attracted other Orthodox Christians as well.

Given the favorable geo-political and religious situation in the eighteenth century, and the fact that trade was flourishing along established routes, it is only natural that there should have been an increase in the movements of Greeks and other merchants from the south. Due to Austrian economic policy aimed at attracting foreign merchants — and, indeed, Ottoman subjects — conditions for migration and diffusion were favorable until 1770 or thereabouts. Despite their common Orthodox religious affiliation, friction between Greeks and Serbs was exacerbated at the end of the eighteenth century, as both of these dominant groups began to develop a national consciousness. As a result, the Orthodox diocese of Karlowitz began to play a divisive political role rather than a unifying religious one.⁴²

Geo-political and religious conditions were similar to the east of Hungary and the Banat, in Transylvania and especially in the Danubian Principalities. Or rather, in the Danubian Principalities, Ottoman dependence allowed the Greeks to remain in economic contact with diaspora communities in the estuaries of the Danube on the Black Sea. Here, the sea factor was added into the equation. North-east of the Danube estuaries, an extensive plain extends, mostly steppe, and watered by the Dniester, Bug, Dnieper, Don, Volga, and their tributaries. In the eighteenth century, conditions here resembled those of the Military Frontiers (*Militärgrenze*) between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire. Russia had been making war on the Tataric Khanate and the Turks since the time of Peter the Great as part of its efforts to re-organize and westernize itself, and to acquire a gateway to the sea.⁴³ Catherine II⁴⁴ took care to populate those provinces she was gradually acquiring by means of specific plans for colonization (*Manifesti* 1762, 1763), either with Pontic Greeks from the surrounding areas or Serbs transferred from South Hungary (1752–1753),⁴⁵ or by attracting German, French, and other settlers from abroad. The Serbs, who were facing difficulties in the area of the Habsburg Military Frontiers, volunteered to be resettled. Once again, it was their bishops who led them in this venture, and the place where they settled (between the Dnieper and Bug rivers) is known as New Serbia.⁴⁶ But the creation of Novorossija (New Russia) in 1764,⁴⁷ encompassed the Dnieper, already a commercial artery of huge importance. New Russia was characterized by a military organizational structure and a colonization policy that were reminiscent of the Habsburg Military Frontiers.⁴⁸ Lands were granted to populations for the purpose of cultivation and ensuring a strong defensive posture, mostly in response to the Ottoman threat.

This policy of colonization reflected the state's mercantilist outlook.⁴⁹ The power of the state depended both on the size of its population and its specialization in trade and crafts. Thus, although Serbian

military colonists arrived in this new area first, as they did in the Habsburg Military Frontiers, they were considered neither sharp-witted nor trustworthy.⁵⁰ Greeks from the Aegean Islands and other areas swiftly carved out a key economic role for themselves, along with the Armenians with whom they were familiar with from living in cities such as Odessa and Kerch. The secondary literature makes it clear that this distribution of communities was part of Russian colonization strategies in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.⁵¹ The new cities spread along the shores of the Black Sea and the river estuaries, so that the sea and the rivers, in combination with the overland routes,⁵² comprised a single, unified area within which traders, craftsmen, and land-owners could move about freely.

In the Hungarian and Russian communities, there was a close link between residents and the productive land in the areas around their settlements. Many settlers acquired land either through concessions as part of a system of privileges (as was the case with Russia), or by investing their capital in land. Many of the landed gentry actually acquired titles of nobility.⁵³ This phenomenon did not occur frequently in the Group A port city communities we are examining here, where investments were centered primarily in real estate, banking, insurance, and shipping enterprises. Only in exceptional cases towards the end of the nineteenth century do we note the purchase of land in the interior (for instance, Skaramanga, Rallis, and Economou in Trieste; Sinas in Vienna and Hungary).⁵⁴

Church leaders played a key role in the Group B communities, particularly those that were founded as a result of colonization policy. The movement of Serbs after the Treaty of Karlowitz took place under the leadership of Bishop Arsenije Černojević. As we saw, the foundation of the diocese of Karlowitz on Habsburg territory created an ecclesiastic and intellectual center for the Serbs. The migration of Greeks to Azov province (1778) took place thanks to the efforts of Ignatius, the last Bishop of Caffa. In entrusting the diocese of Kerch (Χερσών) to Eugenios Voulgaris,⁵⁵ a name which itself recalls the ancient Greek ties to the area, which was then already a new multi-national region, Catherine the Second must have wished to emphasize not only Russia's bonds with Orthodoxy but also, for political and ideological reasons, its respect for the historic connection between Hellenism and New Russia. Voulgaris' heir, Nikiforos Theotokis, played a significant role in spreading Orthodoxy in the lower Ukraine and along the shores of the Pontos, and in forming the national religious Russian-Orthodox identity.⁵⁶

The ongoing formation of communities in Lower Ukraine and New Russia led to the emergence of a new network of peripheral and central communities similar to those in Hungary and Transylvania. These new communities in the Ukrainian and Russian south no longer needed to remain in direct and frequent contact with their counterparts in Hungary and Austria, since a new set of central and peripheral communities

had sprung up along the passage to the sea. However, the overland routes to the Southern Balkans via Moldavia did not fall into complete disuse, and the communications which gave birth to trade networks and contributed to the development of enduring ideological ties continued to exist throughout the eighteenth century. It was usually in the central communities that national identity was formed and maintained, as were ties to the national state, i.e. the Greek state, following its establishment. The existence of libraries and schools in these communities reinforced the feeling of affiliation. On the other hand, in smaller communities located on the axis of local trade fairs and rivers, alienation and assimilation from the original culture predominated (leading to Hungarianization and Russianization).

In Egypt from the late eighteenth century on, one could say that conditions arose which were similar to those in the other two extensive areas that comprise Group B. The Mameluke wars against the Ottoman administration and the French campaign, which weakened the Mamelukes and perhaps paved the way for the rise of Muhammed Ali Pasha (1805–1848), were the first stirrings in Egypt's nascent modern history. Muhammed Ali Pasha's policies were the catalyst for modernization in Egypt, the initial movement towards independence from the direct influence of the Ottoman administration, and, most importantly, Egypt's integration into the framework of international Mediterranean trade and commerce.⁵⁷ Again, geo-political circumstances, and especially the role of the Nile River, played a key role in bringing about this new political orientation. The Nile and, above all, its delta offered the developing Greek communities a geo-political environment reminiscent of the Danube and the northern shores of the Black Sea. Alexandria (a sea-port located on the banks of the Nile Delta) and Cairo, where two core Greek communities were formed in proximity to a scattered network of Greek merchants and craftsmen,⁵⁸ owed their development to the prevailing political situation but also to the physical terrain. Just as in Odessa, Taganrog, and elsewhere in southern Russia, the Greeks networked with wheat producers to create a system of connections, in the same way, in Alexandria and Cairo, they established networks especially with producers of cotton,⁵⁹ the product that facilitated Egypt's entry into the world of international trade. Smaller groups of residents (merchants and craftsmen) clustered around these two major communities, which, together, would form nineteenth-century Egypt's highly-developed version of economic and cultural Hellenism. This developed as a result of many factors, including the communities' geo-political position, but mainly Egypt's integration into the framework of international trade, and the incorporation of its communities into the trade networks of the western Mediterranean communities of Trieste, Livorno, and Marseilles. The foundation of the Greek state and its uninterrupted contact with the Greek center would, over time, strengthen Egypt more than any of the other communities that were formed at the same time.

Until the foundation of the Greek state and the start of the modern wave of migration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most residents of the communities in the Diaspora originated from the Ottoman Empire. As long as economic conditions allowed, they sought to remain Ottoman subjects, since most of the privileges they acquired from their host countries were given to them on the basis of special trade agreements with the Ottoman Empire (e.g., the Treaty of Passarowitz) or on the basis of political schemes aimed at attracting more craftsmen or experienced merchants. The residents of Group A communities, especially the wealthy, or those positioned in local government or senior banking, stock-market, or administrative agencies, sought citizenship from their host states when they and their businesses no longer benefited economically by remaining Ottoman subjects.

Nonetheless, acquiring citizenship did not mean that they loosened the national ties that bound them to Greeks from the Ottoman Empire or the Greek State. There were frequent instances of high financiers taking the citizenship of their host country (typical examples include Demetrios Kartsiotis and Ambrosios Stephanos Rallis of Trieste in the late eighteenth/early nineteenth and the second half of the nineteenth century, respectively,⁶⁰ and other Greeks in Vienna and Russia).⁶¹ Although not remaining Ottoman subjects, which one would have thought would link them emotionally to their compatriots in the Greek peninsula, these men did not fail to publicly declare their ties to the Greek nation and the Greek State, and indeed to demonstrate their support.

The rich historical research of recent years has demonstrated the powerful role of these communities in the formation of modern Greek consciousness. The Greeks of the Diaspora from the eighteenth century on were aware of the effects of the Enlightenment, and contributed to the revival in Greek letters, the foundation of schools, and the publication of contemporary books in Greek areas under Ottoman rule, as well as in the communities themselves. From the eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century, the Greek language was the *lingua franca* of commerce, and to a considerable degree, of education. The existence of communities and churches, continuous communication via roads and trade with Greek areas, interest in the letters, and the economic support of infrastructural works in the Greek State were among the factors that contributed to the maintenance of Greek national consciousness. Communities, primarily those in Group B, often lacked these dynamics and this, along with the fact that they were scattered along the periphery of central communities, meant that their residents often assimilated into the broader culture. Inter-marriage often accelerated this process, although Hungarianization and Russianization occurred throughout the interior in most peripheral communities, and especially in those where the Greek State was not represented by official authorities (embassy, consulate) which connected it to the national center.

**B. THE JEWISH DIASPORA:
SPIRITUAL SOLUTIONS**

CHAPTER FIVE

A LAND ADORED YET FEARED: THE LAND OF ISRAEL IN JEWISH TRADITION*

AVIEZER RAVITZKY

Even when I turned my back on you —
'it was love alone that guided me,
you are too pure, too holy even
To be my consort, to dwell with me
(H. N. Bialik)¹

Introduction

Can a Holy Land also be a homeland? Can the same place simultaneously be experienced on the one hand as the King's palace and gateway to Heaven, and on the other, as national home to the collective and nurturing mother to the individual?² And how are we to resolve this dichotomy, which has figured so prominently in Jewish history and Jewish texts?

The home (or homeland) protects and shelters its inhabitants, creating a sense of intimacy and comfort. In stark contrast, the sacred generates a sense of exaltation and dread, eliciting feelings of fear and trembling. Homeland is a national-historical category, while holiness is a religious-normative one. The home is an existential concept — "Have mercy on Zion, for she is our home," but the sacred is a metaphysical notion — "How awesome is this place; this is no less than the House of God, the gate of Heaven."³ The purpose of the home is to attract and nurture, while the sacred must demand, or even threaten. And yet despite these differences, these two concepts have converged over the course of Jewish history.⁴ This convergence has generated considerable tension, and even conflict, that has sometimes reached critical proportions.

Religious awe of the sacred is a familiar phenomenon,⁵ and traditional

fear of the holy place is even more so. In the history of religions, however, this fear has usually been directed toward a defined center and specific place, such as a mountain, a city, or a shrine, rather than toward an entire land.⁶ In all such instances, the sacred, whether emanating from one or several sources, leaves in its vicinity pockets of routine or even secular space. Not so the Holy Land in post-biblical Jewish tradition,⁷ in which the dwelling place of God's presence (*shekhinah*), the focus of transcendence, was extended to encompass the entire Land — "a Land of gateways, mirroring the gateways of heaven" (Yehudah HaLevi).⁸

Correspondingly, the tension between attraction and dread was also broadened to encompass the entire Land. For although the Holy Land wove bonds of love around its children, its religious demands and metaphysical intensity also struck fear into their hearts (and especially into the hearts of its exiles).⁹ In extreme cases, this fear evolved into a taboo, and the entire Land — not just the Temple Mount or the City of Jerusalem — became forbidden territory that could neither be touched nor enjoyed: "'You shall set bounds for the people round about' (Exod. 19:12) — around Jerusalem and around the Land of Israel. 'Take heed to yourselves, that you not go up into the mount, or touch its edge' — this is the Land of Israel and the Temple Mount" (Eli'ezer of Würzburg, thirteenth century).¹⁰

Naturally, exile and geographical distance exacerbated this tension. The very people who exalted the Land and cherished and longed for it the most were those who, over the course of time, withdrew from it and refused concrete contact with it.¹¹ As time passed and distances increased, the earthly Jerusalem was apotheosized to the point of being identified with the heavenly Jerusalem.¹² Given that, who would be worthy of entering its gates and who would dare to cross its threshold? Like a lover who so exalts his beloved in his dreams that he comes to avoid actual contact with her (lest he profane her or, perhaps, lest he be rebuked), so the exiles came to fear concrete contact with the Holy Land: "You are too pure, too holy even, to be my consort, to dwell with me."¹³ They, too, idealized the Land of Israel from afar.

Since antiquity, then, the religious consciousness manifested ambivalence in how it treated the concept of the Land of Israel: was it homeland or was it holy land? In time, however, another distinction evolved, this one historical: the real Jew versus the ideal land.¹⁴ These two tensions came to reinforce each other, giving rise to a perpetual oscillation between desire and dread, attraction and withdrawal. In some cases, not only exile but also destruction (of the Temple and Land) sharpened this tension, infusing the ruins with a dark, demonic quality that only the chosen few could encounter and withstand.

While historical research has dealt extensively with the Jewish yearning for the Land of Israel, it has almost completely ignored the dread and fear of it.¹⁵ The only literary genre that has given this theme the importance it deserves is the modern Hebrew poetry.¹⁶ But this motif of withdrawal

has failed to make its mark on the historical, ideational, or ideological discourse relating to the nation's ties to its Land.

There is, however, one exception: A. B. Yehoshua's article, "Exile — A Neurotic Solution." According to Yehoshua, Jews dread the Land and see exile as "an escape to a new, conflict-free situation."¹⁷ Yehoshua, however, draws a clear distinction between the nation's conscious attitude to the Land and its subconscious, repressed attitude. He argues that while Jews consciously abhor exile and feel an irresistible pull toward the Land of Israel, subconsciously they fear the Land and seek to escape from it into exile.¹⁸ He regards this discrepancy as a pathological, neurotic state that requires resolution. I share Yehoshua's recognition of the Jews' traditional fear of the Land, but I dispute his "diagnostic" distinction concerning traditional Jewish consciousness. I will attempt in this essay to demonstrate that Jews have explicitly acknowledged dread of the Land, alongside their desire for it, throughout history. Many sages have developed this theme into reflective constructs and even, on occasion, into existential positions and philosophical doctrines. Jewish authors, over the generations, have recognized that the attitude toward the Land of Israel has always been characterized by tension and duality. It is only contemporary scholarship, with its entrenched, ideological bias, that has refused to acknowledge this. It is time we made amends.

In a previous work,¹⁹ I drew attention to the fact that the anti-Zionism of the *Haredim* (ultra-orthodox) has expressed a similar fear of the collective encounter with the Holy Land. On the face of it, their objection was only to the secular nature of the Zionist movement and its leaders, and to the audacious attempt to precipitate national redemption through natural means; but they were motivated by other deep-rooted considerations as well, prominent among them the traditional dread of the Land of Israel, its demands, and spiritual sublimity, as they had been portrayed over the course of the exile. In this article, I investigate the historical/literary roots of this awe, from the Middle Ages to modern times.

1. The King's Palace

I begin with examples of ambivalence toward the Land of Israel precisely in the writings of several sages — from the medieval Rhineland to present-day Morocco — who longed for Zion and viewed *aliyah* as a positive step, if only for an elite. Thereafter, I move on to a more systematic study of the subject, taking account of the views of more radical writers, whose feelings of dread overpowered their desire for the Land and led them to ban *aliyah* during the historical period, before the End-time.

In the late thirteenth century, R. Meir of Rothenburg (Maharam), one of the greatest sages of the Rhineland, compiled a collection of responsa on the subject of immigration to the Land of Israel. Maharam's halakhic

decisions and practices generally manifested his great yearning for the Land of Israel, and he appears to have attempted *aliyah* himself. In principle, his responsa favored immigration and stressed the Land's spiritual merit and providential nature.

But that background only highlights Maharam's account of the special religious demands the Holy Land imposes on its inhabitants and the risks attendant on failing to meet them. In clipped, pointed sentences, he invokes most of the dire admonitions regarding the Land that appear in Jewish sources. The Land demands of its inhabitants extreme piety and asceticism, along with strict observance of the precepts relating to the Land. God's direct presence in the Land is depicted not as a sheltering, protective force, but as a fearsome one; God's permanent providence over the Land is not a source of security but a vigilant, threatening eye.

Most importantly, Maharam sees added offense if one sins in the Holy Land: "One who rebels against the King within the King's palace is not the same as one who rebels outside it,²⁰ and that is the meaning of 'a Land that consumes its inhabitants' [Num. 13:32]." In other words, Maharam takes the biblical scouts' warning of the physical danger awaiting the children of Israel about to enter the Land and transforms it into a warning against the metaphysical danger awaiting sinners who venture there.²¹ Fear of the enemy's physical strength²² metamorphosed, in the writing of the leading sage of the generation, into a fear of divine providence and the divine radiance emanating from the Holy Land. True, this does not deny the untold blessings that await those few who can rise to the challenge and resist the dangers, but it instills fear in the masses of simple, honest Jews. To quote Maharam:

Let him be abstinent [in the Land] and beware of any transgression and observe all the commandments contingent on the Land, for if he sins there, he will be punished more severely than if he sins outside the Land. For God constantly supervises the Land, subjecting it to His oversight and providence. One who rebels against the King within the King's palace is not the same as one who rebels outside it, and this is the meaning of "a Land that consumes its inhabitants" (Num. 13:32). And it is also written, "That the Land not vomit you out as it vomited out the nation [that was before you]" (Lev. 18:28); for the Land vomits out transgressors,²³ and that is why the Land of Israel is now desolate, lacking walled cities like those in other lands. As for those who go there and think they can get away with levity and reckless contentiousness, I would invoke the verse, "But you came and defiled my Land" (Jer. 2:7).²⁴ But those who go to the Land with pure hearts, and behave there with sanctity and purity, will be rewarded without limit.²⁵

As noted, Maharam of Rothenburg himself sought to enter the palace, no doubt inspired by the desire to live up to its demands and maintain the

requisite degree of religious intensity. He did not succeed, however; he was arrested and imprisoned in Italy, where he met his tragic end. The historians of Ashkenazi Jewry have analyzed Maharam's view of the Land's magnetic force — a normative drive to observe the commandments and sanctify life²⁶ — in contrast to the spiritual approach of those who saw settling in Israel as a means to attain metaphysical transformation and absolution of sins.²⁷ Equally important, however, is the emphasis Maharam placed on those factors that inspire dread of the Land, for which he provided a clear metaphysical and theological basis.

More than three centuries later, another leading Ashkenazi sage, R. Yesha'yah HaLevi Horowitz (Shelah), adopted this theme of "a Land that consumes its inhabitants" within the Land of Israel itself, again transposing it to a spiritual-mystical plane. But Horowitz maintained that the biblical threat was directed not only at those who sinned in the Land of Israel, but also at those who moved there for earthly reasons alone, seeking to lead a secure, quotidian life there, oblivious to the Land's unique, religious character:

"A Land that consumes its inhabitants" — it destroys those who wish to settle there in tranquility, to enjoy its fruit and simply derive benefit from it. And even though it was the scouts who spoke that verse, they intended to speak ill, transforming a holy theme [metaphysical dread] into a profane one [physical fear] — it is profane for them only [and not for us].²⁸

In 1621, Horowitz emigrated from Prague to the Land of Israel, where, about two years later, he completed his book *Shenei Luhot ha-Berit*. His book sings the praises of the Land and advocates *aliyah*, since "anyone who journeys to the Holy Land should do so in order to sanctify himself and observe its precepts."²⁹ Studies suggest he was drawn to the Land in order to pursue Lurianic mysticism in depth.³⁰ But what concerns us here is his understanding of how a Jew is to live in the Land of Israel, and the mental stance he is expected to maintain.

Horowitz adopted a singularly anti-existential position on these matters. A Jew should not venture to the Land of Israel to settle there securely, but only as a resident alien (*ger ve-toshav*): "As King David said (Ps. 119:19): 'I am an alien in the Land' — that is, the most I can aspire to is to be an alien in the Holy Land."³¹ One who dwells in the Land should not feel a sense of permanence and belonging, but, rather, a sense of transience and ethereality. He must experience his presence there as shaky, under constant threat both existentially and metaphysically. The biblical motif of dependence on rain, in particular in the Land of Israel,³² was extended by Horowitz to embrace the human condition in its entirety. Life in the Holy Land is closely associated with insecurity, vulnerability, transience, and alienation from the rest of the world.³³

Horowitz seems to have perceived the very essence of religious

consciousness to be a stance of contingency, dependence and a total submission to the divine will. It follows that life in the Holy Land epitomizes religious consciousness as so understood. Using fanciful etymology, Horowitz even interprets the Land's biblical name, the Land of Canaan, by association with the Hebrew root *c'n'a'*, signifying submission. The Land represents religion's absolute demand for spiritual surrender, in contrast to worldly ownership and dominion. "He who dwells in the Land of Israel in this manner is assured of a place in the World to Come."³⁴

Horowitz weaves all these strands into the leitmotif of religious dread of the Land. To that end, he uses classical sources creatively, associating the term "sojourning" (*megurim*, as in "the Land of his fathers' sojourning" [Gen. 37:1]) not only with the "stranger and sojourner" (*ger ve-toshav*, rendered above as "resident alien") but also with horror (*magor*, from a different root, similar in sound) and dread. In sum, living in the Land of Israel requires both a sense of alienation from one's own home and a sense of dread in the face of the ever-present threat of divine retribution associated with the Land's sanctity.

Horowitz's perception of the Land of Israel, then, is that of a crucible that purges and purifies. His immigration made him all the more energetic in preserving this religious tension and sharpening the rigorous view of holiness.³⁵ And yet, Horowitz still calls on the chosen few to come to the Holy Land and take up the gauntlet, "for of this it is said, 'the righteous will walk in it; sinners will stumble in it [the Land of Israel].'"³⁶

We see that despite their very different historical contexts, both Maharam in thirteenth-century Germany and Horowitz in the seventeenth-century Land of Israel were torn between love of the Land and dread of its holiness. This might lead one to assume that their views were typical of Ashkenazi Jewry throughout the generations. Let me therefore cite a final example, this one from Morocco of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Bible commentary of R. Rafael Berdugo (1747–1822), written in a radically different cultural context, also bears testimony to the same profound and paradigmatic Jewish ambiguity toward the Land of Israel. Like Maharam and Horowitz, Berdugo transforms fear of a physical enemy into a metaphysical dread of the religious demands of the sacred place.

Praise of the Land of Israel figures prominently in the works of Berdugo, a leading Moroccan sage who served as rabbi of Meknes. In particular, he stresses the spiritual distinction and "divine allure" of the Holy Land,³⁷ which he depicts as an opening between physical and spiritual reality, a bridge between the worldly and the divine. The Holy Land, for him, is "a gateway to heaven through which our prayers ascend³⁸ and prophecy descends." It is the natural location for an elevated degree of divine providence, for the presence of the *shekhinah*, and for revelation of the Torah's mysteries. Accordingly, any seeker of God "should attempt to go to the city of our might the place where one is always in the presence

of [God's] glory."³⁹ In one of his sermons, Berdugo also castigated Jews who built luxurious houses for themselves in the Diaspora.⁴⁰

Despite, or perhaps because of, the above, Berdugo does not mince his words in describing the spiritual demands and dangers of life in the Land of Israel. The Land, he maintains, is meant only for those who have undergone thorough spiritual cleansing and are ready to devote their entire beings to the service of God. Although the Land is well disposed toward the God fearing, it poses grave dangers for sinners. Berdugo, like other sages before him,⁴¹ compares a person sinning in the Land of Israel to a person defying a king in his palace, "under the king's very eyes." Moreover, Berdugo does not attribute the metaphysical benefits and dangers of the Land to the divine eye only, but also to man's intense exposure to its direct energy and immanent sanctity. This exposure, however inspiring and beneficial, is also threatening and disturbing.

For example: Why did Jeremiah call on the inhabitants of Jerusalem to abandon the besieged city and surrender to the enemy? ("He that remains in this city shall die by the sword, and by the famine, and by the pestilence; but he that goes out, and falls to the Chaldeans who besiege you, he shall live, and his life shall be his booty" — Jer. 21:9, 38:2). According to Berdugo, the prophet's warning was based not so much on pragmatic considerations — lest the enemy attack those imprisoned in the besieged city — but rather on theological grounds — lest God's wrath be directed specifically against the inhabitants of the holy place:

One who sins in the king's palace, under the king's eyes, is not the same as one who sins outside it...This is why, when they angered God (may He be exalted) at the time of destruction, the prophet declares that those who leave the city will keep his life, while those who remain in the Land will endure great hardships. And this, as we have said, is because only a true servant of the Lord, who is scrupulous in his actions and engages in Torah study, has the right to dwell in the chosen Land. Anyone else would do well to avoid living there.⁴²

In other words, one who chooses to live at the very center of holiness may find himself not only at the summit of the mountain but also at the epicenter of an erupting volcano. Those incapable of withstanding the associated tension "would do well to leave" and make do with the plain and the profane. Berdugo, in his creative interpretation of Jeremiah's words, points not only to Jerusalem as the source of potential danger (as the plain reading of the text suggests), but to the entire country. Like Maharam in his audacious reading of the scouts' words ("a Land that consumes its inhabitants"), Berdugo, too, transposes the physical danger referred to by Jeremiah to the metaphysical plane. And it is not only the enemy, or even sin, that generates tribulations, but the essence of the place itself, as the natural habitat of divine justice and retribution. On

the one hand, "Happy is the man who has not walked in the counsel of the wicked ... he shall be like a tree planted by streams of water" (Ps. 1:1, 3) — this refers to the Land of Israel." On the other hand, (ibid, 1:4–5), "'Not so the wicked,' for whom it is better to be 'like the chaff which the wind drives away,' so that they will be outside the Land and therefore, 'the wicked shall not confront the same strict judgment as those who live within the Land, angering God in his very presence.'"⁴³

Despite their different cultural contexts, all three sages — each in his own place and time — reacted to a historical situation in which immigration to the Holy Land was a feasible option for select individuals or groups,⁴⁴ and each of them considered that to be a positive development. But their fear of trivializing the Land (Maharam: "those who go there to conduct themselves with frivolity and recklessness"), of normalizing life there (Horowitz: "to settle there in tranquility and to enjoy its fruit") and, worst of all, of profaning the holy Land (Berdugo: "one who sins in the king's palace") led them to emphasize the more daunting aspects of life in the Holy Land, and to regard *aliyah* as appropriate only for the chosen few. The Land of Israel was first and foremost a center of transcendence, tolerating within its borders nothing less than religious purity and spiritual perfection.

Given the recurrence throughout the ages of such religious tensions over the Land of Israel, it is hardly surprising that some Jews came to a more radical conclusion, recoiling from the Land and urging others to do so as well. It is no wonder that the very sanctity of the Land of Israel eventually led some sages and writers to warn their compatriots against any concrete encounter with it in history. This extreme expression of religious fear of the Land represents one possible resolution of the desire-dread dilemma. However in my judgment, we must discuss the varied expressions of this dilemma simultaneously; they all represent different facets of one and the same phenomenon.

2. Between Neutralization and Dread

Contemporary research on the status of the sacred place in the history of religions has been enormously influenced by the writings of Mircea Eliade. According to Eliade, the sacred place organizes the religious person's space and cosmos, anchoring him within an otherwise disordered and inchoate reality. For such a person, existence without an axis of holiness is mere chaos, and a world that lacks a pathway to the transcendent has no organizing principle. It has no "up and down," no "front and back," no focus of meaning, and, therefore, no real substance. The sanctification of place (and time), in contrast, restructures the world around a solid, cosmic center. A person takes a piece of territory, separates it from the rest, and transforms it into the ontological and existential axis of his being. Once a specific space is chosen, hallowed, and accorded

absolute importance, it permits one to orient oneself within reality: chaos becomes cosmos, and the amorphous acquires shape. In this way, sanctity builds man's entire religious universe.⁴⁵

According to this interpretation, the sacred place is a person's true habitat, his cosmic home.⁴⁶ Eliade maintains that the religious personality strives to draw as close as possible to the source of concrete, ultimate being. It yearns and thirsts for an ontic experience of God's nearness. Accordingly, the individual constantly seeks out a sacred cosmic axis — a pivot of reality — that offers refuge from terrifying nothingness and homogenous secularity. By repeatedly re-establishing this reality ("the eternal return"), one is able to reach the very center of the universe.

Eliade's disciple, Jonathan Smith, has convincingly criticized his master's theory.⁴⁷ Smith claims that Eliade did justice only to a certain version of this cultural and religious phenomenon.⁴⁸ True, there are cultures that revolve around a sacred axis, that constantly reaffirm a centralized perception of sanctity, and that aspire to dwell in a limited, centripetal world. But there are other cultures that take a more open, centrifugal approach to the sacred, that look to the perimeter and seek to transcend boundaries, and that occasionally create new opportunities and new sacralizations.

The centrifugal approach to the sacred, claims Smith, can be found mainly in religions that are "in exile," geographically remote from their natural centers. Unlike localized cultures, in which the believer is defined by the place, a culture in exile frequently transcends place, opening up new horizons for the believer. Instead of encouraging an "eternal return" to the center, it creates a new utopia (literally, a "non-place"). For example, in the Greco-Roman region in the ancient world, as the exiles' ties to the center weakened, they began clearing new pathways to the divine, pathways that lay outside the sanctuary and beyond place. The exiles not only consecrated alternative places; frequently, they even "anthropologized" the holy place by a transfer of the religious focus from the holy place to the holy person. In this and other ways, they neutralized the territorial center of the universe, and created new anchors and pathways.

Jewish history provides numerous examples of such attempts to neutralize the Holy Land (at least until the messianic era). From Philo of Alexandria (first century)⁴⁹ to modern Hasidism (eighteenth century),⁵⁰ symbolic and spiritual perceptions of the Land of Israel have periodically resurfaced. They enabled the Jews to achieve religious fulfillment outside the Holy Land and provided them a sense of wholeness and religious worth that transcended time and place. These perceptions developed in an interesting manner during the Middle Ages, when mystics and philosophers sought to portray "the Land of Israel" as an extraterritorial concept or experience. "Any place where wisdom and fear of sin are to be found is similar to the Land of Israel," wrote the thirteenth-century scholar and philosopher, Menahem Ha-Meiri.⁵¹ "The name 'Zion' alludes

to the souls of scholars who are distinguished [*metzuyanot*, a play on the word "Zion," *tziyon*] in what they encompass, for within them, the divine presence dwells," wrote the mystic, Isaac of Acre in the same period.⁵² Similar viewpoints, naturally, have emerged in the modern era, and have occasionally been translated into popular idioms ("The Jerusalem of Lithuania" to describe Vilna, for example). And, needless to say, these viewpoints have also frequently been sharply criticized: "I have heard several fools claim that each city and each country where they live are today as holy as the cities of Israel and Judah" (R. Moshe Hagiz).⁵³ This subject has received well-deserved scholarly attention in recent years.

What concerns us here, however, is a further, more dialectical phenomenon.⁵⁴ What happens when an exile neither neutralizes the sacred center nor seeks a provisional alternative to it, but, on the contrary, remains vividly and acutely aware of it and, despite the physical distance, continues to direct his religious consciousness and cultural creativity towards it? For such a person, there is no other sacred place, nor any religious fulfillment outside the original site. Will such a person be subject only to the existential and ontological pull of the place, or might one anticipate a more complex and subtle reaction? Moreover, what happens if historical reality changes and the absolute center suddenly becomes accessible to the individual or the masses? Will they strive to turn the "cosmic home" into a real home, or will they be deterred by its absoluteness? Eliade maintains that existence is contingent on nearness to the absolute; but might there not be situations in which it depends precisely on distance from the absolute?

Zali Gurewitz and Gide'on Aran, in two fascinating articles, recently claim that Jewish tradition, by its nature, interposes a distance between the nation and its place.⁵⁵ It does not allow the Jew to become fully entrenched in his concrete, geographical location. Since the concept of "place" always precedes the place itself, (for the biblical account of "the Land" precedes the encounter with the Land itself), a complete, harmonious encounter with "the place" and "the Land" is never possible. The Land is always just beyond reach, just over the horizon, and the Jews are always poised on the threshold. Accordingly, Gurewitz and Aran argue, the Jewish perception of the sacred place differs from Eliade's. It does not attempt to create a primeval, mythical unity between sanctity and place; rather, it locates the sacred beyond place. Although the Land may be perceived as a focus of significance and object of desire, it is not regarded as a cosmic axis or source of holiness.

Once again, several Jewish sources support this claim.⁵⁶ But my concern here is with a far more radical phenomenon, namely: What happens when the place itself embodies the idea? When the real land harbors all the hopes and demands of the ideal land? According to Maharam and Berdugo (and other sages discussed below), it is impossible to live in the earthly Land of Israel while maintaining a distance from its heavenly counterpart. Contact with the concrete necessarily entails contact with

the absolute, and the encounter with the geographical place necessarily entails an encounter with the transcendent.⁵⁷ And that is the root of the distinction between the distancing and alienation from the Land described by Gurewitz and Aran and the fear and awe of the Land considered here. According to their conception, even one who reaches the place has not yet touched “its essence,” the “true” place. In contrast, the texts I deal with reflect the fear that one may touch the “essence” itself, and “ascend the mountain.” In this understanding, the concrete Land is seen as a center of intense, immanent holiness, a holiness that not only transcends place, but emanates from it as well.⁵⁸

And so, Eliade’s view can be questioned more sharply, for there exists a religious consciousness diametrically opposed to the one he portrays. Eliade holds that there is no religious existence — only profane chaos — without the act of sacralization. The starting point, in Eliade’s view, is a state of disorder and meaninglessness, and it is necessary to mark an axis of sanctity, establishing thereby an absolute center of reality. But the opposite could also be true: The religious starting point could be the premise that *everything* is holy, and that nothing is devoid of holiness. The metaphysical experience could begin with a sense of divine immanence that fills all worlds. It would follow, in that case, that a person designating a specific place as a center of holiness would be establishing not the locus of sanctity but the profane, neutral realm that surrounds it. By in effect “confining” the sacred to a single, circumscribed place,⁵⁹ we are declaring all other places profane and freeing them of the intense religious tension associated with the holy place.⁶⁰ Correspondingly, by designating certain times as holy or “awesome,” we do not construct the sanctity and awe as much as we confine them, implying that all other times may be spent in worldly, routine pursuits. R. Avraham Ibn ‘Ezra (twelfth century) puts it this way:

Since the glory of God fills all space, and man cannot maintain [the proper level of spirituality] everywhere, a limited place has been designated for his prayer, and must be honored as such. Similarly, man is supposed to thank and praise God at every moment... but, since he is involved in worldly affairs, fixed times have been designated for prayer, namely, evening, morning and afternoon.⁶¹

In other words, since no one can meet all the ubiquitous and constant demands of the immanent divine presence, “the glory of God” was confined to a degree, in both time and place, by the human act of sanctification. This being so, it may be asked whether the spiritual exaltation of the distant Land, while providing the exiles a point of orientation, could also have relieved them of the terrifying burden of living in an atmosphere of undiluted sanctity.⁶² Has the “eternal return” of the sacralizing act always brought the Jew closer to his Land, or has it also sometimes distanced the lover from the object of his love?

3. A Desirable Land

I begin this section by reviewing the four major factors that, over the generations, have fueled religious yearning for the Land of Israel. I then consider the tension (between desire and dread) inherent in them, citing examples from medieval and modern literature.

a. The Draw of the Commandments

The observance of the commandments that are contingent on the Land enriches the lives of Jews living in the Land of Israel. Therefore, devout Jews yearned for the Land in order to broaden their observance of the Torah. As early as the Second Temple period, the sages issued extra-biblical regulations that further distinguished the Land of Israel from other lands. In time, the *tanna'im* designated all agriculture-related commandments as pertaining exclusively to the Land of Israel,⁶³ thereby intensifying the Land's magnetism with respect to halakhic matters. As the *amora* R. Simlai stated later in the Talmud: "Why was Moses so eager to enter the Land of Israel? Did he need to taste its fruit or eat of its produce? [No,] but he said as follows: Israel has been given many commandments that can be observed only in the Land of Israel. Let me enter the land so that I can keep them all."⁶⁴

In fact, some of the medieval sages considered this the main purpose of dwelling in the Land: "One is not allowed to leave the Land,"⁶⁵ since he is thereby "relinquishing the obligation of observing the commandments contingent on the Land" (Rashbam).⁶⁶ Similarly, the growing interest in the Land of Israel and *aliyah* among the Jews of Christian Europe in the early thirteenth century was triggered primarily by their new, intense interest in the laws pertaining to the Land.⁶⁷ Even the famous *aliyah* of the Tosafists in 1211 has been attributed by most scholars to such motives. These immigrants abandoned their homes in France not necessarily out of a spiritual-mystical attraction to the Land, but rather out of a desire to intensify their concrete religious lives by observing the commandments unique to it.⁶⁸ During another wave of *aliyah*, following the expulsion of the Jews from Spain, R. Shim'on ben Tzemah Duran (Rashbatz) wrote: "Just as the biblically ordained commandment to dwell [in the Land of Israel] is due to the biblically ordained commandments [that are observed only there], so, too, the rabbinically ordained commandment to dwell there is due to the rabbinically ordained commandments [that are observed only there]."⁶⁹

Indeed, according to many religious authorities, it is not only these particular commandments that are at stake, for all of the Torah's commands are fulfilled in a qualitatively superior manner in the Land of Israel. But that bears on the Land's second attractive factor, related to its inherent virtues.

b. The Longing for Holiness

The Land of Israel has drawn Jews to it not only because of the unique way of life it offers, but also because of the ontological, metaphysical appeal of the sacred. Religiously sensitive Jews desired the Holy Land because of the divine presence with which it is imbued. It is a Land of prophecy, providence, atonement, and religious inspiration, sanctified by the acts of the Patriarchs and the history of revelation. The *tanna'im* already emphasized its supernatural qualities⁷⁰ and its unique place in the universe.⁷¹

The quest for metaphysical meaning in the Land of Israel's very physical existence was widespread among the medieval sages. "There the Presence [*shekhinah*] abideth in thee [i.e., the Land]; yea, there thy Maker opened thy gates to face the gates of heaven" (R. Yehudah HaLevi).⁷² Some sages lauded the Land's geographical and climatic advantages, or its astrological and astral superiority.⁷³ Above all, many sages attributed to the Land an intrinsic holiness that set it apart from other lands and placed it in a different order of existence. Naturally, other sages rejected or refuted this concept of intrinsic holiness, crediting the uniqueness of the Holy Land only to its special commandments and unique history. But the concept of intrinsic holiness struck a chord within many circles. The kabbalists in particular were receptive to the idea, for they organically connected the Land to the supernal divine attributes, associating it with the emanation of "sovereignty" (the *seferah* of *malkhut*, "the heavenly Land of Israel") or even higher divine emanations according to kabbalistic theosophy.

Nowhere is this attitude more clearly stated than in a responsum sent by R. Shelomoh Alkabetz to R. Yosef Karo while on his way to the Land of Israel. Alkabetz distinguishes between the correct belief in the Land's intrinsic sanctity and the erroneous belief that makes its sanctity dependent on the Jews' observance of the commandments within it. In other words, Alkabetz effectively draws a sharp distinction between the two foregoing ways in which the Land exercises religious attraction. He writes:

Many people believe that the superiority of the Land of Israel is conditioned on the Jews' presence there and would disappear in their absence. This opinion is based on their belief that the superiority of the Land of Israel is caused by the observance of the commandments there, rather than that the observance of commandments is simply an indication of its superiority. This opinion is wrong. Know that the Land of Israel is essentially perfect, since it was the first entity to be created... As the rabbi explained to the Khazar [king, in R. Yehudah HaLevi's *Kuzari*], the perfection of the Land is attested to by our forefathers having yearned for it even when idolatry was rife within it;⁷⁴ what more convincing proof can there be that the Land is inherently perfect? ...Its inhabitants dwell

in an atmosphere of purity and are surrounded, day and night, by sacred objects.⁷⁵

c. The Desire for Political Fulfillment

The Land of Israel has been and is the Promised Land not only for the individual Jew but also for the entire nation, the Congregation of Israel. The desire for collective fulfillment has been associated with it from time immemorial. Just as the historical memory associated with king, judge, prophet, and priest has always been rooted in the Holy Land, so, too, has been the anticipation of the nation's future religious and political fulfillment. Although Jews never believed that "the Jewish nation came into being in the Land of Israel" (as stated in the opening of the State of Israel's Declaration of Independence), they determined, in their collective consciousness, that the nation walked upright in this Land and would come to do so again. Messianic national expectations shone on the Land of Israel and fed the Jewish yearning for it over the generations.

The most eminent political philosopher in Jewish history, Moses Maimonides, viewed most issues concerning the Holy Land in a communal and political context. In his view, the Land of Israel was the space designated for the establishment of the ideal Jewish community, the territory of the kingdom of Jews living in accordance with the Law of the Torah. For Maimonides, there could be no spiritual autonomy without political autonomy, and no political autonomy without the Land of Israel. But Maimonides' halakhic and philosophical system accords the Land of Israel no special metaphysical status⁷⁶ nor any intrinsic holiness of the sort discussed under the preceding heading.⁷⁷ It is no wonder, therefore, that the context in which Maimonides recounts the praises of the Land of Israel is in his Laws of Kings. We see repeatedly how large a part the socio-political factor played in shaping his doctrine of the Land of Israel and his messianic doctrine in general.⁷⁸ "The Messianic period is the time when sovereignty will be restored to Israel, and the Jews will return to the Land of Israel."⁷⁹ "The King messiah will arise and restore the kingdom of David to its former state and original sovereignty... If he succeeds, vanquishes all the nations around, rebuilds the sanctuary on its site, and gathers the dispersed of Israel, then he is beyond all doubt the Messiah."⁸⁰

In a sense, all laws relating to the Jewish kingdom, the Temple, the Messiah, and other related matters have become Land-oriented laws. Even if they are not "contingent on the Land" in a technical or formal sense, they depend on the Land historically and are rooted in it ideologically. Accordingly, the Land of Israel is destined to enhance Jewish religious and national life in ways that go far beyond agriculture; it offers national fulfillment. This messianic hope is yet another factor that has contributed to the attraction of the Land of Israel throughout Jewish history.

d. Poetry and Nostalgia

Finally, the Land of Israel is the object not only of systematic halakhic, political, philosophical, or mystical doctrines but also of purely emotional yearning, as reflected in legend, poetry, imagery, and folklore.⁸¹ "For Your servants take pleasure in her stones and love her dust" (Psalms 102:15). Sometimes this yearning expressed itself as a craving for the physical Land, "for its very houses and dwellings, to which Jews journey," and sometimes it sought out the wondrous Land, one that "they could not imagine to exist in this world and they believed the Land of Israel was an entirely different world, given its great sanctity."⁸² Either way, the Land of Israel figured in dreams, visions, and legends, not only in halakhah, theosophy, or political theories.

4. "Lest I Sin"

If the Land of Israel was so desirable, why did so few Jews actually immigrate? Surely all the foregoing factors should have induced people to immigrate, especially after Nahmanides and his followers issued a halakhic ruling that immigration to the Land of Israel was a positive biblical commandment. Why then was there so little *aliyah*? Was it because of external, political-economic factors only, or considerations of comfort and self-interest? Or was there perhaps an internal dialectic at work here, within the faith, and within the yearning itself? Did every failure by an individual or community to take advantage of an opportunity to immigrate necessarily signify an ideological or theological betrayal, or was a more complex, existential principle called into play?

The congregation of Israel does not wish to leave its exile, saying, lest I sink again into sin, God forbid, and again have to be banished from my Land... As Scripture says, "But Zion said, the Lord has forsaken me" (Isa. 49:14). For how can I return and expose myself again to sin? Therefore, the Lord, blessed be He, destined [an End] when the evil inclination will be eradicated from the Land, and a voice will proclaim: "Your children hasten [to return]" (*ibid.* 49:17). And if one says: "Behold, there is a crazed bear in the way!" — to this [the prophet] responds: "Your destroyers and they that made you waste shall go forth from you" (*ibid.*), that is, the evil inclination will be eradicated from the Land, and "[you will] return to me" (Jer. 3:1), fearing neither destruction nor devastation.⁸³

These words, uttered by R. Yehonatan Eybeschuetz in a sermon in Metz in the middle of the eighteenth century, vividly portray the collective Jewish dread of sin and retribution in the Land of Israel. That dread, which reaches a peak in this passage, prevents the real-life Jew from

entering the Land. Since the destructive inclination, or human nature in general, will not permit the real-life Jew to attain absolute purity, it, like "a crazed bear," bars the way to the sacred place. In other words, the Land of Israel is relegated to some utopian era, beyond real history; it is available only to the ideal person, who is above good and evil. Until that time, when the "evil inclination is eradicated from the Land" and human nature undergoes a radical transformation, the way to the Land is barred.

For Eybeschuetz, even the traditional fear of pressing for the messianic era represents only an aspect of the overwhelming dread of sinning in the Holy Land. ("For how can I return and expose myself again to sin?") Redemptive activism is not disqualified here solely on its own account, because of the theological objection to hasten the End. First and foremost, it is rejected because it exposes Israel to the danger of sinning in the Holy Land, for the world remains unredeemed and unrepaired. As Eybeschuetz wrote in another sermon, which I have discussed elsewhere: "The Congregation of Israel shouted out their vow... against the ingathering of Israel [before the End] ... It is absolutely forbidden to go there. Because the End is unknown and perhaps this is the wrong time. Indeed, tomorrow or the next day they might sin, and will yet again need to go into exile, Heaven forbid, and the latter [exile] will be harsher than the former."⁸⁴

Eybeschuetz's diatribe is an unusually extreme expression of the Jewish dread of the Land and withdrawal from it. Eybeschuetz, a great but controversial figure, refers to the three basic factors that feed this dread: fear of *sin and punishment*, fear of *the sacred place*, and fear of *pressing for the End*.⁸⁵ (These factors correspond to the three attractive qualities of the Land discussed above: commandments, intrinsic sanctity, and collective fulfillment.) Despite, or perhaps because of, the intensity of this passage, it can serve as a yardstick for assessing more moderate expressions of dread of the Land.

Before reviewing the different causes of the fear of the Land through Jewish history, I should emphasize that the texts I cite do not represent all, or even most, of Jewish literature on the subject through the generations. There is no symmetry between the expressions of dread and the expressions of yearning in the sources; for every example of the first type, there are ten of the second. But the expressions of dread have been suppressed in both the scholarly and ideological literature,⁸⁶ so there is all the more reason to present them. Only then will we obtain a clear picture of traditional Jewish ambivalence toward the Holy Land.

5. Daunting Demands

The primary source of tension is the religious demands imposed by the Land of Israel. "R. Hananiah ben 'Akashia says: The Holy One, Blessed

be He, wished to confer merit on Israel, therefore he plied them with Torah and commandments."⁸⁷ On the face of it, this aphorism seems simple enough: Commandments are variously said to enhance one's merit, refine one's personality,⁸⁸ or help one triumph on the Day of Judgment.⁸⁹ But a more careful reading of this text reveals a polemical undertone, designed to counter the (Pauline) claim that the yoke of the commandments was too onerous, and liable to cause man to sin and be punished.⁹⁰ This Pauline argument of course was rejected by the Jewish sages, but what of the specific burden imposed on the Jews by the Land of Israel — the burden of observing commandments they had not been called upon to observe for many generations? And what of the added measure of stringency demanded in the Land with respect to religious life overall? In this respect at least, might there be room for preserving the status quo that pertained in the Diaspora?

Therefore, it was not by chance that the late-twelfth-century French Tosafists, who showed a special interest in the laws related to the Land of Israel, also voiced withdrawal in the face of the Land's demands and the risks of sinning there. Some of the Tosafists, to be sure, were eventually to emigrate to the Land, but others took a different position: "Rabenu Hayim [Kohen] would say that there is no obligation to dwell in the Land of Israel nowadays, because there are several commandments contingent on the Land that we are unable to observe meticulously."⁹¹ From the traditional religious point of view, this statement is clearly paradoxical: Not only does it fail to see the Land-related commandments as encouraging *aliyah*; rather, in its view, they actually deter it. And not only does it disregard the traditional view, stated by R. Meir, that "one who dwells in the Land of Israel has his sins forgiven";⁹² rather, it takes the view that dwelling in the Land actually enhances our potential for sinning. It is worth noting that R. Hayim's warning is set out in *Tosafot* immediately after a passage describing the physical dangers attendant upon *aliyah*. As R. Hayim stated it elsewhere: A man cannot force his wife to move to the Land of Israel, for "Nowadays, the roads are in bad condition...overrun by wild beasts and robbers."⁹³ All in all, the Land of Israel represented both a physical and a spiritual danger. Earlier generations rose to this challenge and future generations will do so as well, but the current generation, with its weak moral fiber, falls short of the task.⁹⁴

The innovation here was not in the paradox itself, which made the enriched religious life of the Holy Land a pitfall on the path to that Land. A similar idea can be found, for example, in Yehudah HaLevi's *Kuzari*, when, toward the end of the book, the King of the Khazars tries to dissuade his Jewish mentor from going to the Land of Israel: "I thought that thou didst love freedom; but now I see thou strengthenest thy bondage by imposing duties which are obligatory only if thou residest in Palestine and bidest not here."⁹⁵ Here, too, as in the passage from *Tosafot* cited above, the statement was preceded by a warning of the physical

dangers awaiting the potential immigrant: "Why dost thou expose thyself to the dangers of land and sea and to the risks incurred by contact with other peoples?" Ze'ev Harvey draws our attention to the clever literary device used by HaLevi in developing this argument. At the beginning of the book, before the King converts, he marvels at the Jews' alienation from the concrete Land of Israel. By the end of the book, after he has converted and himself developed a "Diaspora" mentality, he suddenly begins voicing all the typical Jewish arguments against settling in the Land.⁹⁶

Interestingly, the same argument was taken up by a Spanish apostate in the early fourteenth century, who claimed that the Jews preferred a state of exile because it released them from the yoke of many of the commandments.⁹⁷ Presumably, then, the argument put forward by the Khazar King was not merely a literary device, just as the argument put forward by the apostate was not merely a polemical device. Both appear to represent a certain intellectual trend within Spanish Jewry.⁹⁸

However, the strikingly original elements of R. Hayim's statement are its speaker and its context. In contrast to the criticism voiced by the King of the Khazars and the apostate regarding Jewish avoidance of the Land, the statement in *Tosafot*, with its exemption from *aliyah*, was articulated by a halakhic authority and sealed with a normative stamp. And while the Khazar and the apostate spoke of the *burden* of Land-related commandments, R. Hayim Kohen, the French halakhist, warned his contemporaries of the *dangers* inherent in them. It should be noted that he delivered his warning in the late twelfth century, in a cultural context that, only a few years later, would lead to a substantial immigration of sages to the Land of Israel.⁹⁹

To what extent did R. Hayim's ruling influence the halakhic debates over the generations on the question of *aliyah*? Interestingly, it left no real mark on the *rishonim* (earlier, pre-sixteenth-century authorities), but it resurfaced in the literature of the *aharonim* (later authorities) and was discussed in many halakhic works. Several sages were so taken aback by R. Hayim's ruling that they went as far as to deny its authenticity: "It is a disciple's gloss, and is not to be relied on at all."¹⁰⁰ A greater number of sages rejected it out of hand.¹⁰¹ But more than a few sages followed it or referred favorably to it, including Spanish exiles such as Yosef de Leon,¹⁰² great Ashkenazi halakhic scholars, such as Moses Isserles (Rema),¹⁰³ David b. Shemuel HaLevi (Taz),¹⁰⁴ and Yehezqel Landau (*Nod'a bi-Yhudah*),¹⁰⁵ and important Turkish and oriental arbiters, such as Shelomoh HaKohen (Maharshakh),¹⁰⁶ Hayim Shabetai (Maharhash),¹⁰⁷ and Tzedakah Hotzin (*Tzedakah u-Mishpat*).¹⁰⁸

In any event, R. Hayim's warning of the spiritual dangers of living in the Land of Israel penetrated deep into the halakhic consciousness¹⁰⁹ and on several occasions competed with Nahmanides' position on the commandment of dwelling in the Land. R. Hayim's view underwent tortuous transformations until it finally gained a place of honor in the

haredi polemic against Zionism, from the Lubavitcher Rebbe at the dawn of the twentieth century¹¹⁰ to the Rebbe of Satmar at mid-century.¹¹¹ Even the greatest halakhic authority of contemporary *haredim* in the United States, the late R. Mosheh Feinstein, asserted that "One must certainly take into account R. Hayim's concern in the *Tosafot* regarding his ability to properly observe the commandments contingent on the Land."¹¹²

This is not the place to trace all the interesting metamorphoses of this idea through the generations. For now, let me focus on three of its noteworthy branches in the first half of the nineteenth century. The first, in the writings of Mosheh Sofer (Hatam Sofer), nicely embodies the paradoxical nature of the idea. The second, in the works of Israel of Shklov, represents its radicalism. Finally, the comments of Akiba Joseph Schlesinger combine these two aspects.

In two halakhic responsa, R. Mosheh Sofer concludes, rather surprisingly, that nowadays, a reduction in the Land of Israel's halakhic sanctity intensifies its religious pull! Precisely if one accepts the view that denies the desolate Land the special degree of holiness it had had during the Temple period (the view of Rabad),¹¹³ then there is all the more reason, halakhically speaking, to immigrate there. In the two responsa,¹¹⁴ Hatam Sofer distinctively portrays the basic tension between religious yearning for the sacred place and religious dread of it. As he describes it, it is a tension between two opposing types of sanctity: On the one hand, the yearning is directed toward a metaphysical sanctity reflecting the Land's closeness to God. That sanctity is absolute and eternal and therefore exerts a constant pull. On the other hand, the recoiling is rooted in a normative sanctity, associated with the commandments, which generates fear of sin and retribution. It follows that if the second kind of sanctity expired or diminished after the destruction of the Temple, the dread generated by it likewise expired or declined, leaving only the yearning in force. Hence, Hatam Sofer's surprising conclusion, based on R. Hayim's assertion: "Were the commandments not applicable, there would be more reason to go up to the Land!"¹¹⁵

At the time R. Mosheh Sofer was formulating his responsa in the town of Pressburg, R. Israel of Shklov, head of the *Perushim* (disciples of the Vilna Ga'on) who had settled in Safed, was writing his book, *Pe'at ha-Shulhan*, on the halakhot of the Land of Israel. R. Israel naturally rejected R. Hayim's teaching out of hand: "Its reasoning is defective, and it deserves no recognition at all."¹¹⁶ He even aligned himself with those who denied its authenticity: "It is not part of the *Tosafot* at all ... but merely a disciple's gloss, not to be relied on."¹¹⁷ Moreover: R. Israel of Shklov equated this false logic with the logic of Moses' scouts (or, it might be said, as suggested above, with the "Pauline" logic) that turned "a desirable Land" into "a Land that consumes its inhabitants"!

At the beginning of this article, I referred to a responsum by Maharam of Rothenburg on the question of *aliyah*. As noted there, Maharam saw the Land of Israel not only as "the king's palace" but also, because of its

religious demands and metaphysical dangers, as “a Land that consumes its inhabitants.” Unlike R. Hayim Kohen, however, Maharam ultimately favored immigration by pious Jews, who recognized the stringencies and risks involved. R. Israel of Shklov questioned Maharam’s view but then resolved the difficulty, as follows:

Concerning Maharam’s statement that it is “a Land that consumes its inhabitants,” the question immediately arises: [How could he endorse] words that were spoken by the scouts?

Maharam, may his memory be for a blessing, evidently reasoned that the scouts did not lie... Indeed, it is obvious with respect to the conduct of [a Jew] in the Land of Israel that he is within the king’s palace, and one who dwells there and angers the king by his actions can expect to be severely penalized. But does this in any way detract from the splendor of the king’s palace? For, in a similar manner, when the most select person (the High Priest), on the most select of days (the Day of Atonement), enters the most select of places (the Holy of Holies), once a year, he is immediately punished if his actions there are flawed (*Yoma* 69b). But does that detract from the holy place? This is the nature of the Holy Land, that it does not abide transgressors, as Nahmanides wrote [in his commentary] on the portion *Aharei Mot*, it was only when the Cutheans sinned in the Land of Israel that God sent the lions against them.¹¹⁸ But the scouts intended to speak ill and condemned it, for it is difficult to dwell there and observe all the commandments meticulously, for [the Land] consumes.¹¹⁹

In other words, religious life, by its very nature, entails an existential threat and demands spiritual strength; this is equally so for the high priest on the Day of Atonement and the ordinary Jew in the Holy Land. And that explains why religious life presents us with two opposing options: separation and disengagement from the sacred, as chosen by the scouts, or involvement and immersion in the sacred, as recommended by Maharam and Nahmanides. It is readily apparent which of these ways is reflected in the tradition attributed to R. Hayim Kohen. Note: R. Israel of Shklov carefully frames the scouts’ argument in words almost identical to R. Hayim’s: “It is difficult to dwell there and observe all the commandments meticulously.” Both refer to a fear of sin so overwhelming that it paralyzes all religious activity. But while R. Hayim referred specifically to the commandments, the scouts (as portrayed by R. Israel) extended the religious *danger* of the Land to all aspects of life there. So, too, Maharam and R. Israel of Shklov extended the religious *challenge* of the Land from its particular commandments to all aspects of life there. True, “the scouts intended to speak ill and condemned it,” but Maharam and R. Israel of Shklov regarded it favorably¹²⁰ and were intensively drawn to the source of holiness.

Finally, we come to a view that combines the paradoxical with the radical. R. 'Aqiva Yosef Schlesinger, an extreme *haredi* of the nineteenth century (a follower of the Hatam Sofer), and an ardent proponent of *aliyah*,¹²¹ summarily rejected R. Hayim Kohen's argument. But he did so, surprisingly enough, precisely out of extreme fear of sinning in the Land. If there were no obligation to dwell in the Land of Israel, he reasoned, and men therefore could not compel their wives to immigrate with them, many men would immigrate alone and defile the Land with impure thoughts:

Many of those who immigrated to Mount Zion in search of help and refuge will perish for their sins. For they literally fulfill the verse: "But when you entered you defiled my Land" (Jer. 2:7). They may have escaped the clutches of sin, but do not imagine for a moment that they escaped the clutches of depraved thoughts. In earlier generations, a man — even if a renowned elder — was not permitted to dwell in the Land of Israel without a wife who would keep him from sinning... But now, everything is topsy-turvy, and people immigrate alone and live a miserable existence, without a "wall" [to protect them against sin]. It is not for us to say, but who can tell if they are not delaying the redemption?¹²²

This position is doubly paradoxical: R. Hayim's view that dwelling in the Land of Israel is not mandatory and may actually encourage immigration of men (alone). That immigration, however, would likely cause sin, and the only way to prevent it would be to make immigration binding (on both men and women), contrary to R. Hayim's view.

6. Dread of Holiness

The last two examples were focused not solely on the Land-contingent commandments, but on spiritual life in the Land in general, and the stringent standards of observance demanded by its unique sanctity. This leads us directly to the second deterrent factor — fear of the Land's elevated spiritual plane and of the intense divine presence that radiates within it. These attributes confer special meaning on any act performed in the Land of Israel, but also demand that its inhabitants maintain high levels of piety and purity in thought and deed.

That being so, "Who shall ascend into the mountain of the Lord? And who shall stand in His holy place?" (Ps. 24:2). Just as according to Eybeschuetz (see above) the Congregation of Israel balks at collective *aliyah*, so does the individual hesitate to "dwell in the sacred place [the Land], lest its sanctity not accept [literally: not suffer] him"¹²³ and make it impossible for him to exist there. Like the prophet Jonah who fled the Land of Israel¹²⁴ to "a place where the *shekhinah* was neither present not

revealed," so did many Jews prefer to remain in exile, where they were free of the harsh standards of religious excellence demanded by the Land of Israel. Even a lover of Zion like R. Hayim of Volozhin (nineteenth century) is said to have limited *aliyah* to a singular elite. In responding to an inquiry on the subject, he is reported to have sharply said: "For a person who is a pure soul, and of no body [i.e., who is highly spiritual], it is fitting to dwell in the holy city. But you and the rest of us, who contain the soul of the living God combined with our bodies, must not travel there in these times."¹²⁵ As already noted, R. Hayim of Volozhin was deeply concerned about Zion and supported *aliyah* on the part of some of his students.¹²⁶ But he regarded their *aliyah* as a daring and demanding act, and apparently sought to dissuade other (ordinary?) Jews from following their example. We see here yet another characteristic instance of the tension between yearning and recoiling.

Having already cited varied examples of this dread of the Land's holiness (Maharam, Horowitz, Berdugo, Eybeschuetz, Israel of Shklov, Schlesinger), let me turn now to a related intellectual development that began with the Safed mystics' view of the unique attributes of the Land and its inhabitants. From there, it evolved into a total spiritualization of life in the Holy Land, but finally gave way to a competing proto-Zionist outlook, which garbed even the most spiritual notions of Jewish tradition in concrete, worldly terms.

In his book, *Tuv ha-Aretz*, the mystic R. Natan Shapira, a mid-seventeenth-century emissary from the Land of Israel to Italy,¹²⁷ attributes a surprising passage to R. Mosheh Cordovero. The passage opens with enthusiastic praise for the inhabitants of the Land: "Know, that anyone who dwells in the Land of Israel is deemed a righteous man, even if, on the face of it, he does not appear so. For were he not righteous, the Land would spew him forth, as Scripture says: 'and the Land vomited out its inhabitants' (Lev. 18:25). Since the Land does not spew him forth, he must surely be a righteous man, even if the opposite seems to be true."¹²⁸ The text innovatively uses the traditional idea that the Land's inhabitants are meritorious — an idea based on the *Mishnah* and *Zohar*¹²⁹ — to refute the message of a Land fraught with spiritual dangers and replace it with a message of protection and reassurance. If the Land is so strict towards its inhabitants, he argues, even apparent evildoers must have hidden merit, and anyone who survives should be considered a living example of the verse (Ps. 118:20) "This is the gate of the Lord — the righteous shall enter into it."¹³⁰

Although I could not trace this passage in Cordovero's printed works,¹³¹ there is no reason to doubt its authenticity, since many of his works are unpublished. In any event, R. Natan Shapira continues in a different vein, in a passage that he may or may not mean to attribute to Cordovero. Unlike in the earlier passage, he here fulminates against anyone who sins or behaves frivolously in the Holy Land, and he appears to indict the inhabitants of the Land of Israel as vigorously as he defended

them before. He emphasizes that simply being in the Holy Land in a physical sense does not automatically confirm one's righteousness. There is another, metaphysical, reckoning, another judgment, in another world. On that reckoning, anyone unworthy of dwelling in the Land of Israel would be cast forth from it — if not physically in his lifetime, then metaphysically after his death. Shapira (in Cordovero's name?) puts it this way:

Those who come to the Land of Israel without paying attention to being in the King's palace, and rebel, and sin, and indulge in feasting, drinking, and revelry — of them Scripture says: "But when you entered you defiled My Land, And made My estate an abomination" (Jer. 2:7) and "When you come to appear before Me, Who required this of you, to trample My courts?" (Isa. 1:12). Let them not think that after they die they will remain in the Land. On the contrary, they will be cast forth like curs. And this is the wording of *Pirquei de-Rabi Eli'ezer*.¹³² All of the wicked who die in the Land of Israel, their souls are cast out from the Land, as it is said: "And the soul of your enemies He shall sling out, as from the hollow of a sling" (1 Sam. 25:29). In the days to come, the Holy One, Blessed be He, shall take hold of the corners of the Land, and shake them out, and cast out the impure, as it is says: "That He might take hold of the ends of the earth [*ha-aretz*, interpreted here as referring to the Land] and the wicked be shaken out of it" (Job 38:13). Therefore, anyone coming to the Land of Israel should be careful to be many times more God-fearing than he was before, and should always be cognizant of dwelling in the King's palace.¹³³

Unlike the first passage, which imparts a sense of existential security and stability on the ground of the Holy Land, the second passage conveys an anti-existential feeling: one is constantly at risk of having the ground pulled out from under him, and one can never be certain of his moral and metaphysical standing. Interestingly enough, each of these passages appeared separately in works by different authors who predated Shapira. The second, unsettling, passage appears verbatim in *Sefer Haredim* by El'azar Azikri (a late-sixteenth-century Safed mystic),¹³⁴ while the first, reassuring, passage appears, also verbatim, in *Hesed le-Avraham* by Avraham Azulai (who immigrated to the Land from Morocco in 1613, and was influenced by Safed mysticism).¹³⁵ Shapira's argument therefore may be seen as a dialectic: a harsh "thesis" (proposed by Azikri), a protective "antithesis" (put forward by Azulai), and a synthesis provided by Shapira (or by Cordovero himself),¹³⁶ bringing together the poles of compassion and retribution, desire and dread.

This close reading of the texts sheds light on the religious tension related to the Land's distinctiveness and the demands it imposes. As Azikri himself states: "Each Jew must love the Land of Israel and come

to it with great desire from the furthestmost corners of the world, like a child seeking out its mother's breast¹³⁷ but one must also be fearful and apprehensive...regarding the commandments, because of the whip poised to strike."¹³⁷ No wonder, therefore, that this duality left its mark on the writings of other sages. Azikri's *Sefer Haredim*, in particular, and his tremendous fear of sin and retribution in the Holy Land, exerted a great influence on later generations. Shelah, too, whose anti-existential position and emphasis on the sense of transience demanded of the Land's inhabitants have already been discussed, owed a great debt to El'azar Azikri. He quotes Azikri extensively, both the yearning and the admonitions.¹³⁸

Azikri's loving yet demanding approach underwent many metamorphoses over the generations and exerted broad influence, even bearing on the contemporary theological argument against Zionism.¹³⁹ A detailed account of that history is beyond the scope of this article, but one episode — the most fascinating from a dialectical point of view — may be noted. It involves the Sefardi sage, Eli'ezer Papo, in early-nineteenth-century Bosnia, and his disciple, Yehudah Alkalai (Al Qala'i). An extremely ascetic and spiritualistic viewpoint is articulated throughout Papo's ethical work, *Pele Yo'etz*,¹⁴⁰ especially in relation to the Holy Land. According to Papo, anyone living in the Land must refrain not only from "feasting, drinking, and revelry" (as Azikri had said previously) but also from all worldly pleasures and comforts. "Even if God has granted him much wealth, he must not indulge in worldly pursuits, but live a life of austerity, contrition, and piety."¹⁴¹ Earlier admonitory themes regarding dread of the Land of Israel figure prominently in Papo's works, but his spiritualization of Jewish life there is so extreme that the reader may come to wonder why this Land is called "the Land of Israel" and yearned for by its people, when its entire being is bound up in self-flagellation and austerity.

Papo frequently refers to Azikri's book,¹⁴² particularly on the issue of the Land of Israel. He states:

The main purpose of dwelling in the Land of Israel is repair (*tiquin*) of the soul, [as is said,] "And the spirit will return to God, who gave it" (Eccles. 12:7) and "the soul shall praise the Lord" (Ps. 150:6), and the holiness of the place and relief from [worldly] burdens are of great help in this process. Accordingly, one who is privileged to enter the Land must be holy and abstemious. Even if God has granted him much wealth, he must not indulge in worldly pursuits, but live a life of austerity, contrition and piety... One must do everything within his power to observe the commandments contingent on the Land with all his soul and all his might, for this is the reward for dwelling in the Land of Israel. The pure author of *Sefer Haredim* [Azikri] has already listed all the commandments contingent on the Land. It is common knowledge that one who

sins in the Land of Israel incurs a penalty double that of one who sins abroad, for the Land is God's palace. Therefore, anyone of spiritual stature should protect his soul, clinging to God and to his Law, day and night, without a moment's respite, "and it shall atone for the sins of his soul" (Num. 6:11) all the days of his life, "for it is the time to be gracious to her" (Ps. 102:14)... The rule is that for a person dwelling in the Land of Israel, every day is like the Day of Atonement, and the fear of Heaven should hover over him constantly ... [As Azikri states]: One dwelling in the Land of Israel should rejoice constantly over his constant fulfillment of that precept, and his love for the Land should make all his tribulations seem trivial.¹⁴³

How ironic that the author of these words was none other than the mentor *par excellence* of R. Yehudah Alkalai, the famous herald of Zionism, who later adopted a diametrically opposed position on all these issues. The irony is manifest in two principal aspects of Papo's thought: his radically spiritualistic view of the Land of Israel, which completely rejects all worldly aspects of life there, and his extremely individualistic attitude toward the Land, which tied the Land nowadays to personal redemption alone, to the return of a man's soul to its heavenly source. Even the verse "You will arise and have compassion upon Zion, for it is the time to be gracious to her" (Ps. 102:14) is interpreted by Papo as referring to the redemption of the individual soul. Elsewhere, he gives it a mystical interpretation, alluding to the raising of the *shekhinah* from the earth (literally: dust),¹⁴⁴ but nowhere does he take it as referring to the real Land, or to the historical nation. Needless to say, Papo's view of redemption adhered to the traditional, passive position. According to him, the future redemption depended entirely on the repentance and religious devotion of each individual Jew, and on a collective and consistent asceticism and submission until the End. For example:

We must incline our heads like reeds and accept exile lovingly... It is fitting that we should be distraught, grief-stricken and disconsolate when we remember Zion and the many bad things we have occasioned, and the many good things we have lost. It is only right that we set Jerusalem above our chiefest joy, and be extremely submissive. In this way, God will be considerate of us and hasten our redemption.¹⁴⁵

One should be fearful and be seized by great dread, and should be exceedingly vigilant, and do all he can to raise the *shekhinah* from the earth. And that is all the more so, for when "it is time to be gracious unto her, for the appointed time has come" — a time that is known only to the Lord of Wisdom — even a single Jew who repents can bring the redemption closer.¹⁴⁶

It was in this sort of spiritual climate that R. Yehudah Alkalai was educated. Even years after Papo's death, Alkalai continued to present him as his mentor *par excellence*, and refer to him with honorifics such as "the holy mouth, the crown of my head, my master and teacher,"¹⁴⁷ or "our master, Rabbi Eli'ezer Papo, of blessed and holy memory."¹⁴⁸ No wonder, then, that Alkalai's discourses initially tended toward the spiritualistic. Even when he began to be caught up in the messianic ferment that preceded the year 1840, it remained focused in his view entirely on the spiritual measures of contrition, prayer, and charity, to the total exclusion of the practical steps of *aliyah* and settling the Land. As Professor Jacob Katz has demonstrated, the dashing of the messianic hopes for the year 1840 and the trauma of the Damascus blood libel affair led Alkalai to an ideological about-face.¹⁴⁹ From that point on, his attitude toward the Land of Israel seems to have metamorphosed into a reverse image of his mentor's views, evolving from the spiritual to the tangible, from the miraculous to the natural, and from personal redemption to national redemption.¹⁵⁰ Even the concept of repentance (literally, "return"), the prerequisite to Israel's redemption (according to the Talmud),¹⁵¹ took on for him the real, concrete dimension of communal efforts to accomplish the physical return of the people to its Land. And he interpreted the legendary symbol of Messiah son of (the tribe of) Joseph as referring to the leader of the people's elected assembly. Israel would rise up and walk to Zion "for it is time to be gracious unto her, for the appointed time has come." Only then would the nation merit a divine awakening from on high.¹⁵²

At one point, at least, Alkalai appears to have been fully aware of how far he had moved from his mentor's teachings. In his book *Minhat Yehudah*, he takes a passage from Papo's *Pele Yo'etz* and grafts his own ideas on to it. Papo contrasted the uncertainty of financial investment with the certainty of personal elevation for those who fulfill the commandments, particularly that of giving charity.¹⁵³ Alkalai quotes Papo but provides his own slant: he argues that there is a sure and stable form of financial investment, but he sees it not in giving charity but in settling the Land: "to observe one of the choice commandments, to purchase a field or vineyard, and build house in the Land of Israel in the everlasting Land."¹⁵⁴ This is yet another example of how Alkalai radically translated traditional concepts into concrete, worldly terms.

To sum up, the spiritualized, anti-existential fear of the Holy Land became increasingly extreme until there arose a contrary call for practical implementation and nationalist activism related to the Land. In a sense, this process prefigured, in miniature, the Jewish national revolution that was about to take place.

7. With Fear, Not Bravado!

The third of the factors identified earlier as those drawing Jews to the Land

of Israel was their desire for collective religious and political fulfillment. This messianic expectation, of course, was closely bound up with the Land; but, as already noted, it too was controversial because it entailed “pressing for the End” and violating the oaths (in both *midrash* and the Talmud) to remain passive in national and political matters during the time of exile.

In a detailed discussion of this subject in an earlier work, I sought to show that the barriers erected by these oaths between the people and its Land were far higher than we had been led to believe by the historians and students of religion. The internal logic of the pledge made redemption of the place contingent on redemption in time, implying that one should not go to the ultimate place (the Land of Israel) before the ultimate time (the messianic era) had arrived. But as long as immigration as a practical matter was not a real option, the Jews could ignore their fear of the Land. Whenever immigration emerged as a real option, however, and immigrants actually ventured there, warnings against “pressing for the End” before the fortunate moment would again proliferate. As I wrote in the earlier article, “the appearance of the oaths serves as a sort of seismograph, measuring, as it were, the impact of the Land upon the life of the communities.”¹⁵⁵

It appears that the same logic may be applied to the other dread-inducing factors identified earlier in this article. They, too, came into play primarily in response to the concrete possibility of *aliyah* — that of the “300” Tosafists in the thirteenth century, that of the Hasidim and *Perushim* in the nineteenth century, and, of course, that of the Zionist enterprise itself. In all these cases, misgivings and dire warnings arose not only in the utterances of the opponents of *aliyah*, but also in the thoughts of its proponents and those who had actually immigrated: “The Knower of Secrets knows that our intention is to sanctify ourselves in the holiness of the Land, to approach it with fear, not bravado!” [lit. “to ascend in fear, not to ascend the wall”] (R. Eshtori Ha-Parhi, fourteenth century).¹⁵⁶

I have focused in this article on literary and ideational expressions of the dual attitude toward the Land of Israel. But this tension also found expression in emotions, visions, and images that have less to do with doctrines and creeds than with passions and hopes (the fourth factor identified above). These feelings likewise oscillated between the poles of desire and dread — between yearning for the heavenly Jerusalem and trepidation regarding the earthly Jerusalem; between existential longing for the “home” and the “mother’s breast” and oppressive recoiling from the sense of disillusionment and desolation within the abandoned Land:

And so it is easy to understand the feeling of coming down a step within the Land of Israel... one almost ceases to feel any remnant of the Land’s sanctity, and no longer knows what brought him there, or why. And it appears to him as if the Land’s holiness has left it, and it has declined from its earlier state. (R. Israel Horowitz)¹⁵⁷

We have already witnessed, on several occasions, people coming to the Land of Israel, borne on a wave of enthusiasm, and fired by passion and imagination. And yet, not long after, they no longer feel the same way about the Land, and, cold as ice, abandon it.

(A. D. Gordon)¹⁵⁸

The first quotation is from a faithful nineteenth-century disciple of Hatam Sofer, while the second is from a pioneer of the Second *Aliyah* in the twentieth century, but both were inspired by an intimate knowledge of the Holy Land and life there. And both proposed the same antidote to the fear of disillusionment — an inner resolve, capable of recreating reality. Horowitz put it this way: “Therefore, one must stand to attention, awaken one’s heart to God... Even if it seems that the spiritual intensity has been taken from you, you should, nonetheless, trust in God, strengthen yourself and be of good courage, and not despair of salvation and mercy. Then, God will send forth help from His sanctuary.” Gordon, though writing in a different cultural context, invokes the same personal resolve: “And yet, if you turn to the Land of Israel with a heart that is totally open and vulnerable, with a heart that feels all the pangs of creativity... then rest assured: your loyalty will not be disappointed.”

Conclusion

Although this article dealt with the Jews’ love and fear of the Land of Israel from the Middle Ages to modern times, it bears as well on a major nerve center of the contemporary Jewish and Israeli experience: Can the Holy Land also be a homeland? Does religious allegiance necessarily entail an anti-existential approach that precludes engagement with concrete history? In actual fact, the three primary aspects of tension discussed in this article can be viewed as a metaphor for the way in which an entire society contends with the three dimensions of its past: the normative dimension (the commandments), the metaphysical dimension (sanctity), and the eschatological dimension (messianism). Although many would argue that only recently has this struggle filtered through to the collective consciousness, I have attempted to show, on the contrary, that it has been an integral feature of that consciousness from early times. In any event, it is certainly no “neurosis”;¹⁵⁹ rather, it has been, and remains, a deep-seated tension that can have either a paralyzing or a catalyzing effect, as the case may be.

CHAPTER SIX

SPAIN, GREECE OR JERUSALEM? THE YEARNING FOR THE MOTHERLAND IN THE POETRY OF GREEK JEWS

SHMUEL REFAEL

In many ways, the culture of those Jews, who upon their exile from Spain then settled in the Ottoman Empire for several hundred years, is very special. Their insistence upon preserving their Iberian culture while living in the Ottoman countries despite their physical distance from Spain; the special connections maintained by the Jews with neighboring cultures; the loyal attachment shown to their Jewish heritage; and the enormous effort made to continue developing Jewish culture — all of these contributed to the shaping of an exceptional Jewish society, which has not been equaled in the history of the Jewish people. And so, those who today wish to analyze that particular culture can only be amazed at the special and inexhaustible capacity shown by these Jews to safeguard, all at the same time, their connection to more than one motherland, to several legacies, to various cultures, and to numerous languages; in fact, the members of this multi-cultural society carried on an unending dialog among themselves, the purpose of which was to define their own identity.

Throughout both the Ottoman era and the Greek National era, the Jews of these regions kept alive the historical memory of their Iberian roots. At the same time, it is possible to trace other affinities that emerged over time: first, towards the Ottoman culture, and later on towards the Greek culture before and even after the Holocaust. Towards the end of the Ottoman era, the traditional adherence to the idea of their forefathers' land in the East — the land of Israel — gained momentum. Was this a

yearning for the real motherland, or a craving for something abstract and unattainable?

The yearning for a motherland, in its most simple interpretation, is one of the central characteristics of nationalist poetry. This genre usually seeks to express the feelings of a people, a nation, a country, or a large number of people united by their common ancestry and history. Nationalist poetry carries the banner of a defined territory.

In the poetry of the Eastern Sephardic Jews — who first were *Dhimmi* in the Ottoman Empire under Islam¹ and later on became Greek citizens, in neither instance having a defined territory to identify with — an interesting phenomenon occurs: a triple-rooted link to three “motherlands” — Spain, Greece, and Israel — all of which become a part of the special identity of these Sephardic Jews. It must be noted that in the poetry of the Eastern Sephardic Jews at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, these three motherlands continue to appear in tandem, and it can be said, paradoxically, that the authors identified deeply with three completely different territories. The connection to Spain is clearly rooted in the period of Jewish settlement there before the Inquisition, the link to Greece is a result of historical and political processes that took place at the beginning of the twentieth century, and the attachment to Jerusalem is an expression of a deep connection to the Zionist ideal and the historic homeland of Zion and Jerusalem.

In this article, an attempt will be made to present and characterize examples from the poetry of the Greek-Sephardic community that exemplify our hypothesis, pointing to similarities in the various literary texts that Jews used to express their affinity or link to these different motherlands. The tangle of roots reflected in the texts is the literary manifestation of a very extensive subject — the issue of Sephardic Jewish identity throughout the generations.

1. Spaniards without a Motherland

The Jews who survived the horrific expulsion from Spain in the year 1492 remained in many ways Spaniards at heart, but Spaniards without a motherland. The land from which they were expelled by order of the Catholic king continued to play a central role in the lives of the Sephardi Jews. Not only did they continue to speak and write in Spanish, but they also created a purely Jewish language with a noticeable Iberian flavor and this was used as the vehicle for expression in the Sephardi way of life. Many other facets of Spain and its culture flowed through the exiles' blood. The poetry and songs of Spain became one component of that culture that the Sephardic Jews took with them to their new communities. Much has been said in the research literature about the obstinacy with which the Sephardic Jews preserved old Spanish poetry in their lives. In

the main, this desire for continuity stemmed directly from a feeling of yearning, a clinging and a nostalgia for Spain. Many scholars believe that this explains the ability of the Spanish *romancero* to survive for hundreds of years among the Ladino-speaking Sephardi Jews. Other poetic genres — for example the *lirica* or even the *coplas* — are rooted in the Iberian peninsula but also appear in Jewish culture. By adopting these genres, the Sephardi Jews succeeded in maintaining a sense of poetic Spanish, and in that way, expressed their yearning for their native Spain and what it represented for them.

Many years after their expulsion from Spain, Sephardi Jews continued to sing about the landscapes and sites of Spain, its characters and heroes, its language and its literature. With their poetic Ladino language, they were able to paint pictures full of longing for days gone by — days in which these Ladino speakers, now citizens of the Ottoman Empire, were part of the cultural landscape of Spain. Despite the fact that the experience of their expulsion from Spain left an indelible mark on the Sephardi Jews, they continued to demonstrate an affection for the symbolism of Spain; this is amply demonstrated by the following lines written by Ladino poet Avraham Aharon Capon, who described Spain in one of his poems (written in Vienna in 1922) as the undisputed motherland of Sephardi Jews.²

A España

A ti, España bienquerida
nosotros madre te llamamos
y, mientras toda nuestra vida,
tu dulce lengua no dejamos.

Aunque tu nos desterraste
como madrastra de tu seno,
no estancamos de amarte
como santísimo terreno.

En que dejaron nuestros padres
a sus parientes enterrados
y las cenizas de millares
de tormentados y quemados.

Por ti nosotros conservamos
amor filial, país glorioso
por consiguiente te mandamos
nuestro saludo glorioso.³

(En nombre de los sefarditas amantes y conservadores de la lengua de Cervantes) [For the Sephardi lovers and preservers of the tongue of Cervantes]

This poem is unique in the repertoire of Ladino poetry. It was written at the beginning of the twentieth century, at a time when the Sephardi Jews were intertwined among many identities and far removed from the momentum of the Spanish expulsion; it was a time when nation states began to emerge and the power of the Ottoman Empire was on the wane. During this period, a time of change and of vicissitudes, Avraham Aharon Capon devoted himself to expressing his yearning for the Spanish motherland. From this poem we learn about the suffering of the Sephardic Jews and their strong desire to be once again part of their old and still beloved homeland, even after having been driven out of it centuries earlier. The closeness between the Sephardis and the land of Spain was expressed in their language, and the poet clearly states at the end of the poem that it was written in the name of the Sephardis who still love Cervantes.

In collections of popular Ladino verse, there are other examples of poems in which the writers demonstrated their great affinity towards Spain, and to everything that land could possibly symbolize for them. One poem of interest in this regard was "Sion y españa" or "Zion and Spain," a popular verse which had been collected through fieldwork among Ladino-speaking sources. In 1885, a version of this poem was published in an article written by Hayim Bijarano, a Rabbi as well as a translator, writer, and poet, who was born in 1846 in Eski Zagoura and lived for many years in Romania and Edirne.⁴ In his foreword to the poem, Bijarano wrote: "I know that some lines compare the exile from Jerusalem to the exile from Spain," thereby emphasizing the double exile experienced by the Sephardi Jews, which was expressed in their poetry.⁵ Some lines from the poem:

A Sion querida mia
 porque vistes de negrura
 onde esta tu alegria
 porque tanta amargura?

Piedrimos nuestro corazon
 piedrimos la esperansa
 bushcamos la nuestra razon
 ah! Restimos sin olganza.

This poem is exceptional in popular Ladino poetry, since it is one of the few in which a well-known poet compares the Jewish homeland — the Holy Land — to Spain as two dearly loved countries which the Jews left behind centuries before, under tragic circumstances. This poem illustrates the sense of the Sephardi Jew that he was always embraced by the arms of two homelands — one being Spain, and other the land of his forefathers. On the one hand, Spain never stopped nourishing the world of Ladino poetry, and on the other hand, Eretz Israel with its scenery and

its holy sites also had an important influence on the thoughts of Sephardi Jews, and on their Ladino poems.

2. The Link to Eretz Israel

Another very important place in the hearts of the Ladino-speaking Jews was Eretz Israel, its landscapes and its holy places, and there were two main types of poetry that venerated it. First — poems that praised the Land, those who lived in it, its special places and its charm, and secondly — poems written to encourage active Zionism. My recent book about the coplas genre had a chapter dedicated to Eretz Israel, in which I analyze two coplas songs from among the earliest found in Ladino tradition, which revolve around Jerusalem and Tiberias — two of the most symbolic and holy cities in Eretz Israel — as objects of yearning.⁶ Coplas poetry was one of the genres that was used to depict the world of Eretz Israel, and as such, it held a central place in the poetic consciousness of Ladino speakers.

In this research, I showed that Eretz Israel played an important role in the spiritual consciousness of Sephardic Jews, much before the Zionist idea was ever born. This research demonstrates, particularly after studying coplas poetry, that Ladino-speaking Jews already wrote poetry thirsting for Eretz Israel at the beginning of the seventeenth century and throughout the eighteenth century, despite the fact that their feet were deeply rooted in the Ottoman countries, and long before the active immigration of Ladino-speaking Jews to Israel had even begun. Only very few members of Ladino-speaking communities were settling in Israel at that time, and those coplas which revolved around Eretz Israel were designed mainly to create a spiritual link to the Jewish homeland, and not necessarily to encourage immigration to it.

In other research studies,⁷ I have dealt with the later periods in Zionist poetry — poetry which did have the goal of encouraging people to forsake the Jewish communities of the Ottoman Empire and immigrate to Israel. In these studies, I show the importance of Eretz Israel in the consciousness and the verse of Ladino speakers, particularly in popular poetry, which complemented the coplas poems of the written Ladino tradition.

In the past, I have emphasized the special place held by the land of Israel in the poetic awareness of the Sephardi Jews. In my articles about the songs of Zion that were incorporated into the popular repertoire of the Salonikan Jews, and also in my articles about the character of Zionist expression in poems by Sephardi Jews, I have shown that Zion and its landscapes were vital to the poetic world of the Sephardi Jews. I demonstrated that Zion and its scenery began to attain a central position in the world of Sephardi poetry, generally at the time of increased Zionist activity, but also before that. In both these works, I have claimed that the Sephardic Jews did not find it easy, despite the emergence of the Zionist

ideology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to replace the landscape of the Spanish motherland with their historic homeland in the East. My basic assumption has been that even hundreds of years after their banishment from Spain, after the memories of that experience had dimmed with time, the Jews still considered themselves in exile. The landscapes of Spain with its medieval castles, its cavaliers, and gentle maidens continued to hold a special place in Ladino poetry.

In two other pieces, I explored the way in which the Zionist experience first appeared in Ladino poetry. The first of these was dedicated to a generic and thematic study of the Zionist movement hymns of Salonika. The focus of the second was the adoption by the Ladino community of works written at the end of the nineteenth century by the knight of Hebrew poets, Hayim Nahman Bialik; these verses, which aimed to instill Jews with a national pride, were translated from Hebrew into Ladino and published in Salonika's Jewish press. The perusal of numerous poems preserved in both the oral tradition and written literature can teach us about the early days of Zionism as it gained ground in the Jewish Balkans; specifically, it can illustrate how much the Sephardi Jews aspired to, and sometimes even succeeded to, join the nascent Zionist movement.

However, it is important to note that poems of yearning for the land of the forefathers began to make their way into the Ladino language much before the Zionist concept began to take shape in the Jewish Balkans, and were even unconnected to this phenomenon. In these poems, saturated with mystic-religious contents, the Ladino speakers wished to praise the land and to provide, through their poems, a vehicle for intensifying the connection between the faithful Jew in the Ottoman Empire and his ancestral homeland towards the East. The Ladino speakers knew how to use original poetic expression as well as translations from the Hebrew, to show their longing for Eretz Israel, and there are many testimonies to the fact that they always had a warm spot in their hearts for the homeland. They did their utmost to combine their yearning for the Spanish homeland and their longing for the ancient Jewish homeland of Eretz Israel. We shall present examples of poems in which the Ladino poets demonstrated their love and yearning for the land of Israel. These examples are taken from a large corpus of Ladino poetry collected from the oral tradition, all of which concentrate on Eretz Israel.

This longing for the land of Israel was expressed in several generic frameworks of Ladino poetry; among these, we shall mention the genres of popular lyrics, coplas, and hymns, most of which were connected to the Zionist movement. All of these generic frameworks feature a number of themes, giving suitable poetic expression to the landscapes and sites of Eretz Israel. The songs give thanks to God for the goodness of the land; they exhort readers to settle in the homeland, either in fulfillment of the biblical prophecies or as a realization of the Zionist dream; they speak of yearning, of traveling to the Holy Land; they depict the landscapes and scenery of Eretz Israel.

To clarify the ways in which Eretz Israel was described in popular Ladino poetry, we shall present a sample of poems in which the description of the land is restrained and limited. For our theoretical purposes, we shall examine poems that had a relatively large circulation in the Ladino oral tradition: "*ir mi quiero madre*" ("I wish to go, mother"), "*palestina ermoza y santa*" ("Palestine the beautiful and holy"), "*ahi en lo leshano*" ("There in the distance"), "*en pasando por la tierra santa*" ("Traveling in the Holy Land") and "*por tus recordos ho yerushalayim*" ("For your memories, O Jerusalem").⁸

In these poems, most of which date from the nineteenth century, Eretz Israel was seen from afar; descriptions were possibly based on myths and travelogues or diaries written by dreamers of Zion, who were not necessarily Sephardic. In nearly every instance, Israel is described in a tone of sadness and sorrow. The country is compared to a mourning mother who only wishes to reunite with her lost children. This image comes across especially strongly in the poem "*ahi en lo leshano*," in which the opening line depicts Eretz Israel as a far-off place under another sky. The poem says:

Ahi en lo leshano bajo en un sielo
egziste una tiera — egziste una madre.⁹

According to the poem, reaching Eretz Israel is a difficult task, involving a dangerous sea voyage aboard small, rickety boats, as follows:

Ma la mar es furiosa y la barca pequeña
en cada remada encuentran una pena.¹⁰

The Holy Land is compared to a mourning lover in the poem "*palestina tu ermoza y santa*," in which the descriptions of Eretz Israel echo many of the words and phrases found in the *Song of Songs*. The land of Israel is portrayed here as a lonely, but coveted and sacred maiden; the poet tells her to stop mourning, to stand up and wait for the arrival of her lover, when together they will walk through her beautiful countryside. In the words of the poem:

Palestina tu ermoza y santa
cuanto tu sos dezeada
alevanta y tu sila canta
paz y amor al dientro el corazon

In the poem "*en pasando por la tierra santa*," Eretz Israel is also compared to a coveted maiden, but in this case, the lover, upon seeing for himself the special beauty of the land, becomes mute and cannot express himself:

La tu ermozura mos encanta
cuando el dia empesa a esclarecer.¹¹

Interestingly, the well-known poem "*ir mi quero madre*," which illuminates the world of the traveler to the Holy Land, uses oblique references to provide an incomplete description of the land. The poem's narrator declares that his love and passion for the land is so great, that he would willingly be satisfied with eating only its weeds:

Ir me quiero madre a Yerushalayim
y comer de las llervas y artarme de ellas.¹²

Compared to the gloomy and reticent descriptions expressed in the four poems mentioned above, we find that "*por tus recuerdos*," attributed to Salonikan poet Mercado Covo,¹³ contains more realistic descriptions of Eretz Israel. The poet's broad knowledge of the land's geography and its biblical past is apparent in the verses, and despite the fact that the poem was written in critical tones and draws a picture of an abandoned and miserable place, the poet urges his reader to go to the Holy Land and to visit its magnificent sites — the Carmel, Lebanon, the Shomron and of course, the Jordan River:

Triste esta tu estado
ho! Rios del Yarden, montes del Carmel
sharas de Lebanon, montes del Shomron
que se hicieron Sion tus gigantes?
reyes, profetas y tus amantes.¹⁴

And so we find that in all five poems, the land is always described as being female, and in most of them, she is compared to a coveted maiden or a tearful mother waiting for the return of her children. In all five poems, the land is described as being abandoned, a desolate place that is difficult to live in, where any radiance is derived from its biblical past and its magnificent prophets. A thematic common denominator can be seen in the poems — mainly a call to the reader to take part in the Zionist enterprise, to bring about a change in the condition of the land, to revive it and make it flower. The poets present Eretz Israel from a distant, perhaps even a mystical, perspective, to the point where the sky is described as "another sky."

Most of the works presented here are general examples of later literary works in the Ladino language, composed in the nineteenth century and the start of the twentieth century, which hint at an awakening of Jewish nationalism among Ladino speakers, particularly in the region of Salonika, where most of these texts originated. These poems clearly show that, as the Ottoman Empire began to disintegrate at the turn of the century and different nationalistic tendencies reemerged, the Sephardi Jews also began to experience the urge to return to Eretz Israel, its landscapes and holy sites. In a reflection of this emotional transformation, the themes of Ladino poetry shift away from a longing

for Spain, to a yearning to rediscover the roots of the Jewish People in Eretz Israel.

3. The Link to Greece

There is a third country — the land of Greece — that appears in Sephardic poetry as a place for which Oriental Jews, particularly those from Salonika, have an extraordinary affinity. Greece, as a political entity, entered the consciousness of the Sephardi Jews only during the first two decades of the twentieth century, once Salonika was incorporated into the Greek nation and Greek became the official language in which the Salonikan Jews had to educate the next generation. The fact that the Jews of Greece — mainly those from of Salonika — began serving in the Greek army, and even attained prominent positions in it, contributed to the evolution of their patriotic feelings. During the Second World War, quite a number of Salonikan Jews served on the Albanian frontier, and this is surely where they became exposed to poems and songs of praise for the Greek land. But this was not enough to dim, blur, or reduce the Jews' affinity towards the "previous" motherlands — Spain and Eretz Israel. Ladino poems, as well as verses centered on Eretz Israel, continued to exist in the popular repertoire. Simply put: a third motherland had been added to the two previous loyalties.

It should be noted that the connection of Greek Jews to Greece was not different than that of the other, non-Jewish, residents of this country, who also placed the homeland at the center of their poetic and musical creativity. In this sense, the Greek Jews adopted the surrounding culture and made it their own. Greek songs became part of Jewish Salonikan life. The melodies, the themes, the special aromas of Greek poetry and even the Rembetika genre were gradually assimilated by the Jewish community of Salonika.¹⁵ Even anthems such as the Greek Partisan's Song (*pano sto perando pirgo zen inen pia y germani*) which was popularized during the Second World War, were not anathema to the Jews — in fact, they sung them with fervor, as citizens of the Republic who were fighting together with their compatriots for its survival.¹⁶

Compared to those songs that became a part of the popular Greek nationalistic repertoire, Jews wrote poems that praised the homeland, its scenery, and its language. Songs were specially written in tribute of the city of Salonika — which can really be called a very special "Jewish Republic." Greek Jews incarcerated in German extermination camps sang two songs, the lyrics of which were a tribute to Salonika.

The songs: "Khronia ime makriasou." (Away from you for so many years) , and "Saloniki mou glikia patrida doksazmeni " (Salonika , my sweet glorious homeland), are brought here in Latin transliteration ,in Greek , and finally translated into English. The Latin transliteration reflects the way the songs were actually sung by the Jewish informants,

survivors of the Holocaust. The normative Greek pronunciation is emphasized in brackets following the distorted transliteration into Latin characters.

Khronia ime makriasou

Khronia ime makriasou	Χρόνια είμαι μακρυά σου
Alou planithika ke zo	Αλλού πλανήθηκα και ζω
Ma to khoma su elada	Μα το χώμα σου Ελλάδα
Panda ego to nostalgo	Πάντα εγώ το νοσταλγώ
Ise I protimou patrida	Είσαι η πρώτη μου πατρίδα
Ke ya afto de se ksehno	Και γ' αυτό δεν σε ξεχνώ
Ime apto Rezi Vardari	Είμαι απ' το Ρεζή Βαρδάρη
To palio sinikizmo	Τον παλιό συνιοικισμό
Evreopoula levendes	Εβραιόπουλα λεβέντες
Idane eki to fos	Είδανε εκεί το φως
To fonazo ke kafyeme	Το φωνάζω και καυχίμαι
Ime Salonikios	Είμαι Θεσσαλονικιός
Ke sa ime osto telos [Ke	Και θα είμαι ως το τέλος
tha ime os to telos]	Γνήσιος και πιστός ρωμιός
Gnistios [Gnisios] ke	
pistos romios	

Away from you for so many years,
In other places I wandered and lived.
But, Greece, for your soil
I always yearn
My first homeland you are,
And that is why I do not forget you.
From the old neighbourhood Rezi Vardari I come,
Strong Jewish young men
There have seen the light!
I shout it loudly and I am proud of it
I am a Salonican!
And I will be 'til the end
A true and faithful Greek!

Saloniki mou glikia

Saloniki mou glikia	Θεσσαλονίκη μου γλυκιά
Patrida zoksazmeni	Πατρίδα δοξασμένη
[doksazmeni]	
Ach pote sarsi [tharhi] o	Αχ, πότε θα 'ρθει ο
keros	καιρός
Na zoume enomeni	Να ζούμε ενωμένοι
Ke na su po ta vasana pou	Και να σου πω τα βάσανα που
traviksa eki pera	τράβηξα εκεί πέρα
Stis Polonias ta stena	Στης Πολωνίας τα στενά

sto lager nichta mera	στο lager νύχτα — μέρα
san sta [ta] zourla mas	Σαν τα ζουρλά μας
disane	ντύσανε
me ble ke aspres riges	Με μπλέ και άσπρες ρίγες
ke apton kaimon t'adelfia mas	Κι απ' τον καημό τ' αδέρφια μας
pethenan san tis miges	Πεθαίνουν σαν τις μύγες
varousana na drasklira	Βαρούσαν άναντρα σκληρά
[varousan anandra sklira]	
opos [pos] I kardia matoni	Πώς η καρδιά ματώνει!
ke keran [kegan]	
enikofima [gynaikopeda]	Και καίγαν γυναικόπαιδα
I mavri dolofoni	Οι μαύροι δολοφόνοι
Ke esis pedias tis	Κι εσείς παιδιά της
lefterias	λευτεριάς
Pou mathate to drama	Που μάθατε το δράμα
Skotosate to nasizmo	Σκοτώσατε το ναζισμό
[nazizmo]	
Sas to afino tama	Σας το αφήνω τάμα

My dear Salonika
 My glorious homeland
 Ah, when will come the time
 When we shall be united
 So that I will be able to tell you about the tortures
 I have suffered there,
 In the straits of Poland
 In the lager, day and night.
 They have dressed us like mad
 In blue and white stripes,
 And out of bitterness
 Our brothers were dying like the flies,
 They were beating cowardly, hard
 How the heart bleeds!
 Burning women and children they were,
 These black killers
 And you,
 Freedom's Children,
 Now that you have learnt our drama,
 Kill nazism!
 I swear you in!

These lyrics for the two songs, composed by the Salonikan Jacob Levy,¹⁷ reflect on one hand his own mastery of the Greek language, whereas the distortions which dot the songs as conveyed by the informants reveal the gap that existed between them and the culture of their newly

adopted homeland. On the other hand, it also reflect a profound sense of connection to the city of Salonika and the land of Greece. It is interesting to note that while imprisoned in the extermination camps, the Jews of Greece chose to sing those songs that expressed their link to the recent past and not to the distant past — that is, to Salonika and not to Jerusalem. The separation from their city and their homes, the sudden departure, this is what became deeply embedded in the hearts of the Greek Jews, and between the wire fences they chose to sing these poems as a sign of their suffering and dislocation. The poems clearly express their identity crisis. By 1943, they already processed the fact that Salonika is Greece, and that if they want to continue their Salonikan existence, even on the mental level, this entails now their Greek existence as well. The processing work was so succesful that the Greek Jews denounced the fact that, despite battling for the land and paying with their lives, the country did not or could not protect them from paying “the price of horror.” However, even this betrayal did not suffice to diminish their love for Greece, and until this day Greek music, Greek food and the Greek language form an integral part of the identity of Greek Sephardi Jews.

Given that in 1943 the Jews of Salonika had only recently moved out of the rule of the Ottoman Empire and accepted Greek authority and culture, it is not easy to explain or to substantiate the depth of their connection to Greece and the rapidity with which that link became a central element in their poetry. The choice of the Greek homeland was one of three possible alternatives for the Jews of Salonika at that time, the others being, of course, Eretz Israel and Spain. Instead, during that tumultuous period at the start of the twentieth century, the Sephardi Jews were expressing their “entanglement of identities,” as they quite suddenly found themselves pining for three motherlands.

The search for a homeland among the Jews of this Mediterranean diaspora has been an unending journey. Eternal strangers in a strange land, they have always been in search of a solution to this existential quandary. While they could not always find answers to their questions, it is also clear they realized there would be no return, no going back — not to Spain and not to Greece. If they tried to return, they would find an empty space and would never be able to recoup their lost time. These Jews were ready, throughout the generations, to lose their property, their home, their shops, and their assets and even to lose their country, to be exiled if necessary; nonetheless, in their own unique way, they continued to identify with the landscapes of their past, with the history which had such a profound impact on their character. The poetry written by this community must not be viewed from a national perspective, but rather as a representation of individual, personal experiences.

The exception is the poetry about Zion, which was expressly intended to foster the nationalistic concept of a Jewish home for the Jewish people. These poems were based on Jewish sources, reflecting the eternal Jewish prayer for “next year in a rebuilt Jerusalem.” However, the Jews were

not compelled to remember Spain or Greece, and they surely were not expected to live with their double-rooted connection to three different homelands. These Jews not only developed a yearning for the three homelands, but they also preserved this yearning in their poetic creativity, which is what makes these works so special.

We shall end with the saying attributed to the philosopher Jean Amery: "How many homelands does man need? As he has one less homeland to go back to — so does he need more."¹⁸

PART IV:
THE MODERN WORLD
AND ITS DEMISE

CHAPTER ONE

BREAKS AND CONTINUITIES IN GERMAN-JEWISH IDENTITY

YFAAT WEISS

In early 1911, an old woman set out on a journey. It wasn't really a journey, it was more of a mission. Bertha Pappenheim, founder and director of the League of Jewish Women,¹ was soon on her way to what was then called the Orient in an attempt to do what she could to throw sand in the gears of the white slave trade. From the Ottoman town of Izmir (known by Europeans by its Greek and biblical name, Smyrna), she wrote:

I'm about to go to a ball!! The Austrian colony is throwing it in honor of the arrival of the "Escadre" (the fleet), and because — it's such a bad joke that I can barely squeeze it out of my pen: because to them I'm an Austrian like any other, I'm to go as well, at the invitation of one Dr. M.²

For Pappenheim, who was born in Vienna in 1859, Austrian identity was nothing more or less than a bad joke. It was not that she could never have made a career in Austria. As Joseph Breuer's patient "Anna O," she was the catalyst for the invention of psychoanalysis (although it must be admitted, this was mostly an unconscious accomplishment).³ But the time she spent in Germany was more important for her self-understanding because it was there that she became the very epitome of a Jewish feminist and social worker.⁴ She did not return to Austria until it was necessary to get her travel documents in order. Even then, she tried to avoid it. She sent the following instructions from Hamburg to her colleague:

Enclosed please find my passport, which, due to my unsuccessful

efforts to get a visa, is now completely worthless to me. I'm going to have to ask you to get an entirely new passport made for me, because wherever I travel, I've got to have valid papers. So would you please go to the Austrian consulate and see if it can be done without my personal presence —"⁵

Pappenheim's papers also caused her considerable anxiety during her second trip to Poland in 1912. "The first customs agent that doesn't like my passport, and I'll have to turn right around," she wrote.⁶ But the border crossing seems to have gone off without a hitch in spite of her fears, because two days later she wrote from Lodz:

I didn't have any trouble at the border. They took exception to my nightshirt, but fortunately it was clear from the collar that it wasn't new.⁷

Now let us turn from Pappenheim's ironic joking about papers, borders and identity to the somewhat drier observations of Franz Oppenheimer. Oppenheimer, who was born in Berlin in 1865, would probably not be recognized by name today by most Germans without a hint. But almost every German is familiar with former Chancellor Ludwig Erhard's concept of the "social market," and the social market was based on Oppenheimer's theories, which Erhard learned from him as his student. Beyond economics, Oppenheimer was also interested in Jewish current affairs, Zionist politics, and the future shape of Eastern Europe. In 1910, he gave the following analysis of the difference between Jews in Eastern and Western Europe:

We western Jews have Jewish ethnic consciousness, but eastern Jews have Jewish national consciousness ... Ethnic consciousness rests on the past. It is something you find wherever an individual has the consciousness that he has descended from a nation ... It is the consciousness of common descent or common blood, which means being able to trace oneself back to what was at least at one time a unitary nation ...and on top of that, a consciousness that one shares a common history, a common memory of suffering and joy, of heroism and great deeds ... But national consciousness concerns the present. It means to share a common language and common customs, to have the same economic and legal position, and to share a common intellectual culture.⁸

In the same breath, Oppenheimer explains the widespread patriotism of Jews in the West, which he considers entirely justified:

The lands they fled to became their fatherlands, or their fathers' fatherlands. These countries gave them language and customs,

wealth and education. They gave them legal equality and often full or almost full citizenship. It would be a bad person, an unnatural person, who could forget such gifts!

How do Pappenheim's disparaging comments about her citizenship measure up under Oppenheimer's standards?

Pappenheim came from Austria, the multinational state, and therefore grew up in something very different from the West European model of a nation state that Oppenheimer was assuming when he described Western Jews. On top of that, she was an *Ausländerin*. She lived in Frankfurt and worked for the benefit of Jewish women, but she did it all on an Austrian passport. Oppenheimer's distinction was not intended to cover such exceptions.

Oppenheimer's argument was based on more than just his personal opinion. His terminology clearly expresses an attitude that was widespread among German Jews of the time: that German Jewishness was a hybrid of Jewish ethnicity and German nationality. The ethnic half was understood by German Jews to be a relict of the past. The national half was thought of as something that was anchored in their present citizenship and which found expression through their culture. When Oppenheimer's Jewish contemporaries theorized about religion, and they did so often, they were almost always talking about Jewish antiquity. But when they discussed contemporary culture, they took the German perspective.

This hybrid conception of German Jewishness is well expressed in the title of the largest German Jewish organization, founded in 1893: the *Central-Verein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens* — the Central Association of German Citizens of the Jewish Faith. But even this lengthy title is still a simplification, since by "Jewishness" the founders meant not only faith but also (and perhaps even more so) ethnicity.

Permit me a longish quote from Ludwig Holländer, who was the leader of the Central Verein in 1933:

The Jews were once a nation. Through the universalizing tendency of Jewish doctrine, they became a religion, which overcame the limitations of nationhood ... Jews live in very different countries, and they have developed very differently under the influence of their different environments. If we look at Jews throughout the world, with their different languages, different customs and different cultures, they are physically and intellectually so different from each other that, outside of their religious studies and practice, it is hard to see any unity at all. What binds the Jews together is overwhelmingly their common ethnicity and above all the religious fundamentals they have in common.⁹

Holländer tries as far as he can to cover "common ethnicity" with religion,

which is perfectly understandable in view of his role as chairman of the Central Verein. But he cannot completely suppress it.

The German Jews clearly believed that German nationality and Jewish ethnicity formed a complementary and harmonious whole. But this idea came into increasing conflict with the German conception of citizenship. German citizenship was always defined ethno-culturally. But after 1913, this definition became more stringent.¹⁰ Jews were not explicitly mentioned in the 1913 "State and Imperial Citizenship Law," but it marks a decisive break in German Jewish history. Section 13 of the law was as follows:

Someone who has once been a German, and who has not resided in his native country, can, upon application, be naturalized by the federal state to which he once belonged, if he meets the requirements of Section 8 ...

that is, if he meets the general requirements for naturalization.¹¹ Later on, the same law declares, that "the case is the same for descendants or adoptees of people who were once Germans." In addition, Section 25 states that Germans who received the citizenship of other countries without asking for it will no longer automatically lose their German citizenship. This permitted a certain leeway on the question of dual citizenship for expatriate Germans.

These nuances might not have seemed significant. One contemporary commentator noted that the law certainly "made the loss of citizenship considerably more difficult and the regaining of it considerably easier," but nevertheless concluded that "the new citizenship law differs only slightly from the old one."¹² But outside legal circles, judgements were much starker. Germans recognized at the time that the statute represented a fundamental change in the citizenship law. Carl Sartorius said the law was a "change that had become necessary" because "the growth of national feeling" had demanded "removing the residues of the territorial principle from the law."¹³ He went on to make his point perfectly clear: "While the old law connected citizenship chiefly to domicile, the new law establishes the *jus sanguinis* as its general principle, even though it obviously allows for exceptions."

The heavier emphasis on the *jus sanguinis* (the right to citizenship by reason of ethnicity) and the lessened reliance on the *jus soli* (the right to citizenship by reason of residence) was intended to clarify the ethnic border between Germans and Slavs that was so important to the self-image of the German nation. Saskia Sassen argues: "A law that based itself on blood and ethnicity tried to give an apparent sense to two cultures separately abstracted from their interwoven reality. Cultural history was replaced by biology, and biology was used by the state as the standard for distinguishing between lasting connections and temporary co-existence."¹⁴ This might be going a bit too far. It was true that the

effective citizenship laws in the Reich now followed the principle of ethnicity, but at this time they still allowed for naturalization.¹⁵

The Jews were caught in the midst of an attempt to sort out a tangled reality. They belonged to one of the few groups who had made it through the long and drawn-out process and achieved the right to naturalization.¹⁶ By 1871 at the latest, the vast majority of them were legally German citizens. But they were German citizens without German ethnicity. They had also acculturated themselves, acculturation being one of the preconditions for becoming a citizen. And far as education and becoming cultured were concerned, the Jews became Germans. But culture only constituted half of what made up a German, and no amount of zeal in the cultural sphere could make up for the lack of a proper ethnic background. German citizenship stood on two pillars, culture and ethnicity, and when it came to the Jews, it tottered.

When viewed in light of the situation in the East, ethnically-based citizenship played the role of a legal sorting mechanism. By means of the 1913 law, ethnic Germans who lived in the East were declared to be Germans, and ethnic Poles who lived in Germany were declared to be foreigners. For German Jews, this was the beginning of a never-ending struggle to resist the imputation that a similar trans-border identification of ethnicity with nationhood should be applied to them.

It is for this reason I argue that 1913 was the central turning point in German-Jewish history, even if it was not immediately apparent at the time. With the establishment of this law, the *Kaiserreich* began its change from a flexible entity that accommodated multiple cultures and ethnicities to a political unity defined in terms of blood. The law of 1933 (Law for the restoration of the professional civil service), according to which Jewish civil servants were to be fired, and the 1935 Nuremberg laws together formed the capstone of a process that began in 1913. With these two laws, German citizenship became completely based on biology. And in the period between 1913 and 1933–1935, German-Jewish identity was pulled between ethnicity and nationality, and became alien to its Jewish bearers.

I would now like to comment briefly on the Nuremberg laws, and especially on the citizenship law.¹⁷ This law was intended to align citizenship law with National Socialist principles. It distinguished between citizens of the state and citizens of the *Reich* or empire. While state citizenship could still be granted under the procedures of the 1913 law, imperial citizenship was reserved for citizens of “German and related blood” who “evidenced through their behavior that they were willing and eager” to “loyally serve the German people and the German *Reich*.” Jews, who were now mere citizens of the state, were robbed of their political rights. A Jew was defined in the Nuremberg laws in terms of ethnic descent. That the Germans intended from the beginning to establish such lines of descent through the register of Jewish religious congregations, meaning that entrance into or exit out of religious congregations became

the measure of one's Jewishness, should not deceive us into thinking that the law aimed at religion rather than at ethnicity. Rather the fact that this was the only workable means of identifying Jews simply underlines the limits of the extent to which cultural history can be transmuted into biology.

In his essay, "On the Pressure To Be, and the Impossibility of Being, a Jew," the writer Jean Améry, a Holocaust survivor, described his emotions upon reading the Nuremberg laws in a newspaper in a Vienna café:

When I had finished reading the Nuremberg laws, I wasn't any more Jewish than I had been a half an hour before. My facial features hadn't become Mediterranean-Semitic, my associations were not now by magic filled with Hebrew references. The Christmas tree had not suddenly transformed itself into a Menorah. If this sign that society had suddenly hung over me had a palpable sense it was this: I was more exposed to death. To death. Now that comes to all of us sooner or later. But for Jews, and under this law that meant me, it promised to be sooner, in the middle of a life which was now a sentence of disgrace from which one could be recalled at any second. And I don't think this memory is a projection backwards to 1935 of Auschwitz and the final solution.¹⁸

It might be going overboard to say that stripping Jews of their citizenship rights and the final solution that followed were both direct consequences of the German conception of citizenship. But it would be even farther from the mark to retrospectively write off German-Jewish patriotism as mere self-deception and escape from reality. Holländer died in 1936 in Germany at the age of 59, having experienced the collapse of everything he had worked for. Oppenheimer died in Los Angeles in 1943, after fleeing Germany in 1938 at the age of 74. Pappenheim, Austrian against her will, died in 1936 at the age of 77 in Frankfurt shortly after her arrest by the Gestapo. Améry committed suicide in 1978.

The writing of history owes a duty to chronology. Therefore a teleological reading of the Nuremberg laws should be avoided in view of how deeply German and Jewish identities were interwoven before the Holocaust. But the same is not true for the time after 1945. After that point, the racist codes epitomized by the Nuremberg laws, with their weird mixture of archaic blood imagery and German bureaucratic lingo can no longer be thought away, at least by Jews.

In post-war Germany, there were essentially no German Jews. Only 14,000 Jews (approximately) survived the war in Germany and stayed on to contribute to new Jewish congregations.¹⁹ The great majority of Jews that emigrated from Germany never returned.²⁰ Instead, the majority of Jews that found themselves in Germany in 1946–47 came from the East. They gathered for the most part in the American-occupied zone, and it was around these Jews, who were chiefly Polish, that the new

congregations were built. I would like to make a few comments about how they felt about citizenship and identity.

Most Jews in post-war Germany were German neither by culture nor by law. Under an Allied order they were given the status of "*heimatlose Ausländer*" — "foreigners without a country"²¹ — and German citizenship was offered to them on an individual basis into the 1960s. If they accepted and became Germans, it was in a completely different sense than German Jews before the Holocaust had become Germans.

There were several factors at work. In the first place, the preference, yes, even the love, that Jews before the Holocaust had for Germany would have been considered blasphemy after the war. Under post-war conditions, ambivalence towards accepting German citizenship was the all-too-understandable rule. In the second place, these were Eastern Jews rather than Western Jews. In Oppenheimer's words, they already constituted a nation on the basis of common language, customs, economic status, and from World War I on, a common legal standing.

Eastern Jews were not exceptional in this regard. Eastern Europe at that time was strewn with such minorities. In Eastern Europe, it was normal for there to be a split between the nation one belonged to and the state one belonged to. Nazi Germany, in fact, made a point of seizing on just such dualisms in order to undermine the stability of eastern European states. And just as the Jewish minority in Eastern Europe formed a nation, so it continued to form one in post-war Germany. This fact pervaded all of its social, economic, and political structures as well as its cultural self-understanding. So the Jews in post-war Germany, most of them survivors of the Holocaust and their children, were not German Jews. They were Eastern European Jews who lived in Germany.

And what of the next generation? When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the influx of migrants from there changed the fabric of Jewish life in Germany in a rather radical fashion. According to official and unofficial records, their numbers reached until today around 200,000. The German government together with the Jewish leadership in Germany encouraged this wave of immigration in order to revive Jewish life in Germany. However, the incommensurability between the external German understanding of Judaism and Jewish internal self-determination promises to create many tensions between old— and new-comers in the Jewish communities of the twenty first century. How does this development fit into the scheme of ethnicity and nation? The pressure to become acculturated, and the almost mandatory embrace of a German cultural perspective that this entailed, was originally the outcome of a conscious intention to assimilate. It was an attempt to carry out the ideals of the Enlightenment. And just as this process was about to reach its successful conclusion, Germany locked the Jews out. If Jews in postwar Germany have become acculturated in spite of this history, it is simply because they are modern, urban, educated people, and not because they feel the need to fit in. Against the background of

globalization they can be citizens of the world,²² and as such are neither isolated nor despised.

And besides that? I very much enjoy this quote from Rachel Salamander:

The post-war generation knows that they've struck unwanted roots into this place. What does it mean to strike roots? For me it means one thing above all: German constitutional guarantees are more important to me than German sympathy. Laws are stabler, less changeable than sympathies. If constitutional guarantees ever depended only on sympathy, I'd have to look for another country. Therefore the 50th anniversary of the founding of the constitution, which is what it should really be called, is a decisive date for my existence in Germany.²³

Laws are not always stable. It is precisely German-Jewish history that illustrates the revocability of citizenship. But with the establishment of the Federal Republic as Western democracy, and the extension of the Basic Law to the Eastern German states in 1991, we can consider this chapter of German history closed.

It is exactly this form of democracy, an absolute novelty in German history, which is the precondition of Jews living and acting in Germany today. A fundamental attachment to democracy was also characteristic of Jews in the Weimar Republic. And this illustrates once more the continuities of German-Jewish history. But there's one key difference that should not be forgotten: in the Weimar Republic, Jews were democratic and patriotic at the same time. If Jews today, almost 60 years after the Holocaust, can be counted as Germans, it is as a rule not out of *national* patriotism but out of *constitutional* patriotism. And that, if I may say so, should suffice.

CHAPTER TWO

THE METAMORPHOSIS OF PRE-DUBNOVIAN AUTONOMISM INTO DIASPORA JEWISH NATIONALISM*

MARCOS SILBER

In the late nineteenth century geopolitical landscape of Eastern Europe, when the Habsburgs and Romanovs ruled over an assortment of nationalities, peoples, and ethnicities that coexisted or overlapped, a political idea evolved that called for sovereignty for each of these groups, without dismantling the larger political unit of which they were part. In other words, this idea did not demand the division of the State into nation-states, but rather its metamorphosis into a State of nations — an alternative to the classical objective of creating a nation-state for a people inhabiting a certain territory. For the Jews, this idea allowed a synthesis between Jewish nationalism and loyalty to the State.¹ In Jewish history, this national idea is identified primarily with Simon Dubnov.

The topic of Jewish nationalism is by no means uncharted territory in the historical research. Excellent studies have been, and are being, written on this theme throughout the world. Nonetheless, the research has chosen to focus mainly on the Zionist movement. The historiography of Zionism has frequently — too frequently — identified the nascence of the Jewish national idea with the emergence of the Jewish Palestino-centrist national movement. This focus has pushed aside research on diaspora Jewish nationalism, generally known as autonomism, or Dubnovism.

The focus on only one current of Jewish nationalism has distorted the picture of Jewish nationalism in the diaspora, particularly in Eastern Europe, and glossed over one of its main components — diaspora nationalism.² A study of the origins of diaspora nationalism may shed

light on Jewish nationalism and the secret of its allure for ever-widening Jewish circles from the late nineteenth century until the creation of nation-states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The purpose of this article is to examine one major aspect of diaspora nationalism: the origins and development of autonomism in the 1880s and 1890s, prior to the unveiling of the Dubnovian doctrine in 1897 with the publication of his famous *Letters on Ancient and Modern Judaism* — the canon of Jewish diasporic nationalism.³

1. The Origins of the Idea

The ideological origins of Dubnovism are unclear. In my opinion, the theories offered by the research to date are unsatisfactory. Various historians have pointed to two main sources of influence. The first is a group of west and east European thinkers, who had a major impact on the formulation of Dubnovian theory. Bentzion Dinur pointed in particular to the influence of Ernest Renan on Dubnov's national thinking, as well as that of other west European thinkers such as John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, and Auguste Comte. Dinur also focused on the influence of the radical school of Russian literature, such as Vladimir Soloviov's views on nationalism.⁴ Dinur's hypothesis has been endorsed by researchers, with minor changes and additions.

Robert Seltzer mentions the literature of the Haskalah — especially Lilienblum and his autobiographical *The Sins of Youth [Chataot Ne'urim]* — as a force that projected Dubnov outside the framework of traditional Judaism; he believes that the Russian thinkers Chernyshevskii, Pisarev, and Lavrov were decisive influences. Seltzer lists those west and central European thinkers read by Dubnov in the original or in Russian translations: Comte, Buchner, Mill, Spencer, Renan, and even Victor Hugo.⁵

David Weinberg concurs with Dinur and Seltzer's basic theory concerning the impact that east and west European thinkers, especially Renan, Comte, Spencer, and Mill had on Dubnov.⁶ It is worth noting that Dubnov himself refers to these thinkers in his memoirs as significant influences. Recently, Jeffrey Veidlinger recontextualized Dubnov's thought. He emphasized again the effect of Russian thinkers on Dubnov's ideas, pointing to the influence of Soloviov, Pisarev, Chernyshevskii, and Aksakov's Slavophile conception of the Russian people's distinct spiritual heritage. Although he did not deny the influence of Western thinkers, he emphasized that the exact forms and contours which Dubnov used to articulate his autonomist thought derived in large part from the Russian intelligentsia.⁷

The above notwithstanding, none of them was responsible, in my opinion, for the development of Dubnov's diaspora nationalism. As for Karl Renner, the Austrian Marxist thinker who is associated with

diaspora nationalist theory, and Haim Zhitlovsky, whom Dubnov called the precursor of diaspora national Jewish thought, Dubnov claims ignorance of them at the time he wrote *Letters on Ancient and Modern Judaism*, a claim we have no reason to doubt. With regard to Kautsky, Dubnov mentioned him first in the revised edition of his third letter (1906), published originally in May 1899.⁸

In an attempt to explain the sources of Dubnov's diasporic national views, Dinur resorts to Dubnov's historical works as the key to his ideological outlook. It is Dinur's contention that Dubnov's research into the organization of Jewish communities in Poland shaped his autonomist ideas.⁹ This thesis has also been endorsed by other researchers. David Weinberg agrees with Dinur's main argument that Dubnov's autonomism was a direct result of his Jewish historiographical studies.¹⁰ Recently, Jonathan Frankel has affirmed that "the constant interaction between Dubnov as historian and as ideologist ...led to his heightened interest in Jewish autonomy, both as a historical phenomenon and as a political program."¹¹ Frankel disagrees with Salo Baron who maintained that it was not Dubnov's historical interests that influenced his ideological thought, but vice versa.¹²

Undoubtedly, Dubnov's historiography has a clear political component. During the years in which he was elaborating his autonomist ideology, Dubnov was immersed in a mammoth historiographical study of Russian Jewry, its institutions (the Council of Four Lands), and spiritual movements (Hasidism). In Dubnov's hands, history became a creative force that linked the "banished of Israel" to their host country, Russia, and legitimized their existence in the geographical east European space as equals among equals. Through the historical scientific truths he hoped to arrive at through his research, he sought to legitimize and ratify his ideas and interpretations.

The history that Dubnov exposed during this gargantuan historiographical enterprise was that of a glorious past that augured a future of physical and cultural integration, in which the cultural and distinctive features of the Jewish minority would be accepted like those of other minorities. The historical regularity which Dubnov referred to in his research justified his political demands and his struggle against the dominant society. In other words, his historiographical study of Russian Jewry, which evolved alongside his politico-ideological thought, fueled his demands that Jews be granted a slice of the power pie that was concentrated in the hands of the Czarist administration. The devolution of power was a natural corollary of his historical determinism. His research substantiated his political demands, which, dialectically, crystallized his historiographical research, which, again, underpinned his ideological views, and so on and so forth. Dubnov's theory questioned the very legitimacy of the Russian, or indeed any, nation possessing a monopoly of political power.

Seltzer, resorting to phenomenological arguments, claims that

Dubnov's scholarship was a function of his family environment, which in turn was shaped by his father and grandfather. Be that as it may, the childhood experiences to which Seltzer alludes cannot in themselves explain the ideological origins of Dubnov's diaspora nationalism. On the other hand, a phenomenological approach could help clarify the appeal that diaspora nationalism held for Dubnov.

Dubnov relates in his memoirs that after acquiring the rudiments of the Russian language and a basic Russian education, he left home and applied to university. He failed his external exams in several abortive attempts to gain admission to university. In May 1881, he once again took the exams in St. Petersburg, and failed. The young Dubnov, who had toiled to acquire a cultural capital — a language, culture, and conceptual system — that was alien to him and which he revered, now experienced the bitter taste of defeat. As a young Jew who sought to penetrate that fortress of Russian high culture — the Academy in St. Petersburg — Dubnov found all avenues barred. He decided on the spot to abandon his dream of a university degree. As he wrote in his memoirs, based on the journal he kept at the time:

And so the decision evolved [to stay in Russia without continuing to apply to university] [...] This decision, however, condemned me to a life of suffering that is the lot of Jews who have no rights, who do not belong to the diploma-ed intelligentsia. Perhaps it's all for the best. Perhaps a Jewish author should not enjoy the privileges that a degree confers, but should suffer together with all other Jews, so that he can describe all these tribulations first-hand, in the essayist's 'Book of Wrath,' and serve it up with the historian's dry pathos."¹³

This testimony explains the potential attraction of the idea of diaspora nationalism, an idea that seeks to sever the tie between the State and the culture of the dominant nation (in the case of Dubnov, Russian culture), and between the hegemonic high culture of the dominant nation and other minority cultures. The idea developed by Dubnov denied the State's right to discriminate against those who were not identified with the high Russian culture and were excluded from the Russian cultural elite. Thus, a phenomenological interpretation enables us to understand Dubnov's sensitivity to the hardships experienced by the intelligentsia of a minority group in attempting to gain recognition as equal members of the hegemonic culture.

The emotional trauma of his failure to gain admission to university, and his equally painful operative conclusions, predisposed him toward the idea of diaspora nationalism. We shall return to what is, in my opinion, a pivotal issue below. The above notwithstanding, although the youthful Dubnov's failure to be accepted into the elite, and thereby acquire a high cultural capital, and his subsequent disillusionment may

help us understand the sympathy he felt for this idea, they do not in themselves explain the source of his inspiration. Similar experiences of failure impelled others members of the Russian-Jewish intelligentsia to adopt different attitudes and philosophies, such as territorial nationalism, socialism, revolutionism, and assimilationism, *inter alia*.¹⁴

It is my contention that Dubnov found inspiration in an idea that had begun to develop decades earlier. I believe that autonomism as an ideological/political concept crystallized before 1897, the year in which Dubnov published his first essay on Jewish nationalism. Thanks to the sensitivity he acquired as a result of his personal experience, Dubnov assimilated and developed the idea, until it became consonant with his own political-ideological activity.

2. The Emergence of Diaspora Nationalism

The last decades of Jewish historiography in general and of east European Jewish historiography in particular, have seen a welcome development. Ideologies and cultural, social, and political developments are being studied in the context of the ambient environment and the interaction between the Jews and their gentile neighbors. An understanding of the cross-fertilization and reciprocity between the two societies enhances our understanding of several crucial historical developments, including Jewish nationalism. This necessary and useful development has led to increasing specialization by historians of Jewish history in general and of east European Jewry in particular. This growing specialization demands considerable knowledge of both Jewish society and the ambient societies. Thus, a historian of Polish Jewish history will study also the languages and cultures of the ambient societies, developments in the area he is studying, and the array of forces affecting Jewish society, sometimes surreptitiously, and changing it. Similarly, historians of Russian, Ukrainian, Belarussian, Lithuanian, Romanian, or Galician Jewish history will study the background and culture of the ambient societies.

Obviously, this perception of Jewish history as a facet of the history of these countries is desirable. However, research into the relationship between Jews and their gentile neighbors has sometimes overshadowed research into the relationship between Jews and their co-religionists abroad. In order to clarify Dubnov's sources of inspiration, I shall attempt to shed some light on this heretofore neglected aspect, and shall be traveling west, across the Russian border, to Galicia. I shall be arguing that the autonomist idea developed in Austria, from whence it traveled to the centers of the Jewish intelligentsia in the Romanov Empire — to Poland and to the Jewish intelligentsia in Russia, particularly in the cosmopolitan city of Odessa, where Dubnov developed and perfected this idea. I shall be arguing that an analysis of the interaction between the Maskilic

(Enlightenment) Jewish intelligentsia in Russia and its counterpart in the Habsburg Empire is essential for an understanding of the scope, origins, and appeal of Jewish diaspora nationalism, or Dubnovism.

My argument is that the evolution of Jewish diaspora nationalism paralleled that of non-territorial nationalism in Europe. This idea was born in the Austrian Empire, then still the Habsburg Empire, when one of the leaders of the 1848 Revolution, a young Jewish physician called Adolf Fischhof¹⁵ demanded the complete democratization of the government. He condemned discrimination on ethnic grounds, advocated the decentralization of power, and demanded recognition of the rights of the Austrian nationalities. His views gained currency and his draft laws were debated in the press, especially after the *Ausgleich* (Compromise) of 1867 turned the Austrian Empire into a dual Austro-Hungarian Empire.

In his famous book *Oesterreich und die Buergschaften seines Bestandes* (Austria and guarantees for its existence), published in 1869, he warned of the dangers inherent in the disintegration of the Empire. He saw Austria as a conglomeration of ethnicities and nationalities dispersed through various countries and provinces, a fact that had to be taken into account when drawing up a liberal constitution. The institutions of government, he argued, should not discriminate against any national minority since no nation, however strong, can oppress other minorities forever. An assimilationist policy would be disastrous both for the oppressing minority and the oppressed minority. In a multinational State, he emphasized, only respect of all national rights, namely, national autonomy for all ethnic groups, whether small or large, cohesive or dispersed, within the State, could guarantee the civil rights of its citizens, irrespective of ethnic affiliation.

He favored the establishment of an administrative apparatus, mainly on a local and regional scale, to handle the ethnic affairs of the groups inhabiting a given geographical area. Although this governing body would handle all ethnic affairs, it would focus on education and culture, and would mediate between the individual and the higher authority, in the individual's language. In regions where various ethnic groups overlapped, the autonomy thus granted would be both of a territorial and extra-territorial nature. In these multinational areas, the ethnic minority would defend its national rights through the "Curia" electoral system, based on ethnic constituencies.¹⁶ Fischhof likewise proposed the introduction of various approval, veto, and mediation mechanisms, on issues relating to the nations or their language.¹⁷ Although Fischhof's ideas influenced various liberal politicians,¹⁸ his main influence was felt in Socialist circles, and it is Karl Renner, a leader of the Austrian Social Democratic Party, with whom the idea of personal national autonomy is generally identified.

Karl Renner's philosophy revolves around the national question. Renner, who first developed his theory in the late nineteenth century,

published his ideas in 1899 in a book entitled *Staat und Nation* (State and nation), under the pseudonym Synopticus. Three years later, he published a more sophisticated version of his ideas in a book entitled *Der Kampf der Österreichischen Nationen um den Staat* (The struggle of the Austrian nations over the state) under the pseudonym Rudolf Springer. According to Renner's perspective, as it evolved over the early twentieth century, the world was moving toward a paradigm of large multinational States. Although he believed that the State was no longer constituted on the basis of national principles, the national principle was nevertheless reflected in the multinational States. The national question had to be addressed from within the State, since it could bring about the disintegration of the State, with disastrous consequences for the population as a whole and for the proletariat in particular.

States had to be structured in such a way as to respect the national rights of all ethnic groups dwelling within them. Instead of attempts to blur the identities of the various ethnic groups (the "melting pot effect"), or divide the territory on an ethnic basis, Renner proposed a political structure that would retain the existing geopolitical system and enable the ethnic groups to preserve their identity and share power. Inherent in his proposal was the decentralization of political power based on the principles of a federal State but adapted to the reality of the multinational State. Renner was advocating personal, national autonomy, that is, the division of power among all nationalities within the Empire on a personal basis, based on ethnic affiliation, not geographical location.

According to this theory, political power would be divided among the ethnic groups, irrespective of where the members of these groups lived. This new extraterritorial administrative apparatus would, according to Renner, complement the conventional territorial foci of power. The State would thus be organized along two axes — the territorial axis and the national one. Issues that were essentially territorial (traffic, customs, sanitation, etc.) would be separated from issues that were essentially national (education, culture, etc.), thereby preventing oppression of the minority groups by the hegemonic or majority group.¹⁹

Although the idea of personal national autonomy, as proposed by Fischhof and later by Renner and other Austrian thinkers, was designed to protect minorities from the hegemonic culture, in practice it served to safeguard the integrity of the Austrian Empire. It is clear from the above that the idea of non-territorial — or diaspora — nationalism was born in Austria, a multinational state par excellence, in which the distribution of power between various nationalities dominated the public agenda.

Once the concept of diaspora nationalism appeared on the Austrian public agenda, it was not long before a similar idea emerged among the Jews. Soon, voices were heard demanding a share in the power pie — that is to say, sovereignty for Jews, too. Renner's influence on Jewish political thought is well documented. He and his Austro-Marxist contemporaries had a direct impact on Jewish affairs in both the Jewish Socialist and

Liberal parties, but it took time (the last quarter of the 1890s) until their influence was felt.²⁰ Less well known is the direct impact that Fischhof had on Jewish political thought before Renner even came on to the scene.

Although Fischhof never repudiated his Jewishness²¹ and kept in touch with the leaders of organized Viennese Jewry,²² he never spoke of national sovereignty for the Jews. Jewish Maskilic circles were familiar with his thinking.²³ In 1885, for example, Jacob Fisher, a Hungarian Jewish Maskil and editor of *Ha-Yehudi*, a Maskilic paper published in Pressburg (Bratislava), wrote a Hebrew monograph on Fischhof in which he praised his proposals for a compromise between the various Austrian minorities.²⁴ Fischhof himself tried to disseminate his ideas among his coreligionists, and wrote for the contemporary Jewish press. He contributed to the *Viennner Izraelit*, a German-language paper published in Hebrew characters in Vienna in the 1870s. Some of Vienna's most outstanding Jewish intellectuals contributed to this paper, including Peretz Smolenskin (1842–1885), who wrote frequent articles for it and whose story *Naqam Brit* (The revenge of the covenant) appeared in it in German translation.²⁵

Peretz Smolenskin, who was born in a Belarussian village, received a traditional education before becoming a Maskil. He spent his youth (1862–1867) in vibrant, heterogeneous, and tolerant Odessa, where he published his first novel, *Ha-Gemul* (The reward).²⁶ After many vicissitudes, he reached Vienna in the spring of 1868, bringing with him the tradition of the Russian-Jewish Maskilim.²⁷ In his first few years in Vienna, capital of the multinational Austrian Empire, he experienced the political and social storm unleashed by the *Ausgleich*, and the constitutional changes it triggered, and witnessed first-hand the national ferment and the public debate on the Austrian national question, as well as the political problems and identity crises of the Jews in the post-*Ausgleich* era.²⁸

In Vienna, he absorbed the new nationalist winds that were blowing through the imperial capital, and added them to his Maskilic baggage.²⁹ Although there is no evidence that Smolenskin read Fischhof's writings, there is reason to believe that he was familiar with his ideas, which were debated in the contemporary press and even summarized by Jacob Fisher in a Hebrew pamphlet.³⁰ While in Vienna, Smolenskin founded *Ha-Shahar*, a Hebrew journal, which became the prime Hebrew literary platform for the Haskalah movement in its later period and for the nationalist movement in its early stages. This journal exerted an enormous influence on the east European Maskilic intelligentsia on either side of the Austro-Russian border. *Ha-Shahar's* political agenda aimed at the crystallization of a modern Jewish nationalist consciousness. The journal represented a "nationalist Haskalah," as Samuel Feiner put it.³¹

In the best Haskalah tradition, Smolenskin berated those who sought sanctuary in the world of traditional Judaism. At the same time, unlike his colleagues, he was scathing of those who modeled themselves on

the modern world while repudiating the traditional world — identifying them with the “Berlin Haskalah.”³² This refrain, at least in principle, was later taken up by Dubnov, who originally considered it inflated. Smolenskin himself stood somewhere between the traditional world which, according to him, was shrouded in ignorance and sloth, and the assimilationist world, which rudely rejected any affiliation with the Jewish collectivity. “How to liberate the one, and restrain the other?”³³ inquired Smolenskin. His answer offered a third, new option, namely, the new nationalist position.³⁴

In *Ha-Shahar*, and especially in his main work *Am Olam* (1872),³⁵ as in subsequent works published up to 1881, Smolenskin passionately argued that the Jews were a nation.³⁶ National identity, he argued, was the basis of the cohesion of the Jewish collectivity.³⁷ For Smolenskin, the ties between Jews were ties of “brotherhood,” “national sentiment,”³⁸ and a culture that was rooted in the Bible, Hebrew language, and Jewish history.³⁹ Faith and religion were simply supplementary — not essential — elements of the Jewish national culture.

Smolenskin did not believe that territory was an essential condition for national existence,⁴⁰ an idea that was later to become a major tenet of Dubnov’s philosophy. The essence of Jewish nationalism, claimed Smolenskin, was spiritual. Smolenskin, more a thinker with a Hegelian historicist outlook than a historian as such,⁴¹ maintained that the Jews’ spiritual power fully emerged only after they were exiled from their land. Thanks to its culture or “spirit,” the Jewish People was able to survive the calamity of exile from its land, and to continue its national existence in the diaspora.⁴² Smolenskin viewed the Jews as essentially a nation of the spirit. “Gradually, as the children of Israel’s hold on their **land** loosened, their spirit waxed. As their hold on their land tightened, this spirit waned. However, once all the pillars of governance fell, there was nothing left but the spirit. It was not long before the spirit manifested itself in all its splendor and majesty.”⁴³ According to Smolenskin, the Jews comprised a spiritual, not a territorial, nation, which was united first and foremost by a sense of solidarity, a historical memory, and a common culture. Smolenskin’s idea closely resembled Dubnov’s subsequent notions.

Smolenskin’s “third way” required a reinterpretation of Jewish traditions and their integration, after being divested of their archaic or inappropriate elements, into the modern conceptual world of a multinational Eastern Europe that was in the throes of an unprecedented revival. This engagement with modernity, termed “reformist” (not in the Jewish religious sense) by Anthony Smith, the theoretician of nationalism, and “transformist” by Gideon Shimoni, was the precursor of modern Jewish nationalism.⁴⁴ Smolenskin, who advocated the Jews’ integration into the State, called on Jews to adopt modern culture without relinquishing their ethnic distinctiveness. According to Gideon Shimoni, Smolenskin’s ideology, by its very cogency, represented a transition from “ethnicism” to “cultural nationalism.”⁴⁵ The research has emphasized

the similarity of Smolenskin's outlook to that of Ahad Ha-'Am. I believe that Peretz Smolenskin can equally be considered the father of diaspora nationalism.⁴⁶

Identifying with Jews was not sufficient to ensure the continued existence of the Jewish collectivity, argued Smolenskin. He called for the expansion of Jewish education and the study of Jewish sources "as a primary and fundamental remedy, on which the existence of the nation depends."⁴⁷ Smolenskin also referred to the organizational aspect of diaspora nationalism — which, although embryonic in his own thinking, was later to become a major feature of Dubnovian thought. Smolenskin believed that the Alliance Israélite (with which he had been in contact since 1874) could serve as a Jewish national, supraterritorial, world organization that would represent the interests of the Jewish nation, crystallize its consciousness "better than thousands of preachers and teachers,"⁴⁸ and upgrade its educational and occupational structure. Although not a sovereign organization (which the autonomists of the Dubnovian school would later demand), Smolenskin saw the Alliance as best equipped to promote and protect the interests of the Jewish collectivity.⁴⁹

Austria, home to a vast mix of nationalities, of which the most prominent — Germans, Italians, Poles, and Ruthenians — were dispersed both in and outside the Empire, was fertile ground for the development of Smolenskin's proto-diasporic nationalist ideas. Allegiance to the Habsburg dynasty allowed citizens within the Empire to be both loyal to the Empire and to the ethnic group of which they were part, many of whose members lived abroad. In this respect, the Jews were no different. The nationalism that had evolved in the Empire alongside allegiance to the Habsburgs was mainly an exclusivist nationalism — one that prevented the Jewish intelligentsia from adopting a hyphenated identity. Smolenskin's diaspora nationalism presented a possible solution to these new dilemmas.

3. Pre-Dubnovian Jewish Autonomism

We shall now examine the influence of Smolenskin's nationalist ideas on the evolution of diaspora nationalism on either side of the Austro-Russian border before the publication of Dubnov's letters — the "canon" of diaspora nationalism. The starting point of this study is Vienna, the cradle of a number of national Jewish associations,⁵⁰ such as the famous Qadimah Society, founded and named by Smolenskin and largely influenced by him. Jakob Kohn,⁵¹ a Jewish law student from Jaroslav, Galicia (and from 1901 onward, an attorney) was a member of this society, and in 1893, became its chairman. In November of that year, he was elected to the board of a new association called The National Jewish Party of Austria.⁵²

In 1894, he published a programmatic work, based on his party's

philosophy, called *Assimilation, Antisemitismus und Nationaljudentum* (Assimilation, anti-Semitism and national Judaism).⁵³ In it he argued that Jews were not only a religion, but shared a long history, "relative purity of race," a similar economic stratification, and external pressures. "Clearly, a commonality of physique, religion, and occupational and social structure has created a shared outlook," he wrote in this book.⁵⁴ According to Kohn, the Jews were a nation, "despite thousands of years of exile [i.e., lacking a common territory] and despite attempts at assimilation."⁵⁵

In his book, Kohn berates assimilation, and like Smolenskin before him, attacks Mendelssohn's Haskalah, on the grounds that the assimilation it engendered sought to obliterate Jewish existence through complete integration into the ambient society. Such total assimilation, argued Kohn, provoked a counter-reaction on the part of the ambient society. This counter-reaction was what was known as modern anti-Semitism.⁵⁶ "Modern antisemitism is simply the nations' response to Jewish Assimilationism," he stated.⁵⁷ Assimilation was tantamount to denationalization, and society's opposition to it manifested itself as anti-Semitism.⁵⁸ It followed that "assimilation bred antisemitism,"⁵⁹ and that Jews who wished to integrate into the ambient society had — paradoxically — to preserve their distinctive Jewish, or national, character, not discard it. His objection to assimilation, which was fueled by his nationalist perspective, was even more entrenched than Smolenskin's, since Kohn held that assimilation actually worked against the integration of Jews into their host country.

Kohn's operative conclusion was that the Jews must call for an independent Jewish policy in Austria "rather than bowing to the dictates of the political parties of other ethnic groups."⁶⁰ "We shall obtain our rights when we demand them, in the name of the same principles that govern all national struggles today [i.e., national principles]. Only if we insist on our rights shall we attain them."⁶¹ He called for the establishment of a national Jewish organization that would represent Jewish interests, a call that is reminiscent of Smolenskin's proposals for the Alliance, or Dubnov's call for an autonomous Jewish organization.

However, Kohn's political vision for the Jews in the diaspora remained unclear. He spoke vaguely of eliminating servility, and of abolishing conversion for the sake of professional advancement.⁶² He looked forward to the day when there would be "a Jewish parliamentarian" [*Es wird eine zeit kommen [...] wo ein juedischer Abgeordneter Jude ist*],⁶³ no doubt an allusion to his party's political program following the reform of Austrian electoral procedure in 1893, which allowed the election of a Jewish deputy from Galicia, with its large Jewish urban population.⁶⁴ Kohn's outlook was a compromise between Palestino-centrist territorial nationalism (he called for international cooperation in settling Jews in Palestine) and diaspora nationalism.⁶⁵

In 1897, Kohn joined Hermann Kadisch and Hermann Plaschkes, Fischhof's last secretary who had inherited the mantle of his revered

mentor,⁶⁶ in setting up the Juedischer Volksverein, a non-Zionist national Jewish association as an answer to the Zionist Congress. This society set itself two main goals: fomenting “nationalist sentiment among all strata of the Jewish population,” and “establishing a compact political body” to safeguard “the civil rights that our nation has worked so hard to acquire.”⁶⁷ Following this program, a new political entity, The Jewish People’s Party (*Juedische Volkspartei*), was created that year in Vienna;⁶⁸ in January 1901, it devised a mature autonomist program.⁶⁹

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the national question in Galicia, as in other countries under Habsburg rule, became a stormy public issue. The events of the Spring of Nations in Galicia put the question of Jewish identity to the test: Were the Jews Germans or Poles? Ironically, the very events that challenged the old identities provided a new one: Jews were Austrian subjects who were loyal to the Habsburg Crown.⁷⁰ After the 1867 *Ausgleich*, Galicia gained autonomy under Polish protection. The nationalist struggles between Poles and Ruthenians on the one hand, and between the German center in Vienna and the Polish leadership on the Galician periphery on the other, again intensified the identity crisis of the liberal Jewish intelligentsia, which was obliged to switch from a German cultural orientation to a Polish one.⁷¹ This transition was not seamless, since the dominant German political culture was perceived as liberal, while the Polish one was perceived as conservative.⁷² To make matters worse, the special demographic makeup of Galicia, in which none of the ethnic groups formed a majority, turned the Jews there into a pawn in the demographic contest between the Ruthenians and Poles — a contest in which the relative Polish majority used the Jews to bolster their numbers.⁷³ This situation generated new identity crises.

Naturally, the nationalist agitation in Galicia was instrumental in the nationalization of Galician Jews. Although the two main nationalist movements in Galicia — the Ruthenian and Polish ones — advocated territorial nationalism, a new trend began to emerge among the Jews: diaspora nationalism. This development was the result of close contacts between the Galician Jewish ethnicist intelligentsia and its Viennese counterpart. These contacts were made by Galician Jewish intellectuals who were studying in Vienna but returned home during their vacations. Correspondence between Galician and Viennese Jews was commonplace, and many Galician Jews read the Viennese press, including Smolenskin’s *Ha-Shahar*.⁷⁴

In the 1880s, two trends emerged within this ethnicist intelligentsia. The first advocated the territorialization of the Jews, in the belief that without its own country, the Jewish people had no future. The second advocated political and economic rights for the Jews in the diaspora, in the belief that Jews were an integral part of Galicia, and that territorialization was an unrealistic option.

Fueling the demand for the recognition of Jews as a distinctive entity in Galicia was a certain disillusionment with the Polish national movement

which was perceived as having failed to faithfully represent Jewish interests. These rudimentary and somewhat similar trends coexisted peacefully and even shared a common organizational framework,⁷⁵ breeding a multiplicity of associations from the mid-1880s onwards, and especially in the 1890s. The members of these associations were high school graduates, students, and Jewish intellectuals, all of whom had undergone a process of acculturation but who sought to emphasize their own distinctive, Jewish, national consciousness and disseminate it among the Jewish public at large. They were joined by youngsters from more traditional backgrounds who had come under the influence of Haskalah literature, including Smolenskin's writings.⁷⁶ By the mid-1880s, separate associations of a diasporic tendency already existed in Stanislawów (today's Ivano-Frankivsk), Stryj, and Drohobycz.⁷⁷ The diasporic faction fully supported Joseph Bloch as the Galician deputy to the Austrian parliament, and claimed that one of his tasks was to protect Jewish interests.⁷⁸

In the 1890s, the diasporic trend began increasingly to formulate its political demands. In 1890, as the date of the nationwide census conducted by the Austrian authorities approached, members of the Zion Association in Lvov demanded, "that each person declare himself a member of the Jewish nation whose language was *Lashon ha-Qodesh* [Hebrew] or Yiddish." The association "believes that all those Jews who have not yet sold their souls for financial gain or for empty promises will use this opportunity [the census] to declare that they are Jewish — not Germans, Poles or Ruthenians — and that their language is Hebrew or Yiddish."⁷⁹ Another circular urged "all Jews to declare in the forthcoming census that Yiddish was their mother tongue, as indeed was the case, and thereby demonstrate that they were members of the Jewish nation."⁸⁰

The purpose of these exhortations was twofold: (1) to persuade the Jewish public at large to declare their allegiance to the Jewish nation, and (2) to gain recognition of Yiddish as the spoken language (*umgangssprache*) of the Jews. In Austrian law, once a language was legally recognized as the spoken language of a specific ethnic group, the members of the group were entitled to certain rights, such as recognition of the language in state institutions, support for schools that taught in that language, and recognition of the language in official documents.⁸¹ In other words, calling on Jews to declare Yiddish as their language in the census was a step toward obtaining Jewish national rights.

In 1891, the idea of establishing a Jewish National Party in Galicia surfaced. The debate centered on national political activity in Galicia versus Palestino-centric activity. Although the Palestino-centric faction sought to curtail political activity in Galicia, and the "diasporic" faction sought "to fight [in Austria] for the rights of the Jews as a nation in its own right," the two blocs coexisted peacefully, and together drafted a common, two-pronged plan.⁸² Since the plan, devised by the Lvov Zion Society, was published in Polish, it obviously targeted primarily those

youngsters who had undergone a process of acculturation. The plan's agenda was: (1) to fight assimilation, and (2) to fight for the national rights of Jews. It called for the establishment of a representative Jewish body to organize the Jews, ensure Jewish national representation in State institutions, and defend their rights.⁸³

As a resolution passed by a conference in the spring of 1893 stated: "The Jewish National Party of Galicia considers it its duty to protect the political, social and economic interests of Galician Jews, and therefore recognizes the need for an independent Jewish policy."⁸⁴ In the diasporic context, the Zion Society argued, "we have the same rights as everyone else, and the same duties. [And yet] we have no influence either in the executive or legislative branches [of the State]. We are not represented in the institutions that pass laws."⁸⁵ The Zion Society aspired to turn the movement into a Jewish political party that would be represented in the State's elected institutions, turn the status of the Jews from a religious to a national minority, and defend their economic and cultural interests in Galicia.⁸⁶

In the early 1890s, the Palestino-centric and diaspora trends began to diverge in certain Galician cities.⁸⁷ Concurrently, at Jacob Kohn's initiative, Jewish diasporic national associations in Vienna grew closer to their Galician counterparts.⁸⁸ As Shanes points out, during the infancy of the Jewish nationalist movement in Galicia, the Galician nationalists who supported a diasporic policy predominated.⁸⁹ Nonetheless, the two movements coexisted, by stressing a two-fold program that embraced both diasporic and Palestino-centric tendencies.⁹⁰

Nahum Sokolow, who lived northeast of the Austrian border, was the first to adopt diasporic ethnicist ideas that resembled Smolenskin's. In 1879, Sokolow wrote that throughout its existence, the Jewish People had proved itself to be a nation with a common origin that had succeeded in preserving its national distinctiveness while dwelling among other nations. This, stated Sokolow, was due to the potentiation of the Jewish national spirit — a claim strikingly similar to Smolenskin's.

In the Jewish paper *Ha-Melitz*, Sokolow argued that attempts to preserve the Jewish national spirit did not necessarily contradict the Jews' obligation to be loyal citizens.⁹¹ Like Smolenskin before him, he believed the Alliance to be the embodiment and defender of this spirit.⁹² In the early 1880s, in *Ha-Tzefira*, Sokolow proposed an alternative to the Hovevei Zion manifesto: It was possible to base Jewish national existence in the diaspora on values and principles that had nothing to do with territory, whether in Palestine or elsewhere.⁹³ Again, like Smolenskin before him in *Ha-Shahar*, Sokolow sought to base Jewish national existence on Hebrew language and literature, and new educational institutions.⁹⁴

Hayim Zhitlovsky was the first Russian Jew who not only spoke of a diasporic nation, but also developed the idea of national rights for the Jews.⁹⁵ From the late 1880s, Zhitlovsky, who had a checkered political and ideological career, began to view the struggle for national

existence, together with the struggle for social justice, as the motive force of history.⁹⁶ In 1892, after spending some years in Switzerland — a multinational state that successfully exemplified political power sharing between its various ethnic groups — he published a Russian-language essay entitled “From One Jew to Other Jews,” directed mainly at Russian Jewish intellectuals. In this pamphlet, he condemned the Russification of Jews which, he claimed, merely played into the hands of the Russian oppressors.⁹⁷ He called on the Russian Jewish intelligentsia to return to its people, the Jewish people. Jewish revolutionaries had to fight, not only for the liberation of Russia, but also “for the revival of our people.”⁹⁸

Although the essay contains no evidence that Zhitlovsky was influenced by Smolenskin’s writings, it is clear that he drew his inspiration from Austrian Jewry’s political struggles for recognition as a nation. He states, for example, that one parliamentary committee in Austria had already declared “Jews to be a nation within the Austrian state, with full rights, just like the German or Slavic nationalities.”⁹⁹ He was also inspired by the examples of Switzerland and Belgium, multinational states which had accorded numerous national rights to their ethnic minorities, thereby ensuring their allegiance to the State, despite their ethnic affiliations. In other words, he advocated a dual allegiance (ethnic allegiance and allegiance to the State) as a model that was superior to the nation-state.¹⁰⁰ It was up to the Jewish intelligentsia, he added, to help attain this objective through enlisting the Jewish masses in the revolutionary cause “in their own national interests.”¹⁰¹

Six years later, he had honed his demands: civil rights, as demanded by the bourgeoisie, were no longer sufficient. What they now needed was “equal national rights.” This did not contradict Socialism, since Internationalism maintained “that all nationalities were equal brothers and had to live in fraternity with each other.”¹⁰² In yesterday’s world, argued Zhitlovsky, a nation was synonymous with a state.¹⁰³ In the new world, however, a people [a nation] was not a state, but “its culture, its education. Therefore, Jews could continue to exist as a legal and political entity scattered among the nations, and yet still be Jews, who wished to live in peace with their neighbors and enjoy equal rights, much as the French, who lived among the Germans in Switzerland.”¹⁰⁴

Jews, like other nationalities, had the right to live wherever they wished without having to renounce their nationality or culture, and were entitled, as a group, to receive the same political rights as others.¹⁰⁵ Although Zhitlovsky, at this point, had not developed the concept of “national rights,” his philosophy was fairly clear and bore fruit in the first decade of the twentieth century.¹⁰⁶ Up to 1898, Zhitlovsky failed to organize his autonomist ideas into a more cogent doctrine. When he published his ideas, Zhitlovsky was apparently unfamiliar with Dubnov’s first *Letter* that was published in 1897. Nor was Dubnov familiar with Zhitlovsky’s ideas.¹⁰⁷

4. From the Austrian Empire to Odessa — the Odyssey of an Austrian Idea

From the above, it is clear that Dubnov was not the first to formulate a diasporic nationalist ideology. Such ideas were already fairly developed in 1897, when Dubnov began publishing his famous letters. We shall now examine the question of whether Dubnov was aware of these ideas.

To begin with, we know that Dubnov was familiar with Smolenskin's ideas, and that the two conducted a polemic, Dubnov in *Voskhod* (Dawn), a Russian-Jewish newspaper which relied largely on his contributions, and Smolenskin in *Ha-Shahar*, his own creation. In the early 1880s, this polemic metamorphosed into a bitter controversy over the nationalist question. At the time, Dubnov had not yet embraced the national idea, and attacked Smolenskin's notions on the national component of Judaism.¹⁰⁸ Smolenskin, for his part, harshly criticized Dubnov's early publicist writings with their anti-national implications.¹⁰⁹ In 1887, after Dubnov's ideas on the national question underwent a radical volte-face, he wrote in *Voskhod* that Peretz Smolenskin "as a publicist and critic, was not content to deal only with 'topical issues' but had elaborated an entire historical-philosophical system, a *weltanschauung*, a comprehensive construct of hypotheses and principles that addressed the Jewish problem in the past and in the present."¹¹⁰

In the eighth of his *Letters on Ancient and Modern Judaism*, first published in November 1899, he commented in what was tantamount to a personal confession, that *Ha-Shahar*, Smolenskin's newspaper, "had exerted an immense influence on provincial Jewish youth in the 70s."¹¹¹ In his autobiography, he mentions his visit to Vienna in 1897, en route to Switzerland, a few months before writing the first of his *Letters on Ancient and Modern Judaism*, where he met with David Silberbusch, a member of Smolenskin's circle with whom he evidently discussed Smolenskin.¹¹² Dubnov even mentions Smolenskin's attitude toward Mendelssohn and the Berlin Haskalah in his first letter (he considered Smolenskin's criticism exaggerated).¹¹³ Like Smolenskin before him, Dubnov saw history as the key to understanding, and more important, to remedying, the present. There can be no doubt that Smolenskin's writings made an impression on the young Dubnov, and were instrumental in the development of his ideology. It is poetic justice that Smolenskin, who had brought his Odessan Maskilic ideas with him to Vienna, sent his Viennese ideas back to Odessa (his home from the age of 20) courtesy of Dubnov's writings.

Second, Dubnov probably also knew of the political-ideological developments in the Austrian Empire, at least from reading *Voskhod*, and possibly also from the German-language Jewish press, although the evidence to this effect are not conclusive. Thus, for example, in 1893, *Voskhod* lauded party political developments in Austria that were fueling the diasporic national program. The paper welcomed the Jewish

National Party “because it was effectively a people’s party that advocated a rapprochement between the Jewish intelligentsia and the masses.” In the same vein, in 1894, the paper welcomed the “establishment of a special political party to protect the rights of Jews.”¹¹⁴ At the time, the paper recognized Jewish nationalism without divorcing it from its east European — particularly Austrian — context. “Jews,” wrote *Voskhod* in 1895 in its column *Echoes from the Press*, “are a nation like the Czechs, Slovaks, or Ruthenians in Austria, or like the Germans, Armenians, Tatars in Russia. They have the same right as other nationalities to national solidarity and national egoism.”¹¹⁵

About two years later, Dubnov used a remarkably similar formulation in the first of his *Letters*.¹¹⁶ During his visit to Vienna in 1897, he may possibly have heard about the polemic between the Diasporists and Zionists that led that year to the establishment of the *Juedische Volkspartei*, the Jewish People’s Party, the same name as the party that would be founded in Russia a decade later at Dubnov’s instigation, and based on his philosophy. On his way to Vienna, Dubnov toured Lemberg (today L’viv, once Lwów), where he may have heard first-hand of the diasporic national ferment among the local Jewish intelligentsia, although there is no conclusive evidence to that effect. In any event, his guide around the city was Gershom Bader, a supporter of the aforementioned 1891 program.¹¹⁷

Third, Dubnov may have known of Sokolow’s proto-diasporic nationalist views from the latter’s writings, since Dubnov kept up with the Hebrew press.¹¹⁸ What is certain is that they discussed the issue when they met in Warsaw in 1888, an encounter in which Sokolow made a tremendous impression on Dubnov. In his autobiography, Dubnov describes the encounter thus: “We spoke at length [...] about party disputes. Sokolow, by the way, steered a middle course between the Palestinocentrists and the Assimilationists.”¹¹⁹ This middle course was a reference to Sokolow’s proto-diasporic views.

If Dubnov received his diasporic ideas from Austria and from thinkers who were influenced by Austrian political thought, why did he not mention this when describing the influences that shaped his worldview? I believe that this was because Dubnov himself was not aware of these influences, or may not have been required to respond to this issue, as he was required to respond to the preeminent place that Zhitlovsky or Renner held in his thinking. Be this as it may be, we must not forget the phenomenological influence, namely Dubnov’s bitter experience of rejection and the way in which this heightened his sensitivity to the plight of those who were barred from higher education, the key to social mobility.

Although most of the evidence cited above is circumstantial, I believe that it is sufficient to determine that the diasporic idea that evolved in Vienna and gained momentum in Galicia crossed the border eastwards to the Romanov Empire. Despite the circumstantial nature of the facts, it is safe to say that this idea exerted a decisive influence on the crystallization of Dubnovian diaspora nationalism.

5. On the Spread of the Autonomist Idea

The main characteristic of the diasporic view that evolved in Austria was its instrumentalist nature — its emphasis on socio-national characteristics and its demands for real equality and natural justice. Dubnov's thought, on the other hand, was dominated by the essentialist or primordial element based on a scientific evolutionary-ideological system which emphasized the preservation of cultural features and ethnic-national identity as a deterministic historical necessity. This Dubnovian view presented the specific interests of the east European Jewish minority as being universal interests, shared by all nations of the region.¹²⁰ These two approaches — the instrumentalist and the essentialist — were complementary. The difference between them lay in the circumstances of their ideological development rather than in the end results.

The political environment in Austria triggered the development of an instrumentalist diasporic idea there. First, the Austrian Empire, including Galicia, had a progressive and sophisticated political system (far more so than that of the Russian Empire) in which Jews enjoyed relatively favorable political conditions. Second, the Jews were accustomed to elections and parliamentary politics, which were totally unheard of in late nineteenth-century Russia. Third, ethnic struggles were a staple of Austrian politics, and this in itself was sufficient to legitimize national demands. Fourth, the Jews' loyalty to the Austrian crown was absolute, and expressed itself in the wish for stronger ties between the various minorities and countries that historical fate had united under Habsburg rule. These four factors accounted for the vibrant political activism of Galician and Austrian Jews, who, unlike their Russian counterparts, had nothing to fear and felt no need for historicist, deterministic and/or universalistic justifications.

The political situation in Russia was the polar opposite. In Russia, there was no possibility of political activism or national/political organization, and Russia lacked a democratic or even quasi-democratic tradition. The only way the integration of Jewish national allegiance and allegiance to the State could be expressed was through the development of a theoretical ideological system, since political circumstances proscribed political praxis. Ideological systems, such as that developed by Dubnov, were anchored in historicist deterministic attitudes that were capable of undermining the government's legitimacy. The above notwithstanding, the political purpose of autonomism, whether of the Austrian or Russian brand, was the same: To abolish the hegemony of any one national group over another. The Jewish diasporic national idea sought to attain formal equality for the various nationalities that lived in the State, including the Jews.

Such equality, it claimed, would ensure the coexistence of all national groups in one State, while providing equal opportunities for the development of each nation.¹²¹ Depriving the nationalities of their rights

would breed constant unrest and numerous insurrections and riots that would threaten the State's existence. The division of the Great Empire into national territorial units was against the State's interests, it argued. The breakdown of the economy of the multinational state into smaller economic units would lead to poverty and endless economic crises. Such a program was also unfeasible on demographic grounds, since the various ethnic groups overlapped. Any attempt by the nationalities to break the empires up into smaller territorial units would simply result in bloodshed. Only a personal national autonomy could preserve the advantages of the large state and satisfy the wishes of its national components, without leading to the disadvantages attendant upon the division of the state into smaller units.¹²²

In the early 1900s, the autonomist idea penetrated the political thought of east European Jewry. The first Jewish party in Russia to adopt it was the Bund, tentatively at its 1901 conference and unreservedly after 1905.¹²³ Between 1901 and 1907, other Jewish national parties adopted it, for a variety of reasons.¹²⁴ The Volkspartei, or Bund, adopted it for essentialist-historicist reasons; the Sejmists and Y.S. or SERP, and the Borochovist *Poalei Zion* (before adopting a position that combined a territorial Jewish nation and its extraterritorial dispersal)¹²⁵ for instrumentalist-political reasons;¹²⁶ and the Zionists, after the 1906 Helsingfors Conference, for instrumentalist-educational reasons.¹²⁷ In Austria, Nathan Birnbaum, who was familiar with the autonomist idea from its inception in Vienna,¹²⁸ became its advocate in 1902.¹²⁹ Autonomism was also adopted by Jewish socialist parties in Austria.¹³⁰

Thus, autonomism became the common denominator of all Jewish national movements in east Europe. Parties that adopted the autonomist idea or incorporated it into a broader ideological perspective flourished. As they began to process and refine the idea, its popularity grew, which in turn cemented their commitment to the idea. After the Helsingfors Conference, Zionism helped Jews achieve national rights wherever they lived, be it Russia, Austria, or the successor states, even more than it helped them achieve their territorial aspirations.¹³¹ The Bund, after its 1905 platform, and the various factions of the Jewish Workers' movement, helped organize the Jewish workers into a modern nation that demanded equal rights as individuals and as a collective, even more than they furthered the revolutionary cause among them.¹³²

Why did this idea so captivate the political, national Jewish intelligentsia? The answer lies in its demand for the recognition of Jews as an ethnic minority entitled to national rights. The immediate significance of this was the recognition of Jewish cultural capital as the key to integrating individuals into the state apparatus. The "transformist" Jewish intelligentsia, which combined Jewish cultural capital with the constituted majorities' high cultural capital, was especially drawn to diaspora nationalism, since it legitimized their desire for integration into the State and a share in its power. Russian high-culture in Russia,

German high-culture in Austria, and Polish high-culture in Galicia were the only cultures that would facilitate upward mobility. The ethnicist intelligentsia that refused to slough off the distinctive features of Jewish culture soon discovered that they lacked the requisite "cultural capital" for advancement along the social ladder, since familiarity with these languages did not guarantee admission to the corridors of power, and discriminatory regulations or "a glass ceiling" (that sometimes tended toward the opaque) hindered the integration of acculturated Jews into the hegemonic culture, as was the case with the young Dubnov.

Autonomism, by demanding a fair distribution of the State's resources, appealed to both the transformist and ethnicist Jewish intelligentsia. The recognition of Jewish culture as equal to Russian, Polish, or German culture was a passport that would admit Jews to the corridors of power and allow them to receive a share of the available resources. For the Jewish intelligentsia, therefore, autonomism was a tool for challenging the hegemonic culture. In the competition for resources, it based its demands on universal and objective criteria that it considered effective in its political struggle.

Note that the east European Jewish intelligentsia did not base its demands on the universal message of diaspora nationalism only, but also demanded symbolic recognition of Jewish culture, which had been marginalized by the central government (in Russia, as in Galicia and Austria). It demanded not only a more equitable distribution of power, but also legitimization of Jews as an ethnic group like other ethnic groups in the state. In the context of the liberalization and democratization of the state, the Jewish intelligentsia demanded recognition as a legitimate group equal to the Polish, German, or Russian intelligentsia. Its members sought to abolish the ascendancy of the hegemonic cultures, and to obtain not only formal, but also actual, equality for the Jewish collectivity.

The ethnicist and transformist intelligentsia thus saw diaspora nationalism as an effective tool for its struggle against the hegemonic culture. This may explain why the Austrian and Russian authorities did not view diaspora nationalism as a potential ally in their struggle to preserve the Empire's integrity, despite the fact that one of the tenets of diaspora nationalism was the preservation of a trustworthy and dependable multinational state. The autonomist alternative, with its deterministic, objectivistic, and universalistic messages, was uniquely suited to the needs of the Jewish ethnic minority¹³³ and was viewed by the central government with the same suspicion as the separatist or irredentist movements of other nationalities.

Conclusion

A study of the relationship between the Jews and their surrounding societies and cultures has tended to overshadow research into the

relationship between Jews and their coreligionists abroad. A study of the universal dimensions of Jewish history as Baron judiciously proposes (a study of the Jews in time and place), tends to overlook interactions between Jews and their coreligionists abroad, who, although living in different social, political, and/or economic contexts, share similar characteristics, as Dubnov points out in his *World History of the Jewish People*.

Let us take the example of Smolenskin, the Jewish Maskil who was born in Odessa, and later moved to Vienna. His thinking, which was shaped by political developments in Vienna, later spread to Galicia, and from Galicia east and north, until it came back full circle — to the Romanov Empire. The relative political freedom that prevailed in the Austrian Empire, which engendered a vibrant and rich political life on the one hand, and ethnic struggles on the other, favored the emergence of diaspora nationalism there rather than in Russia. The idea underwent mutations on the western side of the Austro-Russian border, until it found its way back east to cosmopolitan Odessa, which Smolenskin had left three decades earlier.

Dubnov was not, therefore, the first Dubnovist, but rather the one to present the ideology of diaspora nationalism in the most systematic manner. This is how the term Dubnovism or “autonomism” denoting diaspora nationalism came to be associated with him.¹³⁴ This form of Jewish nationalism did not seek to set up a Jewish State for the Jewish nation on a specific territory, but rather sought recognition of the Jewish minority as a national minority that merited collective rights, wherever they lived.

Autonomism was a total ideology capable of embracing all aspects of Jewish life. It embodied the continuity of Jewish life, and pointed clearly to the future. Once it began insinuating itself into Jewish thought, the east European Jewish national parties had no choice but to meet the challenge it posed. It was not long before other Jewish national movements adopted it. The struggle for Jewish national rights in the diaspora became a canon of the east European nationalist movement, one that pushed the Palestino-centric struggle for Jewish territorialization into the background.

The origins of Dubnov’s diasporic ideas are a test case of the interdependency of two Jewish communities that lived on either side of a political border. A deconstruction of the cultural space of east European Jewish society must be followed by a re-examination of this space as one in which the mobility of individuals and ideas was by no means uncommon. We are not proposing a reversion to the concept of a “People that dwells alone,” divorced from its ambient environment. On the contrary, Jews and the ambient society are interdependent. What we are suggesting, however, is that alongside an in-depth study of the interaction between Jews and their gentile neighbors, a detailed study of the east European Jewish space as a whole is indicated.

CHAPTER THREE

DOES MONEY TALK? THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN AMERICAN ZIONISTS AND THE YISHUV IN THE EARLY 1940S

ZOHAR SEGEV

1. The American Zionist Movement in the 1930s and 1940s — Change and Growth

The Zionist movement in the United States underwent major changes in the years 1938–1948. There was a significant increase in all sorts of Zionist activity in the United States, from the number of members recruited to the sums of money raised. Hitler's rise to power and the resulting crisis for the Jews of Europe shifted the balance of power in the Jewish world and strengthened the role of the Zionist movement in the United States.¹ In 1938, the situation of the Jews in Germany deteriorated appreciably, and the likelihood of war increased.² It was clear that, in the event of a war, American Jews in general and American Zionists in particular would become key players in whatever was to come.³ From 1938 on, as the world was swept into war, and as the crisis affecting the Jews in Europe worsened, the leadership of the world Zionist movement became increasingly aware of the potential inherent in American Jewry and the Zionist movement there, both because of the increased power and importance of the United States among the community of nations, and because of the growing prominence of American Jews within the Jewish world.⁴

The special status enjoyed by the American Zionists is illustrated by

the degree of attention they received from the Zionist leadership. Leaders of the Jewish Agency spent long periods in the United States, trying to influence the policy and the patterns of activity of the American Zionist movement. For example, David Ben Gurion, chair of the Jewish Agency Executive, spent some 14 months between October 1940 and October 1942 in the United States.⁵ Moreover, questions regarding America's Zionists occupied significant portions of top-level meetings held by the various Zionist organizations and were raised repeatedly in letters and diaries written by Zionist leaders. It was a most stormy period of time, singularly critical to the Jewish fate and to the future of the Yishuv (the Jewish entity in Palestine): the fate of the Jews of Europe, policies of the British Mandatory authorities in Palestine, and the risk that the Axis powers would occupy Palestine. David Ben Gurion's decision to spend such long periods of time in the United States, and devote them primarily to American Zionist affairs, shows that he considered the American Zionist movement to be of crucial importance.

The extraordinary importance of America's Zionists to the overall Zionist enterprise is also evident from the fact that not only Ben Gurion paid considerable attention to events in the United States and focused on the American Zionists. Chaim Weizmann, president of the World Zionist Movement, spent a relatively short time in America, but he too was closely involved with the activities of the American Zionists.⁶ His involvement is revealed, for example, by the 1940 appointment of Meyer Weisgal, a reporter and a Zionist activist, as his permanent personal representative to the United States, and Weizmann's ongoing participation in political Zionist events there.⁷

The watershed of 1938 marked not only an increase in Zionist activity in the United States, but also a fundamental change in the types of activity undertaken by American Zionist leaders. In the 1920s and the 1930s, the American Zionists shied away from the political aspects of Zionist activity. Their leadership chose not to get involved with the key issues that the Zionist movement as a whole was facing, and limited itself to collecting money within the framework of the American Zionist Appeal. The Americans were the major financial backers of the Zionist movement, but they had no say over how the funds were distributed or invested, and how the Zionist budget was managed. They acted passively and philanthropically.⁸ From the end of the 1930s onward, there were substantial changes in the patterns of activity of the American Zionist leadership as they attempted to change their role in the world Zionist movement. Their aim was to create an organizational structure that would ensure their independence while allowing them to maintain their unique position.⁹

The wish of the American Zionists to take an active role in the World Zionist movement found a focused and radical expression in the worldview of the group known as the "Young Turks," whose members were associates of Brandeis, and which became one of the main power loci

of American Zionism in the early 1940s.¹⁰ One of the main topics in the report submitted by Eli'ezer Kaplan, the treasurer of the Jewish Agency, to the Smaller Action Committee of the Zionist Executive Committee after his visit to the United States in the summer of 1940, related to the Young Turks.

Kaplan claimed that this group wished to enhance the independence of the American Zionists; they believed that the unique power of America's Zionists should be exploited in order to change the entire Zionist movement. Kaplan emphasized that the Young Turks were looking beyond their own borders. They wished to shape the social and economic structure of the Yishuv in Palestine and challenge the decline that they saw in the world Zionist movement. The most outspoken of the group claimed that America should actually assume responsibility for managing the world Zionist movement's international relations, political affairs and economic concerns. Kaplan was well aware of the grave dangers and difficulties raised by the Young Turks through their pursuit of independence and fear of unity. But even so, he did not think it posed a risk for the very existence of the Zionist movement. In his opinion, one could influence separatists and involve them in a wide range of activities: any and every American resource should be conserved, not dismissed, but rather manipulated to serve the needs of the Yishuv in Palestine.¹¹

The worldview of the Young Turks was an extreme manifestation of the American Zionists' aspiration to influence and guide the Zionist enterprise. Their search for change found expression in various ways: expanding the number of American office holders, seeking control funds raised through the Appeal, trying to establish independent economic institutions, demanding responsibility for political action in the United States, criticizing the practices of the Zionist establishment, resisting the assignment of emissaries to the United States, asking that the independent Zionist infrastructure in the United States be expanded, and demanding that the rest of the movement defer to them vis-à-vis Zionist activities in the United States.¹² Equality within the Zionist movement was, in their opinion, a right rather than a privilege, due to their economic contributions, number, and the political assistance they gave to the Zionist movement. They demanded that the American Zionists be considered a legitimate part of the Zionist world, not just a vehicle for providing aid and support without expressing any opinion.

The struggle for greater independence and more influence within the Zionist movement cut across the various factions of American Zionists, but at the same time, there was a range of opinions regarding how much independence was appropriate, and what that influence should be used for. Still, before any of the American Zionist factions could influence the Zionist movement as a whole, they had to gain their own independence.¹³ Different attitudes towards various key issues on the Zionist agenda were expressed later, during the second half of the 1940s, when the numerical, economic, and political strength of America's Zionists was unquestioned,

and was already being translated into an ability to wield power over policy decisions affecting both the Yishuv in Palestine and the world Zionist movement.

This essential change in the mode of activity of the American Zionists is dismissed in previous research as being merely a technical change and a matter of scale — that is, the strengthening of the American Zionist position was attributed to the dramatic changes taking place within the Zionist movement and on the international stage on the eve of the Second World War. In this context, the Zionists of America are mentioned as providing crucial economic support to the Zionist budget and contributing to the political struggle of the Zionist movement. The picture, however, is more complex and multifaceted than the way it is presented in most of the scholarly research. A complete description should reflect the way in which the leaders of the American Zionist movement adapted and broadened the scope of their own activities in the late 1930s in order to play a more active role in the Zionist enterprise, both internationally in general, and in Palestine in particular.

In this article, I will show how leaders of the American Zionist movement put into practice the concept that “money talks.” One key example of this was their attempt — unique and so far unknown — to establish an American Zionist bank in the early 1940s as an alternative to the Zionist Appeal in the United States. The struggle of American Zionists for economic independence in the 1940s should be viewed in the context of the continuous tension between the American Zionist leadership and the majority of the Zionist establishment throughout the world and in Palestine. To illustrate this issue, the second part of the article will focus on the opinion of Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, who advocated more independence for the American Zionist movement. Brandeis’ opinion is important not only because it represented the ideological underpinning of the struggle engaged in by the leaders of the American Zionist movement, but also because his loyalists within the American Zionist establishment tried to materialize his ideological philosophy in various ways, for instance, the creation of the bank mentioned above.¹⁴

2. Does Money Talk?

By the end of the 1930s, the American Zionists were supplying about two-thirds of the budget of the Jewish Agency. Thus, the issue of fundraising was a core component of the relationship between American Zionists and the Zionist movement, and was the lever that the American Zionists applied to advance their standing in the Zionist establishment.¹⁵ The economic importance of the United States was all the more crucial because of the difficult economic conditions faced by the Zionist movement and the Yishuv in Palestine at the start of the Second World War.¹⁶ The combination of these factors — the desperate situation of the Zionist

movement and the potential for raising money in the United States — induced Weizmann and Ben Gurion to devote a major part of their visits to the United States to seeking increased donations.¹⁷

Even though the American Zionists were the major source of financial support for the Zionist movement, they had no real control over the process through which the money was budgeted or used.¹⁸ The inability of the American Zionists to translate their economic might into a political force that could shape the Zionist movement and its policy was one of the most telling expressions of how passive they had been during the 1920s and most of the 1930s. From the end of the 1930s onward, this changed: the Zionists of America started to exert their influence over budgetary policy, especially vis-à-vis allocations for education and security, and for minority groups in the Yishuv in Palestine.¹⁹

3. American Zionist Attempts to Influence the Zionist Budget

The American Zionists' determination to influence the disbursement of funds collected in the United States is reflected in the Jewish Agency Executive's 1939 budget deliberations. The situation in Palestine during the third year of the Arab riots demanded a reallocation of the budget, with more resources devoted to security. This change in policy required the approval of the heads of the Appeal in the United States.²⁰ Yet despite the urgency of the security situation, the heads of the Appeal and of various Zionist organizations in the United States were not immediately convinced, and demanded a detailed explanation of budget allocation procedures.

So, for example, when economic experts from Palestine and the treasurer of the Jewish Agency, Eli'ezer Kaplan, turned to the Hadassah organization to ask for emergency money over and above the approved yearly budget, the leaders of that organization were not satisfied with the declaration of an "emergency" but rather insisted on an exact breakdown of the extra-budgetary spending and a justification for each additional outlay.²¹ The American reaction also illustrates a basic normative difference between the American Zionists and the Zionist institutions in Palestine regarding appropriate public administrative procedures; the latter were far less likely to adhere strictly to standard accounting criteria.²² For example, when the American Zionists sought background material before agreeing to consider the requests of the Zionist Executive for another 2 million dollars, Kaplan turned to the Executive for their approval before supplying the material.²³

The incident of the emergency funding was not an extraordinary occurrence in the efforts of American Zionists to influence the Yishuv in Palestine through its budget. In a letter to the *Va'ad ha-Po'el* (Executive), written on his way back to Israel from the United States in 1939, Ben Gurion told of a meeting he had with the leadership of Hadassah.²⁴ Most

of the four-hour meeting was devoted to complaints about the "rule of Labor" in Palestine and the short-changing of the middle class and the General Zionist party in all spheres of life: settlements, social services, leadership of the Yishuv and of the Zionist movement.

To counter these accusations, Ben Gurion requested a large amount of detailed information about many subjects: the organization of *Qupat Holim* (Labor medical care institute), the share of the Yishuv in the budget of Hadassah institutions, the existence of Labor-led cooperative employment offices and the reasons that prevented the creation of others, a description of the educational system in Palestine according to educational political streams and the sources of funding for each stream (from both the British government and the Zionists), the payment of unemployment benefits, and the organization of the welfare network.²⁵ The questions posed by the Hadassah leaders showed their thorough familiarity with the situation in Palestine and the unique social characteristics of the Yishuv, and their demand for detailed answers showed their desire to change the existing situation according to their own worldview.

The letters from Kaplan and Ben Gurion made plain the tension between the leadership of the Jewish Agency in Palestine and the funding bodies in the United States. The Zionists in the United States had a two-fold objective in trying to oversee how the money was distributed: to prove their economic might and to ensure that the money was put to good use in accordance with their agenda. This friction is revealed not only in the debate over the budget and the allotment of funds in Palestine, but also in the efforts of American Zionists to ensure that the Appeal had a fundraising monopoly in the United States. Indeed, preliminary steps taken in preparation of opening a branch of Bank ha-Po'alim in the United States confirm the existence of agreements, promising that the American Zionists would be consulted prior to the initiation of any economic activity in the United States, that the American Appeal would not be limited in any way, and that Palestinian economic institutions in the United States would be subject to the oversight of American Zionist institutions.²⁶

Eli'ezer Kaplan made his position very clear, writing "we had agreed not to give letters of recommendation to people going to the United States without discussing it with you first, and I am hereby doing so."²⁷ He also promised that Bank ha-Po'alim would operate under the auspices of Zionist institutions in the United States: "The bankers told me explicitly that they will get in touch with the United Palestine Appeal and will accept any request it would make to avoid damaging activities of the Appeal."²⁸

4. Budget Allocations to Minority Groups and Opposition Groups in the Yishuv by American Zionists

The ambition of prominent Zionists in the United States to establish and conduct independent economic activity is evident in the way that money was appropriated to different groups in the Yishuv, especially sectors that did not belong to the Labor Movement, such as the Mizrachi (religious Zionist party). Budget allocations were a powerful political tool and could be used as a means of achieving considerable influence. Kaplan opposed the Americans' attempts to increase the amount of money under their control and to use this money independently, without the approval of the Zionist establishment. He complained about the lack of consultation on the part of "our American friends"; they not only decided of their own accord to continue their support for Mizrachi, but increased their allocation from \$60,000 to \$90,000.²⁹ Kaplan criticized the autonomy demonstrated by the American Zionists, who stopped asking for his authorization to disburse money collected by them.³⁰

A similar clash characterized the allocation of money for *yeshivot* (institutions of religious higher education) in Palestine. The American Zionists tried to increase the number of bodies they supported directly, and to include the *yeshivot* in the total. Kaplan strongly opposed such an action, claiming it was the first time that the Appeal was allocating a sum of money for a specific body in Palestine without the Jewish Agency's approval.³¹ Menahem Ussishkin, head of Qeren Qayemet le-Israel (Jewish National Fund), was of a similar opinion. According to him, the Appeal was only permitted to *recommend* the allocation of such and such a sum to a particular group; the *decision* was up to the Jewish Agency. It was improper, in his opinion, to accept the Appeal's unilateral action. He claimed that he himself, as head of Qeren Qayemet le-Israel, was not permitted to spend that organization's money to assist one group or another.³²

Since it was impossible to contest the Americans' decision, a suggestion was made in the Jewish Agency Executive to accept it, but to render it meaningless by the sum already allocated to the yeshivot by the Jewish Agency Executive by the same amount.³³ The allowance for the yeshivot and for the Mizrachi was only a part of a wider demand by the American Zionists to allocate hundreds of thousands of dollars to institutions that they considered to be inadequately supported.³⁴

The authority of the Jewish Agency was eroded even further when entities in the Yishuv started turning directly to the United States, bypassing the Jewish Agency Executive. Such requests reinforced the impression that the Jewish Agency Executive was short-changing various groups. In Kaplan's opinion, such requests should of course be rejected, but it was regrettable that members of the Yishuv approached the Americans like pestering beggars.³⁵ The Jewish Agency Executive used its total monopoly over economic dealings with the American Zionists

as a tool to prevent them from listening to requests from bodies within the Zionist establishment and perhaps allocating money to them independently. Such a situation would have posed an unacceptable challenge to the authority of the Zionist Executive both in the United States and the Yishuv, and would have empowered the American Zionists.

These considerations were behind Ben Gurion's strong reaction to his discovery that the Va'ad Leumi (Jewish National Council) turned directly to the Zionist Organization of America for an additional allowance. Control over the money raised in the United States was so crucial that Ben Gurion and Kaplan opposed the Jewish National Council's monetary requests just as forcefully as they opposed the requests of the yeshivot. Yitzhaq Ben Tzevi, president of the Jewish National Council and head of its political department, wrote a letter to Shlomo Goldman, president of the Zionist Organization of America, seeking additional economic aid from the American Zionists as a result of the emergency situation.³⁶ According to Goldman, the Jewish National Council required additional means to deal with the special demands placed on it by the emergency; this entailed an immediate influx of \$100,000. The Council asked the American Zionists for a donation of \$50,000 towards this sum, to come from outside the framework of the Jewish Agency budget.³⁷

Ben Tzevi was aware of the sensitivity of his special request and thus made sure to emphasize that the money should not be taken from the budget of the Jewish Agency Executive but given above and beyond it. Nonetheless, this did not lessen Ben Gurion's opposition. Ben Gurion stated that the request had not been coordinated with him and that he found out about it by chance; he demanded that Ben Tzevi withdraw his request immediately by sending a second telegram, as the appeal has been initiated without the knowledge and assent of the Zionist Executive. It was, in his opinion, a step outside the Jewish National Council's proper sphere of authority and a precedent that could cause severe damage to the Zionist Movement.³⁸

Ben Gurion's reaction shows that his main concern was the Zionist Executive's control over the money raised in the United States, not the identity of the body that tried to bypass it. Thus, Ben Gurion and Kaplan were as sharply opposed to a direct request by the National Council as to that of the yeshivot.

The question of independent budgetary systems operating in parallel to the formal Zionist system stayed on the agenda for a long time. Ben Gurion wrote in his diary that the American Zionists, against his wishes and those of the Jewish Agency Executive, wanted to dedicate \$75,000 of Appeal income to the General Zionist Party in Palestine, mostly for youth activity.³⁹ The money was supposed to be distributed by the Jewish Agency, but in accordance with instructions from America. In another case, the Americans insisted on setting aside 2000 Palestine Liras to build a Palestine exhibition. Kaplan was against it, but, as he said, it was difficult to fight against the entire American leadership.⁴⁰ Kaplan's

letter shows again that in the late 1930s, the American Zionists were not allowed to spend even small sums of money independently. They did not accept this situation and struggled to change it, putting continuous pressure on the Zionist leadership.

American Zionists feared that bodies and institutions not connected to the Labor establishment might be discriminated against and suffer. Rose Jacobs, a past president of Hadassah and a member of the Jewish Agency Executive, demanded that the Zionist Executive desist from any action that might discriminate against kibutzim and settlements associated with the United States.⁴¹ During her visits to various locations, including the Meir Shfeyah children's village and Ju'arah (a Jewish settlement in the north of Israel), Jacobs had been informed that the British Mandate government allocated money to agricultural education, but that the funds were actually distributed by the Jewish Agency Executive, which did not include Shfeyah on its list of recipient institutions. Also, despite the fact that Ju'arah, which was established by a group of American settlers, was in a dangerous place, the Jewish Agency did not designate appropriate levels of funding for it. The only contribution Ju'arah received was 4000 Palestinian Liras raised by Brandeis.⁴²

Ben Gurion dismissed all of Rose Jacobs' claims that the Jewish Executive was discriminating against settlements simply because they had been founded by Americans. The reasons, he said, were purely objective; and in any case the people of Ju'arah identified themselves more as members of Ha-Shomer ha-Tza'ir than as Americans.⁴³ Eli'ezer Kaplan also claimed that Jacobs' assumptions were baseless. Ju'arah received more money than other places which were in areas just as dangerous. As for money for agricultural education, Kaplan suggested that Jacobs turn to Dr. Arthur Rupp, who was handling this matter. In general, Kaplan was of the opinion that Jacobs was not familiar with the situation and that her worldview did not fit the state of affairs in Palestine.⁴⁴

Yitzhaq Gruenbaum, the Vice President of the Jewish Agency Executive, objected to the mere idea that Jacobs should raise any criticisms. He said that it was a crime against Zionism for a person who spent only a few months in Palestine to pass judgment without studying the situation. He himself, he said, had been in Palestine for five years but still did not know the land as well as did Arthur Rupp or Ben Gurion. He suggested to Jacobs, who was leaving to return to the United States, not to talk about Palestine at all if this was going to be her line.⁴⁵

The conflict between Jacobs and members of the Jewish Agency Executive over money reflects deep differences of opinion about the status of the American Zionists. The disapproval directed at Jacobs was not only against the specific claims she made, but even more so against her very right as an American Zionist to criticize the actions of the Zionist Executive. Jacobs, on the other hand, was of the opinion that American Zionists should have a say in decisions over political and economic matters in the United States and in Palestine.

In fact, discrimination against institutions and organizations that were outside of the establishment concerned the Zionist leadership in the United States throughout the 1940s. For example, the American Executive of Qeren Hayesod (Palestine Foundation Fund) held a meeting to hear complaints about discrimination against the General Zionist Party of Palestine and especially its youth activities, and decided on several actions to strengthen the connection between the American Zionist movement and the General Zionist Party.⁴⁶

On the other hand, the question of supporting opposition groups in the Yishuv divided American Zionism as well. In early 1946, Po'alei Zion in the United States confronted Abba Hillel Silver, the most important American Zionist leader of the latter half of the 1940s, who was at the time President of the American Zionist Organization,⁴⁷ because of his decision to allocate \$500,000 of the Appeal money to support settlements of members of the General Zionist Party in Palestine, and \$150,000 to build the headquarters of the Zionist Organization of America in New York.⁴⁸ Po'alei Zion of the United States, who was acting in this case as a representative of Ben Gurion and Mapai (*Mifleget Po'alei Eretz Israel*, the Workers' Party of Eretz Israel), claimed that this allocation was neither legal nor morally justifiable, and that it was prohibited by the regulations of the Palestine Foundation Fund. Putting money from the Appeal to further programs at home was, in their opinion bad for the United Palestine Appeal and might upset the faith of the Jews of the United States in the entire fundraising system. They demanded a meeting of the Emergency Council about Silver's decision, and threatened to take serious actions to protect the Palestine Foundation Fund.⁴⁹

5. The Struggle Over the Control of Zionist Funds in the United States

The story of the Zionist Organization of America House in New York and the activities on behalf of the General Zionist Party illustrate how much the leaders of the American Zionist establishment strived to increase their control over the use of money collected by Zionist foundations in the United States. In this context, Kaplan reported to members of the Jewish Agency Executive that while in the United States, he often heard demands to allow the American National Executive of Palestine Foundation Fund oversee the expenses of the Jewish Agency Executive. Such a demand conflicted with the regulations of the Palestine Foundation Fund, according to which all money, barring administrative expenses, was the property of the World Zionist Movement.

Following the Po'alei Zion report regarding the allocation of money for the General Zionist Party in Palestine and the Zionist Organization of America, Kaplan sent an urgent telegram to the United States, making it clear that the Palestine Foundation Fund there had no mandate to

set aside allowances. This authority was solely in the hands of the Zionist Executive and the Smaller Action Committee; if the American Zionists needed money, they could request an allocation. For Kaplan, this was a matter of principle. If the Zionist Executive were to allow local institutions, who were really just a vehicle for transferring money, to actually use that money and give loans, there would be no way to control or manage the budget of the Zionist movement.⁵⁰ In another meeting that discussed the same issue, Kaplan opposed various compromises that would have set aside money for distribution by philanthropic funds that were part of the Zionist budget.⁵¹ Kaplan declared that if his opposition were dismissed, he would contest the matter in the next Congress, as an issue of organizational integrity; the Americans must not be able to distribute the monies collected in America, no matter what the amount.⁵² Even though the Americans believed that they had the right to do so, Kaplan stated outright that they did not in fact have the legal authority to set aside an allowance, not out of the National Fund and not out of the Palestine Foundation Fund.⁵³

The efforts of the American Zionists to transfer money from the Palestine Foundation Fund and National Fund into their own hands are confirmed in a letter sent from the National Fund's Central Office in Jerusalem to Kaplan. The subject of the letter: "The request by activists in the United States to set aside money for the Emergency Council in the United States."⁵⁴ The letter itself describes a telegram sent from Jerusalem to Israel Goldstein, the President of the National Fund in the United States, refusing his request for the said sums of money. The Directorate of the National Fund in Jerusalem suggested that Kaplan too adopt a similar stance vis-à-vis the handling of Palestine Foundation Fund money in the United States.

The contents of this letter and the large volume of correspondence regarding Goldstein's request indicate how difficult it was to carry out the decision and to stand firm against American demands. The struggle continued, as can be seen in another telegram sent to Silver from the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem. Silver was requested to stop allocating Appeal money to settlements of the General Zionist Party in Palestine, and likewise, to refrain from giving any more loans to the Zionist Organization of America; to submit explanations for his actions; and to stop all activities pending a joint investigation.⁵⁵

The Zionist leadership's limited ability to control and oversee economic activity in the United States prompted Kaplan to try to bring about organizational changes that would strengthen the hand of the Jewish Agency Executive in the United States.⁵⁶ In a speech given by Kaplan to the directorate of the United Palestine Appeal, he held that the Jewish Agency Executive was directly in charge of the Executive of the U.P.A.⁵⁷ Control of the Appeal in the United States was supposed to be in the hands of any members of the Agency who happened to be there, or through other representatives appointed by the Jewish Agency

Executive. Kaplan also suggested that ten percent of the members of the Directorate of the Appeal should be appointed by the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem. Kaplan told his listeners that the Jewish Agency Executive decided to increase and deepen the activities of the Zionist leadership in the United States, and the major impact of this process would be seen in the Appeal. Kaplan emphasized that the Jewish Agency Executive's control over the Appeal was a fundamental Zionist concept. The money-collecting apparatus in the United States, or anywhere else in the world was only a tool, an instrument subject to the World Zionist Movement, and it should work for it, rather than the reverse.⁵⁸

One can surmise that Kaplan chose to reiterate the preeminence of the Jewish Agency Executive precisely because the struggle over the status of the Zionist Organization of America was so intense and because large sectors of American Zionists supported independent action. Examples of such independent action were Silver's efforts to use some of the Appeal money to reinforce his position in two interconnected ways: by strengthening the General Zionist Party in Palestine, and by widening the organizational infrastructure of the Zionist Organization of America in the United States. Silver preferred to finance his activities with Appeal money collected in the United States rather than using the Zionist budget; in this way, he could bypass the need to obtain approval for his expenditures from the Zionist institutions.⁵⁹ Even if such approval were granted, it would have decreased Silver's authority and strengthened the power of the Jewish Agency Executive in the United States. Kaplan's vociferous reaction is clear evidence that this was a key issue, touching upon the very structure of the Zionist movement and the authority of the Zionist leadership. Ben Gurion stated this position unequivocally at the Po'alei Zion International Section Executive before the Zionist Congress of 1946.⁶⁰ According to newspaper reports in *Davar*, Ben Gurion demanded that the Zionist Organization of America, too, should be subject to the Zionist Executive in all areas, including the budget.⁶¹

The use of Appeal money by the Zionist Organization of America came up again in a letter by Israel Goldstein, the President of the Zionist Organization of America, to Emanuel Neumann, a central figure in the American Zionist arena and a close associate of Abba Hillel Silver. The letter establishes that the allocation to the Zionist Organization of America House was not an exception, but rather part of an ongoing situation in which the American Zionists were using Appeal money for their own purposes.⁶² The objection to transferring money from the United Appeal to the Zionist Organization of America was raised once more when \$54,000 was earmarked as payment for publicity and public relation services provided by the American Zionists to the United Palestine Appeal in their official newspapers.⁶³ Goldstein argued that the Appeal was obliged to pay this fee since the newspapers had less space available for commercial advertising and thus suffered a loss of income; this was not a convincing argument.

According to Goldstein, there was no reason the Zionist Organization of America should have to give up this money, but due to the ensuing criticism, it might be wise to minimize future transfers of money from the Appeal to the Zionist Organization of America. Goldstein's letter makes explicit the fact that the direct transfer of money from the Appeal to the budget of the Zionist Organization of America occurred on a regular basis, although the amounts involved were relatively small compared with the budget of the Palestine Appeal. Even though Goldstein favored these financial transfers, he recognized that they contravened the regulations of the Appeal and of the Zionist Organization of America itself, and that his explanations were implausible and not quite legal. The transfer of money strengthened the Zionist Organization of America and its struggle for independence, which explains Ben Gurion and Kaplan's opposition to it. For Goldstein, however, his ultimate goal overshadowed all the legal objections to what he was doing, and encouraged him to build a web of excuses that would minimize damage to the Zionist Organization of America and make it possible to continue transferring money.⁶⁴

Another point of contention between the American Zionists and the Zionist establishment was the method by which money was allocated to Zionist institutions in the United States. The American Zionists wanted to create procedures that would let these institutions get their budget directly from Zionist funds in the United States rather than through the regular Zionist budget that was managed by the Jewish Agency Executive. This strategy is revealed in repeated requests for the transfer of money to the United States, which were denied by the Executive. Kaplan saw a paradox in the situation. American Zionists did not send money to the Executive, but on the other hand, they asked again and again for permission to spend money locally.⁶⁵ Mosheh Shertok (later Sharett), head of the Jewish Agency Political Department, shared Kaplan's opinion; he claimed that the Zionist establishments in the United States had a huge budget that was spent freely according to their own wishes.⁶⁶

Members of the Jewish Agency Executive worried that the collection of Appeal money in the United States enabled the American Zionists to use it for their own needs. This situation was particularly intolerable, in their opinion, considering the sharp contrast between the affluence in the United States and the economic hardship faced by Zionist institutions in Palestine. The Americans wanted to use the money to increase the number of office holders and to strengthen the Zionist establishment in the United States — actions that, according to critics, would not advance overall Zionist objectives.⁶⁷

Beyond specific cases that came up regarding particular events, organizations, or requests, the American Zionists wanted to standardize and establish their right to keep a certain percentage of the Appeal money under their sole control, in spite of opposition from leaders of the Zionist establishment in general and leaders of the economic infrastructure in the Yishuv in particular. Thus, Eli'ezer Kaplan was resolutely opposed to

demands by American Zionists to allocate \$75,000 in Palestine according to their instructions; he probably opposed the request on principle, since the sum involved was relatively small. Kaplan wrote that the request was rejected unanimously, since it would be destructive both to the interests of the Funds and to the Zionist structure.⁶⁸ He emphasized that the issue was not the amount of money involved but the fundamentals of the Zionist enterprise and the organization of the Zionist establishment.⁶⁹

6. The Aborted Attempt to Establish an American Zionist Bank in the Early 1940s

An unusual episode in the struggle of the American Zionists for budgetary independence and freedom from Zionist Executive control was their attempt to establish an American Zionist bank. This occurred in 1940 secretly, hurriedly, and with no advance coordination with the Zionist establishment outside the United States. The attempt was also kept secret from those among the American Zionist establishment who were expected to oppose it. Reference to this scheme can be found in a secret memorandum written by Izidor Breslau, at the time acting manager of the Zionist Organization of America.⁷⁰

Breslau mentioned that he found out about the Bank indirectly when, during a phone conversation with the offices of the Zionist Organization of America in New York, he was told of a press conference that was supposed to be held the next morning, Friday, by the President of the Zionist Organization of America, Edmund Kaufmann, a Washington businessman and an associate of Brandeis.⁷¹ Breslau was disturbed, since the press conference was not coordinated with him ahead of time as was the norm; he was also unable to persuade Kaufmann to divulge the contents of the statement he was going to make, or to receive an adequate explanation for the secrecy and urgency of the press conference. He found out only that Kaufmann would give a general declaration about the Italian bombing of Tel Aviv.⁷²

Under the circumstances, Breslau decided to fly to New York early the next morning to participate in the press conference. When he arrived in New York, he went directly to Kaufmann's hotel, where he discovered that shortly before a telegram had been sent to Kaplan, notifying him of the establishment of the American Zionist Bank and Kaufmann's intent to announce this at a press conference that same day.⁷³ In his telegram, Kaufmann wrote that the Jews of America, who were partners with the Yishuv in the building of Palestine, were shocked by the bombing of Tel Aviv and its innocent victims. In response, the American Zionists would redouble their efforts to assist the Yishuv, and that one means of doing so would be the establishment of a new Zionist bank. Kaufmann stated that he himself planned to buy \$10,000 worth of founders' shares in the bank.⁷⁴

Kaufmann fully intended to present Kaplan and the Zionist leaders in Palestine with a fait accompli. He neither consulted with them nor asked their approval, but informed them of the bank at almost the same time as he made the public announcement. Breslau, who had not been aware of the secret plan, held telephone consultations with some American Zionist leaders, chief among them Stephen Wise.⁷⁵ While he was doing so, Robert Szold, treasurer of the Zionist Organization of America, who found out about Kaufmann's planned public announcement, called and demanded that the press conference be stopped, because the project had not been discussed beforehand by the American Zionist establishment.⁷⁶ It may be that Szold was told of the press conference by Wise.⁷⁷ Szold interrupted the press conference and brought it to a halt; representatives of the media were asked not to mention the bank. Instead, Kaufmann gave a general declaration about the bombing of Tel Aviv by the Italians. Szold's sudden intervention is also mentioned in a letter by Abraham Dikenstein, representative of Bank ha-Po'alim in the United States, who wrote that Szold found out about the press conference by chance, and that for that reason he called Kaufmann by phone and demanded that he cancel his announcement about establishing the bank.⁷⁸ According to Dikenstein, the unexpected intercession by Szold was the only thing that prevented a public announcement about the bank.⁷⁹

Albert Epstein, a Jewish activist from Chicago, also opposed the bank. He wrote to Dikenstein shortly after the press conference, stating that Kaufmann was not just an individual but the President of the Zionist Organization of America, and that the bank he wished to establish was not a private bank but a Zionist one; this being the case, he should have asked for approval from the Zionist institutions and organizations in the United States and by the American representatives to the Jewish Agency Executive.⁸⁰ Epstein expressed his hope that the announcement about establishing the bank was not published in Palestine; this would have caused much confusion, seeing as the plan had not been authorized by the American Zionists and was not coordinated with the establishment in Palestine. Epstein also opposed the bank on the grounds that it would not answer the immediate economic needs of the Zionist movement. Moreover, he questioned the legality of selling shares in a bank before receiving official approval from the American government.⁸¹

Abraham Dikenstein was trying to convince Robert Szold that creating the bank was a necessary measure.⁸² Dikenstein reminded Szold how difficult it was to get loans for the Yishuv in Palestine, both for financial establishments like the Palestine Foundation Fund and for various economic projects. The proposed bank was supposed to alleviate such difficulties. Its aim was to raise capital from American Jews and give loans to various projects based on true investment criteria. In the future it was also supposed to take responsibility for Palestine-U.S. commerce. Dikenstein remarked that the bank could be a historical turning point in the effort to raise money for Palestine. At the end of the war, millions of

destitute Jews from Europe would come to Palestine, and the bank could facilitate the economic development of Palestine and the absorption of new immigrants.⁸³

The bank affair is further proof of the American Zionists' attempts in the late 1930s and 1940s to change the passivity that marked their footing within the Zionist movement during the 1920s and the first part of the 1930s.⁸⁴ The documents reveal that the attempted establishment of the bank was not a spontaneous reaction to the bombing of Tel Aviv, but the culmination of a calculated strategy aimed at utilizing a dramatic event to change the economic structure of the Zionist movement and the rules of action in the Zionist movement and in the Yishuv itself.⁸⁵ The founders of the bank wanted the bank, rather than the Zionist establishment, to decide how to invest the donations of American Jews, according to certain economic criteria. They thought it was better to establish a commercial bank, which would ensure that funds were used correctly and efficiently, than to contribute directly to the Zionist Appeal. The bank would have enabled the Jews of the United States to take part in building Palestine through profit-oriented commercial activity conducted according to their preferences and under their supervision. The Zionist funds would have suffered, since most of American donations would have been channeled to the planned bank, and thus the leaders of the Yishuv in Palestine would have lost their ability to devise an independent economic policy that met their own priorities. The bank was supposed to work both through loans, and by controlling the financing of export and import between the United States and Palestine.

The Zionist movement and the Yishuv in Palestine had their own financial and business institutions, some of which had representatives in the United States.⁸⁶ These institutions could serve as instruments for business investments in Palestine. But the would-be founders of the American Zionist bank were not motivated purely by economic aims, but also by their desire to create a means of declaring their independence from the Zionist establishment, the world Zionist movement and the Yishuv in Palestine. This would have damaged the authority of the Zionist Executive, and would have created patterns of behavior that would have been difficult to change even with the establishment of a Jewish state. The disagreement within American Zionism about establishing the bank, the secrecy of the steps that led to its aborted founding, and the strong reaction of its opponents, attest to the fact that the leaders of America's Zionists were aware of their economic strength and the possibility of using it to influence the Yishuv in Palestine and the organization of the Zionist movement.

The bank affair is one event in a recurring pattern of efforts by American Zionists to institutionalize their economic power in order to change the structure of the world Zionist movement. There is a similarity between Brandeis' opposition to the founding of the Palestine Foundation Fund in 1921 and the efforts to establish a Zionist bank in

1940.⁸⁷ The Palestine Foundation Fund was established as part of the reorganization of the Zionist establishment, which itself was done in response to the challenges facing the Zionist movement after the Balfour Declaration; Brandeis had suggested establishing a different mechanism for collecting money that would be totally different from the Palestine Foundation Fund, a mechanism that would work in the American arena in particular and in the world arena in general.⁸⁸ The set of organizational guidelines that Brandeis suggested in the early 1920s and its projected effect on the structure of the Zionist movement were similar to those that guided Brandeis' loyalists in the American Zionist bank affair of the early 1940s. In both instances, the Americans aimed to establish a new Zionist economic institution, whose very establishment would damage both existing economic institutions and the authority of the Jewish Agency Executive by decentralizing economic activity. In both cases, the transfer of money from the United States to Israel would have taken place under guidelines that were more oriented towards the United States, i.e., through business-like considerations, not just donations. The change in the economic structure of the Zionist movement would have shifted authority from the Jewish Agency Executive to the American Zionist movement. The bank affair is one more in a series of attempts by American Zionists to gain greater control over the use of their money. The dispute over the Palestine Foundation Fund died down in the 1920s, when American Zionism was politically weak, and re-ignited in the early 1940s as America's Zionists grew stronger.

7. Brandeis' View of the Desired Structure of the Zionist Movement

As stated above, the economic activities of the American Zionists had aspects other than pure economics — they were a part of a wide-ranging political and social worldview regarding the desirable organizational structure of the Zionist movement and the status of the American Zionists in that movement. An examination of Brandeis' activities in the early 1940s sheds light on the constant debate within the movement and the ideological nature of a seemingly economic struggle.

The many parallels between Brandeis' activities in 1921 and the issue of the bank in the early 1940s are not coincidental. Brandeis and Kaufmann, the would-be founder of the bank, were close political allies. Kaplan himself pointed out the connection between Kaufmann and Brandeis. Kaplan described the new President of the Zionist Organization of America as a nice man, much sharper than he seemed at first, soft-spoken but strong-minded, a member of the National Executive of the Joint, and of scores of committees and institutions in the United States. Brandeis introduced him to the Zionist movement in 1916, but Kaplan described him as being quite unfamiliar with Zionist affairs. He was rich, and

Brandeis was the one who nominated him for the presidency. In fact, in Kaplan's view, Kaufmann epitomized the emergence of Americanism in the World Zionist Movement.⁸⁹

Kaplan noted that Kaufmann combined a tendency towards Americanization — that is, giving more rights to American Zionists and organizing Zionist activities in the United States and in the world according to an American perspective — with an intimate and deep knowledge of the American banking system on the other.⁹⁰ His monetary know-how and his closeness to financial circles would have given a boost to the fledgling Zionist bank. Moreover, the very idea of the bank was based on the principles of Americanization and the independence of the American Zionists, as well as the methods of raising capital and investing advocated by Brandeis and his followers, i.e., combining donations with business investments, decentralizing Zionist activities, and giving more authority to the American Zionists.⁹¹

Thus, there was a close connection between Brandeis and Kaufmann. Brandeis enthusiastically supported Kaufmann's nomination to the presidency of the Zionist Organization of America, and was involved both personally and through his associates in the entire process, from the time that Kaufmann was first offered the job, of galvanizing political support up to the election itself,⁹² which filled Brandeis with satisfaction and joy.⁹³ Brandeis and Kaufmann had similar views, both with regards to the appropriate position of American Zionists in the world Zionist movement, and with regards to the necessity for establishing appropriate economic institutions. Nothing exemplifies this relationship more than the similarity between Kaufmann's bank initiative and Brandeis' stand on the Palestine Foundation Fund. Establishing the bank would have fitted right into Kaufmann's overall worldview, which held that the American Zionists should act independently and establish an American organizational system, independent of the Jewish Agency Executive and uncommitted to working through it.

Kaufmann's opinions regarding the political balance of power in American Zionism is reflected in a letter written by Arthur Lourie, Secretary of the Emergency Council in the United States, to Joseph Lynton, Political Secretary of the Zionist office in London.⁹⁴ Lourie reported to Lynton that a great deal of the formal agenda and informal discussions at the 1941 Congress of the Zionist Organization of America in Cincinnati revolved around electing a new president to replace Kaufmann, who had to retire for medical reasons. Lourie was very satisfied with the election of Louis Lewental, a judge on the Pennsylvania supreme court, in Kaufmann's place. Lourie explained that Kaufmann's group was strongly supportive of plans aimed to give more independence to the American Zionists and to increasing the influence of the Zionists of America over the world Zionist movement politically and economically.⁹⁵

These plans were also the focus of Brandeis' activities, who in 1940 clearly expressed his opinion that American Zionists should be

independent.⁹⁶ Brandeis laid out four central points that were supposed to be the foundation for all Emergency Council and Zionist activities in the United States during the Second World War.⁹⁷ The starting point of Zionist activity in the United States must be a clear separation between international affairs and American affairs. In international affairs the American Zionist movement should be guided in some fashion by the Jewish Agency Executive and its representatives. On the other hand, in the American arena it should rely solely on itself and act according to its own judgment. Any activity aimed at the American public or at contacts with the American government must be conducted and initiated solely by the American Zionist organizations.⁹⁸

Brandeis emphasized that in order to clarify and prevent the interference of any non-Americans in Zionist activities in the United States, it was essential that formal contact with representatives and agencies of the American government would be conducted solely by citizens of the United States. This condition would have prevented representatives of the Jewish Agency Executive and its emissaries from acting in the United States even after spending long periods there. Thus, Brandeis used American citizenship as a tool to regulate Zionist activity. The decision of who would be allowed to act in the United States would be not in the hands of the Zionist establishment but would depend on a criterion that had nothing to do with Zionism, and would have given American Zionists a monopoly on policy in the United States by allowing U.S.-based Zionist organizations, rather than the Jewish Agency Executive, to direct and authorize activities there.

The wide range of authority that Brandeis sought for the American Zionists would have necessitated building an organized framework and formulating decision-making procedures. To that end, Brandeis suggested establishing a special committee to include representatives of the various bodies that made up the American Zionist movement. Another possibility was appointing the Zionist Organization of America as the body responsible for political work, which, in Brandeis' opinion, would have necessitated including the Hadassah organization in the World Zionist Movement decision-making apparatus.⁹⁹ Brandeis' blueprint for an independent Zionist organization with managerial abilities, not subject to the authority of Jewish Agency Executive, would have irreversibly lowered the status of the Executive in the United States and in the world Zionist movement.

Brandeis also tried to clarify the areas of responsibility of the American Zionist movement. In his opinion, the Zionists of America should assume responsibility for all Zionist activity in the United States, directing most of their efforts to the benefit of Palestine. He was aware that it was difficult to separate political activity conducted by American Zionists on the one hand, and Zionist activity which should be under the authority of the Jewish Agency Executive, on the other, but in his view, it was up to the American Zionists to decide what was within their sphere and what

they should pass on to the Zionist Executive or its representatives.¹⁰⁰ The scope of operations of the American Zionists, according to Brandeis, should be wide-ranging and include most Zionist activity in the United States.

Notwithstanding his formal separation between the political activity in the United States, which should fall under the auspices of the American Zionists, and international Zionist activity, which was supposed to be overseen by the Jewish Agency Executive, in practice Brandeis' approach placed all Zionist activity in the United States under the guidance of the local Zionist movement. He favored giving the American Zionists the authority to decide what issues they should deal with, which would have given them practically unlimited authority and damaged the legal standing of the Jewish Agency Executive.

In the special circumstances that marked the outbreak of the Second World War, a great deal of the political activity of the Zionist movement took place in the United States, including intensive contacts with various agencies within the United States government. Brandeis' suggestions vis-à-vis the responsibility of the American Zionist movement for political activity in the United States was part of an overall view that championed independent action by the American Zionists. If Brandeis' views had prevailed, the Jewish Agency Executive would have become a passive player in the American arena. Since the United States was crucially important for the Zionist political effort, and the American Zionist movement was central to the Zionist movement, this would have gravely damaged the World Zionist Movement and its ability to act. In particular, it is difficult to imagine what the standing of the Jewish Agency Executive would have been had the ability to decide how to use money collected in the United States would have been taken away from it, and if contacts with officials of the American government would not have been within the sphere of responsibility of the Zionist Executive.

Epilogue

The bank affair in particular and the economic struggles of the American Zionists within the framework of the overall Zionist movement in general, should be examined in the context of how the Jewish Agency Executive viewed the American Zionists. The head of the Zionist Executive, Ben Gurion, attempted to prevent a situation where the economic strength of the American Zionists would be transformed into unrestrained political might; in his opinion, money had no right to talk.

He resisted attempts by the American Zionists to initiate independent economic activity; he also opposed unification of the Zionist and non-Zionist Appeal in the United States, and the notion of dividing the funds raised according to a pre-set formula. Ben Gurion ignored the potential savings that could be gained through a united fundraising

campaign; instead, his primary consideration was the educational and political aspects of the Appeal and its utility as a major organizational tool that could have a critical impact on America's Jews. His aim, first and foremost, was to preserve the unique character of the "Eretz Israel" Appeal, as a Zionist rather than a philanthropic venture. He belittled fundraising for purposes other than Zionist settlement activities as being "philanthropic," unlike the Palestine Appeal that he saw as being a legitimate part of the Zionist enterprise.¹⁰¹

During the 1920s, the American Zionists practically forsook all political activity — as can be seen in their inability to influence how their money was used.¹⁰² Efforts by the American Zionists to change the organizational structure and the political framework that was established in the 1920s and that ensured American passivity were strongly resisted by Ben Gurion.¹⁰³ Ben Gurion was clear about his relationship with the American Zionists: Palestine first, America second.¹⁰⁴ Just as New Zealand and Australia and English-speaking in Canada look to England for leadership, although the government of England no longer rules them, so too should the Land of Israel be at the center for American Zionists.¹⁰⁵

Preserving the primacy of Palestine dictated an organizational structure that would ensure that the Jewish Agency Executive, and Ben Gurion himself, would maintain control over American Zionist institutions. The economic issue was central, because the Americans could have expressed their strength through the money they raised. Ben Gurion appreciated the political and economic benefits that the American Zionists provided the Zionist movement and the Yishuv in Palestine, but took care to build an infrastructure that would prevent American Zionists from utilizing their economic and political might to shape the Zionist movement and the Yishuv in Palestine. Menahem Ussishkin, chairman of National Fund, characterized the relationship between the Zionist movement and the American Zionists even more bluntly: "The American Zionists are a good Jewish community, a good cow, it is nice to milk it. But why do they sometimes kick the bucket?"¹⁰⁶ Thus Ussishkin highlighted the discrepancy between the usual image of the American Zionists as a passive "milk cow" and its transformation into a "kicking cow" from 1938 onwards, when the American Zionists started challenging the Zionist establishment to recognize and respect their role in the Zionist enterprise, policy, and agenda.

The struggle of American Zionists to assume a central position in the world Zionist began with the conflict between Brandeis and Chaim Weizmann. At the end of the First World War, Brandeis, as the leader of the American Zionists, tried to shape the world Zionist movement and the enterprise in Palestine according to his own worldview. Manifestations of this effort included his opposition to the Palestine Foundation Fund and his conflict with Weizmann, president of the Zionist movement. After his failure, the prevailing norms in the 1920s and 1930s were such that American Zionists by and large had to forego any attempt to influence

trends within the Zionist movement, but Brandeis' struggle was neither one of a kind nor an exception. The desire to shape the Zionist movement came up again and again from the late 1930s to the establishment of the State of Israel, which was catalyzed by the strengthening of the American Zionist movement. Ben Gurion's removal of Silver, the most important American Zionist leader of the time, from office in 1948 epitomized the decreasing political power among leaders of the American Zionist movement, though one can see elements of the same conflict in the relationship between American Jews and the State of Israel after 1948.

How to include American Zionists in the Zionist organization was a question that crossed the usual political lines and became a central issue in the political world of American Zionism and all its components. The struggle involved all sectors of American Zionism, not only bodies opposed to the Zionist establishment — though there were differences of opinion as to the degree of independence that American Zionists should pursue within the world Zionist movement. The attempts by American Zionists to overcome their passivity derived from their desire to influence the Zionist movement and the Yishuv in Palestine. They offered a general world view as to the central questions facing the Zionist movement: the relationship between the Yishuv and the future state on the one hand with the Jews of the Diaspora, the social makeup of the Jewish community in Palestine, the bureaucratic framework of the Zionist movement and the Yishuv in Palestine, the character of the Zionist democracy, and the methods of funding the Zionist enterprise on the other.¹⁰⁷ The American Zionist movement encompassed many different opinions regarding appropriate courses of action to establish a future Jewish state and the nature of that state. In spite of their political differences, the various groups were united by their unwillingness to remain passive participants in the Zionist political enterprise and their wish to shape it according to their worldview and using their political and economic might.

CHAPTER FOUR

GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH NETWORKS IN THE NEAR EAST AND THE EMERGENCE OF ARAB NATIONALISM (1899–1947)

SOTIRIOS ROUSSOS

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, new trends in the political thought of various Arab elites in the Near East emerged to become the forerunner of Arab nationalism. These trends accompanied significant political developments in the region, namely the transformation of the Ottoman Empire and the ascent of European influence on the Near East, which was mainly a result of the Russian Orthodox enterprise in the Levant, British domination of Egyptian politics, and the British and French Mandates in Palestine and Syria.

These developments had a considerable impact on the Arab Orthodox faithful of the Patriarchates of Jerusalem, Antioch, and Alexandria; most significantly, they contributed to the antagonism between the Arab Orthodox laity, which was seeking control over the affairs of the Patriarchates, and the Greek upper clergy, which was the dominant force of the Greek Orthodox Church in the Orient.

The Greek ecclesiastical hierarchy, for its part, never accepted these changes and developments, which occurred in the Orthodox Church after the fall of Byzantium and the emergence of various autonomous Churches in the Balkans. Alexander Schmemmann has pointed out that Greek upper clergy in both Constantinople and Jerusalem failed to incorporate these developments into their own Church worldview. On the contrary, they tended to identify the Greek Orthodox Church with

the Greek (national) Church, denying that other Orthodox Churches (Russian, Serbian, or Arab) were also essence components of the Greek Orthodox Church. This phenomenon was certainly not limited to the Greek upper clergy. During the nineteenth century, there were similar appearances of religious nationalism among the Slavic Church as well.¹

The first part of this essay is devoted to the emergence of new ideas among the Arab Orthodox Christians in Palestine, Syria, and Egypt. The article also highlights the formation of an Arab Orthodox communal identity in Palestine and Syria, as well as the economic and social strengthening of the Greek and the Syrian Orthodox communities in Egypt.

The second half focuses on the network of persons and institutions that shaped the attitudes of both the Greek Orthodox Church and the Greek State towards this new situation, namely the emergence of Arab nationalism and Arab Orthodox demands. Leading ecclesiastics such as Meletios Metaxakis, Chrysanthos Metropolitan of Trebizond, Germanos Metropolitan of Thyateira (Great Britain), Chrysostomos Papadopoulos, and a number of key positioned clerics in Constantinople, Alexandria, Athens, London, and Jerusalem made up this network. The members of the network by no means shared common political or ecclesiastical views. They had, however, reached similar conclusions vis-à-vis the Greek character of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchates in the Orient, they exercised considerable influence on the Greek Foreign Ministry and, to a great extent, they molded Greek foreign policy in the region until 1947.

Throughout the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the Patriarchates of Jerusalem and Antioch faced similar if not identical problems: the issue of lay participation in Church affairs, the Russian Orthodox influence prior to 1917, and the ascent of Arab nationalism in the Middle East. In virtually every patriarchal election from 1872 onwards, these issues surfaced and absorbed the interest and energy not only of the hierarchies of a particular Patriarchate but of a whole network of clerics and policy makers as well. During the period in question, the Patriarchates of Jerusalem and Alexandria were (and still are) administered by Greek hierarchies. The Patriarchate of Antioch (Damascus) was, from 1899, administered by an Arab Patriarch and an Arab majority at the Synod but retained its close affiliation with the rest of the Greek Orthodox churches.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the laity in all these Church organizations was demanding a larger role in Church decision-making, particularly in the areas of property, endowments, social welfare, and education. The Ottoman reforms of *Tanzimat* came to strengthen such demands and introduced measures that would curtail the preponderant role played by the Church hierarchy in the affairs of the religious community *millet*.²

This church "constitutionalism" led to modifications in the

Patriarchates' Regulations, which allowed the Arab laity a greater say in Church affairs such as the election of the Patriarch, the management of finances, and the administration of church endowments. At the beginning of the twentieth century, a tidal wave of church "constitutionalism" swept Jerusalem and Damascus, and later Alexandria. This movement had been preceded by similar demands for greater lay participation in the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Constantinople and the Armenian Orthodox Patriarchate.

This trend towards lay participation was reinforced by the Russian ecclesiastical influence in Syria and Palestine, the politics of Arab notables in the new regional environment, the demographic vigor of the Christian communities in the nineteenth century³ and the emergence of Arab nationalism, especially in the twentieth century. At the same time, Greek members of the Greek Orthodox hierarchy were vacillating between Greek irredentism and the new national center represented by the Greek state on the one hand, and the Patriarchate of Constantinople (the old center of the millet), on the other.

Church politics were closely linked with the regional antagonisms between Russia and the rest of the Great Powers as they strived for influence over the crippled Ottoman Empire. Russia dreamed of becoming the Orthodox Empire in the East, using as a vehicle the Orthodox Church and faithful in the Levant. The Pan-Slavists in Russia dreamed of a "great Greco-Russian Orthodox Empire," where all Orthodox nations would praise God in Hagia Sofia.⁴ Under the 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, Russia had already assumed the role of protector of the Orthodox population in the Ottoman Empire. However, progress towards domination over the Greek Orthodox was stalled by the influence of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which was tightly controlled by the Greek-Ottoman elite, the *Phanariotes*.

Russia turned its gaze towards the rest of the Patriarchates, in particular, the weak churches in Antioch and Jerusalem. From 1859, the Greek hierarchy in Constantinople and Athens had viewed the Russian enterprise in the Levant as closely connected to the Slavonic Benevolent Society's parallel activity in the Balkans. The Russians had been assisting native Orthodox Christians to develop religious, educational, and national institutions and thus distancing themselves from the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.

The first major defeat suffered by the Greek Ottoman elite in Constantinople was the election of Cyrillos to the Patriarchate of Jerusalem. Cyrillos who, was supposedly under Russian influence, moved his residence from Constantinople to Jerusalem, curtailing the control of the *Phanariotes* over the Church of Jerusalem.⁵ In 1882 the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society became the vehicle of the Russian enterprise in Palestine, which centered on building hospitals, hospices, and most important, schools that taught in Arabic as well as in Russian. At the beginning, the Pan-Slavist elements represented only a small fraction of

the founders of the Society. By the 1890s, the Pan-Slavists used their dominance in the Society to intensify their struggle against Greek pre-eminence in the Patriarchates of Jerusalem and Antioch, and to promote the Arab Orthodox intellectual revival through extensive publishing.⁶

The Greek hierarchy in Jerusalem and Constantinople exploited their contacts within the Ottoman bureaucracy and the Sublime Porte to thwart Russian influence. The eruption of nationalism in the Balkans and the decline of the Ecumenical Patriarch's influence among the Orthodox population prompted the Patriarchate of Jerusalem to come to an understanding with traditional notables and local Ottoman governors. Ali Ekrem Bey, Governor of Jerusalem from 1906–1908, was suspicious of the Palestine Society's activities and of Russian pressure on the Patriarchate of Jerusalem in general, and he readily assisted the Greek hierarchy.⁷

The Russian project found allies among the Arab Orthodox intellectuals in Syria and Palestine. After the establishment of the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, the Russians initiated a great educational operation. The society was created to achieve the main task, that is, to dissociate a significant part of the laity from the Greek Orthodox Patriarchates. As E. Kedourie pointed out, "...it was Russian efforts which made the quarrel between laity and clergy a definite and inevitable quarrel between Arabs and Greeks."⁸ The demand of Church constitutionalism was now transformed into Church nationalism. Along with the emergence of an as-yet unarticulated Arab nationalism, the ascent of an Arab Patriarch to the Throne of Antioch contributed to a similar formation of Greek national identity among the Greek-speaking Orthodox population of Cilicia, in Asia Minor. However this trend was neither widespread nor strong within the communities. While the young Arab Orthodox elite, educated in the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society's schools, was ready to break its ties with tradition as represented by the Greek upper clergy, the old notables remained loyal to this same clergy.

In 1908, the Young Turks Revolution gave new impetus to the political alliance between Arab Orthodoxy and Arab nationalism and to their common emancipation from the Greek Orthodox Church hierarchy. Moreover, during the first decade of the twentieth century, the first significant wave of Zionist immigration and settlement in Palestine raised considerable concern among the Arab Orthodox and led to the formation of a nucleus of anti-Zionist nationalist journalists in Palestine. The contribution made by members of the Arab Orthodox community in Palestine such as Najib Nassar and the al-Isa brothers to the success of a number of Arabic newspapers and magazines was most important.⁹

In 1908, Nassar founded the newspaper *al Karmil* while the al-Isa brothers started another leading Arab Orthodox newspaper, the Jaffa-based *Filastin*, which was to become the leading advocate for Palestinian-Arab nationalism. *Filastin* was the first voice to depict Palestine as a geographical and political entity distinct from the rest of the Arab lands, and contributed to the emergence of local nationalism (*wataniyya*) as a

movement parallel to pan-Arabism (*qawmiyya*).¹⁰ For Arab Christians, Palestine was the Christian Holy Land under the authority of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem. The anti-Zionist trend was also prevalent in the pages of *Filastin*, particularly since segments of the Arab Christian urban elite felt threatened by the Jewish economic and social enterprise, and were swayed by the anti-Semitic doctrine of their Catholic and Russian education.¹¹

Zionism did not have the same effect on the development of new elites in Syria and Egypt. Arabism, a counter-trend of Ottomanism and a forerunner of Arab nationalism, decisively influenced the thinking of young educated middle class Arabs in these countries. It flourished as a result of intense intellectual and journalistic exercises, including a major expansion of the Arabic-language press and dramatic discussions on how to revive the past glories of Arab civilization.¹²

The Arab Orthodox elites included new members of the middle classes — teachers, clerks, government officials, and businessmen. However, they remained a relatively restricted group and their inarticulate Syrian or Palestinian nationalism competed and overlapped with Arabism as well as with traditional religious, local, and family loyalties.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the emergence of young Arab Orthodox elites coincided with the weakening of old local and communal ones. The rapid introduction of new courts administering laws based mainly on Western models and staffed by personnel trained in Istanbul, as well as a secular school system, curtailed the power of the old Orthodox communal elites. These trends eroded first and foremost the authority of the traditional Greek Orthodox Church hierarchy. The resulting uncertainty led old Orthodox notables to attach themselves more closely to their communal organizations by acquiring a greater say in their affairs, thus reserving for themselves the role of protector of their distinct communal identity.

In Palestine there was always a split between the traditional Arab Orthodox leadership, which stressed communal identity and was mainly concerned with improving Orthodox education and welfare, and the radical young generation. The latter thought that Arab Orthodox demands for greater participation in Church administration would be best served through the Palestinian Arab national movement and the struggle against the Zionists and the British. Radical Arab Orthodox leaders became leading figures of Muslim-Christian associations.¹³ This radical group called for the complete "Arabization" of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate; to that end, they attempted to follow the ill-fated example of the "Turkish Orthodox" Church under the Kemalist regime.¹⁴

During the Second Arab Orthodox Congress, which was held in Jaffa in 1931, the radical Arab Orthodox succeeded in linking Arab Orthodox demands for a greater share in the administration of the Patriarchate to the mainstream Palestinian Arab national movement. They accused the Patriarchate of selling land to the Jewish Agency and of co-operating

with the Zionists against the Arabs, and declared that all the Arabs, Christians and Muslims alike, should struggle against the British, the Zionists, and the Greek upper clergy.¹⁵ In December 1931, despite the growing tension between Muslims and Christian Arabs over government jobs, the Pan-Islamic Congress, held in Jerusalem, congratulated the Arab Orthodox Congress for its nationalist stance.¹⁶

It seems, however, that as a consequence of the antagonism between the young generation and the old notables, the community failed to identify demands for Arab lay participation in the Patriarchate's administration with the Palestinian national movement. Khalil Sakakini, perhaps the most eloquent of the young Arabist generation of the Arab Orthodox, abandoned the fight against the Greek hierarchy, realizing that traditional views were much more widespread and influential than his own vision of "Arabizing" the Patriarchate.¹⁷ This division continued to split the community throughout the 1930s.¹⁸

In Syria, the identity of the Greek Orthodox community was more complex and multi-dimensional. They felt part of the Ottoman Empire and in 1912, Orthodox notables participated in the *Jam'iyyat Bayrout lil Islah al Watani* (Beirut Society for National Reform) which sought to re-define the relations between Turks and Arabs in the Ottoman Empire. The Orthodox communities of Damascus and Aleppo joined the initiative. However, the ascent to power of the Party of Union and Progress, which was hostile to decentralization, suspended these activities.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the Christian communities felt that on a spiritual level, they were part of the Eastern Orthodox world. They also saw themselves as indigenous people and hence Arabs or "Arabized" through history. Initially, some Christian Arab intellectuals deplored the decline of Arab societies and civilization, which was mainly due to non-Arab, Turkish, domination and called for an Arab quasi-secular revival.¹⁹

In the *Al Mahabbat*, the official review of the Arab Orthodox communal organization *Jam'iyyat Ta'lim al Masîhî*, the expressions related to identity included *watan* (homeland), *oummah* (community), *bilâd* (country), *soûriyyat* (Syria) or *'arab* (Arab), and were associated, at the same time, with the general term *al jâmi'at al 'outhmâniyya*, that is the Ottoman world.²⁰

The Greek Orthodox and Christian communities of Damascus were experiencing a sharp economic crisis. In the 1890s, political changes in the Ottoman Empire had deprived the Christians and the Jews of Damascus of their privileged status, which offered them protection by the European Consulates.²¹ Moreover, in 1888, the clash between Damascus and Beirut and most importantly the ascent of the latter's commercial elite, which included leading families of the Orthodox community, led to the creation of the Beirut province (*vilayet*). Acre, Nablus, Latakia, and Tripoli were now included in the province of Beirut, which served henceforth as their commercial, financial, and cultural center.²²

It was these developments and the subsequent uncertainty that prompted Orthodox Damascene traditional notables to take the lead in efforts to dethrone the Greeks from the ecclesiastical leadership of the Patriarchate of Antioch and replace them with Arabs. In doing so, they endeavored to take control of the communal pyramid. It is certain that the crucial involvement of the Orthodox notables of Damascus in deposing the last Greek Patriarch placed them in a dominant position, which they consolidated through the Regulations for the patriarchal election.

The major crisis in the Patriarchate of Antioch from 1928 to 1932 over the succession of Patriarch Gregorios, following his death in 1928, is a fine example of how complex such crises in the region were, and unveils the interwoven socio-economic and political factors behind them. It also provides insight into the political and social relationships between the Greek Orthodox Church and the community.²³

First, the crisis was seen as a product of the antagonism between the Orthodox notables of Damascus and those of Beirut. However this antagonism acquired a political character, and turned into a conflict between the Arabist Damascene notables and their rather pro-French Lebanese counterparts. The separation of the state of Lebanon from Syria as a result of the French Mandate gave Orthodox Beirut notables such as the Trad family more prominence. After the collapse of Emir Faysal's plans to establish an Arab Kingdom in Syria in 1921, the Lebanese notables preferred a compromise with the Mandate.

The absence of a protecting power explains in part why the Syrian Greek Orthodox turned to Arabism. France was always seen as the protector of Catholic interests in the Levant. The intensive interaction between Catholic circles and their political mainstay in Paris posed a threat to the Greek Orthodox, who had been left without similar protection after the collapse of Imperial Russia.

Among the younger generation of inarticulate Orthodox Syrian nationalists who had graduated from the Syrian Protestant College, there was strong opposition to the domination of both the Maronites and French culture.²⁴ They saw in the Church crisis an effort by the French Mandate to detach Lebanon from Syria. However there is no evidence that these new Orthodox Syrian nationalist elites actually played a significant role in the Church crisis. This intra-communal strife was primarily a controversy between Lebanese and Damascene notables, greatly exacerbated by factional feuds and family alliances.

In the case of Alexandria, Egypt, the Greek community was organized on a secular basis. Unlike other areas with a Greek presence, the Greek Orthodox Church in Egypt was neither the center of communal life nor its representative to the Egyptian state. Nonetheless, Greek Orthodoxy was an inseparable component of the community's national identity.²⁵ The ethnocentric dimension of the Greek Patriarchate was strong, and was institutionalized through decisive participation of the Greek communities in the patriarchal elections under the Regulations of 1900.

The controversy between the large Greek community and the much smaller Syrian community, which was one-tenth its size, was partly over the use of symbolic patterns of religion for ethnic identification. The Syrian demands were not related to the rise of Egyptian nationalism in the 1920s and 1930s. The Syrians were concerned more with Arab nationalism and in any case, they were not considered Egyptians.²⁶

Consequently, Church affairs became a battlefield between Greek and Syrian Diaspora nationalisms. While the Syrian community tried to win Egyptian support by stressing their Egyptian citizenship and Arab identity, the Greek community and hierarchy sought the protection of Britain and the Greek State.

The attitude of the Greek Orthodox Church hierarchy towards the above-mentioned developments in the Arab Orthodox communities was uniform and comprehensive. A group of higher ecclesiastics shaped this attitude and their guidelines dominated the thinking not only of Church leaders but also of policy makers in the Greek Foreign Ministry, since the relevant Directorate had neither expertise nor clear long and short-term goals vis-à-vis several issues. The affairs of the Greek Orthodox in Syria as well as the succession of Patriarch Damianos in Jerusalem illustrate the influential role that this group played.

The ecclesiastical group activated by Chrysanthos, Metropolitan of Trebizond, Chrysostomos Papadopoulos Archbishop of Athens, Germanos Metropolitan of Thyateira, and Patriarch Meletios Metaxakis formed a multi-centered network linking Athens, London, and Alexandria, with these four clerics at its head. The lower tier was comprised of ecclesiastics such as Nikolaos of Nubia, Nikolaos of Axoum, and Arsenios Kakoyiannis who prepared reports or undertook missions to investigate certain issues in the Orthodox Patriarchates, particularly in Jerusalem and Syria.

Chrysanthos Philippides graduated from the Theological School of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Halki in 1897 and studied further in Switzerland and Germany. He was ordained Metropolitan of Trebizond and from this post he undertook very important diplomatic missions. During the Paris Conference in 1918, Chrysanthos was the head of the Delegation of Black Sea Greeks, who were under Ottoman rule. The Kemalists condemned him for acting in favor of the establishment of an Armenian State federating the Armenians and the Black Sea Greeks, and he subsequently fled Turkey. He also worked for the re-establishment of the Georgian Orthodox Church and from 1926, was the delegate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Athens. In December 1937, he became Archbishop of Athens and all Greece.

Germanos was also a graduate of Halki. He too studied in Strasbourg and Lausanne and received his Doctorate from the University of Leipzig. In 1907, he became Director of the School of Halki. In 1912, he was consecrated Metropolitan of Seleukia and in 1922, was elected Metropolitan of Thyateira and Delegate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in

Western and Central Europe. He remained in that post for nearly thirty years, until 1951.

The greatest and most controversial figure was Meletios Metaxakis. He served in the Patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem and so had first-hand experience of the fierce struggle between the Greek clergy and the Arab Orthodox communities in both Syria and Palestine. He graduated from the Theological School of the Holy Cross in Jerusalem and in 1903, became Chief Secretary of the Patriarchate. In this position, he established thirty new schools and published several Greek-Arabic schoolbooks. In 1908, he opposed Arab Orthodox demands to control the Patriarchate and he was deeply involved in the attempt of the Holy Synod to depose the Patriarch of Jerusalem, Damianos. This attempt was aborted, and Meletios left Palestine to be elected Metropolitan of Kition in Cyprus. Closely associated with politicians, notably with Eleftherios Venizelos, he was elected Archbishop of Athens in 1918, following Venizelos' assent to power. Although the defeat of Venizelos in the elections of 1920 forced Meletios to resign, he was elected Ecumenical Patriarch in 1922. He confronted the Kemalist regime and proposed the transfer of the Patriarchate to Mount Athos. After the refusal of the Greek Venizelist government, he abdicated in 1923. Despite the opposition of the Greek dictatorship government, Meletios was elected Patriarch of Alexandria. He did not, however, manage to become Patriarch of Jerusalem, although he tried to do so on two occasions, in 1908 and 1935.

Last but not least, Chrysostomos Papadopoulos, Archbishop of Greece from 1923 to 1938, was also on the side of the Venizelists. He was a product of the Jerusalemite tradition, as he taught in the Holy Cross Theological School of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem. He had a genuine interest in the affairs of the Patriarchates in the Near East and he had strong personal views on how to preserve the Greek character of the Patriarchate. A great reformer of the Greek Church, he was rather at odds with the other reformist figure, Meletios Metaxakis, as the two engaged in a race for personal influence over the Greek Orthodox Church.

There were three main characteristics common to all these personalities. Firstly, they were closely associated with Greek politics and Greek irredentist ideology. Chrysanthos and Meletios in particular, were deeply involved in political developments during and after the Great War and they undertook missions which, although they seemed ecclesiastical, were in reality mostly political. For instance, Meletios' involvement in the negotiations over control of Mount Athos in 1913 and Chrysanthos' mission in Albania in the period 1926–1927 both had a distinctly political component. Less prominent ecclesiastics who belonged to the network also claimed associations with political groups. Archimandrite Arsenios Kakoyiannis in his reports to the Foreign Ministry stated that he was a staunch supporter of Venizelos. Their adherence to the national ideology of *Megali Idea* and their confrontation with the Turkish government may explain, to some extent, their position

regarding the preservation of the Greek character of the Patriarchates of Jerusalem and Alexandria.

Secondly, all three maintained close relations with the Anglican Church and used this relationship to safeguard the position of the Orthodox Patriarchates in the Orient. The relations between Orthodoxy and the Church of England date from the reign of the Patriarch Cyrillos Loukaris in the beginning of the seventeenth century, and these relations became closer in the early twentieth century. As a result of these close ties, the Anglo-Hellenic League in London included prominent members of both Churches. In 1925, Canon J. A. Douglas, advisor to the Archbishop of Canterbury on Near Eastern affairs, together with Charles Gore Bishop of Oxford,²⁷ the Bishop of London, the Bishop of Willesden, Germanos of Thyateira, and Archimandrite Constantine Pagonis, participated in the League's activities to support the Ecumenical Patriarchate against Turkish aggression.²⁸

Meletios also advocated close relations between the Greek Orthodox and Anglican Churches. He proposed not only co-operation with Anglicans but also a possible ecclesiastical union between the two bodies. This plan led certain French Catholic circles to portray him as a mere instrument of British policy in the Near East.²⁹ They were anticipating the formation of an improbable "pact" between Greek Orthodoxy and Anglicanism that would stand in opposition to France and Catholicism. The participation of Greek Orthodox delegates in the sixth Lambeth Palace Conference in 1920 and the London Conference between the Orthodox and the Anglican Church in 1930 were clear signs of the close ties between the two Churches.

Thirdly, the ecclesiastic network had developed a certain theory about the affairs of the Patriarchates and the Greek Orthodox communities. As revealed in reports and memoranda exchanged among the members of this network, they believed that a development in any single Orthodox Patriarchate would influence the position of the rest of the Patriarchates in the Middle East. This "domino theory" pervaded the attitude of Meletios in the Patriarchate of Alexandria, the reports of Nikolaos of Nubia and Kakoyiannis on the affairs of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, and the views of Chrysanthos and Germanos on the situation of the Greek Orthodox in Syria.³⁰ They also confounded the ecclesiastical conscience with the modern national conscience: that is, they tried "... to represent the modern Greek national conscience as identical with, and a continuation of, the Greek [Orthodox] 'national' conscience under Turkish domination."³¹

There is considerable evidence that a relationship existed between this Church network and the Committee for the Support of the Greek Church and Education. The Committee was set up by a Royal Decree of the Greek Government in 1893; its intent was to provide financial assistance, primarily to the Greek Church and communities in the still "unredeemed" lands of Macedonia, Epirous, and Thrace as well as Constantinople.³² The Committee was not restricted to the Balkans and Constantinople,

but also conducted its activities within the Greek Orthodox Church and communities in Syria and Palestine.

The Committee was a semi-autonomous body operated within and financed (through secret accounts) by the Greek Foreign Ministry.³³ As the Archives of the Greek Foreign Ministry reveal, from 1896 onwards, the Committee was privy to all diplomatic correspondence in the Greek Foreign Ministry and had considerable control over the decision making related to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchates and Church in the Orient and the Balkans. Most importantly, it financed the Greek Orthodox Churches and the above-mentioned ecclesiastic network. In the Orient, this financial support was mainly channeled to the Patriarchate of Jerusalem.³⁴

The Committee apparently operated until the end of the Balkan Wars in 1913, and recruited its Presidents and members from among prominent academics and members of the Greek parliament, such as Athanassios Kyriakos, Dionisios Stefanou, and Spyridon Lambrou.³⁵ They were all leading members of the National Society (*Ethniki Etaireia*) as well, the banner organization of the ultra-nationalist and irredentist movement in Greece, the actions and propaganda of which contributed to the outbreak of the Greek-Turkish War in 1897. To this group we can add Pavlos Karolidis³⁶ and Neokles Kazazes, professors at the University of Athens, who had strong views on the Greek character of the Greek Orthodox Church in the Near East, visited the Orthodox Orient frequently, and had contacts within the Patriarchates, particularly in Jerusalem.³⁷

The intersection between the ecclesiastic group and members of the Committee for the Support of the Greek Church and Education influenced the ideological basis of both groups. Their common ground was found in their unquestioning irredentist ideology and the struggle against "Slavonic domination," be it Russian or Bulgarian, as well as their suspicion of Catholic Church interests in the Levant. The unity and co-ordination among the four Patriarchates of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem was indispensable in allowing them to preserve the Greek character of the Churches in the Near East and particularly in the Holy Shrines in Palestine.

The election of an Arab Patriarch in Syria in 1899 came as a major setback for adherents of this line of thought. It was seen as a defeat and a sign of weakness of the Greek-Ottoman elite of the Patriarchate of Constantinople; it also prompted the Committee to coordinate the "battle" to bring the Church of Antioch back under Greek influence by providing financial support to those Bishops in Syria who favored the Greek domination of the Patriarchate of Antioch.³⁸

However, after its initial strong reaction, the Greek Church network developed a rather flexible approach towards courting the Arab hierarchy in Damascus. According to a "strategy paper" released by the Patriarchate of Alexandria, dogmatic unity and church coordination between the four Orthodox Patriarchates would be the primary objective. The use of other languages, i.e. Arabic, in the Church should be allowed along with the

Greek language.³⁹ It is evident that for the Greek ecclesiastic network, the dangerous enemy was not Arab demands and the emergence of Arab nationalism but first and foremost the Russian, or "Slavonic" as they called it, political and ecclesiastic influence.⁴⁰

The collapse of Czarist Russia in 1917, the creation of British and French Mandates in Palestine and Syria-Lebanon, and the rise of Zionism and Arab nationalism in the region radically changed the political environment. The focus of the ecclesiastic network now was not Russian-Slavonic influence but the increasing demands for Arab lay participation in the Patriarchates of Jerusalem and Alexandria and the French-Catholic threat to the Patriarchate of Antioch.

In August 1929, Archimandrite Arsenios Kakoyiannis sent a lengthy memorandum to Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, concerning the affairs of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem.⁴¹ It seems clear that the memorandum was received with interest by the Greek Foreign Ministry; in fact, certain ideas and perceptions contained in Kakoyiannis' memorandum are seen in subsequent guidelines issued by both the Greek Foreign Ministry and Greek diplomats in London and Palestine. The document may also represent the views of the Patriarchate of Alexandria and, in particular, Patriarch Meletios Metaxakis.

Kakoyiannis pointed out the threat posed by the demands of the Arab Orthodox community, firstly to take over the rights of the Confraternity in the Holy Shrines, and secondly to replace the Greek hierarchy with an Arab one, eventually "Arabizing" the Patriarchate. He went further and anticipated a rather improbable coalition between the Arab Orthodox and an assortment of other powers such as the Pan-Arabists, the Maronites and Greek Catholic Arabs, the Russian clerics who had remained in Palestine, and the Mandate authorities in Palestine — but not the Zionists. In his view, each of these powers had an interest in diminishing the influence of the Greek Orthodox Church in Palestine. Kakoyiannis suggested that since the situation had changed rapidly in the wake of the Great War, a compromise should be reached between the Greek Confraternity of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem and the Arab Orthodox community under a charismatic Greek Patriarch, i.e., Meletios Metaxakis. To safeguard the international status of the Confraternity as custodian of the Holy Shrines, Kakoyiannis proposed initiating close contacts with the Anglican Church. He explained that in terms of revising the status quo, the Anglican Church could confront Catholicism more effectively. However exaggerated or accurate this view might have been, its main framework and idea formed one of the dominant trends in the minds of Greek policy makers.⁴²

The ecclesiastic group continued to function as an informal decision-making group after the dissolution of the Committee for the Support of the Greek Church and Education, influencing the Greek diplomats and politicians and using Greek foreign policy in the Near East to advance their plans. For instance, Meletios, Germanos, and Chrysanthos were the

authors of many studies concerning Russian interests, Arab demands, the history of the Patriarchates, and the Greek Orthodox communities. They possessed a wide knowledge of the region and had tremendous insight into the internal affairs of the Orthodox Churches. Being in such an advantageous position, the "ecclesiastic network" could influence, sometimes decisively, developments in Middle Eastern Greek Orthodox communities.

To sum up, nineteenth-century Ottoman reforms and Balkan nationalist movements eroded the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople as head of the Greek Orthodox *millet* and destabilized his leading position among the Greek Orthodox Patriarchates in the Near East. Moreover, changes in the Ottoman state apparatus deprived the *Phanariotes*, the Greek bureaucrats of the Ottoman Porte, who constituted the mainstay of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the central Ottoman government, of their influence on the Porte's decisions. Imperial Russia, on the other hand, which had in previous centuries been seen as protector of the Greek Orthodox communities, was, in the nineteenth century, antagonistic to the preeminence of the Greek Church in the Levant.

By the end of the nineteenth century, a group of high-ranking Greek ecclesiastics, who shared a common educational background and were posted in centers of considerable political or Church importance, comprised an influential network that replaced the old basis of Greek hegemony over Greek Orthodox Churches in the Levant, i.e., the Ecumenical Patriarch and the *Phanariotes*. Thanks to its simultaneous presence in Athens, London, Alexandria, and Jerusalem, this ecclesiastic network was interconnected with political circles and groupings, which enhanced the network's influence on decision making in both the Church and the Greek state.

Most importantly, the network had a clear ideology and clear objectives. Its members were staunch Greek irredentists and ultra-nationalists. They all agreed that unity and close cooperation between the four Patriarchates was the only way to preserve Greek influence over them. Their main argument was the "domino theory." According to this theory, any adverse development in one of the Patriarchates would undoubtedly pull the rest out of the sphere of Greek influence. They emphasized the need to preserve the Greek character of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem and the Holy Shrines.

The network was facing the transformation of Orthodox communal elites and their demands for greater lay participation in the affairs of the Patriarchates of Jerusalem, Antioch, and Alexandria, as well as occasional calls for the "Arabization" of these Churches. The communities did achieve lay participation to a lesser (Jerusalem, Alexandria) or greater extent (Syria). However the split between the old Orthodox communal notables and the new Arab Orthodox nationalist generation did not lead to a considerable decrease in Greek influence over the Patriarchates until

1947. Even in Syria, where an Arab Patriarch headed the Patriarchate, the Greek ecclesiastical influence remained significant through the first half of the twentieth century.

The Arab Orthodox communal elites, divided as they were, without clear objectives and vacillating between Orthodox communal identity and Arab nationalism, proved to be much less effective than the Greek ecclesiastic network with its well-defined ideology, broad knowledge of the region, well-articulated methods and objectives, and international connections. The ecclesiastic network failed, however, to foresee future cataclysmic developments, signs of which were already present on the Middle Eastern horizon. The Arab-Israeli conflict and the 1948 war would mark the total collapse of this network among many other networks and loyalties that characterized the Middle East in the late nineteenth century.

CHAPTER FIVE

CENTER AND DIASPORA IN THE STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE JEWISH 'DESAPARECIDOS' IN ARGENTINA DURING THE MILITARY REGIME (1976–1983)

EFRAIM ZADOFF

Exactly twenty-five years ago, on March 24, 1976, Argentina — a country with a lengthy record of military coups beginning with its first uprising against democratic rule in 1930 — was once again the scene of a military *putsch*, the declared objective of which was “national reorganization” (in Spanish, Proceso de Reorganización Nacional). This came after an unsuccessful political effort to set the country once again on a stable political footing by bringing back aging leader Juan Perón from exile and reinstating him in the wake of his sweeping victory in democratic elections held in September 1973, when he received 62 percent of the vote. Upon Perón’s death, the presidency devolved upon his third wife, Estela Martínez de Perón (“Isabelita”), who had been duly elected to the vice-presidency.

Even during Perón’s final years, and after his death, right- and left-wing armed guerilla movements, as well as paramilitary forces, had opposed the government’s policies with sporadic violence. During 1975–76, Isabel Perón granted the armed forces freedom of action in many regions of the country to stamp out the guerillas, a task they had almost completed by early 1976. The coup d’état of March 1976 was a direct result of the

collapse of the Perón administration, and not a measure designed to end guerilla and terrorist activities. The ideological foundations of the new military regime — not unlike the one which ruled from 1943 to 1945 and tended to support the Axis powers during World War II — were nationalism and Catholicism. The constitution was amended, the federal and provincial legislatures were disbanded, and all activity by political parties and trade unions was outlawed.

However, unlike the dictatorship of the 1940s, this ruling junta instituted a cruelly oppressive regime that ruthlessly pursued those involved in opposition activities — whether actual or ideological — as well as their supporters, even those with whom they had only casual social contact. It was in this manner that the rulers intended to secure their regime and “reorganize” Argentina by reshaping the opinions of its citizens. The brutal tactics adopted by the authorities included systematic terror and intimidation against Argentine citizens. Persons aged fifteen and over were kidnapped and held in prisons and concentration camps, generally without their relatives having any knowledge as to their fate. The inmates were tortured, most of them were murdered, and their bodies concealed. Several of the kidnapped women were pregnant. The children born in captivity were illegally appropriated, at times by the very persons who had murdered their mothers.¹

This regime collapsed in 1983 as a consequence of the defeat suffered by Argentina’s armed forces at the hands of Great Britain in the hapless war declared over sovereignty of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. The new government, led by President Raúl Alfonsín, reinstated democracy and appointed a government commission of inquiry — Comisión Nacional Sobre la Desaparación de Personas (CONADEP) [National Commission to Investigate the Disappearance of Persons]. The report summarizing its findings was subsequently published in several languages, including Hebrew.²

This report, entitled *Nunca Más*, explicitly stated that the acts of oppression, torture, and murder had a definitely anti-Jewish dimension.³ On the basis of statistics collected by this commission, which were then processed by the Commission for Solidarity with the Families of the Murdered and made public in Barcelona in 1999,⁴ 1,296 (12.43 percent) of the 10,424⁵ victims known by name were Jewish. According to some estimates, the number of victims was much greater, but for various reasons there is no evidence of their identities or their fate. At the time, Jews accounted for only 0.6% of the Argentine population. Yet the number of Jewish babies born in captivity (21 of a total of 260 cases) is also disproportionately high. Thus, these statistics indicate that the Jews were particularly hard hit by the oppressive measures, having been victimized at a rate twenty times greater than their representation in the total population.

All those involved in studying this issue, including members of the government-appointed commission, have concluded that one reason for the exceptionally ruthless treatment meted out to the Jews was the fact

that the military and police forces, as well as the irregular forces that aided them in their repressive operations, were enthusiastic adherents of anti-Semitic and Nazi ideology.

During those years of military rule, relatives of the kidnapped, and many other persons who were being threatened by the powers that be, turned to diverse bodies for help, first and foremost to government authorities and to the courts, seeking their aid and requesting writs of *habeas corpus* to help them ascertain what had happened to their loved ones. Simultaneously, or as a second step, they addressed desperate appeals to international human rights organizations, including the United Nations,⁶ and to the governments of nations such as Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United States. These latter petitions were submitted by persons who had been born in those countries and immigrated to Argentina, or who were eligible for foreign citizenship by virtue of a blood relationship — *jus sanguinis*.

The manner in which these states responded is an important issue that, to the best of my knowledge, still awaits academic research. Recently, a number of Argentine army officers were tried in absentia in an Italian court for their crimes against Italian citizens, and a similar trial is being prosecuted in Germany. Worthy of mention in this context are the groundbreaking steps taken by a Spanish judge, Baltasar Garzón, who conducted an in-depth investigation of the matter, paying particular attention to actions conducted against Jews simply because they were Jewish. Justice Garzón issued international arrest warrants against the perpetrators of these crimes. Though he failed in his attempt to have former Chilean president Pinochet extradited to Spain, his efforts in this case encouraged the Chilean authorities to take legal action in their own country. The Mexican authorities have recently agreed to extradite Argentine Army officer Ricardo Cavallo, who was apprehended in Mexico after Garzón issued a warrant for his arrest.⁷

The Jewish victims, or their relatives, in addition to appealing to these same bodies, also turned for help to Jewish sources: the officers of local Jewish committees and especially to the DAIA — the umbrella organization of Argentine Jewry; American and world Jewish organizations, particularly the Anti-Defamation League, the American Jewish Committee, the World Jewish Congress, and the Joint Distribution Committee; and the State of Israel and the Jewish Agency. They beseeched these agencies for help in finding out what had happened to their loved ones, securing their release, and allowing them emigrate to Israel, or at least to extricate those who lived under immediate threat of imprisonment or worse from Argentina. In a joint effort, Israel and the Jewish Agency successfully rescued more than 500 Argentine Jews, undoubtedly saving many of them from much suffering, if not almost certain death. Those who view Israel's behavior with a critical eye claim that it did not rescue many others for political or economic reasons, and accuse Israel of being indifferent to the defense of human rights elsewhere.⁸

Israel's rescue operation was exceptional when compared with the efforts of various European and American countries. According to information made public to date, no other state rescued so many people from jail or gave refuge to so many whose lives were in danger. Furthermore, the lack of effort on the part of the governments of Germany and Italy aroused substantial domestic criticism.⁹ Moreover, the efforts of other nations were directed towards aiding their own citizens, or their descendants who were eligible to receive their parents' citizenship on the basis of *jus sanguinis*. In contrast, Israel's efforts were aimed at rescuing Argentine citizens who did not hold Israeli citizenship.

In practice, Israel provided refuge to oppressed Jews on the basis of the relationship that exists between the Jewish state and Jews everywhere, a relationship based on the nexus between the "center" and an ethnic, or even national, diaspora. The ideological foundation for this relationship is entrenched in Israel's Declaration of Independence, and was later given statutory authority in the Law of Return.¹⁰ One of the scholars who has explored this issue has censured Israel's use of this legal framework to legitimize the rescue of distressed Jews in Argentina; in his opinion, Israel is bound by its universal moral obligation under the Declaration of Human Rights to provide asylum to political refugees no matter who they are.

On one side of the controversy was the Jewish Agency Immigration Department's representative in Buenos Aires, Daniel Recanati, who demanded that the government confer the status of new immigrant on these refugees, thereby obliging them to serve in the Israeli armed forces immediately. On the other side were his superiors in Jerusalem and the officials of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Herzl Inbar and Ran Curiel, who wanted to issue temporary resident visas. After extensive discussions, the issue was resolved when Foreign Minister Mosheh Dayan and the directors of the Jewish Agency agreed to make the second choice available to those who requested it.¹¹

The controversy concerning the refugees' status is but one indication of the debate raging over whether Israel was prepared to rescue Argentine Jews in distress. At the center of this dispute was the question of whether these Jews — most of whom were estranged from Israel and Judaism in general, and some of whom even espoused fashionable, radical views that were hostile to Israel and sympathetic towards the Palestinians — deserved the efforts that Israel would have to expend to rescue them. On the basis of oral documentation (which still awaits confirmation from written sources), Yigal Allon and Menahem Begin were among those whose opinions tipped the scales in favor of rescuing oppressed Jews irrespective of their ideological inclinations. The story goes that Begin declared: "We shall contend with these people here in Israel just as we contend with members of Matzpen."¹² In Argentina, they are Jews like all the others." However, there is no written evidence to uphold the veracity of this anecdote.

Though the domestic controversy in Israel was resolved in favor of fulfilling Israel's obligation towards every Jew in distress, (on condition that he had not committed a crime or been involved in any act of bloodshed), some of the naysayers involved in the rescue operation tested the refugees' commitment to Israel by demanding that they complete their mandatory military service. Not surprisingly, some of those Jews awaiting rescue saw this as an attempt to humiliate them.¹³

As we have already intimated, the legality of Israel's intercession with the Argentine government on behalf of Argentine Jewish citizens was not cut and dried. It should be noted that among the victims in Argentina were two Israeli citizens — Mauricio Weinstein and Alejandra Jaimovich — who had emigrated to Israel at a very early age with their parents and lived there for about two years before returning to Argentina, still as minors. Despite their Israeli citizenship, Israel did not make special efforts to rescue them.

The intervention of the State of Israel in this issue has to be analyzed in light of its acceptance and legitimization by the three parties involved: Israel, the Argentine government, and the Argentine Jews (including both relatives of the victims and the victims themselves). The legal and moral right claimed by Israel to assume responsibility for the well-being of Jews holding foreign, i.e. not Israeli, citizenship has no basis in international law. However, international law does give every state the right to intercede in cases of serious human rights violations. Furthermore, in the 1970s, there was no legislation that explicitly codified Israel's right to exercise its obligation vis-à-vis Jews wherever they be. True, it may have been argued that under the Law of Return, every Jew was a potential Israeli, but this interpretation had never been tested in a court of law.¹⁴

Actually, this state of affairs changed only in 1994, when the Knesset determined that the Israeli penal code applies to anti-Semitic crimes committed against Jews outside the State of Israel. Amendment 39 to the Penal Code, 5754–1994, reads in relation to Paragraph 13(b) (2): "The Penal Code of Israel will be applicable to all crimes committed abroad against... the life, body, health, freedom, or property of a Jew because he is a Jew, or the property of a Jewish institution, because it is such." The amendment was unanimously passed by the plenum of the Knesset on July 25, 1994.¹⁵

The validity of this amendment has been controversial among Israeli jurists. Prof. Yoram Shahaar argued that it goes beyond the authority of the state, and that the defense of victims abroad should be limited to providing a refuge on the basis of the Law of Return. The opposite was argued by Professors S.Z. Feller and M. Kremnizer, who asserted that it is inconceivable that the State of Israel would not react to an anti-Semitic attack against Jews, for that would be morally unjust and a betrayal of the *raison d'être* of Israel as a Jewish state.¹⁶

A compromise position was taken by Dr. Mosheh Hirsh at a session of

the Knesset Committee on Immigration, Absorption, and the Diaspora that was held on July 3, 2000, at which the Justice Minister, Dr. Yossi Beilin, presented a considered opinion regarding the responsibility of Israel for the fate of its citizens and all Jews, wherever they be. Dr. Hirsh explicitly stated that international law does not grant Israel any special standing as a protector of the Jews. However, it does have the same standing as any state, which may intervene when another country is infringing upon basic human rights in relation to life, liberty, and property.¹⁷

Any discussion of the relevance of international law to this issue should not overlook the view of Prof. Irwin Kotler, then a member of the Canadian House of Commons (and since 2004, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada) who is an expert on international law and greatly involved in actions to safeguard human rights the world over. At that same session of the Knesset committee, which discussed several cases — Jews kidnapped by the Chechnyan rebels, Jews being tried in Iran on charges of espionage for Israel, and also the Jewish desaparecidos in Argentina — Kotler clearly expressed his view that even though there are some states, including Canada, which do not recognize Israel's unique standing in relation to the rights of Jews everywhere, most of the world does accept its exceptional right to intervene, as a state, in such cases. In his opinion, Israel's authority in these matters flows from its definition as a Jewish and democratic state.¹⁸

Two more arguments, in addition to those brought forward regarding the amendment to the penal code, were raised in Israel during the course of this debate over whether it was legitimate and necessary in such cases for Israel to fulfill the special relationship that it holds — or should hold — vis-à-vis the Diaspora:

A. The activities conducted by Israel on behalf of Diaspora Jewry should be subordinate to its economic and other interests. On many occasions, it was publicly claimed that Israel limited its intervention on behalf of the victimized Jews in Argentina out of concern for the important economic relations that it was then developing with the Argentine government. According to these sources, never corroborated by the Israeli government (as this documentation has not yet been made accessible to the public, but also never denied by official spokesmen), Israel was wary of the harm its policies could have on its exports of military equipment. According to international professional publications, between 1976 and 1981 Israel supplied Argentina with 13% of its weapons acquisitions, worth a total of \$150,000,000.

There are different opinions concerning how the special status that Israeli enjoyed in Argentina as a result of these sales could have helped it to favorably influence the fate of Argentine Jews. There are those who claim that this status led to the rescue of many Jews, while others contend that it was not sufficiently exploited. A third argument held that it would have been inexpedient for Israel to take advantage of its special status to

intervene on behalf of the kidnapped Jews, lest this be turned into a tool through which the Argentine authorities could apply pressure on Israel and threaten Argentine Jews should the sale of Israeli military equipment not meet their expectations.¹⁹

The Israeli government's responses to eight parliamentary queries posed to it between March 8, 1978 and March 4, 1985, by members of the Knesset with political orientations as diverse as Yair Tzaban, Yossi Sarid, Dror Zeigerman, and Geula Cohen were, for the most part, vague, did not supply any information, and were not real answers to the questions.²⁰ One can only hope that when the relevant files of the Foreign Ministry and the Knesset are made available to the public, the information they contain will either prove or disprove the various claims.

B. The other argument raised was that Israel should take no steps that would identify it with Diaspora Jewry. Official representatives of the Foreign Ministry both in Argentina and in Israel have publicly declared that the State of Israel only handles cases involving Israeli citizens and should not be responsible for the well-being of Diaspora Jewry in general. Those representatives have claimed that this view is compatible with the policy guidelines of the Government of Israel.²¹ But the fact is that these declarations contradicted statements made by government ministers and official government spokesmen on several occasions.²²

It seems that one of the sources for this attitude was the decision adopted in 1948 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the recently-established State of Israel to define new boundaries between the diplomatic activities of the State and the Jewish communities that help to found it. The new dispositions were aimed at preventing Jews, non-Israeli citizens, from becoming involved in Israel's political arena. This decision was designed to establish a clear boundary between Israel and the Jewish Diaspora: 1) only Israeli citizens are privileged to make political decisions in Israel; 2) the Jews of the Diaspora must be seen as loyal citizens of their own countries. The instructions disseminated to Israeli diplomats abroad at the time point out that, while they have to safeguard the security of Jews everywhere and fight anti-Semitism, they should avoid any interference in the internal affairs of their host country and make it clear that Israel's interests are different from those of Diaspora Jews, no matter how much they identify with each other.

Apparently the last instance in which a government minister reiterated Israel's obligation towards Diaspora Jewry was at the fore-mentioned session of the Knesset Committee on Immigration, Absorption, and the Diaspora, when Minister of Justice Beilin declared that even though Israel and Diaspora Jews in particular must beware adopting positions that could be misconstrued as dual loyalty (to the state in which they live and also to Israel), Israel's status as the state of the Jews — and not simply as a Jewish state — obliges it to deal with anti-Jewish attacks.²³ An opposing view held that Israel should do nothing to differentiate

between the Jewish people and other nations, nor should it strengthen the overt ties between itself and world Jewry on this issue; rather, Israel should lend its support to the families of Jewish desaparecidos who were demanding that their loved ones be given a proper Jewish burial on humanitarian grounds alone.²⁴

Despite the positive statements to which I have alluded concerning the responsibility of Israel for the fate of Jews wherever they be, it was only in 2000 — after incisive discussion of the issue both in Israel and in Argentina, and after the intervention of the Knesset Committee on Immigration, Absorption, and the Diaspora and its chairperson, MK Naomi Blumenthal, as well as that of Rabbi Michael Melchior, Israel's Minister for Social Affairs and the Diaspora — that the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Justice assumed responsibility for dealing with the issue in an organized and official manner. They acceded to the request of the Knesset to establish a special inter-ministerial committee on which the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Diaspora would also be represented. The committee was charged with investigating what had happened to the Jews of Argentina, and helping the relatives of the Jewish desaparecidos in their claims against the Argentine government. The establishment of this committee — even if it was too little too late — was undoubtedly Israel's way of acknowledging the nexus between the Jewish center and the Diaspora.²⁵

Until now, I have dealt with only one side of this issue — the views of and in the State of Israel. However, as already noted, there were two other protagonists that turned the question of the legitimacy of Israeli efforts on behalf of Argentine Jews into a triangular relationship: the Argentinean Jews and the government of Argentina. Argentine Jewry's recognition of the legitimacy of Israel's efforts became their *raison d'être*; the Argentine government's recognition of the nexus between the center and the Diaspora enabled Israel to materialize that connection overtly and legally.

Argentinean Jews were not united concerning Israel's obligation to deal with their problem, or the necessity — or even the possibility — of turning to Israel in their time of distress. Hundreds of Jews approached the Israeli Embassy during the period of military rule, requesting help in locating missing relatives, or in spiriting those who were in real or imagined danger out of Argentina. However, it is difficult to ascertain how many Jews chose not to approach the embassy. We know for certain that among the thousands of missing persons there were at least 1,180 Jews whose identity is known, but we do not know the exact total number of Jews who were victims of the oppression. On the other hand, the Archives of the State of Israel contain documents listing close to 500 names of disappeared people, most of them Jews, that were submitted to the embassy and Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir.²⁶ These lists included about 300 cases presented directly to the embassy by parents and relatives, and some 200 derived from community institutions like

DAIA and AMIA, other embassies in Buenos Aires, and organizations abroad such as the Anti-Defamation League and Amnesty International.²⁷

It is almost certain that other Jews applied to the embassy for help: what is beyond a doubt, however, is the fact that the majority of Argentine Jews who were arrested or under the threat did not turn to the embassy for any sort of assistance.²⁸ In any case, members of the Embassy staff have testified that some of the Jews they visited in jail declined Israel's offer of refuge, an offer that would have secured their release.²⁹ The reason for their refusal was in all likelihood ideological — a rejection of all connections with Israel. At a later stage, some relatives claimed that Israel was taking an interest only in the fate of Jews, and not in what happened to all the missing persons irrespective of their ethnic origin.

Despite the ambiguity, it is clear that hundreds of families felt that there was a unique bond between them and the State of Israel, and when they believed they were not being treated appropriately, they protested to internal Argentine Jewish frameworks, to persons in the Israeli government and the Knesset, and also publicly, in the Argentina and Israel press. The latest example is an open letter to the press published in Argentina in November 1999 under the title: "Why is There No Israeli [Judge] Garzón?"³⁰ It was the activism of the relatives of disappeared Jews, who in Israel established "Memoria — In Memory of the Missing in Argentina," and in Argentina the Asociación de Familiares de Desaparecidos Judíos en Argentina — AFDJA (Association of Relatives of Disappeared Jews in Argentina), that led to the establishment of the Israeli Inter-Ministerial Commission and forced the government to recognize the legitimacy of the connection between center and Diaspora, and turn into from declarations alone into concrete action.

The third apex of the triangle is the least problematic from the viewpoint of granting legitimacy. To the Argentine authorities, apparently, it was only natural that Israel should intervene (whenever it did) for the well-being of Argentine Jews. Whenever Israel secured prisoners' freedom, it was done on the basis of Paragraph 23 of the Argentine constitution which gives the state the authority, in times of emergency, to annul the civil rights guaranteed by the constitution. Under such conditions, the president of the state may "arrest persons and transfer them to various places in the state, this on the condition that they [the arrested] do not express a preference to leave Argentina." There were cases as early as 1975 in which Jews were able to free themselves by using this clause in the constitution in order to leave for Israel. This was after their requests for asylum in other Latin American countries, the United States, and Europe were turned down.³¹

This possibility ("opción" or option) of being freed from jail by virtue of having a foreign visa was conditional on the approval of the military authorities. Some 12 embassies in Buenos Aires issued visas to people wishing to leave Argentina, but the Israeli Embassy had more visas authorized (57) than most.³² This may be attributed to the fact that the

majority of Argentineans consider Israel to be the motherland (*Madre Patria*) of the Jews, as they consider other immigrant groups that comprise Argentine society to have motherlands in their native countries, despite the fact that the Jews arrived in Argentina long before the creation of the State of Israel.³³ Furthermore, the junta held the anti-Semitic view that Jews controlled American politics, and hoped to have some influence over them as they passed through the Israeli embassy.³⁴

According to journalist Marcel Zohar, during an interview with General Harguindeguy, then Argentina's Minister of the Interior, the general presented a rather strange argument justifying the government's actions. He claimed that the Argentina authorities felt "safer and sounder in issuing exit permits to Israel, because they know that the political situation in Israel will not enable [the emigrants] to engage once again in harmful political action." Therefore, he declared, they permitted more people to emigrate to Israel than to any other country.³⁵

I do not think that these explanations completely clarify matters. Better reasons for explaining why Argentine Jews were the subject of special treatment in the sphere of emigration, and not only in the torture chambers, can and should be sought in Argentine archives and oral testimonies. Perhaps there is something to be said for the idea that the regime's anti-Jewish attitude was at the bottom of the riddle: the emigration of Jews to Israel allowed Argentina to rid itself of them forever.

Epilogue

The foregoing discussion takes for granted the existence of the State of Israel as a center to which the rest of the Jewish world, perceiving itself as a Diaspora, gravitates. However, international Jewish communities are extremely heterogeneous, existing across the spectrum of political, economic, cultural and geographical milieu. They all face different challenges and they do not share a common attitude towards the State of Israel as a Jewish center.

Today, after half a century of attempts to define the relationship between Israel and the Jewish Diaspora, there is still not one single, accepted worldview. All of the contradictions and issues may never be resolved, nevertheless, a discussion about this relationship and a clarification of Israel's official attitude towards the Jewish Diaspora is still warranted. Such a discussion must encompass not only a debate over the scope of the Law of Return, but also a definition of the responsibility of the State to ensure the safety and welfare of Jews everywhere.

The events that I have described, the discussions and controversies that developed around them, and the relationships among the three protagonists of this drama dramatically illustrate the vacillation of world Jewry when it comes to formulating the relationship between the center

and the Diaspora, within the fabric of each party's regional relations and national and global interests. I referred only to the three apexes of the triangle and their contribution to the development of the unique relationship between the center and the Diaspora. However, there are other players that influence this process.

Understanding these developments demands a broader perception that should consider at least two other relevant aspects:

- 1) A comparative perspective of the attitude of other ethnic-cultural communities such as Italians, Irish, Japanese, Spaniards, etc., and their efforts and readiness to offer emergency assistance to members of their émigré community; and
- 2) A certain worldview, based on more than legal niceties, vis-à-vis the unique relationship between the State of Israel and Jews in the Diaspora.

CHAPTER SIX

JEWISH DIASPORA AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF ISRAELI SOCIETY

DANIEL GUTWEIN

1. The Ethos of Diaspora Negation

The negation of the Diaspora (*shelilat ha-golah*) is one of the fundamental principles of the Israeli hegemonic ethos as it was constructed, primarily, by Labor Zionism; it was based on the assumption that the negative political, socioeconomic and cultural conditions in the Diaspora — in liberal no less than repressive countries — endangered Jewish existence physically and corrupted it morally. Negation of the Diaspora as a counterculture reflects and delineates the essential underpinning of the Zionist agenda, which calls for the normalization of Jewish existence through the territorial concentration of the Jewish People in the Land of Israel; the reestablishment of Jewish sovereignty there; the development of a productive occupational infrastructure; the elimination of Diaspora cultures, especially Yiddish, and their replacement with the emerging new, secular Hebrew culture; the creation of a melting pot where Hebrew would be transformed into the dominant culture; and the eradication of the ghetto mentality with its inherent psychological and moral flaws through the construction of a “new Jew” — in the tradition of the *fin du siècle* European “new man” — embodied in the hybrid figure of the native Sabra.¹

Since the 1980s, though, as part of the post-Zionist campaign against Zionism,² the ethos of Diaspora negation as a fundamental article of Zionist ideology has been challenged and become a target of pointed criticism. The post-Zionists’ critique perceives the negation of the Diaspora as just another proof of the oppressive nature of Zionism in

general and of hegemonic Labor Zionism in particular. The post-Zionists point to its alleged repressive ramifications on Zionist ethos, policies, and practices, and use it as an argument for their principled negation of Zionism as a whole.³ The contempt inherent in the Zionist attitude towards the Diaspora Jew, the post-Zionists argue, set the stage for the indifference shown by the Zionist leadership during the Holocaust towards the tragedy of European Jewry.⁴ This lack of concern, however, did not preclude the Zionists from cynically exploiting the victims' memory and the survivors' plight to manipulate international public opinion in support of the Zionist agenda — the establishment of the Jewish State.⁵

The negation of the Diaspora, the post-Zionists argue further, proved to be a catalyst for some of the more repressive features of Israeli policies and practices. It reared its head through the negation of the national identity and rights of the Palestinians, an attitude that legitimized their ethnic cleansing during the 1948 war and the creation of the refugee problem. Likewise, it fostered continuous state discrimination against those Palestinians who remained on their land and became Israeli citizens.⁶ The Israeli establishment, according to the post-Zionist critique, further used the negation of the Diaspora to exclude different groups of Jews, defined by their ethnicity and ideology, most notoriously those of Oriental origin. The "melting pot" policy was enforced, compelling Oriental Jews to renounce their culture and identity while adopting the hegemonic one; in this way, they were stripped of their symbolic capital and subjected to a constructed inferior status.⁷

At the same time, the post-Zionists cultivated the inverse attitude, one that glorified the exile (*golah*).⁸ Blurring its discriminatory and oppressive aspects, they posited the Jewish diasporic history as the ultimate experience of otherness, one that heralded an ideal multicultural symbiosis and recognition of differences. Thus, in juxtaposition to the Zionist negation of Diaspora, the post-Zionists advanced a sort of fascination of the Diaspora, based on an imagined nostalgic diasporic experience. However by the 1980s, when the post-Zionists launched their critique, Israeli society, as Anita Shapira has indicated, "ha[d] gradually retreated from the idea of negating exile, to the point of rendering it an anachronism."⁹

Moreover, the Israeli Zionist mainstream had also begun to reconsider and revise its views towards the negation of the Diaspora.¹⁰ This revision did not involve a renunciation of the assumptions and consequences of this concept, but it did point out that changing historical circumstances had rendered it irrelevant in many ways. The mainstream revision argued that the "old Diaspora" with its repressive nature — that had been discredited by the negation of the Diaspora — no longer existed, and a completely different Diaspora, that might be labeled a "new Diaspora," had emerged. The Holocaust, the establishment of the State of Israel, the process of global decolonization, and the collapse of the Soviet Union

with all their demographic and political ramifications, had, in practical terms, liquidated the "old Diaspora." In the "new Diaspora" — that included the established Western communities alongside the new ones in the former Soviet bloc — Jews no longer suffered from the civic, political, economic and social exclusion and discrimination that had characterized the "old Diaspora" in Eastern Europe and the Moslem world, or the pressure to assimilate that had been so pronounced in the West.

Rather, in the "new Diaspora," enjoying equal legal and civic rights, Jews were fully integrated into non-Jewish societies. They were free to cultivate their Jewish culture and identity, a process that was only strengthened by fighting anti-Semitism at home and abroad, struggling for the rights of distressed communities — key among them Soviet Jewry — and identifying with Israel. Another striking feature of the "new Diaspora" was the gradual growth of large communities of Hebrew-speaking emigrants from Israel, who had once been morally reproached as deserters, but beginning in the 1990s, were increasingly accepted as "Israelis living abroad."

The perfect model of the "new Diaspora" is the Jewish community in the United States, which has developed into a political, social, and cultural power in its own right and, by helping to secure American political and military support, has turned into a strategic asset for Israel. The new equilibrium that has arisen between Israel and the Diaspora — principally the American Jewish community — has been reflected in a gradual change of attitude in the Zionist mainstream, which began to accept the Diaspora as a legitimate and viable form of Jewish existence. Consequently, it perceived the concept of the negation of the Diaspora as irrelevant in the new circumstances and called for an ideological reconceptualization of the mutual relations between Israel and the Diaspora.¹¹dy

The simultaneous rejection of the concept of Diaspora negation by the post-Zionists on the one hand, and by the Zionist mainstream on the other, is notable in view of the acrimonious and principled struggle that has been waged between these rival ideological factions over Israeli public opinion since the 1980s. The alternatives to negation of the Diaspora offered by the post-Zionists and the Zionist mainstream differ markedly in orientation: The post-Zionists morally reproach the negation of the Diaspora, pointing to its repressive implications for Zionist and Israeli ideologies and policies regarding Jews and Arabs alike; the mainstream, on the other hand, while acknowledging its positive role in the past, emphasizes that negation of the Diaspora has become irrelevant due to historical developments. The post-Zionists imbue the concept of Exile with positive elements and consider the rejection of Diaspora negation as a step towards the emancipation of Israeli society from Zionist repression and towards a non-Zionist multicultural state; the mainstream, on the other hand, believes that the attitude towards the Diaspora requires modification in light of the changing circumstances of Jewish existence.

However, in the context of the bitter struggle waged between the

post-Zionists and the Zionist mainstream, their shared rejection of Diaspora negation — despite the opposing arguments that inform it — seems to contradict the accepted rubrics that delineate the standard Israeli ideological discourse. This is particularly true with regard to the Zionist mainstream. The post-Zionist critique of Diaspora negation is quite obvious in view of its principled opposition to Zionist ideology, policies, and practices; in contrast, the Zionist mainstream denunciation of Diaspora negation that was voiced in the course of its struggle with the post-Zionist faction — even if from a different perspective — might seem to be self-defeating. The ideological paradox that shaped the joint and simultaneous rejection of Diaspora negation by both the post-Zionists and the Zionist mainstream will be analyzed below in the context of the fundamental socioeconomic transformations Israeli society has undergone in the past three decades with an emphasis on the profound political and cultural ramifications of the privatization revolution.¹²

2. The Post-Zionist Critique

An outstanding example of the post-Zionist critique of the idea of Diaspora negation is a two-article series by Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin which appeared in *Theoria u-Viqoret* (*Theory and Criticism: An Israeli Forum*), a periodical with a distinctive post-Zionist orientation.¹³ Raz-Krakotzkin argues that

“negation of exile” is the central element of the Zionist myth and ideology, signifying the Zionist concept of history and the Zionist image of the present. As such, it directs the various aspects of Israeli-Zionist culture and determines the boundaries of political discourse as well as the limits of collective memory.

The concept of exile has played an essential role in traditional Jewish self-definition, Raz-Krakotzkin emphasizes, and this “explains the exceptional difficulty of the Zionist attempt to define Jewish identity in national terms.” The negation of the Diaspora culminated in the “normalization” of Jewish existence, by shaping the image of the “new Jew” and consequently it “demanded cultural uniformity and the abandonment of the different cultural traditions through which Jewish identity has previously been determined.” Raz-Krakotzkin further argues that the Zionist self-definition through the negation of the Diaspora meant the negation “of the basic concept of Judaism” and the construction of “a nationalist narrative of Jewish history that implies an active rejection of the critical import of traditional Jewish terms.”

Raz-Krakotzkin repeatedly underscores “the oppressive role” exerted by the negation of the Diaspora “over various aspects of Israeli culture” and the emancipatory potential that could be realized by articulating

and developing "the cultural options that can be found in the concept of exile itself." To this end, he uses Walter Benjamin's critique of the positive concept of history, based on the modernist idea of progress, an idea that informs Zionist historiography as well. According to Benjamin, the positive concept of history "ignores the memory of the oppressed" and as such "serves the ruling classes." Instead, he suggests a practice of remembrance that uncovers "the memory of the victims of the past, since their oppression is still part of the construction of the present." Juxtaposing Diaspora negation with Benjamin's critique, Raz-Krakotzkin calls for "a Benjaminian turn in Jewish historiography," the beginnings of which, he maintains, can be seen in the works of a group of Israeli "revisionist" — post-Zionist — historians.

Theory and Criticism continued the discussion of Diaspora Negation with the publication of a Hebrew version of "The People of Israel Has No Motherland: On the Place of the Jews," by Daniel and Jonathan Boyarin,¹⁴ who dedicated their article to Marek Edelman, a member of the anti-Zionist, Socialist Bund party and the living symbol of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising. The Boyarins declare "Diaspora and not monotheism ... may be Judaism's most important contribution to the world". Accordingly,

For those of us who are equally committed to social justice and collective Jewish existence, some formation other than territorial Zionism must be constituted. We suggest that an Israel that reimports diasporic consciousness, which shares space with others and is devoid of exclusivist and dominating power, is the only Israel that could answer the calls ... for species-wide care without eradicating cultural differences. Revising A. B. Yehoshua's famous pronouncement that only in a condition of political hegemony is moral responsibility mobilized, we argue that the only moral path is the renunciation of Jewish hegemony *per se*.

While they admit that "the profundity of Jewish attachment to the Land of Israel cannot be denied," they insist that "the traditional Jewish attachment to the Land provides a ... critique of identities based on notions of autochthony." In Judaism, they argue, the memory of the place took precedent over the place itself, and

continuing this impulse, a privileging of Diaspora is proposed — a dissociation of ethnicities and political hegemonies as the only social structure that begins to make it possible to maintain cultural identity in a world grown inextricably interdependent.

Like Raz-Krakotzkin, the Boyarins too seek to reproduce the essence of diasporic existence in Israel. As a possible model for such existence, they point to the ultra-Orthodox *Neturei Qarta* (the City Guardians) who define themselves — in a statement they issued as members of the Palestinian

Delegation to the Middle East Peace conference held in Washington, D.C. in 1992 — as “Palestinian Jews” who are concerned “with the safeguarding of the interests of the entire Jewish nation.” The Zionists, according to *Neturei Qarta*, had rebelled against “the divine decree of exile” by establishing the State of Israel and expropriating the land from the Palestinians, its indigenous inhabitants. It seems that for the Boyarins, *Neturei Karta* are not only a living example of resuscitating the diasporic life and ethos in Israel, but also — in contrast to Zionism — the epitome of true Judaism, combining spiritual-cultural self-definition, affirmation of the Diaspora, and negation of Jewish sovereignty and statehood.

Raz-Krakotzkin and the Boyarins use the critique of Diaspora negation to draw political, social, and cultural conclusions regarding the contemporary Israeli situation. The diasporic approach sets the necessary ideological basis for loosening the yoke of “Zionist oppression” from both Jews and Palestinians, and turning Israel from a “Jewish and democratic” state into a multicultural “state of all its citizens,” in accordance with the post-Zionist *weltanschauung*. In this spirit, Raz-Krakotzkin points out that Diaspora negation has had an oppressive affect on different groups in Israeli society, mainly on Holocaust survivors, Oriental Jews, and the Arabs.¹⁵ Adopting “the concept of exile,” he claims, “can direct us towards a pluralistic approach to Jewish collectivity in Israel” that will advance the emancipation of these groups.

In this way, Raz-Krakotzkin’s diasporic ideology links the two major Israeli discussions: the Jewish-Israeli identity problem and the Jewish-Palestinian conflict. The Zionist attitude towards the Palestinians is for him the most significant consequence of the negation of the Diaspora: it is used to justify oppressive Israeli policies and practices that culminated in the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem; and it informs the construction of an Israeli collective memory characterized by “total ignorance of the Palestinian tragedy”¹⁶ — prevailing also in “so-called ‘leftist circles’” — that reproduced itself in the legitimization of ongoing repression, discrimination, and exclusion of the Palestinians, both those who live under Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza and those who are Israeli citizens. In contrast, by overcoming the hegemonic Zionist concept of negation of the Diaspora and by developing a positive “use of the concept of exile,” it becomes possible, according to Raz-Krakotzkin, to “suggest a different approach to Jewish collective identity.” Thus,

By using the Jewish “exilic” conception rejected by Zionism, we can give value to the bi-national character of the land and to the concrete culture of the others inhabiting it — namely Palestinian identity and Palestinian memory. The exilic approach (from the Jewish point of view) means remembrance based on the Palestinian point of view. The concept of exile is thus a necessary step towards the development of a bi-national ethic.

The Boyarins, too, put forward the vision of Israel as a bi-national, secular, and multicultural state. They maintain that Israel should cease to be a Jewish state, repeal the Law of Return, and renounce the cultural practices that make it a Jewish state, recognizing instead individual and collective rights. Thus, the Jews will reproduce in Israel a diasporic condition, with its built-in creative tension.¹⁷

The diasporic ideology has been further promoted since the mid-1990s by Ilan Gur-Ze'ev, who provides its most developed version.¹⁸ He criticizes the "last hundred years' attempt to turn away from the Diasporic Jewish goal by the Zionist barbarization of the Jewish Spirit within the projects of 'annihilating the Diaspora,' 'homecoming,' and 'normalization'," that have turned the Israelis into "doomed victimizers." Diasporic life is, he explains,

an ecstatic way of moral life, an existence that allows a universalistic moral responsibility and intellectual commitment to overcome any dogma ... and reject the promises of mere power, glory and pleasure. All this has changed in face of the successes of Zionist education and its political realization.

Gur-Ze'ev believes that "the Zionist negation of the Diaspora is a turn away from Jewish moral destiny" and its realization has turned Israel into the "the Sparta of the wicked," in which the Palestinians are victimized to such a degree that even the Israelis "cannot bear the burden of such guilt feelings." The Zionist nation-building project has become "a present-day 'Egypt'" that warrants "a new exodus" from Israel to the Diaspora, which is "the genuine 'Zion'," and it is here "that redemption and Diasporic existence meet." Gur-Ze'ev preaches the Israeli self-initiated new exodus to the Diaspora both literally and metaphorically.

On one hand, he points to the need for "a self-initiated Jewish displacement and for a Diasporic way of life" to be accompanied by a Diasporic counter-education that would "prepare our children for a worthy life in external exile." On the other hand, he emphasizes that counter-education in contemporary Israel should serve as preparation for "not only the exodus from Zionism and the State of Israel but, what is even more important, the possibility of Diasporic life in Israel itself."

Gur-Ze'ev's Diasporic project has two prominent sociological traits: He directs it to the Israeli middle classes and it is of a remarkably individualistic nature. Thus, he maintains that "history insists already now on self-initiated displacement as a nomadic way of life for the better-off Israelis who can afford fleeing, accompanied by big capital that learns the way from Israel Westward, after more than one hundred years of paving the way from the West to Israel."

Gur-Ze'ev's Diasporism has an unmistakably individualistic anti-collectivist nature. The "special Jewish mission," he argues, was made possible by "a Diasporic existence as a realized ideal of a community

that is not a collective" composed by individuals "not in the liberal terminology." Accordingly, "genuine Diasporic philosophy is never to be reduced to any kind of collectivism, and as a counter-education it cannot avoid being nothing more than an open possibility for the individual, only for the individual and by the individual." And it is in the individual, Gur-Ze'ev concludes, that "redemption and Diasporic existence meet." In this way, Diasporism is unveiled to be no more than the gospel of individualism, an ideology that strives to reconstruct Israeli social reality to fit the interests of an emerging new class of "better-off Israelis" whose material basis is not the nation state with its ethnic struggles, but the global market.

The idea of re-establishing diasporic conditions in Israel is the object of a pointed critique by Yoav Peled, himself a post-Zionist, and like Raz-Krakotzkin a member of the editorial board of *Theory and Criticism*. In his article "Luxurious Diaspora: On the Rehabilitation of the Concept of Diaspora in Boyarin and Raz-Krakotzkin,"¹⁹ Peled discusses the criticism of Diaspora negation and the implications of nostalgia for the diasporic ethos on contemporary Israeli and American-Jewish politics. He considers their efforts to resuscitate the "diaspora as a principle of Jewish identity in Israel and abroad" as "both futile and dangerous." Their diasporic nostalgia, Peled indicates, is above all ahistorical: the Jewish Diaspora was intertwined into the medieval corporate system, and it was the modern state — that emerged with the downfall of feudalism and the rise of capitalism — and not Zionism, that brought the diasporic order to its end.

While disputing Raz-Krakotzkin's arguments, Peled notes the importance of his contribution in turning the Diasporic option into a critical perspective for reconstructing Jewish-Palestinian relations. On the other hand, Peled regards the Boyarins' analysis as pretentious and devoid of any analytical value. He rejects their definition of Jewishness as essentialist, and their concept of Jewish diasporic identity as "a meaningless concept." The Boyarins' analysis, Peled claims, "cannot be a basis for a critique of Zionism" because they share the basic Zionist assumption that perceives emancipation as the origin of "the problem of Judaism." This proximity, he continues, weakens their critique of Zionism, makes it ambivalent, and turns it into simple apologetics.

Peled regards the Boyarins' project as no more than "an ideological construct, designed to safeguard the privileged position of Jews in the United States." The national-diasporic solution suggested by them, he emphasizes, is typical of the views prevailing among many Jewish ex-radicals in America, who — like their mouthpiece, the periodical *Tikun* — consider the maintenance of diasporic-Jewish identity as a sublime political and moral mission. Peled points out that standing for "otherness" or "difference" and opposing the "oppressive" nature of modernism and universalism, as evidenced in the Boyarins' diasporic project, is not a unique Jewish phenomenon in the United States; rather, it characterizes

the intellectual perspective of many ethnic and identity minority groups in the aftermath of the failure of the radical changes proposed in the 1960s.

Peled is clearly more disapproving of the Boyarins' arguments than of Raz-Krakotzkin's; this, however, is not the only difference between his analysis of the two articles. In his critique of the Boyarins, Peled goes beyond exposing the theoretical inconsistencies and historical deficiencies that inform their arguments. He contextualizes their analysis — which he thinks is void of any analytical value — positing it as no more than the ideological masquerade of American Jewish ex-radicals who, in compliance with the prevailing and politically correct trend of multiculturalism, construct the Jews as just another group of "others," who try to establish their own different identity against the pressure of the hegemonic culture. Peled points out that this argument is theoretically misleading and politically oppressive, in view of the dominant position the Jewish community holds in American society. In Raz-Krakotzkin's case, on the other hand, Peled limits the criticism to the theoretical and historical levels and avoids contextualizing his views or probing the ideological and political agendas that inform his critique. These will be discussed below by reviewing Raz-Krakotzkin's discussion of the reaction of the Zionist leadership to the Holocaust, in the context of Gur-Ze'ev's individual Diasporism.

3. From Rejection of Diaspora Negation to Denunciation of Zionism

The post-Zionist critique of Diaspora negation makes extensive use of the arguments that were put forward in 1977 by S. B. Beit-Tzvi in his book *Post-Ugandan Zionism in the Crucible of the Holocaust*.²⁰ Beit-Tzvi argues that from the late 1930s and during the period of the Holocaust, the Zionist leadership favored the economic and political interests of the Zionist settlement in Palestine — the Yishuv — over those of the Diaspora Jews; it consciously underestimated the dangers that threatened European Jewry, and thus, in fact, cooperated with Nazi propaganda. The Zionist leadership ignored the horrible and tragic fate of the Jews under German occupation and even when it became aware of the mass murder of Jews and of Nazi genocide policy, it did not initiate or assist rescue operations when those were still possible. At the same time, and in sharp contrast to this indifference, the Zionist leadership did not refrain from using the memory of the Holocaust victims and the survivors' plight as a moral and propagandistic weapon to advance their cherished project of establishing a Jewish state.²¹

The arguments of Beit-Tzvi were willingly endorsed by the post-Zionists who, turning *Post-Ugandan Zionism* into a cult book, posited them as just another proof of the oppressive nature of Zionism. Moreover, the alleged rejection of Beit-Tzvi's book by the Israeli historiographical

establishment gave rise to post-Zionist accusations that, like their conduct in regard to other embarrassing issues that expose the oppressive nature of Zionism — like the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem or the socioeconomic and cultural exclusion of Oriental Jews — Israeli historians were no more than court historians, working to cover up the innate immorality that informs the policies of the ruling Labor-Zionist elite by supplying whitewashed “official versions” that were used to construct a stainless Israeli collective memory. The attempt to silence Beit-Tzvi’s ideas by ignoring his book was further described by the post-Zionists as another oppressive practice used by the Zionist establishment in a direct continuation of its immoral conduct during the war.²² In this way, the boundaries between past and present, politics and historiography, research and polemics were blurred, depicting Zionist history as a vicious cycle revealing once and again its oppressive nature.

In fact, as the post-Zionist dispute went on, the attitude of academic historiography to Beit-Tzvi’s ideas and book gradually became a more important issue than his original criticism against the Zionist leadership; from an academic historical controversy it turned into a contemporary cultural-political struggle that aroused great attention in the media. Raz-Krakotzkin maintains that the rejection of *Post-Ugandan Zionism* is an “amazing cultural phenomenon,” and emphasizes in the wake of Beit-Tzvi that the Zionist decision to reject the British proposal to establish a Zionist colony in Uganda was actually the turning point at which Diaspora negation was transformed into the basis of Zionism, giving precedence to the principle of return to the Land of Israel over the need to solve the Jewish question, namely, rescuing Jews.²³

Another post-Zionist, who believes that a “tragic contradiction” exists “between the Jewish interest and the Zionist interest,”²⁴ is Yosef Grodzinsky. In a series of articles in the daily *Ha’aretz*²⁵ and in his book *Good Human Material: Jews vs. Zionists, 1945–1951*,²⁶ Grodzinsky blames the Zionists for deliberately eradicating diasporic options of Jewish existence. Zionist historiography, Grodzinsky emphasized, silenced Beit-Tzvi’s criticism for an obvious political and ideological reason: to protect the Zionist hegemonic collective memory of the Holocaust, which delineates the boundaries of Israeli identity and thus, has crucial importance for the “continuation of the Zionist ideology in its present form.”²⁷

The alleged hushing of Beit-Tzvi’s arguments by academic historiography, however, is no more than another post-Zionist myth. Criticism of Ben Gurion and the Zionist leadership for their indifference to the tragedy of European Jews during the Holocaust — and even of collaboration with the Nazis in some cases — was part and parcel of standard Israeli political discourse beginning in the 1950s and played a significant role in inter-party rivalry. Moreover, since the 1960s, and particularly in the wake of the Eichmann trial, the way that Diaspora life and Holocaust victims and survivors are represented in the Israeli

collective memory has changed tremendously, and a more empathetic and even nostalgic image has emerged.²⁸

This is true in regard to the academic research as well. Since the late 1960s — almost a decade before Beit-Tzvi's *Post-Ugandan Zionism* appeared — the Zionist response to Nazi policies towards the Jews before and during the Holocaust had been subjected to scholarly criticism, that intertwined with and affected the public discourse. Likewise, Beit-Tzvi's book was not ignored or silenced. On the contrary, during the 1980s his critique was discussed in different academic forums and gradually became an integral part of the standard academic discourse on Zionist and Holocaust history.²⁹ Moreover, the dilemmas pertaining to Zionist rescue policies were extensively and critically dealt in the mid-1980s by Dina Porat in her study *An Entangled Leadership: The Yishuv and the Holocaust, 1942–1945*³⁰ which refutes the monolithic image of Zionist leadership that emerged from Beit-Tzvi's study and Grodzinsky's criticism.

Porat portrays an embarrassed Zionist leadership, divided over the right course of action in face of the horrible news that began to flow from Europe. She further emphasizes that Yishuv public opinion demanded the leadership to undertake immediate rescue operations, and to give them priority over the interests of the Yishuv. This of course should not be a surprise, since the majority of the Yishuv was of European and mainly East European descent, and it was their next of kin who were being persecuted and murdered. The Zionist response to the Holocaust was thoroughly dealt with in the mid-1990s by Tuvia Friling's authoritative study *Arrow in the Dark: David Ben Gurion, The Yishuv Leadership, and Rescue Attempts during the Holocaust*.³¹ Based on rich primary documentation, Friling refutes Beit-Tzvi's contentions regarding the attitudes displayed by the Zionist leadership and particularly Ben Gurion towards the ordeal European Jewry had undergone during the Holocaust. A survey of the scholarly discussion of the Holocaust in the 1980s and 1990s proves, then, that by clinging to Beit-Tzvi's arguments and to the myth of his rejection, the post-Zionists misrepresented the attitudes regarding Jewish destiny and rescue on the part of Zionist leadership and public opinion during the Holocaust as well as of contemporary historical research.³²

Moreover, in contrast to Raz-Krakotzkin and Grodzinsky's continuous efforts to turn Beit-Tzvi into a post-Zionist martyr, the plain fact is that Beit-Tzvi was an ardent and committed Zionist. The declared goal of his critique in *Post-Ugandan Zionism* was not to reproach Zionism, but to warn against what he perceived as the indifference of the Israeli government to the plight of Soviet Jewry in the 1960s and 1970s. Beit-Tzvi intended his book to serve as a vehicle for mobilizing Israeli public opinion to press the government to take an active part in the struggle to open Russia's gates to Jewish emigration, a cause which he had advocated since the early 1960s.

Beit-Tzvi's research originated in a series of letters that he exchanged with Prime Minister David Ben Gurion and the chairman of the Jewish

Agency, Mosheh Sharett, in the early 1960s. In these letters, he demanded that the leadership draw the appropriate lessons from the desertion of European Jewry during the Holocaust, and provide more vigorous help to Russian Jewry, which in his view faced dangers similar to those encountered by German Jewry in 1938, on the eve of Kristalnacht. Beit-Tzvi was poles apart from the post-Zionists and believed in "Big Zionism." He repeatedly emphasized that Israel, as a Zionist state, was established in order to rescue Jews, and accused the Israeli government of pursuing the "Narrow Zionism" that was practiced during the Holocaust by acting as a bystander and deserting Soviet Jewry.³³

This "Narrow Zionism," according to Beit-Tzvi, originated in the ideological and political turnabout that took place during the seventh Zionist Congress (1905) when the plan to establish a Jewish settlement in Uganda as an immediate temporary shelter for persecuted Jews was rejected and the Zionists made an unconditional commitment to Palestine, *Eretz Israel*. He argued that post-Ugandan Zionism abandoned its original Herzlian goal of rescuing Jews, and reversed its priorities: the primary goal of Zionism became the settlement and development of *Eretz Israel*, while rescuing Jews was relegated into a means to achieve this end; the Zionist movement had developed an "ethnocentric trait" that overlooked the interests of Diaspora Jews insofar as they did not directly serve Zionist or Israeli interests. Zionism had narrowed the scope of its mission: it forsake the leadership of the Jewish people and gave precedence to the interests of the *Yishuv* over those of Diaspora Jews, an approach that culminated in the desertion of the Jews during the Holocaust.

The lesson to be drawn from this tragic failure to come to the rescue of European Jewry, Beit-Tzvi emphasized, was that "Narrow Zionism" should be rejected and that the pre-Ugandan "Big Zionism" should be re-endorsed. Unlike Grodzinsky, Beit-Tzvi did not see any "tragic contradiction between the Jewish interest and the Zionist interest"; on the contrary, he claimed that from the perspective of "Big Zionism," there could be no contradiction between the interests of *Eretz Israel* and the Diaspora, or between the interests of the State of Israel and the efforts to rescue Jews. Indeed, he claimed, Zionism was all about rescuing Jews.³⁴

Beit-Tzvi's "Big Zionism" that puts the rescue of Jews at the top of the Zionist agenda is an indication that the post-Zionist presentation of Diaspora negation as necessarily involving indifference to the Diaspora plight is quite simplistic if not altogether misleading. And indeed, the extreme Diaspora negation posited by the post-Zionists as representing standard Zionist ideology is not the only version of this concept. In fact, Diaspora negation had other versions, more favorable to certain aspects of Jewish history and life in Exile; moreover, the dispute between the different versions of Diaspora negation informed the basis for rival Zionist schools of thought.³⁵ Likewise, contrary to post-Zionist teachings, the Zionist appropriation of the Holocaust as a justification for the establishment of the State of Israel works against the concept

of Diaspora negation. In fact, by emphasizing the role of gentile guilt feelings — aroused by the Zionists through manipulation of the sufferings and atrocities endured by Holocaust victims and survivors — in the establishment of the State of Israel, Zionist historiography reduces the significance of Zionist settlement activity and military efforts which dominate Israeli collective memory, especially in its Labor Zionist version. Thus, the Diaspora in its lowest moments was elevated into a decisive factor in the establishment of the State of Israel, equal to that which has been accorded to the “new Jew” as constructed by the Zionist revolution.³⁶ Instead of supporting the post-Zionist contention regarding the ramifications of Diaspora negation, their arguments against the “Zionization of the Holocaust” and Beit-Tzvi’s critique in fact contradict it.

Zionist *weltanschauung* and Israeli collective memory regarding the Holocaust and the Diaspora in general are, therefore, much more complex than their representation in the post-Zionist discourse. The post-Zionist disregard for this complexity is not accidental: it uses Diaspora negation as one of its main indicators of the oppressive nature of Zionism, and the rejection of Diaspora negation as a key element in the post-Zionist denunciation of Zionism.

4. The Zionist Revision of Diaspora Negation

In the 1990s, at a time when the post-Zionists were using the critique of Diaspora negation in their overall assault against Zionism, the Zionist mainstream began to revise its own attitude towards the negation of the Diaspora. Shapira points to a gradual change in the Israeli attitude to the concept of Diaspora negation that has evolved since 1948, mainly since the 1960s. But, she emphasizes, “on the whole, changes in awareness become noticeable only after they have ripened and taken on a clear direction.”³⁷ And indeed, the direction has become clear since the 1980s.

The mainstream revision, and even turnabout, of Diaspora negation is most clearly manifested in the writings of Eliezer Schweid. Since the late 1960s Schweid, a professor of Jewish philosophy at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and a winner of the Israel Prize, has been accepted as one of the leading Zionist ideologues. Identifying himself initially with Labor Zionism he later moved to a right wing, quasi-religious, and settlement-supporting party, *Ha-Tehiyah* (Revival). Thus in the public discourse, Schweid appears to represent the two major competing Zionist ideologies, a synergy that amplifies his message. It is no wonder that since the late 1980s, Schweid has emerged as one of the outspoken rivals of post-Zionism, anchoring his critique in his opposition to post-modernism, combined with loyalty to past Zionist values and traditions.³⁸

In the early 1980s, with the beginnings of the revision of Diaspora negation in mainstream Zionism, Schweid emphatically argued that

despite the new circumstances affecting the relations between Israel and the Diaspora, mainly in the United States, Diaspora negation was still a valid and fundamental principle of Zionism.³⁹ In his article "The Rejection of the Diaspora in Zionist Thought: Two Approaches," published in 1984 in *Studies in Zionism*, Schweid called for a renewal of the message of Diaspora negation and writes:

I admit unashamedly that my motivation for this revaluation of Diaspora Negation is not scientific but rather derives from sensitivity to the problem encountered in present-day education. It is apparent that the idea of Diaspora Negation was removed from the basic premise guiding national education in the State of Israel more than twenty years ago. Perhaps there was no official decision to cease transmitting that ideological message, but in fact it was "forgotten."⁴⁰ In any event, no serious effort was made to reassess the validity of the concept with regard to today's Diaspora, existing as it does after the Holocaust and the establishment of the State of Israel. In my opinion that was a grave error which has weakened Zionist education, the purpose of which is to provide the basis for the identification of the younger generation with the State of Israel, its people, its society, and its culture. This is particularly true given that Zionism is still posited upon a justified and reasoned preference for Jewish life in Israel as opposed to Jewish life in the Diaspora. Without an understanding of why Jewish life in the Diaspora is rejected, a primary motive for the national settlement of the Land of Israel and the necessary dedication for the construction of the State is lacking.

Schweid calls for the renewal of the message of the negation of the Diaspora as a central element in the Israeli educational system in order to cope with phenomena like emigration from Israel (*yerida*) and alienation from Zionism, both in Israel and in the Diaspora. He acknowledges that this "necessitates a confrontation with the character and quality of the Diaspora today,"⁴¹ but emphasizes that "the Zionist movement must sharpen its criticism of the Diaspora experience and bring it up to date in order to make the people face the cruel truth of disintegration and decadence in Jewish life abroad."⁴²

Less than two decades later, however, in his article "The State of Israel, the Diaspora and the Jewish People: The Role of Zionism in Our Times,"⁴³ Schweid completely reversed his attitude to Diaspora negation. Now he argues that the growing estrangement between the Jews in the Diaspora and Israel is a "concrete threat to the very existence of the Jewish people, as well as to the existence of Israel." To meet this challenge, Schweid wants to free the Zionist movement of the bureaucratic yoke that has weakened it, re-establish Zionism as a popular democratic movement, and "revolutionize its ideology, reject the now irrelevant

theory of the Negation of the Diaspora." Until the establishment of Israel and during the early stages of statehood, Schweid argues, the ideology of Diaspora negation was a vital driving force for mobilizing the necessary resources for the realization of Zionism. When the Zionist project was accomplished, however, the negation of the Diaspora lost its relevance, and was degraded into a state ideology that served the Israeli political establishment, until nowadays it has been turned into "a damaging factor."⁴⁴

The changing attitude toward Diaspora negation is also evidenced in the writings of Yosef Gorni, a leading historian of Zionism and Jewish nationalism at Tel Aviv University, who is also active in updating Labor Zionist ideology. In his 1997 article, "The Attitude to the Diaspora: Between Negation and Acceptance,"⁴⁵ Gorni acknowledges the ramifications of the changing nature of the Jewish Diaspora on the accepted notion of Diaspora negation and suggests a new one. For him, Exile (*galut*) is no more the absence of sovereignty and territory or subjection to persecutions and prejudices. Rather, Diaspora is a state of separation: separation between the State of Israel and Jewish communities worldwide; separation of Jewish communities in different countries, as well as within every single community. This Exile of separation, Gorni explains, has different qualities in Israel and in the Diaspora: in Israel it takes the form of social fragmentation, while in the Diaspora it manifests itself in the disintegration of the Jewish communities to the point where the future of Jewish institutional frameworks is not certain and Jewish organized life is in danger. Gorni emphasizes that:

Despite the dividing line between the danger of separation in Israel and the danger of disintegration in the Diaspora, and precisely because of it, I am convinced of the mutual existential interest shared by both. And the interest lies in the shared need for the existence of both and in the reinforcement of the ties between them. Therefore it is important to return to the paradoxical formula of Yehezkel Kaufmann, that the strengthening of national Jewish existence in the Diaspora "holds the key to the most decisive and most energetic *shelilat ha-galut*."⁴⁶

Gorni extends this paradox and maintains that it is the conventional and radical notion of Diaspora negation, that, in fact, leads "to separation between Israel and the Diaspora, to internal disintegration within the Diaspora and to deep rifts within Israeli Jewish society." Thus, the negation of the Diaspora is not necessarily renewed territorial sovereignty, but the renewal and maintenance of the sense of *Klal Israel*, namely, of Jewish mutual responsibility, and mainly between Israel and the Diaspora, the feeling of "national 'togetherness'." From this perspective, Gorni suggests a common goal that will serve as a new basis for Zionism: "the continued existence of Jewish life in the Diaspora and in the State

of Israel," that acknowledges the centrality of Israel. Gorni reverses the classical definition of "negation of the Diaspora" in a way that turns the concern for the future existence of Jewish life in the Diaspora into the true meaning of *shlilat ha-golah*. This paradoxical reversal enables Gorni to remain within the Zionist framework and transcend it at the same time.⁴⁷

E.

Post-Zionists like Raz-Krakotzkin, the Boyarins, and Gur-Ze'ev on one hand, and mainstream Zionists like Schweid and Gorni on the other, agree — albeit for different reasons — that Diaspora negation should be rejected, and that a different, positive attitude towards the Diaspora should be introduced into the contemporary Israeli ethos. The simultaneous rejection of the concept of Diaspora negation by the post-Zionists and mainstream Zionists seems to be ideologically and politically contradictory in view of their opposing *weltanschauungs* and agendas, and the bitter struggle these two rival ideologies waged in the 1990s over the redefinition of the Israeli ethos and redelineation of its boundaries. This contradiction is clarified, however, once the common rejection of Diaspora negation is examined and interpreted not through the prism of the ideological dispute between post-Zionism and Zionism, as the prevalent interpretation does, but in the context of the social and economic transformation Israel has undergone throughout the 1980s and the 1990s. From this socioeconomic perspective, the simultaneous rejection of Diaspora negation by both the post-Zionists and mainstream Zionists seems to be part and parcel of the process of adaptation undergone by different sectors of the Israeli elite in response to Israel's privatization revolution.

Post-Zionism tends to present itself as an ideology of emancipation for formerly excluded groups in Israeli society from the oppression and control enjoyed by the veteran Labor Zionists. The rejection of Diaspora negation, the post-Zionists argue, subverts the Israeli hegemonic collective memory and paves the way for recognition and acceptance of alternative, formerly silenced memories. This version, however, is more a part of the post-Zionist ideology rather than a critical analysis of the economic, sociological, political, and cultural circumstances that informed its development. In fact, post-Zionism emerged as the ideology of the privatization process that Israel underwent in the 1980s.

Zionism, with its inherent collectivism based on values of national and social solidarity and welfare-state policies, proved to be a major ideological obstacle in the way of the privatization project in Israel, mainly vis-à-vis the privatization of the public sector and welfare services. Thus, privatization of the Israeli mind and identity became a

necessary precondition to the privatization of the Israeli society, economy, political system, and culture. Post-Zionism is spreading its word through institutions closely identified with the business and professional elites — like the high-brow daily *Ha'aretz*, the Van Leer Institute in Jerusalem or the universities — that advanced the privatization project. And indeed, post-Zionism proved itself to be an effective ideological weapon in the struggle to subvert the Zionist collective ethos and construct an alternative, privatized one by challenging and undermining the morality of Zionism.

Employing a variety of accusations — such as the desertion of European Jewry during the Holocaust, the expulsion of the Palestinians in 1948, and the oppression of Oriental Jews — post-Zionism strives to make Zionist history loathsome and its policies and practices abhorrent. In this way, post-Zionism presented the Israeli, Zionist collective memory as glorifying, preserving and, in fact, encouraging, injustice, oppression, and atrocities toward Jews and Arabs alike. Branding Zionism as fundamentally evil, post-Zionism left no choice for the moral Israeli individual but to dissociate himself from the Zionist immoral and repressive collective, and to privatize himself.⁴⁸ The post-Zionist rejection of Diaspora negation, combined with this cult of guilt, was wielded, then, as an instrument that challenged the morality of the Zionist idea and history and advanced the privatization of Israeli identity and society.

Zionism used Diaspora negation and the overall criticism of Jewish life in the Diaspora to legitimize the social engineering that informs its collectivism in general and that of Labor Zionism, culminating in the Israeli welfare state, in particular. Zionist ideology viewed the Diaspora as the realm of social and political Jewish dispersion and individualism, whereas Zionism meant turning the Jews into a nation, society, and body politic.

For Theodore Herzl, Zionism meant, first and foremost, a public and national regulation of Jewish migration that would replace the prevalent individualistic mode of migration. The effective absorption of this regulated migration was conditioned, he maintained, on the establishment of a “new society,” based on the principles of Utopian Socialism and the cooperative organization of society as an alternative to capitalism and its distortions. In the context of contemporary Israeli discourse, the meaning of post-Zionist nostalgic diasporism is, then, laying the ideological foundation for the negation of Zionist social engineering and collectivism and their institutionalization in the Israeli welfare state, while supporting individualism, the dismantling of the welfare state and the privatization of its services. Thus, by rhetorically attacking Diaspora negation as informing past Zionist oppression, the post-Zionists actually provided an ideological platform for the privatization policies in present-day Israel.

Post-Zionism not only presented itself as the mouthpiece of the Israeli oppressed and excluded “others,” it posited the Diasporic Jewish

condition as a state of complete "otherness"; thus, they include in the concept of the Exile both the ultimate oppression and the ultimate emancipation, which turns it into an alternative to any existing order. In Raz-Krakotzkin, the Boyarins, and Gur-Ze'ev's analyses, Diasporism has no territorial dimensions; it is an abstract ideological concept that can easily be implemented in Israel and the Diaspora alike. This hybrid perspective on diasporism delineates a new option of Israeliness, and as an alternative to the Zionist "new Jew," creates the post-Zionist "new Israeli," who fits well into the global condition and reproduces a sort of Israeliness that complies with the post-national and post-modern condition. Thus, post-Zionist diasporism reflects the interests of those strata of Israeli society that are in the process of integrating into the global system — with its neo-liberal privatized inclinations — and it is no wonder that it is among these strata that post-Zionism finds the greatest support.

While the rejection of Diaspora negation by the post-Zionists is understandable, its rejection by the Zionist mainstream seems ideologically puzzling. A possible explanation to this apparent paradox is that the growing success of the privatization project in Israel induced the Zionist mainstream to change its attitude towards Diaspora negation as a means of preserving the old collective Zionist ethos. By rejecting the concept of Diaspora negation, the Zionist mainstream has turned the Diaspora into a legitimate field of Zionist action. Thus, after privatization destroyed the edifice of Labor Zionism, and ideologically beat the collective ethos of Zionism, the Zionist mainstream targeted the Diaspora — turning it into the "new Diaspora" — as a new terrain for exercising the Zionist ethos of social solidarity and responsibility. While this might be the explanation, it suggests that the Zionist mainstream is turning full circle from Herzlian Zionism to the ideology espoused by his great rival, Ahad Ha-'Am.

Contrary to appearance, then, the target of the new diasporism suggested by both the post-Zionists and the Zionist mainstream is not the Diaspora but Israel. It uses the nostalgia for the imagined cosmopolitan Diaspora to serve as a background for the ideological disputes in Israel since the 1980s, during the era of privatization. By doing so, however, the new diasporism only highlights the basic thread of Zionist ideology: national and social collectivism that realizes itself in a regulated economy and welfare state. Thus, it is not Diaspora negation that is rejected by the new diasporism, but the social solidarity of Israeli society and its past socialist values, and it is not the Diaspora that is reaffirmed but rather privatization and neo-liberal capitalism.

CONCLUSION

DIASPORA, IDENTITY, AND NATION-BUILDING

PASCHALIS M. KITROMILIDES

In this age of multiculturalism, the idea of diaspora has moved into the realm of social thought. Diasporas now belong to a world made up of numerous and diverse groups striving for recognition. The political ethics of recognition has ascribed a novel kind of legitimacy to concepts such as diaspora, ethnicity, minority, and the social ontology they denote — a social ontology quite different from the uniformity enshrined in the ideals of nationalism. Because these notions are now connected to the ideal of difference and integrated into a normative discourse deriving from the powerful moral status of this idea, they tend to assume a mythical dimension. My impression is that many notions such as these, which are linked to the discourse of difference, are acquiring a new normative resonance within contemporary social theory which is not always helpful to historical understanding. It is paradoxical, at least at first glance, that new meanings and symbolisms, paradoxically on the face of it, reinforce older conventional views that were shaped mostly by nationalist historiography in the nineteenth century. It is amidst these multiple layers of meaning that one has to navigate in search of a substantive and critical understanding of the concept of diaspora and its historical significance.

The overall picture remains anachronistic and to a considerable degree ideologically predetermined. This becomes immediately evident if we look at the standard way of understanding the notion of diaspora in contemporary social thought. The diaspora is perceived in relation to a center, in fact, it cannot exist without this center, from which population groups are dispersed and which forms their point of reference. The center,

of course, can often be imaginary or hypothetical, or highly contested, but nevertheless, it has to be there for a diaspora to be conceivable. This is a notion deeply ingrained in contemporary social and political thought and surfaces even in its most imaginative critical expressions. Yet very few can appreciate that this way of thinking and speaking “of diaspora, whose center is elsewhere,”¹ is anachronistic and derives from a historiographical framework that is closely connected with ideological priorities established, mostly in the nineteenth century by triumphant nation states, which have reduced diasporas into their distant peripheries.

Can we hope then to reach an Archimedean vantage point, from which to be able to think critically about diaspora as an idea and a social and historical experience? I cannot claim to have the ability to respond with any degree of adequacy to this question. I can only propose an inductive and exploratory approach. We can perhaps gauge the broader issues by looking at a couple of suggestive themes that might at least illustrate the conceptual problems. I suggest, therefore, an initial examination of the inception and conceptualization of the idea of diaspora in Greek and Balkan thought. Secondly, we may proceed to a more complex and difficult issue — the interplay between diaspora and identity as exemplified by the broader Balkan context. My hope is simply to illustrate and invite rethinking of some conceptual conventions on the subject.

1. Early Conceptualizations of Diaspora in Greek Thought

The word diaspora is, in terms of language and etymology, purely Greek, and as a concept is, of course, of very great significance for understanding Greek history, ancient and modern. The wide range of meanings associated with it, however, is due not to the intellectual heritage of ancient Hellenism, but to the richness of language and style in the Old Testament. The ancient Greeks, despite the weight of their historical experience, which comprised the phenomena of migration and colonization on a large scale, did not use the term.² It occurs at a relatively late date in Plutarch’s *Moralia*.³ In the Old Testament, in contrast, we find the term diaspora in Deuteronomy, Psalms, and Jeremiah.⁴ Channeled through the Septuagint, the word diaspora was thus bequeathed to Christian Hellenism, to borrow the phrase coined by Greece’s national historian, Constantinos Paparrigopoulos. Invested with the symbolism of the tragic historical destiny of ancient Israel, the idea of diaspora was to carry out its function in the literature of the Christian world, where the idea of the diaspora took on the appropriate overtones and became associated with preaching the word of truth. In the Gospel according to John [VII, 35] we find the Jews asking:

Whither will he go, that we shall not find him? Will he go unto the diaspora of the Greeks, and teach the Greeks?⁵

In this way, the concept of diaspora passed into the literature of "Christian Hellenism."

In the literature of later Hellenism, the concept of diaspora played a limited, even marginal role, despite the Christian character it had assumed in the meantime. This can be seen quite clearly from the manner in which the word is listed in what is effectively the first dictionary of the Greek language, the *Quadrilingual Thesaurus* [Ἑσάτυρος τετραγλωσσος] by Yerasimos Vlachos, one of the most important representatives of religious humanism in the history of Greek education and culture. A Neo-Aristotelian philosopher, heir to the brilliant tradition of humanist letters of the Cretan Renaissance, abbot of the Monastery of the Virgin at Palaioepoli on Corfu, and archbishop of Philadelphia in Venice, Yerasimos Vlachos compiled and published in 1659 the first dictionary of the spoken language of later Hellenism. Later editions of this dictionary, the *Thesaurus*, appeared in 1723, 1784, 1800, and the last in 1820.⁶

The word diaspora was not among the entries in the *Thesaurus*. It occurred only in the definition of the word διασκοπισμός, which was explained with reference to the corresponding words in Latin and the Romance languages: *dispersio*, *dispersione*. In the 1784 edition, the French word *dispersion* was added. In the 1820 edition, the Latin terms were omitted and instead of being quadrilingual, the *Thesaurus* became monolingual, a dictionary of the Greek language. Here, diaspora referred to the dispersion of persons, things, words, ideas, and peoples. The meaning of the term listed by Yerasimos Vlachos reflected a new linguistic context associated with the historical fragmentation of the main body of the Greek-speaking Orthodox community during the centuries of subjugation to the Ottomans.

This is the linguistic background to the first conscious use of the term diaspora in modern Greek literature to describe the historical reality, the existential ontology of Greek society before the period of nation-states and national centers. Like so many other intellectual endeavors to find words to express new ideas and novel perceptions, this pioneering use of the term diaspora originated with Iosipos Moisiodax:

A glance at the history of Greece (when I say Greece, I mean all the diasporas of the Greeks)shows the condition it found itself in after the Fall of Constantinople.

So wrote Moisiodax in 1761, in the Preface to his *Moral Philosophy*:

When I say Greece, I mean all the diasporas of the Greeks.⁷

The word that was not deemed worthy of inclusion as a main entry in the most authoritative dictionary of the period became for Moisiodax synonymous with the historical hypostasis of Greece and a way of clarifying the importance of the Greek world: the diasporas of the Greeks. The truly

astonishing similarity between Moisioudax's formulation and that in the Gospel according to St. John indicates a continuity in the formal culture of Christian Hellenism; it should not prevent us, however, from noting the new and original manner in which the contemplative intellectual, who knew the full length and breadth of the Greek world, comprehended the historical reality surrounding him. In the same treatise, Moisioudax tells us: "I have spent time in a great many places in Greece, and I know of what I speak."⁸ Indeed, he did know of what he spoke. He knew the Greek world, he knew its dynamism first hand, through personal experience of a multi-faceted geographical, educational, social, and political mobility, and he gave expression to its contradictions, its potential, its good and bad qualities. He saw a world of diasporas, with no centers to level it, imposing uniformity and uprooting diversity. In Moisioudax's eyes, this world of the Greek diasporas had unlimited potential, for, in a literal sense, it was not encompassed by boundaries, by closed borders that defined predominant ideologies, established orthodoxies, or conventional identities. This was the world of the Greeks at the time of the Enlightenment. The future, of course, was to be quite different.

The diasporas were to become a single diaspora, the most distant province of a center, and the receiver of its surplus population. The borders would close; the potential would be hermetically sealed by ideologies that did not brook dispute, since they controlled the means of psychological force and physical coercion. The diaspora would exist only as an idealized place of escape, a refuge inhabited by yearning and grief. For Moisioudax, the diaspora was a place of longing ("I was reduced to the state of a vagabond in foreign lands" he was to complain elsewhere⁹), a land of hope and visions for the future.

What exactly were the "diasporas" of the Greeks that Moisioudax had in mind? It is not easy to provide an answer to this question, but it would be reasonable to assume that Moisioudax subsumed under this heading the large communities of merchants living in the cities of Central Europe and Italy, among which he so often found refuge and support. For example, the "most honorable brotherhood" of the "proud Community of the Romaioi, which dwells in the conspicuous Metropolis of the Venetians," as Grigorios Phatseas writes in the same year as Moisioudax,¹⁰ and the "Most honorable Brotherhood of the local Romaioi-Vlachoi in Vienna," as Vasilios Papaefthymiou writes in 1807.¹¹ These brotherhoods of Romaioi and Romaioi-Vlachoi were integral parts of the "diasporas of the Greeks."

The conception of "Greece," of Greek society as a population or human community widely dispersed in space as understood by Moisioudax on the basis of his own social and existential experience, still persisted in the revolutionary proclamation of his disciple, Rhigas Velestinlis. In the opening sentence of his manifesto calling for the overthrow of despotism and the transformation of Southeastern Europe into a republic modeled on the Jacobin constitution of 1793, Rhigas urged "the people, descendents of the Hellenes, inhabiting Rumeli [=European Turkey],

Asia Minor, the Mediterranean Islands and Moldowallachia" to rise and take up arms in the struggle for freedom. These were precisely "the diasporas of the Greeks," mapped out in space and transformed into agents of political change in a revolutionary age. Rhigas now aspired of course to incorporate the "diasporas of the Greeks" into a unitary democratic republic. Their identity was by then understood not simply in geographical terms but in definitions derived from the cultural heritage of ancient Hellas, which itself was seen to be the foremost depository of democratic and republican ideals.¹²

This "visitation of names" would allow us, if space permitted, to shed further light on the concept of diaspora, beginning with the meaning associated with the two most important communities of the diaspora, and to define the character of the cultural identity around which this world coalesced. Romaioi, Romaioi-Vlachoi, the world of the "conquering Orthodox merchants"¹³ who zealously guarded the intellectual and cultural heritage of Christian and Greek literature, and therefore lent their support to schools and men of learning and subscribed to the publication of books; who were familiar with and benefited from the world of Europe, who saw the history of Greece through the eyes of Europe, and drew from it the moral strength to mold the collective future. Moisioudax, Phatseas, Papaefthymiou, and many others were fully conscious that this future would be formulated within the diaspora, using the means that they themselves offered to their nation — moral philosophy, the geography of Europe, the history of the republics of ancient Greece — in other words, all the elements which comprised the thought and culture of the Enlightenment. That the future was not shaped precisely as they envisioned it is perhaps due also to the fact that the claims and aspirations expressed symbolically by moral philosophy, the geography of Europe, and the history of democracy were not the decisive factors in later political and constitutional developments.

2. Shaping Identities

We can perhaps now turn to the question of the role that the world of diaspora played in shaping collective identities. I can neither hope nor pretend to provide even a remotely adequate treatment of the problem. Again, all I can do is to offer some inferences gleaned from available sources. Let us return to the world of the diaspora, still the "diasporas of the Greeks" in the second decade of the nineteenth century. By this time, migration from Thessaly and Western Macedonia to Central Europe, from the islands and Epirus to Venice, Trieste, and Livorno, and from the Western and Pontic regions of Asia Minor and again from the islands to Southern Russia and the Ukraine produced a diaspora which had already generated its second or third generation and was experiencing considerable prosperity.

Yet a pervasive anxiety is noticeable in the sources concerning the future of the diaspora. Scholars and teachers in Trieste, Vienna, and Odessa, that is, in the three major and most dynamic communities of the Greek diaspora of the time, record in public between 1816 and 1820 their worry that the children of Greek families were losing their national language and by extension, were running the danger of being lost to the community through assimilation into the surrounding environment.¹⁴ A commentator on the social mores of the community in Vienna noted with indignation the fact that the children of local Greek families were learning the Greek language not only at school but also at home with the help of specially-appointed tutors instead of imbibing it naturally from their parents.¹⁵ Ten years earlier Vassilios Papaefthymiou whose *History of Greece* we have noted above, complained about the ignorance of their mother tongue among children of Greek Orthodox families in Vienna.¹⁶

The intellectuals of the diaspora did not remain idle and inactive in the face of this cultural dilemma. The most enlightened among them in Vienna, Pest, Zemun, Trieste, and Odessa attempted to cope with the problem by producing bilingual manuals and grammar books that would enable the children of Greek families to learn both the language of their parents and ancestors and also the language of their social and cultural milieu.¹⁷ The sustained effort at multilingualism that was undertaken in schools sponsored by Greek communities from Venice and Trieste through Habsburg Central Europe to Odessa essentially provided a mechanism which was designed to meet both the social objective of integrating diaspora children into their environment and the ideological goal of preserving the ethno-cultural heritage that was transmitted through the Greek language.

Despite the anxiety of critics, half a century after Moisioudax's attempt at a conceptualization of the diaspora, what was in fact happening in "the diasporas of the Greeks" was the emergence of a genuinely multicultural world — *avant le mot* to be sure — in which diverse groups were finding ways to interact and coexist. The climate of multiculturalism that prevailed in the "diasporas of the Greeks" can be fully appreciated if we take into consideration the multiple processes of recognition and self-discovery that made up cultural life in the diaspora. Orthodox Greek speakers were showing a newly-discovered respect, indeed a palpable affection, for their vernacular language, which was acquiring a symbolic significance equal to that of ancient Greek as a component of their heritage.¹⁸ Side by side in the diaspora, Orthodox Vlach speakers were quick to follow the example of the Greeks: they sought self-recognition by means of a new linguistic pride, which was quite unthinkable just a few decades earlier. This was the first expression of their sense of ethnic distinctiveness, and they attempted to give it a concrete form by producing a written version of their hitherto unwritten language, using the Greek alphabet.¹⁹

Another expression of multiculturalism in the diaspora can be seen

in the oldest and most illustrious Orthodox community in the West, the Confraternity of St. George and St. Nicholas in Venice. By the early nineteenth century a great number of names in the registers of "cofratelli" were distinctly South Slavic or Illyrian, as the populations of the Eastern coast of the Adriatic were known at the time.²⁰ The Orthodox South Slavs were apparently eager to be accepted as members of that venerable "Greek" community, in order to enjoy the educational and philanthropic benefits which were organized under its aegis.

The image of ethnic encounters in the diaspora should not be idealized of course. Multiculturalism in the Orthodox communities of Central Europe and Italy did not involve just processes of recognition and mechanisms of social solidarity, but a considerable dynamic of antagonism and conflict as well. Linguistic differences, conflicting ecclesiastical loyalties, and economic antagonisms often turned the communities into hotbeds of strife and occasionally jeopardized their official recognition by the host governments or even their very survival as organized entities. Trieste in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, where intense confrontations between Greeks and Serbs led to the creation of separate communities, is a case in point.²¹ In Vienna the conflicts were more clearly of a class nature, leading to the establishment of two rival Orthodox parishes.²²

Despite such conflicts, and notwithstanding their devotion to their Orthodox doctrine, the communities of the Balkan diaspora generally avoided the inwardness of other diaspora groups and retained a remarkable openness to their environments. This exposed them to ideological influences and political motivations such as the Enlightenment and French revolutionary fervor, which over the years led the most forceful members of the diaspora community — merchants, printers and intellectuals as well as clergymen, teachers and minor officials — to develop novel but captivating visions of political freedom and, after 1800, distinct ethnic futures for their countrymen and regions of origin. The inception of such ideas and visions among members of diaspora communities, very often the second generation who had been born in the diaspora and were already encountering difficulties with the language of their parents,²³ constituted a milestone not just for the diaspora itself but for the future of the Balkan peoples as a whole. It represented the birth of an epoch-making movement that was to transform Orthodox southeastern Europe as it was transforming the rest of the world: nationalism.

This process was of course complex and convoluted and cannot be retraced here. Ironically, this seminal event sealed the fate of the diaspora, the very place where it was launched. By leading to the emergence of national states, which assumed the role of national centers for the diaspora, nationalism ended diaspora ascendancy and even led to its eventual decline. This has been noted already by perceptive observers;²⁴ I have the impression, however, that the more profound reason for the

diaspora's decline has escaped them. That decline had more to do with the destruction of the multicultural nature of the diaspora, a destruction which was the by-product of the attachment of particular linguistic or ethnic groups in the diaspora to individual nation-states.

This transfer of attachment to often antagonistic and even openly hostile national centers divided the diaspora and sapped its dynamism, which after all sprang from its multicultural makeup and the forms of behavior that gave it expression. The diaspora was reduced to being an outlying peripheral area of the nation to which it had transferred its loyalties. On the other hand, it did become part of that nation, thereby apparently fulfilling the deeper purposes of history. There can be little doubt that the change was understood in these terms not only by the national state itself but also by leading personalities of the diaspora, who found a new role in patronizing, counseling, and bestowing enormous benefactions upon the national state. The dazzling vitality and social philosophy recorded by Andreas Syggros in his *Memoires* at the end of the nineteenth century is probably the most outstanding example of this mentality — but this was the mentality of the national state, and as such it was quite different from the ethos of the “diasporas of the Greeks.” The world of Moisioudax was by now lost. The power of critical thinking for which he stood was overshadowed by the might of wealth represented by Syggros, who defined the new role of the diaspora vis-à-vis the national center.

3. In lieu of a Conclusion

I am afraid I have overstretched my reader's patience and I should bring this peregrination in the world of the diasporas of the Greeks to its final destination. Where does this survey leave us concerning the concept of the diaspora itself? I will limit myself to three suggestions.

First and foremost, it is necessary to contextualize the concept of diaspora by trying to recover its historicity. Diasporas should be approached conceptually along a continuum of historical change that is dynamic rather than static. This dynamic understanding will emphasize the changing nature of diaspora communities, their transformation over time, and the subsequent reorientation of their agendas and priorities.

Secondly, the concept of “diaspora nations,” which has been used as an analytical category in the literature on nationalism and national identity,²⁵ is in need, I believe, of substantial revision and refinement. If the objective is analytic clarity, we ought to consider whether it is conceptually legitimate to allow the confluence of the notion of “nation,” which presupposes a determinate role for the state, and the notion of “diaspora,” which does not necessarily do so.

Thirdly, if we are to connect nation and diaspora, we will have to view them as different forms of human community, which can interact under

certain historical preconditions but cannot be conceived as forming an identical social collectivity or continuum of the type presupposed by the idea of national communion and unity. The most serious conceptual flaws and confusions, I believe, arise from persisting in this often unstated but generally assumed identification, which obfuscates thinking and, as a result, breeds misunderstanding and mutual disappointment.

NOTES

Preface

- 1 Note, in particular, Armstrong's classification in: J. Armstrong, "Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas," *American Political Science Review* 50(1976): 393–408. R. Cohen used a similar classification in his book: R. Cohen, *Global Diasporas* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003 [2nd edition]). Despite the classification system he used in order to devise a theory of diasporas, Cohen was aware of the fact that no classification system can reflect all, or even most, aspects of the history of a specific diaspora (*ibid*, x–xi, Introduction).
- 2 See, for example Larry Tye's wonderful book, *Homelands: Portraits of the New Jewish Diaspora* (New York NY: Henry Holt & Co., 2001), 13–99.
- 3 *Ibid.*, pp. 99–199; Y Beilin, *His Brother's Keeper: Israel and Diaspora Jewry in the Twenty-First Century* (New York : Schocken Books, 2000). It is significant that the book's title in the original Hebrew version is "The Death of the American Uncle."

People of the Book, People of the Sea: Mirror Images of the Soul

- 1 "The Greek Diaspora in Historical Context," in R. Clogg (ed.), *The Greek Diaspora in the Twentieth Century* (London and New York: Macmillan Press, 1999), 1–2.
- 2 K. Kerényi, *Gods of the Greeks* (London: Thames & Hudson; Reissue edition, February 1980), 5; S. Vryonis, "The Greeks and the Sea: Introduction," in idem (ed.), *The Greeks and the Sea* (New Rochelle NY: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1993), 3–22; idem, "The Sea and the Water in Byzantine Literature," *ibid.*, 113–132; M. Vitti, "Two Visions of the Sea: Seferis and Elytis," *ibid.*, 173–187; G. Holst-Warhaft, "Re-evaluating the Nisiotika," Paper presented at the VIth Meeting of the Study Group on Anthropology of Music in Mediterranean Cultures — International Council for Traditional Music (Unesco) "Music in the Mediterranean Islands" Venice, June 10–12, 2004 (http://research.umBCE.edu/eol/MA/index/number10/holst/holst_0.htm).
- 3 I. Singer, "New Evidence on the End of the Hittite Empire," in E. D. Oren, *The Sea Peoples and their World: A Reassessment* (Philadelphia PA: The University Museum, University of Pennsylvania, 2000), 21–29.
- 4 W. Moran, *The Amarna Letters* (Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), EA 81, pp. 150–1; EA 122–123, pp. 201–2 (for the Shardana); *ibid.*, EA151, pp. 238–239 (for the Dannuna); *ibid.*, EA 38, pp.111–112 (for the Lukka).
- 5 N. Grimal, *A History of Ancient Egypt* (Cambridge Mass: Blackwell, 1992), 250–253.

- 6 Aswan Stela in K. Kitchen, *Ramessid Inscriptions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958–74), vol. II, 290,1–4; N. K. Sandars, *The Sea Peoples: Warriors of the Ancient Mediterranean 1125–1150 BC* (London: Thames and Hudson), 50.
- 7 G. Maspero, in *Zentrum für Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft, Typologie und Universalienforschung* 19 (1881):118; I. Singer, “The Origins of the Sea Peoples and their Settlement on the Coast of Canaan,” in Heltzer M. and E. Lipinski (eds.), *Society and Economy in the Eastern Mediterranean (c. 150–1000 BCE)*, Proceedings of the International Symposium Held at the University of Haifa April 28–May 2, 1985 (Louvain: Peeters, 1988), 239. Their association with the sea is seen in the naval battle relief of Medinet Habu (*ibid.*, 17–21); the rhetorical stela of Rameses II from Deir el-Medinah (*ibid.*, 23–24; A. E. Killbrew, *Biblical Peoples and Ethnicity: An Archeological Study of Egyptians, Canaanites, Philistines and Early Israel, 1300–1100 B.C.E* [Atlanta Georgia: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005], 204).
- 8 There are several methods for dating Ancient Egyptian history. The difference between them is approximately fifteen years. Rameses III dated his victory to the eight year of his reign (see T. & M. Dothan, *People of the Sea: The Search for the Philistines* (New York and Toronto: Macmillan, 1992), 19*.
- 9 For an analysis of these remnants see N. K. Sandars, *The Sea Peoples*, 117–137; Dothan & Dothan, *People of the Sea*, 13–24; D. O’Connor, “The Sea Peoples and the Egyptian Sources,” in E. D. Oren (ed.), *The Sea Peoples and their World*, 85–101; A. Killbrew, *Biblical Peoples*, 202–204.
- 10 Joshua 13: 2–3.
- 11 A. Killbrew, *Biblical Peoples*, 204–205.
- 12 Dothan & Dothan, *People of the Sea*, 210; I. Singer, “The Origins of the Sea Peoples,” 245–248; E. Stern, *Dor: Ruler of the Seas* (Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 2000), 89–90.
- 13 N. K. Sandars, *The Sea Peoples*, 170.
- 14 For an introduction to the theory of the identification of the “Sea People” with proto-Greeks, see J. Boardman, *The Greeks Overseas: The Archeology of their Early Colonies and Trade* (Harmondsworth Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1973), 15–32. For a study based on archeological findings from their settlements and supporting the on-going interaction between the Mycenaean civilization and the coastal regions of Canaan, see Dothan & Dothan, *People of the Sea*. On the scholarly debate regarding the identification of the Philistines, see C. S. Ehrlich, *The Philistines in Transition: A History from ca. 100–730 B.C.E.* (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 6–21.
For a summary of all the theories suggested for the origins of the “Sea Peoples,” see A. Killbrew, *Biblical Peoples*, 230–231. Cf. I. Singer, “The Origins of the Sea Peoples,” 241–244.
- 15 A. Killbrew, *Biblical Peoples*, 232; I. Singer, “The Origins of the Sea Peoples,” 239–250; *idem*, “Egyptians, Canaanites and Philistines in the Period of the Emergence of Israel,” in I. Finkelstein and N. Na’aman (eds.), *From Nomadism to Monarchy: Archeological and Historical Aspects of Early Israel* (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi and Israel Exploration Society, Washington DC: Biblical Archeology Society, 1994), 300–302. (this paper can also be found on the web: http://www.nelc.ucla.edu/Faculty/Mullins_files/ANE230_State_Formation_files/Singer_Egyptians_Canaanites_Philistines.pdf)
- 16 See for example B. Bar-Kochva, *Judas Maccabaeus: The Jewish Struggle Against the Seleucids* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 217–218, 247–248.
- 17 P. Machinist, “Biblical Traditions: The Philistines and Israelite History,” in E.D. Oren (ed.), *The Sea Peoples*, 65–66; I. Singer, “The Origins of the Sea Peoples,” 250.
- 18 Gen. 10:13–14; I Chr. 1:11–12; 18:17; Deut. 2:23; Jer. 47:4; Ezek. 25:16; Amos 9:7.

- 19 See Gen. 10:14; see, for example, Rashi on Num. 34:3, Jer. 47:4, Ezek. 25:16, Zeph. 2:5, Chr.1, 18:17, and Amos 9:7, and cf. Dothan & Dothan, 7–8, 34–35; I. Singer, "Egyptians, Canaanites and Philistines," 327–328; N. K. Sandars, *The Sea Peoples*, 165–166.
- 20 On the identification of Kaphtor with Illyria, via the Balkans, the eastern Aegean, the western Aegean, the eastern Mediterranean in general or Cyprus, see Killbrew, 230–231, and notes 104–108 respectively, and p. 238, note 33.
- 21 J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001/1906), Vol. 4, 41–49, Sections 70–82; J. B. Pritchard, *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament* (3rd edn. w. supplement; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 260–261; I. Singer, "The Origins of the Sea Peoples and their Settlement on the Coast of Canaan," in Heltzer M. and E. Lipinski (eds.), *Society and Economy in the Eastern Mediterranean* (c. 150–1000 BCE) Proceedings of the International Symposium Held at the University of Haifa April 28–May 2, 1985 (Louvain: Peeters, 1988), 241–242; A. Killbrew, *Biblical Peoples*, 245, note 104; I. Singer, "The Origins of the Sea Peoples and their Settlement on the Coast of Canaan," in Heltzer M. and E. Lipinski (eds.), *Society and Economy in the Eastern Mediterranean* (c. 150–1000 BCE) Proceedings of the International Symposium Held at the University of Haifa April 28–May 2, 1985 (Louvain: Peeters, 1988), 241–242.
- 22 For the Sherden in the plain of Acre, see I. Singer, "Egyptians, Canaanites and Philistines," 297–298.
- 23 I. Singer, "The Origins of the Sea Peoples," 243.
- 24 C. H. Gordon, "The Mediterranean Factor in the Old Testament," in *Congress Volume Bonn 1962*, Supplements to *Vetus Testamentum* 9 (Leiden: Brill, 1963), 21–22; M. Astour, *Hellenosemitica* (Leiden: Brill, 1965), 1–112; Y. Yadin, "And Dan, Why Did He Remain in Ships," *The Australian Journal of Biblical Archeology* 1 (1968): 9–23; O. Margalith, *The Sea Peoples in the Bible* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1994). Yadin's suggestion was endorsed by T. & M. Dothan, *People of the Sea*, 215–218; N.K. Sandars, *The Sea Peoples*, 162–164. For a criticism of this theory see: I. Singer, "The Beginning of Philistine Settlement in Canaan and the Northern Boundary of Philistia," *Tel Aviv, Journal of the Tel Aviv University Institute of Archeology* 12 (1985): 116; B. J. Stone, book review of *The Sea Peoples in the Bible* by O. Margalith in the *Jewish Quarterly Review*, New Ser., Vol. 88, 1–2 (July–October 1997): 108–112; P. Machinist, "Biblical Traditions," 67.
- 25 Joshua 19:40–48. Judges 18.
- 26 A. Biran, *Biblical Dan* (Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 1994), 105–146.
- 27 Y. Yadin, "And Dan, Why did He Remain in Ships," 20–21.
- 28 A. Mazar, "פלישתים על גדות הירקון" (Philistines on the Yarkon's Shores)" in I. Zaharoni, *דרך ארץ: אבן חרס ואדם* (*Way of Earth: Stone, Clay and Man*) (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publishing House, 1996), 296–303; Dothan & Dothan, *People of the Sea*, 223–233.
- 29 Y. Yadin, "And Dan, Why did He Remain in Ships," 20. The idea of such an early settlement at Tel Qasile was rejected by I. Singer due to the absence of the monochrome pottery that was typical of all "Sea People" settlements in the stratum ascribed by Yadin to the Denyen ("Egyptians, Canaanites and Philistines," 308–309).
- 30 Judges 5:17; Deborah reproached them for not having responded to her call to fight the Philistines, on account of their nautical occupations: "וְדָן לָמָּה יָגוּר אֲנִיּוֹת?" (and Dan, why doth he sojourn by the ships?). Y. Amit suggests another interpretation of this verse, namely that the word *yagur* (from the root *g'u'r'* = sojourn) is from the root *y'g'r'* (to be afraid) (Y. Amit, *שופטים* [Judges: Introduction and Commentary] [Tel Aviv and Jerusalem: The Magnes Press and Am Oved, 1999], 104).

- 31 A. Biran, *Biblical Dan*, 147–158.
- 32 1Sam. 13:19.
- 33 I. Singer, "לבעיית זהותו של דגון אלוהי הפלישתים:" ("On the Identity of Dagon, God of the Philistines"), *Kathedra* 54 (1984): 17–42.
- 34 S. Rodan, "מורשת וחידוש פולחנים וזיקתם הימית בערי החוף של פלשת בתקופה הרומית" ("Maritime Related Cults in the Coastal Cities of Philistia during the Roman Period: Legacy and Change") (Ph.D., Haifa University, 2003).
- 35 M. Finkelberg, *Greeks and Pre-Greeks: Aegean Prehistory and Greek Heroic Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 154–160.
- 36 Homer, *Odyssey*, 12.072 (seventh century BCE); Theocritus, *Idylls*, 13 (350 — 310 BCE); Callimachus, *Aetia (Causes)*, 24. Thiodamas the Dryopian, *Fragments*, 160. Hymn to Artemis (310 — 250? BCE); Apollonios Rhodios, *Argonautika*, I. 1175–1280 (c. 250 BCE); P. Horden and N. Purcell, *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 342; S. Vryonis, "The Water and the Sea," 117–118.
- 37 Homer, *Odyssey*, 9: 126–129; 14:187–190; 15:59.
- 38 Hesiod, *Theogony*, 9:1; Plato, *Laws*, 704d–705b; G. R. Morrow, *Plato's Cretan City: A Historical Interpretation of the "Laws"* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 95–96; P. Horden and N. Purcell, "AHR Forum: The Mediterranean and 'the New Thalassology,'" *The American Historical Review*, June 2006 (<http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/111.3/horden.html>) (22 Feb. 2007), 48.
- 39 Cited from N. Desyllas (intro. anthology and comments by M. Mountes), *View to the Aegean Sea: Face and Soul of the Natal Sea* (Athens: Synolo Publications, 1993), 11.
- 40 Censorinus: *De Die Natali* IV, 7.
- 41 P. Horden and N. Purcell, *The Corrupting Sea*, 24–25.
- 42 Socrates, in Plato, *Phaedo*, 109B.
- 43 "Amorghos" (1943), in K. Friar, *Modern Greek Poetry* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), 622.
- 44 From "Psalms II" in *Axion Esti (It is Worthy)* (1959), in K. Friar, *Modern Greek Poetry*, 611.
- 45 Three books that try to disprove this statement (R. Patai, *The Children of Noah: Jewish Seafaring in Ancient Times* [1st edition 1936, revised edition: Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999]; S. Tolkowsky, *יהודים יורדי ים [They Took to the Sea]* [Tel Aviv: Otpaz Publishers, 1970]; N. Kashtan (ed.), *Seafaring and the Jews* [London-Portland OR.: Frank Cass, 2001]), should be considered as part of three quarters of a century's attempts to prove that Jews are capable of doing whatever other nations can do. In fact, these particular examples are the exceptions that prove the rule.
- 46 *Contra Apion*, I, A: 12.
- 47 See note 3 above.
- 48 1 Kings 9: 26–28: "King Solomon also built ships in Ezion Geber... on the shore of the Red Sea. Hiram sent his fleet and some of his sailors, who were well acquainted with the sea, to serve with Solomon's men".
- 49 E. Stern, *Dor, Ruler of the Seas*, 85–148.
- 50 See for example W. Hansen, *Ariadne's Thread: A Guide to International Tales Found in Classical Literature* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 263–264; S. Rodan, "Maritime Related Cults", 39–45.
- 51 *Maccabees* 1, 13:25; 14:4;
- 52 J. H. Hayes, and S. R. Mandell, *The Jewish People in Classical Antiquity: From Alexander to Bar Kochba* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1998), 192; S. Rodan, "Maritime Related Cults", 13–15.
- 53 See for example M. Rozen "Les Marchands juifs livournais à Tunis et le commerce avec Marseille à la fin du XVII^e siècle," *Michael* 9 (1985): 87–129;

- idem., "Contest and Rivalry in Mediterranean Maritime Commerce in the First Half of the 18th Century: The Jews of Salonika and the European Presence," *Revue des Études Juives*, CXLVII (1988): 309–352; B. Arbel, "Jewish Shipowners in the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean," in idem, *Trading Nations* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 169–184; J. I. Israel, *Diasporas Within a Diaspora: Jews, Crypto-Jews and the World of Maritime Empires (1540–1740)* (Leiden: Brill, 2002).
- 54 See note 1, above.
- 55 *Qur'an* 3:64–71, Surah Ale-'Imran.
- 56 A graduate student from the University of Southampton has been studying this subject for her Ph.D thesis. Although as yet unpublished, her findings are very illuminating and deserve attention; see Eleni Stefanou's paper abstract "Ancient Greek Maritime Heritage and National Identity: The case of the Greek Maritime Museums," in "SOMA — Symposium on Mediterranean Archaeology," February 24–26, 2005 Chieti University (http://www.soma2005.org/abstract_m.htm). The paper will be published by *Archaeoress B.A.R. Series* in 2007, and I am indebted to Ms. Stephanou who sent me the ms. before publication. Another article of hers that exemplifies the use made of maritime lore to fortify national sentiments is "Embalmed Hearts — Safeguarded Bones: Individual Death, National Resurrection and Social Remembrance expressed through the Greek Maritime Past," presented at the 12th Annual Convention of the European Association of Archaeologists, held in Cracow, 19–24 September 2006, a copy of which I was able to read again thanks to Ms. Stephanou's generosity.
- 57 See, for example, G. Steiner's explanation of the way his father trained him as a "secular Talmudist": "Consciously or not, the skeptical ironist had set out for his son a secular Talmud. I was to learn how to read, how to internalize word and commentary in the hope, however chancy, that I might one day add to that commentary, to the survival of the text, a further hint of light" (*Errata: An Examined Life* [New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1997], 13).
- 58 From Heine to Ludwig Börne, Helgoland, 8 July 1820: "Ein Buch ist ihr Vaterland, ihr Besitz, ihr Herrscher, ihr Glück und ihr Unglück. Sie leben in den umfriedeten Marken dieses Buches, hier üben sie ihr unveräußerliches Bürgerrecht, hier kann man sie nicht verjagen, nicht verachten, hier sind sie stark und bewundernswürdig." (<http://www.heinrich-heine.net/boerne/boerned2.htm>).
- 59 "In Der Fremde: 'Ich hatte einst,'" translated by H. Draper, *The Complete Poems of Heinrich Heine* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 363.
- 60 "That was mere child's play. Where they have burned books, they will end up burning human beings." (German: "Das war Vorspiel nur. Dort, wo man Bücher verbrennt, verbrennt man am Ende auch Menschen"), Heinrich Heine, *Almansor* (1821).
- 61 Steiner, "Our Homeland, the Text," 25–26. Cf. N. Finkelstein, *The Ritual of New Creation: Jewish Tradition and Contemporary Literature* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1992), 6.
- 62 Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (John Hopkins University Press, 1974).
- 63 G. Bennington, *Jacques Derrida* (avec Jacques Derrida, *Circonfession*) (Paris: Seuil, 1991).
- 64 Cf. Finkelstein, *The Ritual of New Creation*, 106.
- 65 Third century BCE translation of the Hebrew Scriptures into Greek in Alexandria, Egypt. The word was used in Greek before the Septuagint with reference to the dispersal of matter as opposed to people — the sense that is used in the Septuagint (See for example Plutarch, *Lives* [ed. Bernadotte Perrin] Sol., Chapter 32, Section 4).
- 66 "יתנך ה' נגף לפני אויבך בדרך אחד תצא אליו ובשבעה דרכים תנוס לפניו והיית לזעזוע לכל ממלכות הארץ"

- 67 See B. Oded, "Exile — The Biblical Perspectives," in the present book.
- 68 E. Voegelin explains the biblical concept of history as a human effort to create order in an otherwise unintelligible sequel of events. See idem, *Order and History*, Vol. 1, *Israel and Revelation* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956), especially 453–455.
- 69 See for example *St. Augustine's City of God and Christian Doctrine*, Chapter 46: "Of the Birth of Our Saviour, Whereby the Word Was Made Flesh; And of the Dispersion of the Jews Among All Nations, as Had Been Prophesied" in: Ph. Schaff (ed.), *Early Church Fathers: Nicene & Post-Nicene Fathers, Series 1* (Grand Rapids, MI; WM. B. Erdmans Publishing Company, printed by the Christian Classics Ethereal Library [New York: The Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1890], series 1, Vol. 2; John Chrysostom, *Discourses against Judaizing Christians*, translated by P. W. Harkins in *The Fathers of the Church*, Vol. 68 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1979), especially homily No. 9.
- 70 *Qur'an* 59.2,4 "It was Allah who drove [Yathrib] the (Jewish) People from their homes and into exile. They refused to believe. You did not think that they would go away. And they imagined that their strongholds would protect them against Allah. But Allah's Torment came at them from where they did not suspect. He terrorized them. Their homes were destroyed. So learn a lesson, men who have eyes. This is My warning. Had I not decreed the expulsion of the Jews, banishing them into the desert, I would have punished them in this world, and in the next they shall taste the punishment of Hell Fire.... That is because they resisted Allah and His Messenger. If any one resists Allah, verily Allah is severe in Punishment, stern in reprisal."
- 71 The expression found in Genesis 49:5 *Kelei hamas mekheroteiem* [כלי חמס מכרותיהם], which refers to Simon and Levi's characters as presented in Jacob's blessing of the Israelite tribes, is the only other expression in the bible that somewhat resembles the one in Ezekiel. The problem is that in the Genesis version, the diacritical marks are not identical to those in Ezekiel, and the word in Genesis should be read *mekheroteihem*. The Aramaic translation of the Bible (attributed to Onkelos), written in the second century CE, translates this expression as: "in their dwelling place they are heroes." According to him, the "k" in the root k'u'r' was replaced by a "g", resulting in the word *megeureihem*, which, with some stretch of the imagination, can be understood as *megureihem*, i.e. their dwelling place. Most modern linguists follow this explanation, and reject the identification of the word with the Greek: μάχαρα = sword, offered by *Midrash Tanhuma*, written approximately at the same period as the Onkelos translation. The *Tanhuma* explanation would yield the following translation: "Their swords are those of violence" which makes much more sense in the Biblical context than the former explanation. See also M. Bernal, *Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization*, Vol. 3, *The Linguistic Evidence* (New Brunswick NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2006), 171. The rejection of the μάχαρα explanation is part of the rigid view entertained by Hebrew linguists that no Greek words found their way into the Old Testament. Words such as *eshet lapidot* [אשת לפידות] (Judges 4:4) are explained as "the wife of Lapidot," despite the fact that *lapidot* is a *hapax legomenon*, and a far more plausible explanation would be "the woman with the torch" or, "the torch-bearer" [*lampadeforos*; λαμπαδηφόρος]. For more examples, see: O. Margalith, *The Sea People in the Bible*, 32–41.
- 72 Plato, *Timaeus and Critias*, 705–804, in *The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. 3, 4th edn., trans. B. Jowett (London: Clarendon Press, Oxford UK, 1951). For all the meanings of the word in Greek classical literature, see www.chlt.org/slips/11082004/UTF8/xw/114481.weave.html. The *khora* has captured the imagination of several modern philosophers. J. Kristeva took the feminine connota-

- tions of the word *khora* to express the stage of infancy in which maternally-oriented primary processes govern human existence. *Khora* is a stage in which the child is unable to differentiate between himself and his mother. Her semiotic *khora* is a matrix-like space that is nourishing, indefinable, and exists prior to the individual: "An essentially mobile and extremely provisional articulation constituted by movements and their ephemeral stases." ("The Semiotic *Chora* Ordering the Drives," in idem, *Revolution in Poetic Language*, trans. Margaret Waller [New York: Columbia UP, 1984] 25–26); M. Sarup, *An Introductory Guide to Post-Structuralism and Postmodernism*, 2nd Ed. (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1993), 124; E. Grosz, *Space, Time and Perversion* (Routledge: New York & London, 1995), 112.
- On the various meanings of *khora* as a lesson in postmodernism, see J. Derida, "Khora," in idem, *On the Name* (ed. T. Dutoit) (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 89–127. On the feminine qualities of the *khora*, see E. Grosz, *Space, Time and Perversion* (Routledge: New York & London, 1995), 112.
- 73 This combination, as well as **KUR-URU**, is found in Hittite. For the whole discussion, see: <http://www.sumerian.org/sumerian.html>.
- 74 Psalms 48:3.
- 75 Ur Kasdim = "Ur of the Chaldees" (Chaldeans), the homeland of the Patriarch Abraham, was translated in the Septuagint as "Chora = the country of the Chaldeans."
- 76 S.N. Kramer, *The Sumerians: Their History, Culture, and Character* (Chicago: University Press of Chicago, 1963), 146–147; E. Apillsthar, "Sex in Ancient Mesopotamia," *History & Archaeology*, Vol. II, Issue I, 16 June 2003 (www.ancientworlds.net/aw/Article/153993)
- 77 Martin Bernal tried to trace the origins of *Khora* (see *Black Athena*, Vol. 3, 200). Obviously I do not agree with his views regarding the origins of this word.
- 78 Accepting this theory would mean not only rejecting the connection k'u'r' — *mekhorah*, but also accepting most of Martin Bernal's works on the "Black Athena" and its Afroasian roots; See *Black Athena*, Vol. 2, 63–77.
- 79 *Living abroad*, Timae 139, Nomoi 4.708d, Nic. Dam. 1032 J., Str. 14.5.13, Luc. Patr. Enc.8; c. pro/jtinaj Aristeas 257; *live in exile*, J.A/16.11.8.
- See George Henry Liddell and Robert Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon* (New York: Harper & Brothers, Pub., 1869), s.v. I was unable to find their reference to *Timaeus*. See also Isocrates, *Speeches and Letters* (ed. George Norlin) (<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Isoc.+5+120>), and the Greek version <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Isoc.+5+121>; Polybius, *Histories*, Book 12, Chapter 25, Section 1 (<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Plb.+12.25h+1>); Polybius, *Histories*, Book 12, Chapter 28, Section 5. (<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Plb.+12.28.1>).
- 80 On the idea of *xeniteia* in Greek history, see below, chapter 3, in the present paper.
- 81 A. Killbrew, *Biblical Peoples*, 197–245.
- 82 See Panagiotis Doukellis, "Between Greek Colonies and Mother-Cities: Some Thoughts," in the present book, as well as J. Boardman, *The Greeks Overseas: The Archeology of Their Early Colonies and Trade* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex and Baltimore Maryland: Penguin Books, 1973).
- 83 I. Singer, "On the Identity of Dagon." Other Aegean deities seem to have amalgamated with their near eastern equivalents, such as Astarte ('Ashtoret)-Aphrodite Urania (O. Margalith, *The Sea Peoples in the Bible*, 32–41). Margalith believes that the Philistines maintained their original imported cults, but that the local people gave the Philistines Greek Gods the names of Semitic gods they recognized. However most of his examples are from the Hellenistic period on, which casts doubt on this statement.

- 84 T. Dothan & M. Dothan, *People of the Sea: The Search for the Philistines* (New York: Macmillan, 1992), 174–175, 177; Finkelberg, *Greeks and Pre-Greeks*, 158–159.
- 85 Near Salerno. As a Greek colony it was founded around 600 BCE. Its heyday continued until 438 BCE. The festival mentioned in the poem dates from the end of the fourth century BCE (*Athenaeus*, Book 14, 31a).
- 86 “Poseidonians” (August 1906), *Collected Poems* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) (translated from the Greek by Edmund Keeley and Philip Sherrard), 193.
- 87 Probably the grammarian of the Trajan and Hadrian period (98–138 CE).
- 88 “Going Back Home From Greece” (July 1914) *Collected Poems* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) (translated from the Greek by Edmund Keeley and Philip Sherrard), 199.
- 89 S. Vryonis, Jr. *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Centuries* (Berkeley: California University Press, 1971). 452–462, 481–96; P. Kitromilides, “Greek Irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus” in idem, *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy* (Variorum, 1994), note. 17 (<http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/www.cyprus-conflict.net/kitromilides.html>).
- 90 2 Kings 15:27–29; 16–18; R. Zadok, *The Jews in Babylon during the Chaldean and Achaemenian Periods according to Babylonian Sources* (Haifa, 1979); idem, *The Earliest Diaspora: Israelites and Judeans in Pre-Hellenistic Mesopotamia* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2002).
- 91 2 Kings 17:6; 18:11. See I. M. Diakonoff, “*ry mdy*: The Cities of the Medes,” in M. Cogan and I. Eph’al (eds.), *Ah Assyria....Studies in Assyrian History and Ancient Near East Historiography*, presented to H. Tadmor (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1991) 13–20; B. Becking, *The Fall of Samaria* (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 61–73; K. L. Younger Jr. “The Deportations of the Israelites,” *Journal of Biblical Literature* 117(1998): 201–227; B. Oded, “The Settlements of the Israelites and Judean Exiles in Mesopotamia in the 8th–6th Centuries BCE,” in G. Galil and M. Weidenfeld (eds.), *Studies in Historical Geography and Biblical Historiography presented to Zecharia Kallai* (Leiden-Boston-Köln: Brill, 2000), 94–97; G. Galil, “Israelite Exiles in Media: A New Look at ND2443+” (Forthcoming). My thanks to Prof. Gershon Galil for this information.
- 92 See: E. G. Kraeling, *The Brooklyn Museum Aramaic Papyri: New Documents of the Fifth Century B.C. from the Jewish Colony at Elephantine* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), 44 ff, and extensive bibliography there. See also B. Forten, *The Elephantine Papyri in English: Three Millennia of Cross-Cultural Continuity and Change* (Leiden: Brill, 1996).
- 93 *Ibid.*, document B51, 264.
- 94 (B. Porten, *The Elephantine Papyri*, documents B17–B22, 135–151; B37–B38, 212–219).
- 95 The letter sent by a certain Hananiah to Jedaniah and the Jewish troop in Elephantine, does not reveal who the addressor was, where it was written, or even why it was sent. It may have been a response to a request sent from Elephantine by Judeans who wished to refresh their knowledge of the holiday procedures. It may also have been a response to the tension between the worshippers of Khnum and the Jewish troop, that made it necessary to substantiate the holidays procedure in case the Jewish troop were barred from practising them (*ibid.*, document B13, 125–126).
- 96 Jeremiah 44.
- 97 M. Jastrow, Jr. “Descent of the Goddess Ishtar into the Lower World,” in idem, *The Civilization of Babylonia and Assyria: Its Remains, Language, History, Religion, Commerce, Law, Art, and Literature* (Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott, 1915) (*Sacred-Texts*. 2 June 2002) (<http://www.sacred-texts.com/ane/ishtar.htm>); D. A. Mackenzie, *Myths of Babylonia and Assyria* (London:

- Gresham, 1915); J. Campbell, *The Masks of God: Occidental Mythology* (New York: Penguin, 1976); *The Epic of Gilgamesh*, trans. N. K. Sandars (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985); F. Guirand, "Assyro-Babylonian Mythology," *New Larousse Encyclopedia of Mythology*, trans. Aldington and Ames (London: Hamlyn, 1968), 49–72; G. S. Kirk, *Myth: Its Meaning and Functions in Ancient and Other Cultures* (Berkeley: Cambridge UP, 1973); D. Wolkstein and S. N. Kramer, *Inanna: Queen of Heaven and Earth* (New York: Harper & Row, 1983).
- 98 Jer. 7:18.
- 99 Josephus (*Antiquities* XII:ii passim) On the provenance and meaning of this document, see below.
- 100 "The number of those whom he transported from the country of the Jews to Egypt amounted to no less than a hundred thousand. Of these he armed thirty thousand picked men and settled them in garrisons in the country districts. (And even before this time large numbers of Jews had come into Egypt with the Persian, and in an earlier period still others had been sent to Egypt to help Psammetichus in his campaign against the king of the Ethiopians. But these were nothing like so numerous as the captives whom Ptolemy the son of Lagus transported.) (14). As I have already said Ptolemy picked out the best of these, the men who were in the prime of life and distinguished for their courage, and armed them, but the great mass of the others, those who were too old or too young for this purpose, and the women too, he reduced to slavery.." (*The Letter Of Aristeas*, edited by R.H. Charles] Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1913], 13–14).
- 101 B. Porten, *Archives from Elephantine* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), 13.
- 102 Ibid. See also A. H. Sayce, "The Jewish Garrison and Temple in Elephantinê," *The Expositor*, 8th Series, 2 (1911): 111–114), and "The Jews and their Temple in Elephantinê," *ibid.*, 420–1.
- 103 Ibid. See also *Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century*, ed. A. Cowley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1923), Introduction, xvi, xix–xx; D. W. Rooke, *Zadok's Heirs: The Role and Development of the High Priesthood in Ancient Israel* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 179.
- 104 B. Porten, *Archives from Elephantine*, 13.
- 105 J. Méléze Modrzejewski, *The Jews of Egypt: From Rameses II to Emperor Hadrian* (Philadelphia PA: Jewish Publication Society, 1995), 25–26.
- 106 For the historical dispute on this issue, and an analysis of the relevant documentation, see B. Bar-Kochva, *Pseudo-Hecataeus*, "On the Jews," *Legitimizing the Jewish Diaspora* (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California Press, 1996). Cf. J. Méléze-Modrzejewski, "Jewish Law and Hellenistic Legal Practice" (www.juedisches-recht.de/rechtsgeschichte-hellenistic-practice.htm).
- 107 See A. Kasher, "The Jewish *Politeuma* in Alexandria: A Pattern of Jewish Communal Life in the Greco-Roman Diaspora," in the present book.
- 108 *Εἰς Φλάκκον (Adversus Flaccum)*, cf. H. Z. Hirschberg, *תולדות היהודים באפריקה הצפונית (History of the Jews in North Africa)* (Jerusalem: Mossad Bialik, 1965), Vol. 1, 3–6. Obviously, an inflated number.
- 109 On the development of Hellenistic Judaism, see E. S. Gruen, "Hellenistic Judaism," in D. Biale (ed.), *Cultures of the Jews* (New York: Schocken Books, 2002), 77–134.
- 110 See, for example, a third-century CE inscription from the synagogue of Stobi, Macedonia, stating that fines would be paid "to the Patriarch," i.e., the contemporary head of Palestinian Jewry (M. Hengel, "Die Synagogeninschrift von Stobi," *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 57(1966), 145–183; D. R. Schwartz, "How at Home were the Jews of the Hellenistic Diaspora?," *Classical Philology* 95.3 (2000), 356.

- 111 Ibid., 349–357.
- 112 E.C. Gruen, “Hellenistic Judaism,” 117–124, and especially 119.
- 113 J. Méléze-Modrzejewski, “Jewish Law and Hellenistic Legal Practice in the Light of Greek Papyri from Egypt,” in *Collatio Iuris Romani* (1995), 299–315 (also at www.juedisches-recht.de/rechtsgeschichte-hellenistic-practice.htm).
- 114 Since the term *khora* was used in Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt to denote the land around Alexandria, where the “natives” rather than the citizens of the Polis, resided, it should be emphasized yet again that I am using it here, as elsewhere, in its other sense, i.e. homeland. For *khora* meaning the land of Egypt as opposed to Alexandria, see *OGI*56.5 (Canopus, iii B. C.), *PHib*.1.27.167 (iii B. C.); M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972); J. Méléze-Modrzejewski, “Jewish Law and Hellenistic Legal Practice.”
- 115 L. H. Feldman, *Jew and Gentile in the Ancient World: Attitudes and Interactions from Alexander to Justinian* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 139, 559.
- 116 His “Geography” is described by the Encyclopedia Britannica as “the only extant work covering the whole range of peoples and countries known to both Greeks and Romans during the reign of Augustus (27 BCE— 14 CE).” Strabo himself had traveled throughout the length of the Roman Empire, from Tuscany, through Europe and Asia Minor, down to Egypt, and up the Nile River to the border of Ethiopia. The citation is brought in Josephus in קדמוניות היהודים (*Antiquities of the Jews*), 14:115.
- 117 E.C. Gruen, “Hellenistic Judaism,” 120.
- 118 For more on these rebellions and their meaning, see below.
- 119 See Aviezer Ravitzky’s paper “A Land Adored Yet Feared: The Land of Israel in Jewish Tradition,” in the present book.
- 120 H. L. Liddell & R. Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), s.v.
- 121 For *xeniteia* as an experience of monasticism, see John Climacus, “On Exile,” *The Ladder of Divine Ascent* (translated by Colm Luibheid and Norman Russell) (Paulist Press: Mahwah, NJ, 1982), 85–91. John Climacus (c. 579–649 CE) was abbot of the Monastery of Catherine on Mount Sinai. His *Ladder* was the most widely used handbook of ascetic life in the ancient Greek Church. On *xeniteia* as a familial experience, see G. M. Saunier, *Το δημοτικό τραγούδι της ξενιτιάς* (*The Folk Songs of Xeniteia*), (Athens: Ermis, 1983), 58. See also Jurodivyĭ, ξενιτεία (Posted Friday, 23 April 2004) (<http://Xeniteia.typepad.com/Xeniteia/exile/index.html>). For *xeniteia* as the condition of Greek mercenaries abroad, see M. Trundle “Ancient Greek Mercenaries (664–250 BCE),” *History Compass* 3.1 (2005) (<http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1478-0542.2005.00116.x>)
- 122 G.M. Saunier, *The Folk Songs of Xeniteia*, 58.
- 123 See I. Malkin, *The Returns of Odysseus: Colonization and Ethnicity* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1998), 9–10.
- 124 See, for example, M. Alexopoulou, “Nostos and the Impossibility of ‘A Return to the Same’: From Homer to Seferis,” *New Voices in Classical Reception Studies* 1(2006):1–9 (www2.open.ac.uk/ClassicalStudies/GreekPlays); N. Sultan, *Exile and the Poetics of Loss in the Greek Tradition* (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999). See also a review by A. Leontis in the *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 18.2 (2000): 461–465; I. Chrissochoidis, “From the Garden of Diaspora to the Cell of Repatriation: Hellenism in the Life and Works of Nikos Astrinidis,” abstract from the International Musicological Conference on “Aspects of Hellenism in Music,” May 5–7, 2006, organized by the State Symphony Orchestra and the Ionian University (<http://www.ionio.gr/Tmssyned/02/calleng.htm>), 38–39; A. Bouteneff, “Exiles on Stage: Greek

- Pontian Theater, 1922–1972,” *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 14.1 (1996): 49–51. The same theme of the impossible return recurs in modern Greek cinema. Most of Theo Angelopoulos’ films are based on this idea (Ταξίδι στα Κύθηρα [Voyage to Cythera] 1984; Τοπίο στην ομίχλη [Landscape in the Mist] 1989; Το Βλέμμα του Οδυσσέα [Ulysses’ Gaze] 1995; Το Λιβάδι που δακρύζει [The Weeping Meadow], and others. So is Pantelis Voulgaris’ Πέτρινα Χρόνια [Stone Years] 1985.
- 125 Idem. See also Shmuel Refael, “Spain, Greece or Jerusalem? The Yearning for the Motherland in the Poetry of Greek Jews” in the present book.
- 126 See, for example, a description of this day in עיר ואם בישראל (Salonika: A Jewish Metropolis) (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv: The Institute for Research of Salonikan Jewish Jewry, 1967), 153–154.
- 127 Yehudah HaLevi was born circa 1080 probably in Toledo. He lived most of his life in Cordova, and died while on pilgrimage to Jerusalem (1140). He was a philosopher and poet who dedicated much of his work to the yearning for Zion. This poem was translated by Bernard Lewis, *Music of a Distant Drum: Classical Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Hebrew Poems* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), 186.
- 128 This poem was translated by Moshe Miller (http://www.kabbalaonline.org/Meditations/shabbatprayers/Lecha_Dodi_new_translation.asp).
- 129 “Lyrisches Intermezzo,” translated by H. Draper, *The Complete Poems*, 62(b).
- 130 See Aviezer Ravitzky’s paper in the present work. See also M. Rozen, הקהילה היהודית בירושלים במאה הי”ז (*The Jewish Community in Jerusalem in the Seventeenth Century*), (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University and the Ministry of Defense Publishing House, 1985), 280–281.
- 131 By way of illustration, see B. C. Roth, תולדות היהודים באיטליה (*History of the Jews in Italy*) (Tel Aviv: Massadah, 1962), 129. Especially interesting is the comment by Laudadio da Rieti, a Jewish banker and Talmudic scholar of the mid-sixteenth century, that he preferred his beloved city Siena to some imaginary home in Jerusalem.
- 132 See Shmuel Refael’s paper in the present book.
- 133 For Lorca and Toledo congregations in Manisa 1544, see R. Mosheh ben Yosef Mi-Trani, שאלות ותשובות (*Responsa*) (Lemberg, 1861), Vol.1, § 84.
- 134 See M. Rozen, “Individual and Community in Jewish Society of the Ottoman Empire: Salonika in the Sixteenth Century,” *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire* (ed. A. Levi), (Princeton NJ: Darwin Press, 1994), 215–274.
- 135 Toledo (Tulitula) regulations on the inheritance of a deceased woman who died without live offspring: R. Mosheh ben Yosef Mi-Trani, *Responsa*, Vol. 1, § 89. Toledo regulations on legal deeds: R. Shemuel de Medina, שאלות ותשובות (*Responsa*) (Lemberg, 1865), חושן משפט (*Hoshen Mishpat*), § 222.
- 136 On the Customs of Andalusia and Castilia regarding levirate marriage in cases where the levir has converted to Christianity: R. Yom-Tov Tzahalon, שאלות ותשובות החדשות (*New Responsa*) (Jerusalem: Or ha-Mizrah Institute, 1980), § 158; R. Avraham ben Mordekhai HaLevi, שאלות ותשובות גינת ורדים (*Responsa Ginat Veradim*) (Jerusalem: Yismah Mosheh Institute, 1991–1992), אבן העזר (*Even ha-‘Ezer*), §. 90, notes 5–6.
- 137 See below.
- 138 See below, and also A. Danon, “לה איסטוריה ישראלית אין טורקיה” (“La istoria israelita in Turcia”), איל פרוגרסו (*El Progreso*) 4, 1888), 57–59; M. Rozen, “The Hamidian Period through the Jewish Looking Glass: A Study of the Rabbinical Court Records of Istanbul,” *Turcica*, 37 (2005): 113–154. Santo Simo, “דון יצחק אברבנאל: דרמה היסטורית בחמש מערכות” (“Don Yitzhaq Abrabanel: A Historical Drama in Five Acts”), המבשר (*Ha-Mevasser*), Vol. 2, issues 7–8, 88–91; 9, 104–105; 10, 115–117; 11, 129–131; 12, 139–142; 13–14, 163–166. Mordekhai ben Hillel HaKohen, “עצם אל עצם” (“Bone to Bone”),

- ibid., Vol.1, issue 19, 292–294; Ish Dameseq, “כל ישראל זה לזה” (“All Jews are Responsible for Each Other”), ibid., 294–295.
- 139 For the lyrics and an English translation, see <http://dbs-win.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/sefarad-scripts/Lyrik.pl>. See also S. Weich-Shahak, “Observaciones sobre el Romancero Sefardí de tradición oral — motivos míticos y foco temático,” (http://parnaseo.uv.es/Lemir/Revista/Revista6/AMPARO_RICO/susana.htm).
- 140 See below.
- 141 See, Shmuel Refael, “Spain, Greece or Jerusalem”, in the preset book: the songs “Xronia ime makriasou” (= Χρόνια είμαι μακριά σου; I am years away), and “Saloniki mou glikia patrida doxazmeni [sic!]” (= Θεσσαλονίκη μου γλυκαία πατρίδα δοξασμένη [“Salonika, my sweet, glorious fatherland”]).
- 142 M. Slobin, *Tenement Songs: The Popular Music of Jewish Immigrants* (Urbana-Chicago-London: University of Illinois Press, 1982), 150–152.
- 143 Ibid., 152–153.
- 144 Ibid., 158–163.
- 145 Glière was a Soviet composer of German descent (1875–1956). See also “Reinhold Glière, Life and Work” (<http://www.schnadt-web.de/index8.htm>). See on his life and work http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reinhold_Gliere.
- 146 <http://www.jmwc.org/pdf/IsaKremer.pdf#search=%22ghetto%20song%20Beltz%22>.
- 147 See <http://shakti.trincoll.edu/~mendelevol05/vol05.062>. The poem was translated by Nitza Tobi. (http://www.nizza-thobi.com/papirene_kinder.htm). I took the liberty of making minor corrections.
- 148 For an example of food as an expression of nostos, see E. Eden and N. Stavroulakis, *Salonika: A Family Cookbook* (Athens: Talos Press, 1997), and Tassos Boulmetis’ film *Politiki Kouzina* (literally Constantinople Cuisine, distributed under the title “A Touch of Spice”) (Greek-Turkish production 2003); I. Romain Ors, “Politiki Kouzina or Cosmopolitanism à la Polita: at the Crossroads of Memory and Nostalgia,” a paper presented in the international conference *Moving Frontiers: Mediterranean Entangled Histories (15th–20th centuries)*, held at the University of Thessaly, Volos, 25–26 April 2007 (<http://extras.ha.uth.gr/mfmed/abstract.ors.shtml>).
- 149 First published in 1946. Reprinted in 2003 (Philadelphia: Paul Dry Books, 2003).
- 150 New York: Riverside Books, 1996.
- 151 Translated by C. Hawkesworth and C. Pribičević-Zoric (London and Portland OR: Valentine Mitchell, 1997).
- 152 Z. Lešić, “Isak Samokovlija, Life and Work,” ibid., 169–178.
- 153 Tel Aviv: Massadah, 1978.
- 154 See, for example, ספר דומברוביצה (*Dombrowice Memorial Book*) (Tel Aviv: Publication of the Israel Organization of Dombrowice Landsmanschaft), 1964, 19–251. Online digital images of entire memorial books exist at the New York Public Library, Dorot Division (<http://www.nypl.org/research/chss/jws/yizkorbooksall.cfm>).
- 155 See, for example Alona Frenkel, ילדה (*Child*) (Tel Aviv: Mapa, 2004).
- 156 See, for example, Jerzy Kosinski, *The Painted Bird* (New York: The Grove Press, 1976) (first published in 1965); Aharon Appelfeld, ספור חיים (*The Story of a Life*) (Jerusalem: Keter, 1999) (translated into English: *The Story of a Life* by Aloma Halter [New York: Schocken Books, 2004]).
- 157 Of the prolific literature on this subject, see, for example, H. Kaminer, “הדחקה בערות ובשינה — מנגנון הסתגלותי בהתמודדות עם החוויות הטראומטיות של ניצולי שואה” (“Repression during Sleep as an Adaptive Coping Mechanism for Holocaust Survivors: A Research Study”), in R. Malkinson, S. Rubin and E.

- Witztum, *אובדן ושכול בחברה הישראלית* (*Loss and Bereavement in Jewish Society in Israel*) (Jerusalem: Ministry of Defense Publishing House and Cana Press, 1993), 71–89.
- 158 B. Feingold, "השיבה אל גיא ההריגה — הפעמונים ורכבות" ("Bells and Trains — The Return to the Slaughter Pit") in *השואה בדrama העברית* (*The Holocaust in Hebrew Drama*) (Tel Aviv: Ha-Kibbutz ha-Meuhad, 1989), 65–74; I. Milner, *קרעי עבר: ביוגרפיה, זהות וזיכרון בסיפורת הדור השני* (*Past Present: Biography, Identity and Memory in Second Generation Literature*) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved Publishers, 2003), 111–117. See more below.
- 159 New York: St. Martin's Press, 2002.
- 160 Yekke is a derogatory term for a German Jew, coined by non-German Jews in 1930s Palestine German Jewish. The name expresses the cultural abyss that existed between these refugees and the East-European immigrants, who comprised the majority of the Yishuv at that time. The name is supposedly an acronym of *Yehudi Qesheh Havanah* ("A dull-witted Jew").
- 161 Immigrants from Eastern Europe.
- 162 See below.
- 163 See, for example, A. Alexandris, "The Greek Census of Anatolia and Thrace (1910–1912): A Contribution to Ottoman Historical Demography," in D. Gondicas and C. Issawi (eds.), *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 66–67.
- 164 For more information on him, see: I. Cazan and E. Denize, *Marile puteri și spațiul românesc în secolele XV–XVI*, Chapter 7 (http://www.unibuc.ro/eBooks/istorie/mai_puteri/Capitolul%20VIII.htm).
- 165 M. Alexiou, *The Ritual Lament in Greek Tradition*. Second edition, revised by D. Yatromanolakis and P. Roilos (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 83–101. See also D. Wright, review of the book in *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* 10.01.2003 (<http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/bmcr/2003/2003-01-10.html>); M. Dobre, "The Venetians in Fifteenth-Century Byzantine Folk Songs," in Șerban Marin, Rudolf Dinu and Ion Bulei (eds.), *Annuario. Istituto Romeno di cultura e ricerca umanistica* 4 (2002), (Venice, 2002) (http://www.geocities.com/serban_marin/dobre2002.html).
- 166 M. Herzfeld, *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology and the Making of Modern Greece* (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1982), 123–139. See also a review of this book by G. Kligman in *American Ethnologist* 11.1 (February 1984): 213–214 ([http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0094-0496\(198402\)11%3A1%3C213%3A00MFI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q](http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0094-0496(198402)11%3A1%3C213%3A00MFI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q)).
- 167 M. Alexiou, *The Ritual Lament in Greek Tradition*, 89.
- 168 This translation can be found at: www.greece.org/poseidon/work/occupation/constantinople.html. For a different translation, see M. Alexiou, *The Ritual Lament in Greek Tradition*, 93–94.
- 169 *Ibid.*, 92–94.
- 170 *Ibid.*, 224, note 31.
- 171 *Ibid.*, 94.
- 172 <http://www.ellopos.net/elpenor/vasilief/constantine-xi-capture-of-constantinople.asp>. On the circumstances of his death, see D. M. Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, Canto edition, 1992). See also: http://www.myriobiblos.gr/texts/english/nicol_condeath.html.
- 173 S. Roussos "Τουρκία, Εγγύς και Μέση Ανατολή" ("Turkey, the Near and Middle East") in I. Hassiotis, O. Katsiardi-Hering and E.A. Abatzi (eds.) *Οι Έλληνες στη διασπορά* (*The Greeks in Diaspora*) (Athens: The Greek Parliament, 2006), 213–215.
- 174 <http://nauplion.net/Elytis.html>.
- 175 <http://www.greece.org/poseidon/work/occupation/constantinople.html>.
- 176 From the Hagadah (<http://www.sacred-texts.com/jud/hagada.txt>).

- 177 L. Politis, *A History of Modern Greek Literature* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1973), 37.
- 178 I. Romain Ors, "Beyond the Greek and Turkish Dichotomy: The Rum Polites of Istanbul and Athens," *South European Society and Politics* 11.1 (March 2006): 91. This has been given an official ratification when Greeks in Turkey were included in the book published by the Greek Parliament recently (see above, note 173).
- 179 "Hellenism, like the Acropolis, has generated numerous struggles of interpretation and confrontations about its control. To this day, these interpretive battles ceaselessly haunt Greeks; they continue to affect the way Greeks view their state, circumscribe their nation, define their present unity, even count their friends and enemies." A. Leontis, *Topographies of Hellenism: Mapping the Homeland* (Cornell University Press, 1995), 68. For more on this subject, see pp. 68–72 in the present paper.
- 180 See, for example, Costis Palamas, *The Twelve Words of the Gypsy* (1907), Trans. Th. Stephanides and G. Katsimbalis (London 1974).
- 181 A. Leontis, *Topographies of Hellenism*, 67–102, 132–171.
- 182 N. Politis, *Εκλογή από τα τραγούδια του ελληνικού λαού* (*Selection of Greek Folk songs*) (Athens, 1932), 199.
- 183 V. Liapis, *Μενάνδρου γνώμαι μονόστιχοι*. Εισαγωγή, μετάφραση, σχόλια (Athens: Stigme, 2002), 529. Reviewed by Antonis K. Petrides, Trinity College, *Cambridge Bryn Mawr Classical Review*. 2003.04.11 (<http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/bmcr/2003/2003-04-11.html>); See also R. Clogg, "The Greek Diaspora in Historical Context," 17, note 1.
- 184 G. Holst-Warhaft, "Re-evaluating the Nisiotika." Paper presented at the VIth Convention of the Study Group on the Anthropology of Music in Mediterranean Cultures — International Council for Traditional Music (Unesco) "Music in the Mediterranean Islands," Venice, 10–12 June 2004. (http://research.umBCE.edu/eol/MA/index/number10/holst/holst_0.htm).
- 185 G. M. Saunier, *The Folk songs of Xeniteia*, 58.
- 186 I am referring to Nicolas Gage's autobiographical novel *Eleni* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1984), one of the key themes of which is male satisfaction abroad as opposed to female dissatisfaction at home.
- 187 G. M. Saunier, *The Folk Songs of Xeniteia*, 59.
- 188 *Ibid.*, 61–62.
- 189 *Ibid.*, 68.
- 190 *Ibid.*, 295.
- 191 E. Petropoulos, *Songs of the Greek Underworld: The Rebetika Tradition* (translated from the Greek, with an introduction and commentary by Ed Emery) (London: Saqi, 2000), 67–75.
- 192 Comparable to the Yiddish "Oy Vey," or to the Arabic "Wai, Wai" and the Hebrew "Avoy, Avoy."
- 193 N. Pappas, "Concepts of Greekness: The Recorded Music of Anatolian Greeks after 1922," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 17(1999): 362, note 36. The *sousta* is a type of folk dance that owes its name to the fact that the dancers look as if they are walking on springs (σούστα in Greek = spring). The *sousta* is said to imitate the motion of the sea and the waves. Although it is considered an islanders' dance, it has many versions, one of which is the Politiki, i.e., the Istanbul version.
- 194 The lyrics of the Turkish song are taken from a poem by Abdulhak Hamit Tarhan, one of the most influential poets of the late Ottoman period. In 1885, on his way back to Istanbul from Bombay where he served as the Ottoman Ambassador, his wife died in Beirut. This poem is an expression of his grief.
- 195 See, for example, Pappas, *ibid.*, 362.
- 196 See, for example, K. Ferris, *Ρεμπέτικο* (*Rebetico*) (Athens: Nea Synora, 2000); E.

- Petropoulos, *Songs of the Greek Underworld: The Rebetika Tradition* (translated from the Greek, with an introduction and additional text by Ed Emery) (London: Saqi, 2000).
- 197 See N. Pappas, "Concepts of Greekness," 362–366.
- 198 1892 Lesbos — 1969 Athens, *Η Παναγία η Γοργόνα* (Athens, 1949) (2nd ed. 1955). On the connection between the passage of time and the conservation modes of past memories see P. Papailias, *Genres of Recollection: Archival Poetics and Modern Greece (Anthropology, History and the Critical Imagination)* (New York NY and Houndsmill England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 101–102.
- 199 F. Bouteneff, "Exiles on Stage," 58.
- 200 L. Politis, *A History of Modern Greek Literature*, 21–25.
- 201 For more on the play and on Pontic theatre, see Fann, "In-Between States: The Uses of Liminality in the Pontic Theatre," *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook* 8 (1992): 273–291; idem, "Pontic Performance: Minority Theater vs. Greek Ideology," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 9/1 (1991): 107–122.
- 202 See my article "Jews and Greeks Remember their Past: The Political Career of Rabbi Tzevi Koretz, 1933–1943," in *Jewish Social Studies* 12.1(2005): 111–165.
- 203 Just as an example: Y. Kaniuk, *היהודי האחרון (The Last Jew)* (Tel Aviv: Ha-Kibbutz ha-Meuhad, 1981); R. Almog, *שרשי אור (Air Roots)* (Tel Aviv: Ha-Kibbutz ha-Meuhad, 1987); D. Grossman, *עין ערך אהבה (Sub Verbo "Love")* (Tel Aviv: Ha-Kibbutz ha-Meuhad, 1986); E. Mazia, *רומן משפחתי (The Unsatisfied)* (Tel Aviv: Keshet, 2005).
- 204 A. Appelfeld, *פולין ארץ ירוקה (Poland — A Green Country)* (Jerusalem: Keter, 2005).
- 205 See note 156, in the present paper.
- 206 A. Appelfeld, *פרחי האפלה (The Flowers of Darkness)* (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 2005). See, also, review by Y. Avni-Levi, "בכל אשר ילך" "הוא שומע את הקולות" ("Wherever He Goes He Hears the Voices"), in *Ha'aretz Literary Supplement* 25.11.2006 <http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=687853&contrassID=2&suBCEontrassID=12&sbSuBCEontrassID=0>.
- 207 Cf. *ספור חיים (The Story of a Life)*, 52–59.
- 208 D. Mash'ani, "איפה אנחנו חיים, איפה רצינו לחיות: בין רחביה למאה שערים" ("Where do we live? Where did we want to live? — Between Rehavyah and Me'ah She'arim"), in *מוסף ספרותי הארץ (Ha'aretz Literary Supplement)*, 24 September 2006 (<http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=765999>).

Exile — The Biblical Perspectives

- 1 On the difference between forced relocation and chosen relocation from the sociological and psycho-social point of view see D. L. Smith, *The Religion of the Landless: The Social Context of the Babylonian Exile* (Bloomington, IN: Meyer-Stone Books, 1989), 50–65.
- 2 See I. Finestien, "Assimilation in Israel and in America," *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 42 (2000): 89.
- 3 For the problem of continuity and discontinuity in relation to exile and return, see W. Brueggemann, "A Shattered Transcendence? Exile and Restoration," in S. J. Kraftchick, et al. (eds.), *Biblical Theology. Problems and Perspectives* (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1995), 169–182 and the references to previous studies, esp. to P. R. Ackroyd, note 19; J. M. G. Barclay, *Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora: From Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE–117 CE)* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996).
- 4 D. and J. Boyarin claim that "crucial to this construction of Jewish history and

- identity is the simple fact, often consciously and unconsciously suppressed, that Diaspora is not the forced product of war and destruction — taking place after the downfall of Judah — but already in the centuries before this downfall, the majority of the Jews lived outside the land.” D. Boyarin and J. Boyarin “Diaspora: Generation and the Ground of Jewish Identity,” *Critical Inquiry* 19 (1993): 721–722. This claim is without textual basis. What evidence do they have to substantiate their claim? What does “Jews” mean before 586 B.C.E.? Were the population of the northern kingdom of Israel “Jews” before and after deportation by the Assyrians?
- 5 For discussions and bibliography see J. M. Scott (ed.), *Exile: Old Testament, Jewish, and Christian Conceptions* (Leiden, the Netherlands, New York, NY: Brill, 1997); L. L. Grabbe, *Leading Captivity Captive: “The Exile” as History and Ideology* [SJSOT, Supplements to Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 278] (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998).
 - 6 See e.g., P. R. Davies, “Exile? What Exile? Whose Exile?” in L. L. Grabbe, op.cit. (*supra*, note 5), 136: “‘Exile’ is not an episode in the ‘history of Israel.’ It was invented by a certain group during the Persian/Hellenistic period as a political claim, yet for whom ‘exile’ was not an experience.” Against this tendency towards denying the historical legitimacy of the biblical traditions, see W.W. Hallo, “New Directions in Historiography,” in M. Dietrich and O. Loretz (eds.), *Dubstar anta-men (Alter Orient und Altes Testament 253)* (Münster: Ugarit-Verlag, 1998), 113. Hallo aptly asserts “this is a fallacy worthy of adding to the long list of ‘Historians’ fallacies’ catalogued by David Hackett Fisher,” and there the reference is to D. H. Fisher, *Historians’ Fallacies* (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1971); J. Pasto, “When the End is the Beginning? Or When the Biblical Past is the Political Present: Some Thoughts on Ancient Israel, ‘Post-Exilic Judaism,’ and the Politics of Biblical Scholarship,” *Scandinavian Journal of the Old Testament* 12 (1998): 155–202.
 - 7 See T. M. Raitt, *A Theology of Exile. Judgement/Deliverance in Jeremiah and Ezekiel* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977) on the myth of Death and Resurrection as a metaphor and a theological interpretation.
 - 8 B. Oded, *Mass Deportations and Deportees in the Neo-Assyrian Empire* (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1979), 41–43.
 - 9 *The Assyrian Dictionary of the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago* (Chicago IL, 1956–2006) (hereafter CAD), s.v. *šibtu*, 388a.
 - 10 The Books of Esther, Daniel, and Tobit are dated to the Persian/ Hellenistic Periods. They are not of an historiographical nature but, rather, are “hero-novels.” Second Isaiah (chs. 40–55) concentrates on salvation, predicting the Edict of Cyrus. See Grabbe, op. cit. (*supra*, note 5), 90–93.
 - 11 For the metaphors, see D. L. Smith-Christopher, “Reassessing the Historical and Sociological impact of the Babylonian Exile (597/587–539 BCE),” in J.M. Scott (ed.), op.cit. (*supra*, note 5), 29–30.
 - 12 The association of exile with a faraway and unknown land is reflected, e.g., in the Akkadian language, *nesû* means “faraway,” “remote,” and the derivative *nussû* means “to deport.” CAD, s.v. *nesû*, 184, 188.
 - 13 See A. M. Knibb, “The Exile in the Literature of the Intertestamental Period,” *The Heythrop Journal* 17 (1976): 253–272; Y. Hoffman “The Deuteronomist and the Exiles,” in D. P. Wright et al. (eds.), *Pomegranates and Golden Bells* [J. Milgrom Vol.] (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1995), 659–675.
 - 14 The eschatological idea that Exile without the hope of return until the Messiah restores the people to its land is represented and articulated mainly in the literature of the Hellenistic period (Dan. 9:24–27, the Apocrypha, Qumran) and see Knibb, op. cit. (*supra*, note 13).
 - 15 There is no justification for separating Deuteronomy 29:27–28 and 30:1–10

- and arguing that according to 29:27–28, exile is considered as the ultimate and final condition of the nation, and no restoration should be expected. Contra Hoffman, *op. cit. (supra, note 13)*. As for Deut. 28:63–68, in the context of exile as curse and intimidation, it is pointless to promise and guarantee a remedy (i.e., return) beforehand. See Hoffman, *op. cit. (supra, note 13)*, 665, note.17. For words of salvation in the context of judgment see Brueggemann, *op. cit. (supra, note 3)*, 179; P. R. Wilson, “Historicizing the Prophets: History and Literature in the Book of Jeremiah” in S. L. Cook and S.C. Winter, *On the Way to Nineveh: Studies in Honor of G. M. Landes (The American School of Oriental Research 4)* (Atlanta, GA: Scholars’ Press, 1999): 136–154.
- 16 D. S. Vanderhooft, *The Neo-Babylonian Empire and Babylon in the Latter Prophets* (Atlanta, GA: Scholars’ Press, 1999), 169–188.
 - 17 Contamination and purification are often associated with the figure seven, e.g., Lev. 12:5, 15:24; Num. 19:11–16; Ezek. 39:12, 14; Ps.12: 7.
 - 18 Cf. Zech. 5:6–11 concerning the symbolic act of casting away the *Efah* (unit of capacity, in this context, refers to wickedness) to Babylonia, and Lev. 16 concerning the goat (who bears the iniquities of the people) which is sent into the wilderness.
 - 19 On the hopes of a restored Davidic monarchy in later writings, including Qumran and the New Testament, see P. R. Ackroyd, “Continuity and Discontinuity: Rehabilitation and Authentication” in P. R. Ackroyd, *Studies in the Religious Tradition of the Old Testament* (London: SCM Press, 1987), 40.
 - 20 Brueggemann, *op. cit. (supra, note 3)*, 178–179.
 - 21 J. Unterman, “The Social-Legal Origin for the Image of God as Redeemer (go’el) of Israel,” in Wright, *op. cit. (supra, note 13)*, 404–405.
 - 22 J. Blenkinsopp, “Second Isaiah — Prophet of Universalism,” *SJSOT* 41 (1988): 83–103.
 - 23 For this issue and discussions see the articles in J. M. Scott. *op. cit. (supra, note 5)*, esp. the article by J. Neusner, 221–237.
 - 24 For the pattern *Sin-Exile-Return* see Knibb, *op. cit. (supra, note 13)*, 264–267.
 - 25 See e.g. the article of D. and J. Boyarin, *op. cit. (supra, note 4)*.
 - 26 Ackroyd, *op. cit. (supra, note. 19)*, 38.

Between Greek Colony and Mother-City: Some Reflections

- 1 T. J. Dunbabin, *The Western Greeks* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), p. V. Also V. and G. Vallet, “Métropoles et colonies. Leurs rapports jusque vers la fin du VI siècle,” in *Atti del 30 Convegno di Studi sulla Magna Grecia* (Napoli: L’arte tipografica 1964), 209 sq. (reprinted in *Le monde colonial d’Italie et de Sicile* [Collection de l’Ecole Française de Rome, 1996], 29).
- 2 Cf. the conclusions of the many papers in J.P. Descoeudres (ed.), “Greek Colonists and Native Populations,” in *Proceedings of the First Australian Congress of Classical Archaeology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
- 3 See I. Malkin, *The Returns of Odysseus: Colonization and Ethnicity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), passim. Cf. G. Martorana, “I nostoi e la Sicilia: tra mito e storia Troia, Roma, Imperium romanum,” *Kokalos* 39/40 (1993/94): 363 sq. Also useful may be the reference to the pages of J. Bérard, *La colonisation grecque de l’Italie méridionale et de la Sicile dans l’antiquité* (Paris: de Boccard, 1941), 324. One of many presuppositions, because the sense of the colony but not necessarily of the diaspora exists even when the colonists settle among their “fellow countrymen”: cf. the relations between Doris and Laconia, when the former, based on the “metropolis-colony bonds” asks for the latter’s military intervention in 457 BC: Thuc., 1. 107, 2.

- 4 The bibliography on the issue is vast. Beyond the references of the first annotation, cf. S. Mazzarino, "Metropoli e colonia," in *Atti del 3o Convegno di Studi sulla Magna Grecia*, 51–85; A.J. Graham, *Colony and Mother-City in Ancient Greece* (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1964), *passim*. See also the synthetic approach of F. de Polignac, *Cults, Territory and the Origins of the Greek City-State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), mainly the third chapter, 98 sq.
- 5 G. Vallet, "Métropoles et colonies. Leurs rapports," 30.
- 6 S. Mazzarino, "Metropoli e colonia," 80.
- 7 Indicatively, I refer to the texts in M.N. Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Chicago: Ares, 1985) (hereafter: *GHI*), 24, "Foundation of Naupaktos by the Lokrians" (460 BC); *GHI* 44, "Foundation of Brea by the Athenians" (445 BC). Moreover, in the law of Thera on the foundation of Cyrene during the seventh century, on an inscription from the fourth century BC (*SEG*, IX 4; *Syll*³ 141 (Issaian settlers to Black Corcyra). Cf. R. Osborne, "Early Greek Colonisation: The Nature of Greek Settlement in the West," in N. Fisher and H. van Wees (eds.), *Archaic Greece: New Approaches and New Evidence* (London: Duckworth, 1998), 252.
- 8 F. de Polignac, *Cults, Territory and the Origins of the Greek City-State*, 118, 143.
- 9 Cl. Baurain, *Les Grecs et la Méditerranée orientale. Des siècles obscurs à la fin de l'époque archaïque* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1997), 313, 317.
- 10 However, when colonists decide to proceed with the foundation of a new colony they did so with an *oikistes*, summoned ad hoc from the old metropolis. G. Vallet, "Métropoles et colonies," 176–177.
- 11 J. Heurgon, *Rome et la Méditerranée occidentale jusqu'aux guerres puniques* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1993, 3rd edition), 176–77.
- 12 An important source on Timoleon is his much later biography by Plutarch. *Kokalos* dedicated its fourth issue (1958) to Timoleon. Cf. M. Sordi, *Timoleonte* (Palermo: S.F. Flaccovio, 1961). About Timoleon as a new founder, cf. J.H. Kent, "The Victory Monument of Timoleon at Corinth," *Hesperia* 21.1 (1952): 13.
- 13 Cl. Mossé, "Timoléon et la recolonisation de la Sicile grecque," in *La colonisation grecque en Méditerranée occidentale* (Ecole française de Rome, 1999), 251.
- 14 F. Chamoux, *Cyrène sous la monarchie des Battiades* (Paris: de Boccard, 1953), 124.
- 15 Herodotus, 4, 159, 2–4 and Plutarchus, *Mulierum virtutes*. 261b, cf. F. Chamoux, *Cyrène*, 134.
- 16 Herodotus, 4, 161, 1.
- 17 *SEG*, IX, 3, 30–33: "If the colonists establish the settlement, any of their fellow-citizens who later sails to Libya shall have a share in citizenship and honors and shall be allotted a portion of unoccupied land," translated by A.J. Graham, *Colony and Mother-City*, 225.
- 18 Cf. W. Hoepfner, *Das dorische Thera V: Stadtgeschichte und Kultstätten am nördlichen Stadtrand* (Berlin: Gebr. Mann, 1997), 13.
- 19 Indicatively, *Esdra* II, 11.9.2, *Psalmi Salomonis* 9.2.1, etc.
- 20 *Epist. Jac.* 1.1.2.
- 21 *In Johannem* 59.281.54 and certainly in *Ev. Jo.* 7.35.3.
- 22 *Antiq. Jud.*, 14. 7, 2.
- 23 S. Freyne, "Studying the Jewish Diaspora in Antiquity," in J.R. Bartlett (ed.), *Jews in the Hellenistic and Roman Cities* (London: Routledge, 2002), 2. Also E. Gruen, *Diaspora Jews amidst Greeks and Romans* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 232.
- 24 M. Casevitz, *Le vocabulaire de la colonisation en grec ancien. Etude lexicologique: les familles de ktizo et de oikoo-oikizo* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1985).

- 25 Ibid., 238.
- 26 Aristot., *Polit.* I. 2. 1252b.
- 27 Pl. *Protagoras* 322b.
- 28 *Polit.* I. 2. 1253a.
- 29 B. Gentili, "Eracle omicida giustissimo," in *Il mito greco*, Atti del Convegno Internazionale, Urbino, 7–12 1973 (Rome, Ed. dell'Ateneo & Bizzari, 1977), 299–305; cf. N. Valenza-Mele, "Eracle euboico a Cuma, la gigantomachia e la via heraclea," in *Recherches sur les cultes grecs de l'Occident*, I (Institut Français de Naples, 1979), 19–51.
- 30 M. Giangiulio, "Greci e non Greci in Sicilia alla luce dei culti e delle legende di Eracle," in *Modes de contact et processus de transformation dans les sociétés anciennes*, Actes du Colloque de Cortone (Collection de l'Ecole française de Rome, 1983), 785–846.
- 31 Cf. the second century BC inscription from Malta where we can find *Heracles Archegetes*, IG, XIV, 600. See C. Jourdain-Annequin, "Etre un grec en Sicile: le mythe d'Héracles," *Kokalos* 34/35 (1988/89): 165.
- 32 Dion. Halic., *Antiq. Rom.* I, 39–44; Cf. C. Jourdain Annequin, "Etre un grec en Sicile," 166. Also the works of D. Musti, *Etrusci e Greci nelle rappresentazioni dionisiaca delle origini di Roma* (Rome, 1981), 23 sqq. and more recently about Greek and Trojan tradition: Idem, "I Greci e l'Italia," in *Storia di Roma*, Vol. 1 (Torino: Einaudi, 1988), 43.
- 33 Cf. note 7 in the present paper with references to inscriptions related to laws and amendments which are decided upon by the metropolis but which pertain to the life of the colonists who are sent to settle in foreign lands.
- 34 See the recent publication and commentary in C. Higbie, *The Lindian Chronicle and the Greek Creation of Their Past* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
- 35 In the year 328/7, without there being mention of the name of the colony.
- 36 C. Higbie, *The Lindian Chronicle*, 227.
- 37 P. Lévêque, "Religion et culture," in P. Briant and P. Lévêque (eds.), *Le monde grec aux temps classiques* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1995), 364, 366.
- 38 Diod. Sic., 12. 30. 4 (it refers to events before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War).
- 39 1. 38 1–2; translated by St. Lattimore (Hackett Publisher, 1998).
- 40 30. 26–27 and 39. 1. See P.N. Doukellis, "Auteurs grecs et paysages coloniaux romains," *Historia* 30 (2007): 12.
- 41 I. Malkin, *Religion and Colonization in Ancient Greece* (New York: Brill, 1987), 123.
- 42 Cf. Pl., *Laws* 754 a-c ; Polyb., 12. 9.3.
- 43 P.N. Doukellis, "Auteurs grecs et paysages coloniaux."
- 44 I. Malkin, *Religion and Colonization*, 19.
- 45 C. Dougherty, *Poetics of Colonization: From City to Text in Archaic Greece* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 157.
- 46 Worshipping the founder of the city first appeared in the colonies and later spread to the metropolitan world. It acquired special dimensions in the Hellenistic era, with the worship of monarchs as founders of cities. I. Malkin, *Religion and Colonization*, 266.
- 47 Ibid., 122.
- 48 Cf. D. Briquel, "La mort de Rémus ou la cité comme rupture," in M. Detienne (ed.), *Tracés de fondation* (Louvain: Peeters, 1990), passim.
- 49 C. M. Antonaccio, "Ethnicity and Colonization," in I. Malkin (ed.), *Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), passim; cf. F. de Polignac, *Cults, Territory, and the Origins of the Greek City-State*, 138 and 143.
- 50 Cf. J. M. Hall, *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 32.

- 51 M. Finley, *Ancient Sicily to the Arab Conquest* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1979), 166. See also L. Campagna, "La Sicilia di età repubblicana nella storiografia degli ultimi cinquant'anni," *Ostraka* XII/1 (2003): 7 sq.
- 52 The bibliography about the nature of Roman imperialism, intended or haphazard, is extremely extensive; cf. Z. Yavetz, "Towards a Further Step into the Study of Roman Imperialism," in E. Hermon (ed.), *Gouvernants et gouvernés dans l'imperium romanum, Cahier des Etudes Anciennes* XXVI (1991), 5 sq. For a more precise description of the Roman conquest of Sicily and Syracuse, see M. Finley, *Ancient Sicily*, 128. See also J. Serrati, "The Coming of Romans: Sicily from the Fourth to the First Centuries BC" and K. Lomas, "Between Greece and Italy: An External Perspective on Culture in Roman Sicily," both in C. Smith and J. Serrati (eds.), *Sicily from Aeneas to Augustus* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000).
- 53 Cf. D. Musti, *Storia di Roma*. See J. L. Ferrary, *Philhellénisme et impérialisme. Aspects idéologiques de la conquête romaine du monde hellénistique* (Rome: Ecole française de Rome, 1988), 517 sq.
- 54 D. and Y. Roman, *Rome, l'identité romaine et la culture hellénistique* (Paris: SEDES, 1994), 219.
- 55 R. J. A. Wilson, "Towns of Sicily during the Roman Empire," *ANRW*, II, 11, 1, 101. See also P. Rizzo, *Tauromenion (Taormina). Storia, topografia, monumenti, monete*, 2nd edition (Caltanissetta: S. Sciascia, 1983), *passim*.
- 56 *Ibid.*, 95; also *CIL* X, p. 718; *It.*, XIII, 2, 60 (or page 547).
- 57 *IG*, XIV, 421–430. These texts have become the subject of many publications, some with commentary; cf. F. Sartori, "Appunti di Storia siceliota: La costituzione di Tauromenio," *Athenaeum*, n.s. 32 (1954): 357.
- 58 *Ibid.*, 376.
- 59 A. Chaniotis, *Historie und historiker in den griechischen Inschriften* (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1988), 13.
- 60 E. L. Bowie, "Greeks and their Past in the Second Sophistic," *Past and Present* 46 (1970): 3 sq. for literary sources.
- 61 Cf. B. Ruck, "Die Fasten von Taormina," *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 111 (1996): 279.
- 62 G. Manganaro, "Una biblioteca storica nel Ginnasio di Tauromenion e il P. Oxy. 1241," *La parola del passato* 29 (1974): 388–409.
- 63 E. Badian, *Latin Historians* (London: Dorey, 1966), 2–6; A. Momigliano, *The Classical Foundations of Modern Historiography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 80.
- 64 Of course, it must be noted that Fabius' purpose in writing Roman history in Greek was to defend Roman policy to the Greek world.
- 65 J. and L. Robert and al., *Bulletin Epigraphique* 1965 (449); R.K. Sherk, *The Municipal Decrees of the Roman West* (Buffalo NY: Arethusa monographs, 1970), 59.

The Jewish Politeuma in Alexandria: A Pattern of Jewish Communal Life in the Greco-Roman Diaspora

- 1 Compare with the translations by H.T. Andrews, "The Letter of Aristaeas," in R. H. Charles (ed.), *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913), 121; R.J.H. Shutt, "Letter of Aristaeas," in J.H. Charlesworth (ed.), *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, vol. 2, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1985), 33. Cf. also Josephus, *Antiquities of the Jews* (AJ), XII, 108.
- 2 *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum* (SEG), XVI, No. 931 (1923); *Inscriptiones Graecae ad Res Romanas Pertinentes* (IGRR), I, No. 102 (1911); *Corpus*

- Inscriptionum Graecarum (CIG)*, 5361–5362 (1828–1877); *Revue des études grecques (REG)*, LXII (1949), 283, 290.
- 3 English translation by R. Marcus, *Josephus* (Loeb Classical Library ed.), (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1961), vol. 7, 509. The citation and its terminology will be analyzed at a later stage of this article. In the meantime, we shall content ourselves in noting the synonymity between *πολιτεία* and *πολίτευμα*, which occurred quite often in the writings of Josephus and Philo. See A. Kasher, *The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1985), 358–364.
 - 4 Among the many studies on these issues, I shall mention only a few: E.M. Smallwood, *The Jews under Roman Rule* (Leiden: Brill, 1981), 220–255, 364–368, 389–412; J.J. Collins, *Between Athens and Jerusalem: Jewish Identity in the Hellenistic Diaspora* (New York: Crossroad, 1983), *passim*; J.G. Gager, *The Origins of Anti-Semitism: Attitudes Toward Judaism in Pagan and Christian Antiquity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 40–54; U. Rappaport, "יהודי מצרים" ("The Jews in Egypt"), in M. Stern (ed.), *הפזורה היהודית בעולם*, in M. Stern (ed.), *ההלניסטי-רומי (The Jewish Diaspora in the Hellenistic-Roman World)* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1983), 21–53, 292–298; Kasher, *The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*, *passim*; J. Méléze Modrzejewski, *The Jews of Egypt from Rameses II to Emperor Hadrian* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), *passim*.
 - 5 H. Strathmann, definitions for *Polis* and *Politeuma* (*πόλις*; *πολίτευμα*) in G. Kittel (ed.), *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, vol. 6 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1959), 519. The same meaning (i.e. *Gemeinwesen*) was ascribed by him (*op. cit.*, 535) to the word *politeuma* which appears in the *Epistle to the Philippians* (3:20) in the New Testament.
 - 6 Smallwood, *The Jews under Roman Rule*, 226. I think it is worthwhile quoting the following to supplement the explanation for her definition: "Politeumata were a regular feature of Hellenistic cities and the Jews of the Diaspora could easily be fitted into this pattern and enjoy an official standing in gentile cities without being integrated into their life and therefore without being faced with the dilemma of being expected to participate in their religious observances. The Alexandrian situation was by no means unique. Josephus says that the position of the Jews in Antioch, Ephesus 'and throughout the rest of Ionia' was parallel to that of the Alexandrian Jews, and for Sardis there is specific evidence to support this. A Jewish *politeuma* (with the technical name used) is known in Berenice in Cyrenaica from the time of Augustus, and there are indications that the Jewish communities in other cities of that province also formed *politeumata*. Even in Palestine the Jewish minority in Caesarea seems to have constituted a *politeuma*, and the same may have been the case with the Jews at Leontopolis in Egypt. In view of these examples, it is probably safe to assume that a *politeuma* was the standard political organization of all Jewish communities of any size in the East."
 - 7 F. Preisigke, *Fachwörterbuch des öffentlichen Verwaltungsdienstes Ägyptens* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1915), s.v. "πολίτευμα".
 - 8 P. Halensis, *Dikaionmata: Auszüge aus Alexandrinischen Gesetzen und Verordnungen in einem Papyrus des philologischen Seminars der Universität Halle mit einem Anhang weitere Papyri derselben Sammlung hrsg. von der Graeca halensis mit 9 lichtdrucktafeln* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1913), 38.
 - 9 M. Engers, "Politeuma," *Mnemosyne, Bibliotheca Classica Batava*, 54 (Leiden: Brill, 1926), 16.
 - 10 W. Ruppel, "Politeuma — Bedeutungsgeschichte eines staatsrechtlichen Terminus," *Philologus* 82, N.F. 26 (1927): 306.
 - 11 *Corpus Papyrorum Judaicarum (CPJ)*, I (1957): 6 (n. 15 with further information); A. Tcherikover, *היהודים במצרים בתקופה ההלניסטית-הרומית לאור הפאפירוסים הלוגיים* (*The Jews in Egypt in the Hellenistic-Roman Age in Light of the Papyri*) (Jerusalem:

- Magnes Press, 1963), 97; idem, *Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews* [translated by S. Applebaum] (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1959), 297ff.
- 12 G. Lüderitz, "What is the *Politeuma*?" in J.W. van Henten and P.W. van der Horst (eds.), *Studies in Early Jewish Epigraphy* (Leiden, New York: Brill, 1994), 199.
 - 13 C. Zuckerman, "Hellenistic *Politeumata* and the Jews. A Reconsideration," *Scripta Classica Israelica* 8–9 (1985/88): 171–185; D. Schwartz, "Felix and *Isopoliteia*, Josephus and Tacitus," *Zion* 58 (1993): 265ff.; J. Méléze Modrzejewski, "How To Be a Greek and Yet a Jew in Hellenistic Alexandria," in S.J.D. Cohen and E.S. Frerichs (eds.), *Diasporas in Antiquity* (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1993), 77–79; idem, "Jewish Law and Hellenistic Legal Practice in the Light of Greek Papyri from Egypt," in N.S. Hecht, B.S. Jackson, S.M. Passamneck, D. Piatteli, and A.M. Rabello (eds.), *An Introduction to the History and Sources of Jewish Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 77ff.; Lüderitz, "What is the *Politeuma*?", 183ff. (especially 204–208); J.J. Price, "The Jewish Diaspora of the Graeco-Roman Period" (book review), *Scripta Classica Israelica* 13 (1994): 177; cf. also B. Schröder, *Die 'väterlichen Gesetze'. Flavius Josephus als Vermittler von Halachah an Griechen und Römer* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1996), 206; A. Kerkeslager, "Maintaining Jewish Identity in the Greek Gymnasium: A 'Jewish Laod'," in *CPJ* III, 519; (= *P. Schub.* 37 = *P. Berol.* 13406), *Journal of the Study of Judaism* 28 (1997), 30 (n. 63); S. Pearce, "Belonging and Not Belonging: Local Perspective in Philo of Alexandria," in S. Jones and S. Pearce (eds.) *Jewish Local Patriotism and Self-Identification in the Graeco-Roman Period* (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 82 (n. 14).
 - 14 Lüderitz, "What is the *Politeuma*?", 204–208.
 - 15 See H.G. Liddell and R. Scott (compilers), *Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), s.v., 1417.
 - 16 For details, including bibliographical references, see Kashner, *The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*, 208–211; idem, "The Civic Status of the Jews in Ptolemaic Egypt," in P. Bilde, T. Engberg-Pederson, L. Hannestad, and J. Zahle (eds.), *Ethnicity in Hellenistic Egypt* (Aarhus University Press: 1992), 109ff. and nn. 49–53; cf. idem, *נגד אפיון : יוספוס פלאוויוס* (*Against Apion, Josephus Flavius*) (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 1997), commentary to II, 36.
 - 17 E. Bickermann, *Der Gott der Makkabäer* (Berlin: Schocken Verlag, 1937), 59ff. His opinion with regard to "Antiochenes in Jerusalem" was also supported by H. Bengtson, *Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit*, vol. 2 (München: Beck, 1944), 175 (n. 1); idem, *Griechische Geschichte von den Anfängen bis in die römische Kaiserzeit* (München: Beck, 1969), 483; F.M. Abel, *Les livres des Maccabées* (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1949), 332; M. Hengel, *Judaism and Hellenism* [translated by John Bowden from the German] (London: SCM Press, 1974), vol. 1, 277ff., vol. 2, 50 (n. 118), 184 (n. 134).
 - 18 M. Stern, "הפרכת ירושלים לפוליס ועליית מנלאוס" ('Antioch in Jerusalem': The Gymnasium, the Polis and the Rise of Menelaus), *Zion* 57 (1992): 239ff; cf. Tcherikover, *Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews*, 160ff; idem, *היהודים בעולם היווני והרומי* (*The Jews in the Graeco-Roman World*) (Tel Aviv, Jerusalem: M. Neumann, 1961), 164ff.
 - 19 Lüderitz, "What is the *Politeuma*?" 285ff.
 - 20 S.J.D. Cohen, *From the Maccabees to the Mishnah* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1987), 109–110, tended to include all Alexandrian Jews within one single circle, namely the *politeuma*.
 - 21 Lüderitz, "What is the *Politeuma*?" 203.
 - 22 R. Taubenschlag, *The Law of Greco-Roman Egypt in the Light of the Papyri*, Vols. 1–2 (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1955), 8ff., has shown that the πολιτικοὶ νόμοι included statutes of autonomous *poleis* (such

- as Alexandria) and ordinances of various *politeumata* (including Jewish ones); cf. also F. Zucker, *Beiträge zur Kenntniss d. Gerichtsorganisation im ptolemäischen und römischen Aegypten* (Leipzig: Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1911), 52ff.; Kasher, *The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*, 31 (n. 13).
- 23 Kasher, *op. cit.*, 138ff. especially 141ff.
 - 24 Kasher, *op. cit.*, 233ff. On the *politeuma* issue, in line with Smallwood's opinion, see also M. Hengel, "The Interpretation of Judaism and Hellenism in the Pre-Maccabean Period," *Cambridge History of Judaism*, vol. 2 (1989): 188, 192ff.; S.J.D. Cohen, "Pagan and Christian Evidence on the Ancient Synagogue," in L.I. Levine (ed.), *The Synagogue in Late Antiquity* (Philadelphia: American Schools of Oriental Research, 1987), 108–111; R.D. Hecht, "Philo and the Messiah," in J. Neusner, W.S. Green, and E.S. Frerichs (eds.), *Judaisms and Their Messiahs at the Turn of the Christian Era* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 160, 167 (n. 41); H. Hegermann, "The Diaspora in the Hellenistic Age," *Cambridge History of Judaism*, vol. 2 (1989): 158–161; P.R. Trebilco, *Jewish Communities in Asia Minor* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 167ff., 255–257 (nn. 2, 11–15); cf. recent studies by L. Boffo, *Iscrizioni greche e latine per lo studio dell bibbia* (Brescia: Paideia Editrice, 1994), 101 (n.13), 137–8, 142ff., 160, 208ff., 360 (n. 15).
 - 25 Engers, "Politeuma," 154 ff., 159; cf. idem, "Die staatsrechtliche Stellung der alexandrinischen Juden," *Klio* 18 (1922/3): 79–90.
 - 26 A. Paul, "Une voie d'approche du fait juif: Diaspora et Galût," in M. Carrez, J. Doré, and P. Grelot (eds.), *De la Torah au Messie: Mélanges Henri Cazelles* (Paris: Descle, 1981), 370, 379; idem, "Le Troisième livre des Macchabées," *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 20/1 (1987): 331–332; B. Otzen, *Judaism in Antiquity: Political Development and Religious Currents from Alexander to Hadrian* [translated by Frederick Cryer] (Sheffield, UK: JSOT Press, 1990), 55–56.
 - 27 L. Troiani, "The πολιτεία of Israel in the Graeco-Roman Age," in F. Parente and J. Sievers (eds.), *Josephus and the History of the Greco-Roman Period: Essays in Memory of Morton Smith* (Leiden, New York: Brill, 1994), 11–22; see also Z. Yavetz, *טיבריוס וקאליגולה: מהעמדת פנים לטירוף* (*Tiberius and Caligula, from Make-believe to Insanity*) (Tel Aviv: Devir, 1995), 124–125.
 - 28 L.H. Feldman, *Josephus* (Loeb ed.), Vol. 9 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 346–9, esp. p. 348 (n. b). And he has referred the readers on that matter to S. Davis, *Race Relations in Ancient Egypt: Greek, Egyptian, Hebrew, Roman* (London: Methuen, 1951), 101–104.
 - 29 *In Flaccum*, 89, 123; *Legatio ad Gaium*, 194, 350.
 - 30 *Legatio ad Gaium*, 183; cf. also 120, 162, 164, 172.
 - 31 See e.g. H.I. Bell, *Jews and Christians in Egypt* (London: Oxford University Press, 1924), 14; Tcherikover, *Hell. Civil.*, 315; E.M. Smallwood, *Philonis Alexandrini Legatio ad Gaium* (Leiden: Brill, 1961), 10, 255; M. Stern, *Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism*, vol. 1 (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1974), 400.
 - 32 *In Flaccum*, 78–79; *Legatio ad Gaium*, 183; cf. also *In Flaccum*, 41, 141; *Legatio ad Gaium*, 152.
 - 33 *Legatio ad Gaium*, 120–164, 166–170; cf. also *In Flaccum*, 41, 108.
 - 34 See *In Flaccum*, 47, 53, 80, 123; *Legatio ad Gaium*, 193, 194, 211, 265, 349, 363, 371.
 - 35 H.S. Jones, "Claudius and the Jewish Question at Alexandria," *Journal of Roman Studies* 16 (1926): 27–29. Other scholars concurred with his conclusion; see e.g. L. Fuchs, *Die Juden Aegyptens in ptolemäischer und römischer Zeit* (Wien: M. Rath, 1924), 96; V.M. Scramuzza, *The Emperor Claudius* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1940), 74ff.; Smallwood, *Philonis Alexandrini Legatio ad Gaium*, 8–10; idem, *The Jews under Roman Rule*, 229ff.; Kasher, *The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*, 233ff.

- 36 Ruppel, "Politeuma — Bedeutungsgeschichte eines staatsrechtlichen Terminus," 288.
- 37 Cf. Taubenschlag, *The Law of Greco-Roman Egypt in the Light of the Papyri*, 582–586; A. Biscardi, "Polis, politea politeuma," in *Atti del XVII congresso internazionale di papirologia*, vol. 3 (Napoli: Centro internazionale per lo studio dei papiri ercolanesi, 1984), 1201–1215; D. Delia, *Alexandrian Citizenship during the Roman Principate* (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1991), 11ff.; Troiani, "The Politeia of Israel in the Graeco-Roman Age," 11–22 (esp. 18, 20–21).
- 38 H. S. Jones, "Claudius and the Jewish Question at Alexandria," 29.
- 39 H.A. Wolfson, "Philo on the Jewish Citizenship in Alexandria," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 63 (1944): 482ff; idem, *Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam*, vol. 2 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), 395ff.; cf. also Smallwood, *Philonis Alexandrini Legatio ad Gaium*, 10.
- 40 Kasher, *The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*, 238ff.; cf. D. Delia, *Alexandrian Citizenship during the Roman Principate*, 13ff., although she believes the terms *astoi* and *politai* to have been synonymous. For more details on the terminology used by Philo to describe the rights of the Alexandrian Jews, which is virtually identical to that used by Josephus, see Kasher *op. cit.*, 233ff.
- 41 However, I am pleased to note the recent work by Troiani, "The πολιτεία of Israel in the Graeco-Roman Age," concurs with my own views.
- 42 For fuller detail, including a general discussion of the term "Alexandrian" in papyrological literature, see Kasher, *The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*, 192ff, esp. 200ff.
- 43 See Delia, *Alexandrian Citizenship during the Roman Principate*, 23ff., esp. 26–27, 45 (her study contains a number of internal contradictions in this matter; see e.g., 45).
- 44 See S. Klein, *Jüdische-Palästinisches Corpus Inscriptionum* (Wien, Lowit, 1920), nos. 135, 137, 141, 154; idem, *ספר הישוב* (*Sefer ha-Yishuv*) (Jerusalem: Palestine Historical and Ethnographical Society, 1939, 1977), Jaffa, nos. 4, 25, 26, 27; J.-B. Frey, *Corpus Inscriptionum Judaicarum (CIJ)* (Rome: Pontificio istituto di archeologia cristiana, 1936), I, nos. 644, 699; II, 918; W. Horbury and D. Noy, *Jewish Inscriptions of Graeco Roman Egypt* (Cambridge, England, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992), nos. 146, 148, 150, 151, 153.
- 45 W. Dittenberger (ed.), *Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae (OGIS)* (Lipsiae: S. Hirzel, 1903–1905), no. 599; CIJ, II, no. 1256; Horbury and Noy, *Jewish Inscriptions of Graeco Roman Egypt*, no. 153; Boffo, *Iscrizioni greche e latine per lo studio dell bibbia*, 343–348.
- 46 See Horbury and Noy, *Jewish Inscriptions of Graeco Roman Egypt*, nos. 143, 144, 151.
- 47 For details, see my Hebrew commentary to *Against Apion*, II, 35–36 (pp. 307–311).
- 48 CPJ, II, no. 143, lines 7–8.
- 49 Cf. Troiani, "The πολιτεία of Israel in the Graeco-Roman Age," 21.
- 50 Tcherikover, *Jews in Egypt*, 151; idem, CPJ, II, 53.
- 51 Stern, *Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism*, vol. 1, 403.
- 52 See Stern, *op. cit.*, 279, 403; Kasher, *The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*, 233ff.
- 53 See Kasher, *op. cit.*, 168ff.
- 54 M. Cary, *A History of the Greek World from 323 to 146 B.C.* (London: Methuen, New York, NY: Barnes & Noble, 1963), 268, cf. also 274.
- 55 See Tcherikover, *Hell. Civil.*, 312ff.; idem, *Jews in the Graeco-Roman World*, 291, 362, 364; idem, *Jews in Egypt*, 152–155; idem, CPJ, I, 60ff., esp. 74; cf. M. Hengel, "The Interpretation of Judaism and Hellenism in the Pre-Maccabean Period," 185–186.

- 56 C. Hoffmann, *Juden und Judentum im Werke deutscher Althistoriker des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts* (Leiden: Brill, 1988), passim, esp. 298; cf. also E. Bickermann, *The Jews in the Greek Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 87.
- 57 Cf. also P. Schäfer, *Judeophobia: Attitudes towards the Jews in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 150–151.
- 58 For details, see A. Kasher, “The Jewish Attitude to the Alexandrian Gymnasium in the First Century,” *American Journal of Ancient History* 1 (1976): 148–161; *idem*, *The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*, 314–321.
- 59 S. Applebaum, “The Legal Status of the Jewish Communities in the Diaspora,” in S. Safrai, M. Stern, et al. (eds.), *The Jewish People in the First Century*, Section One, I (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1974), 435ff.
- 60 S. Applebaum, *יהודים ויוונים בקיריני הקדומה* (*Greeks and Jews in Ancient Cyrene*) (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1969), 161ff.; Kasher, *The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*, 285ff.
- 61 See Tcherikover, *The Jews in Egypt*, 77ff.
- 62 See Kasher, *The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*, 279.
- 63 τὸ τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος διάταγμα τοῦ ἐπιτρέψαντος Ἰουδαίοις τοῖς ἰδίοις ἔθεσι χρῆσθαι, ἔτι μέντοι γε καὶ συμπολιτεύσθαι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν κεκελευκός.
- 64 In *Flaccum*, 53; *Legatio ad Gaium*, 371; see Kasher, *The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*, 235ff.
- 65 See Taubenschlag, *The Law of Greco-Roman Egypt in the Light of the Papyri*, 2–15; Stern, *Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism*, I, 278; Kasher, *op.cit.*, 29ff.
- 66 On this, see P.M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 110ff.
- 67 Exactly the same conclusions, which reinforce my theory, have lately been set forth by Troiani, “The Politeiva of Israel in the Graeco-Roman Age,” 13–15. Schwartz, “Felix and *Isopoliteia*, Josephus and Tacitus,” esp. 284–286, prefers to interpret the term *isopoliteia* from (what he claims is) the Roman point of view, as “citizenship”; to this end, he cites an epigraphic example from Arsinoe in Cilicia (285, n. 57). That example, however, is no different from those which we know from the Hellenistic era; cf. Kasher, *op.cit.*, 279, n. 49.
- 68 Kasher, *op. cit.*, 358–364.
- 69 Cf. lately A.F. Segal, “Conversion and Messianism. Outlines for a New Approach,” in J.H. Charlesworth (ed.), *The Messiah: Developments in Earliest Judaism and Christianity; The First Princeton Symposium on Judaism and Christian Origins* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), 309. Schäfer, *Judeophobia*, 136–152, has raised several questions concerning my interpretation of the *politeuma* and the essence of the Jewish struggle for equal rights, but he has actually not offered any new argument to supplement Tcherikover’s themes.
- 70 J.M.S. Cowey and K. Maresch, *Urkunden des Politeuma der Juden von Herakleopolis (144/3–133/2 v. Chr.)* (P. Polit. Jud.), *Papyri aus den Sammlungen von Heidelberg, Köln, München und Wien* (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2001). See my review published in *Jewish Quarterly Review* 93 (2002): 257–268, some parts of which are interwoven here.
- 71 J. Lesquier, *Les institutions militaires de l’Égypte sous les Lagides* (Paris: E. Leroux, 1911), 142–155; M. Launey, *Recherches sur les armées hellénistiques* (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1949–50), 1064–1085; G.M. Cohen, *The Seleucid Colonies: Studies in Founding, Administration and Organization*, *Historia — Einzelschriften*, Heft 30 (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1978), 74ff., 86.
- 72 Cowey and Maresch, *op. cit.*, 3–4 (esp. note 9).
- 73 J.M.S. Cowey, “Das Archiv des jüdischen Politeuma in Herakleopolis und das Archiv des Phrurachen Dioskurides” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, submitted to Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, 2000). I would like to take this opportunity to thank the author for allowing me to read his thesis manuscript.

- 74 Apropos, it is worth calling the readers' attention to the fact that King Ptolemy I had already settled Jewish garrisons in border fortresses (φρουρία), as stated in the *Letter of Aristeas*, 13, 36; cf. Jos. *AJ*, XII, 7, 45; *CA*, II, 45.
- 75 It was formally designated "Onias Land," after the founder, Onias IV. I shall confine myself to a selective bibliography: Tcherikover, *Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews*, 276ff.; idem, *CPJ*, I, 20–24, 44ff.; Kasher, *The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*, 119–135; G. Bohak, *Joseph and Aseneth and the Jewish Temple in Heliopolis* (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1996); Méléze Modrzejewski, *The Jews of Egypt From Rameses II to Emperor Hadrian*, 124–133; Horbury-Noy, *Jewish Inscriptions of Graeco Roman Egypt*, 51–182.
- 76 For details, see Cowey and Maresch, *Urkunden des Politeuma der Juden von Herakleopolis*, 12, n. 43.
- 77 Kasher, *The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*, 138ff., 144, 151, 163ff. A similar situation, wherein the Jews lived within their own ethnic community, may safely be assumed to have existed in other cities of the Hellenistic-Roman Diaspora, not only in Egypt. This observation seems to apply, for example, to Sardis (*AJ*, XIV, 261) and Rome (H.J. Leon, *The Jews of Ancient Rome* [Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1960], 135ff.). In this connection, I must absolutely disagree with any comparison to a "ghetto," as alluded to by some scholars. On the contrary, the right given to ethnic-religious groups to live in separate residential zones was actually a way for the central authorities to give special consideration to their needs.
- 78 *CA*, II, 64. This "river guard" was probably identical to the *potamofulakiva* referred to by ostraca; for details, see Kasher, *The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*, 57, 108.
- 79 See Tcherikover, *CPJ*, I, 53, n. 14; A. Kasher, "Three Jewish Communities of Lower Egypt in the Ptolemaic Period," *Scripta Classica Israelica* 2 (1975): 115, 119–120.
- 80 See document 3, lines 6, 28–29; document 9, lines 7–8, 28–29; document 12, line 10; for further details see Cowey and Maresch, *Urkunden des Politeuma der Juden von Herakleopolis*, 26, 108, 123. It is very illustrative to refer the readers to a recent article by M. Kister, "From Philotas to Hillel: Betrothal Contracts and their Violation," *Tarbitz* 70 (2002): 631–632, which illustrates the parallels between the matrimonial law described in document 4 (dated 134 BCE) and the Jewish halacha as interpreted by the Mishnaic sage Hillel who lived 150 years later.
- 81 See documents 6, 18; cf. *op. cit.*, 15–16. Cowey and Maresch logically maintain that the linkage between "elders" and "judges," or between "elders" and "archons," is well suited to the Jewish perception depicted in the Septuagint Pentateuch.
- 82 See e.g. Tcherikover, *CPJ*, II, 142–143.
- 83 For details, see Lesquier, *Les institutions militaires de l'Égypte sous les Lagides*, 99ff.; Kasher, *The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*, 42. In classical Athens, for example, the *hyperetes* was the armor-bearer, or the personal servant who attended the heavy infantryman, the *hoplite* (ὁπλίτης) to carry his military equipment; cf. Herodote, III, 63; V, 111; Liddell, George Henry and Robert Scott. *Greek-English Lexicon*. (New York: Harper & Brothers, Pub., 1869), s.v.
- 84 Cf. for example, documents 8, 9, 13, 17–20.
- 85 See in detail Kasher, *The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*, 233ff.
- 86 See L. Robert, *Hellenica, Recueil d'épigraphie de numismatique et d'antiquités grecques*, vol. 1 (Paris: Limoges, 1940), 18–24; Kasher, *The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*, 119ff.; Horbury and Noy, *Jewish Inscriptions of Graeco Roman Egypt*, Nos. 39. The office of *politarch* was familiar mainly in Macedonian cities; see for details: C. Schuler, "The Macedonian Politarchs," *Classical Philology* 55 (1960): 96–98; H.W. Tajra, *The Trial of St. Paul* (Tübingen: J.C.B.

- Mohr, 1989), 34–35; Cowey and Maresch, *Urkunden des Politeuma der Juden von Herakleopolis*, 10ff; Horbury and Noy, *Jewish Inscriptions of Graeco Roman Egypt*, nos. 39, 95–102; for other cases and references, see Kasher, *The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*, 124ff. On the office of *politarch* in Macedonia, cf. G.H.R. Horsley, “The Politarch in Macedonia and Beyond,” in P. Conon (ed.), *Ancient Macedonia: an Australian Symposium*, *Mediterranean Archaeology* 7 (1994–5): 99–126; M.B. Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings*, Vols. 1–2 (Athens: Kentron Hellenikes kai Romaikes Archaioetetos, 1996), (s.v. index).
- 87 Indeed, Cowey and Maresch (*op.cit.*, 22–23, 35, 38–39) fully accept this idea and reject almost any reservation about it.
- 88 Cf. Méléze Modrzejewski, “Jewish Law and Hellenistic Legal Practice in the Light of Greek Papyri from Egypt.” It also can give a satisfactory answer to the indecisive opinions expressed by T. Rajak, “Jews as Benefactors,” in B. Isaac and A. Oppenheimer (eds.), *Te’udah 12: Studies on the Jewish Diaspora in the Hellenistic and Roman Periods* (Tel Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, 1996), 29–30; and S. Honigsmann, “Philon, Flavius Josèph, et la citoyenneté alexandrine: vers une utopie politique,” *Journal of Jewish Studies* 48 (1997): 62ff.

Collective Expatriations of Greeks in the Fifteenth through Seventeenth Centuries

- 1 On Greek emigration and the Greek “diaspora” as a historical phenomenon, especially in the modern era, see, in general, M. A. Dendias, *Αἱ ἐλληνικαὶ παροικίαι ἀνά τον κόσμον* (*Greek Communities around the World*) (Athens, 1919); N. B. Tomadakis, *Η συμβολή των ἐλληνικῶν κοινοτήτων του ἐξωτερικοῦ εἰς τον ἀγῶνα της ἐλευθερίας* (*The Contribution to the Struggle for Freedom Made by Greek Communities Overseas*) (Athens, 1953); N. Psiroukis, *Το νεοελληνικό παροικιακό φαινόμενο* (*The Phenomenon of Modern Greek Settlements*) (Athens: Epikairotita, 1974); A. Ducellier, “Δημογραφία, μεταναστεύσεις και πολιτισμικά σύνορα από τα τέλη του Μεσαίωνα στη νεώτερη εποχή” (“Demography, Migration, and Cultural Borders from the End of the Middle Ages to Modern Times”), *Ta Historika* 3.5 (1986): 19–44; I. K. Hassiotis, “Continuity and Change in the Modern Greek Diaspora,” *Journal of Modern Hellenism* 6 (1989): 9–24; J. M. Fossey (ed.), *Proceedings of the First International Congress on the Hellenic Diaspora. From Antiquity to Modern Times* (Montréal, 17–22.iv.1988; Athens, 26–30.iv.1988), 2 vols (Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 1991); I. K. Hassiotis, *Επισκόπηση της ιστορίας της νεοελληνικής διασποράς* (*A Survey of the History of the Modern Greek Diaspora*) (Thessalonica: Vantias, 1993) (hereafter Hassiotis 1993); P. Kitromilides, “Πρώιμες έννοιες της διασποράς στην ελληνική σκέψη” (“Early Concepts of the Diaspora in Greek Thought”) in *Ο Ελληνισμός της διασποράς. Προβλήματα και προοπτικές. Διεθνές Επιστημονικό Συνέδριο, Πανεπιστήμιο Ιωαννίνων — Τομέας Φιλοσοφίας* (*The Greeks of the Diaspora. Problems and Perspectives. International Congress, University of Ioannina — Department of Philosophy*) (Athens: Nea Synora, 1998), 215–221.
- 2 For a general history of the New Hellenism, see Ap. E. Vakalopoulos, *Ιστορία του νέου ελληνισμού* [*History of the New Hellenism*], 8 vols. (Thessaloniki, 1961 [21974–1988]).
- 3 On the “identity” of Greeks in the modern era, see among others, *ibid.*, Vol. 1 (Thessaloniki, 21974), 15–111.
- 4 See, among others, Hassiotis 1993, 42.
- 5 For a general history of Venetian-ruled Greek regions, see the collective volume, Ch. A. Maltezou (ed.), *Όψεις της ιστορίας του βενετοκρατούμενου*

- Ελληνισμού. *Αρχαιακά τεκμήρια* (Aspects of the History of the Greeks under Venetian Rule, *Archive Material*) (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for Culture, 1993), which includes a large bibliography.
- 6 About Rhodes under the Knights of St. John, see, among others, Ch. I. Papachristodoulou, *Ιστορία της Ρόδου. Από τους προϊστορικούς χρόνους έως την ενσωμάτωση της Δωδεκανήσου (1948)* (The History of Rhodes from Prehistoric Times to the Incorporation of the Dodecanese Islands into the Greek State [1948]) (Athens: House of Letters and Arts of the Dodecanese, 1972), 266–396; A. Luttrell, *The Hospitallers in Cyprus, Rhodes, Greece and the West, 1291–1440* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1978); idem, “The Hospitallers of Rhodes: Perspectives, Problems, Possibilities” in *Latin Greece, the Hospitallers and the Crusades. 1291–1440*, Vol. 1 (London: Variorum Reprints, 1982), 243–266; Z. N. Tsirpanlis, *Η Ρόδος και οι Νότιες Σποράδες στα χρόνια των Ιωαννιτών Ιπποτών (14ος–16ος αι.). Συλλογή ιστορικών μελετών* (Rhodes and the South-East Aegean Islands under the Knights of St. John (14th–16th cc.): Collected Studies (Rhodes: Office of the Medieval City of Rhodes, 1991); M. Efthymiou, “Ομοιότητες και διαφορές στη διοίκηση μιας νησιωτικής περιοχής. Οι Ιωαννίτες Ιππότες και οι Οθωμανοί στα νησιά του Νοτιοανατολικού Αιγαίου” (“Similarities and Differences in the Administration of an Island Region: the Knights of Saint John and the Ottomans on the South-East Aegean Islands”), *Mnimon* 14 (1992): 21–48; Z. N. Tsirpanlis, *Ανέκδοτα έγγραφα για τη Ρόδο και τις Νότιες Σποράδες από το Αρχείο των Ιωαννιτών Ιπποτών, Ι' (1421–1453). Εισαγωγή, διπλωματική έκδοση, σχόλια* (Unpublished Documents Concerning Rhodes and the South-East Aegean Islands from the Archives of the Order of St. John, Vol. 1 (1421–1453). Introduction, diplomatic edition, comments) (Rhodes: Office of the Medieval City of Rhodes, 1995).
 - 7 On the ideological stand of the Greeks vis-a-vis the Venetians, see A. Papadia-Lala, “Οι Έλληνες και η βενετική πραγματικότητα. Ιδεολογική και κοινωνική συγκρότηση”, *Όψεις της ιστορίας του βενετοκρατούμενου Ελληνισμού* (“The Greeks and the Venetian Reality. Ideology and Social Composition” in *Aspects of the History of the Greeks under Venetian rule*, *op. cit.*), 173–185.
 - 8 On the complex problems of inclusion of the group in Venetian society and the climate of mutual distrust, see Ch. A. Maltezou, “Η τύχη των τελευταίων Βενετών ευγενών της Κρήτης”, *Ενθύμησις Νικολάου Μ. Παναγιωτάκη* (“The Fate of the Last Venetian Nobles in Crete”, *Commemorative Volume in Honour of Nikolaos M. Panagiotakis*) (Iraklio: Crete University Press, Vikelea Municipal Library of Iraklion, 2000), 447–458.
 - 9 From the rich bibliography for the Greek Confraternity in Venice, see I. Veloudos, *Ελλήνων Ορθοδόξων αποικία εν Βενετία. Ιστορικών υπόμνημα* (The Greek Orthodox Colony in Venice: A Historical Memorial) (Venice, 1893); F. Mavroidi, *Συμβολή στην ιστορία της Ελληνικής Αδελφότητας Βενετίας στο ΙΣΤ΄ αιώνα. Έκδοση του Β΄ μητρώου εγγραφών (1533–1562)* (A Contribution to the History of the Greek Confraternity in Venice in the XVI Century: Publication of Register II [1533–1562]) (Athens: Notis Karavias' Bookshop, 1976); M. I. Manoussakas, “Επισκόπηση της ιστορίας της Ελληνικής Ορθόδοξης Αδελφότητας της Βενετίας (1498–1953)” (“A Survey of the History of the Greek Orthodox Confraternity in Venice [1498–1953]”), *Ta Historika* 6.11 (1989): 243–264; idem, “The History of the Greek Confraternity (1498–1953) and the Activity of the Greek Institute of Venice (1966–1982)”, *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook* 5 (1989): 321–394; K. G. Tsiknakis, “Ο Ελληνισμός της Βενετίας (13ος–18ος αιώνες)”, *Όψεις της ιστορίας του βενετοκρατούμενου Ελληνισμού*, *op. cit.* (“The Greeks of Venice [13th–18th centuries]” in *Aspects of the History of the Greeks under Venetian Rule*, *op. cit.*, 519–596; Ch. A. Maltezou, *Η Βενετία των Ελλήνων* (Venice of the Greeks) (Athens: Militos Editions, 2000).
 - 10 On this subject, see L. S. Vrokinis, *Η περί τα μέσα του ΙΣΤ΄ αιώνα εν*

- Κερκύρα αποίκησης των Ναυπλιέων και των Μονεμβασιέων. Ιστορική πραγματεία* (Mid-16th Century Nafplian and Monemvasian Colonization on Corfu. An Historical Essay) (Corfu, 1905) (reprint in: *Kerkyraika Chronika* 17 [1973]: 233–261) (hereafter Vrokinis); M. Kolyva, “*Varii siano li animi de li abitanti. Προσφυγικοί πληθυσμοί στη Ζάκυνθο* (16ος αιώνας)” (“*Varii siano li animi de li abitanti. Refugee Populations on Zakynthos* (16th c.)”) in Ch. A. Maltezos (ed.), *Symposium International: Πλούσιοι και φτωχοί στην κοινωνία της ελληνολατινικής Ανατολής* (Rich and Poor in the Greek-Latin East) (Venice: Library of the Hellenic Institute of Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Studies, No. 19, 1998), 419–427; S. S. Zapandi, *Κεφαλονιά 1500–1571. Η συγκρότηση της κοινωνίας του νησιού* (Cephalonia 1500–1571. The Composition of the Island's Society) (Thessaloniki: University Studio Press, 1999), 45–60, 211–212 (hereafter Zapandi).
- 11 See M. Kolyva-Karaleka & E. Moatsos, “Αποκατάσταση Ναυπλιωτών και Μονεμβασιωτών προσφύγων στην Κρήτη το 1548” (“The Settlement on Crete of Refugees from Naflio and Monemvasia in 1548”), *Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher* 22 (1977–1984): 375–453.
 - 12 See also Vrokinis, *op. cit.*, 257–259. Especially on Cretan refugees, see P. Chiotis, *Ιστορία της Επτανήσου και ιδίως της Ζακύνθου. Σειράς Ιστορικών Απομνημονευμάτων* (History of the Ionian Islands and Zakynthos in Particular. Historical Memoirs Series), Vol. 3 (Corfu, 1863) (photographic reproduction: Athens 1979), 230–232; Ch. A. Maltezos, “Πρόσφυγες από την Κρήτη στα Κύθηρα (Άγνωστες πληροφορίες από το Αρχείο των Κυθήρων)”, (*Refugees from Crete on Kythera, new data from the Kythera Archive*), *Eperetis Eterias Byzantinon Spoudon* 39–40 (1972–1973) — *Leimon. Essays in Honor of Professor Nikolaos B. Tomadakis*, 518–526. *Βενετική παρουσία στα Κύθηρα* (Venetian Presence on Kythera) (Athens, 1991, V). On page 519, note 1, cites the earlier bibliography on the subject; *idem*, “Κρητοκυθηραϊκά. Η κρητική οικογένεια Κλαδούρη και το Συμβούλιο των ευγενών στα Κύθηρα” (“Kritokytheraika: the Cretan Kladouri Family and the Council of Nobles on Kythera”), *Thesaurismata* 12 (1975): 257–291 (*Venetian Presence on Kythera, op. cit.*, VI). In general, on the civic communities and the refugees in the Venetian-ruled Greek lands, see also A. Papadia-Lala, *Ο θεσμός των αστικών κοινοτήτων στον ελληνικό χώρο κατά την περίοδο της Βενετοκρατίας (13ος–18ος αι.). Μια συνθετική προσέγγιση* [The Civic Communities in the Venetian-Ruled Greek Lands (13th–18th Centuries). A Synthetic Approach] (Venice: Library of the Hellenic Institute of Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Studies, No. 24, 2004).
 - 13 For example, notice the place names “Anaplitochori-Stratia” on Corfu (Vrokinis, 239) and “Sfakiotes” on Lefkas (C. G. Machairas, *Η Λευκάς επί Ενετοκρατίας. 1684–1797* [Lefkas under Venetian Rule. 1684–1797] [Athens, 1951]), 132 (hereafter Machairas). See also the surnames “Mothonios, Monomvassiotis” in Cephalonia (Zapandi, 165).
 - 14 On Greeks in Istria, see M. Konstandinidis, “*Η άλλοτε εν Πόλα της Ιστορίας ελληνική κοινότης και οι εν τη περιφερεία αυτής ελληνικοί συνοικισμοί* (1540–1796)” (“The Formerly Greek Community in the city of Pola in Istria and the Greek Settlements in Its Environs [1540–1796]”), *Ekklesiastikos Faros* 12 (1913): 508–524; A. Xanthopoulou-Kyriakou, “*Ειδήσεις για άγνωστη ελληνική αποικία στην Ιστρία τον 18ο αιώνα*” (“References to a Previously Unrecorded Greek Colony in Istria in the 18th Century”), *Thesaurismata* 10 (1973): 202–212.
 - 15 On Greeks in Malta, see Z. N. Tsirpanlis, “*Από τη Ρόδο στη Μάλτα* (1523–1530). Οι Ροδίτες πρόσφυγες και οι βυζαντινές εικόνες της Παναγίας Δαμασκηνης και της Παναγίας Ελεημονήτρας” (“From Rhodes to Malta (1523–1530). The Rhodian Refugees and the Byzantine Icons of Our Lady of Damascus and of Our Lady Eleimonitra”), *Dodoni* 17.1 (1988): 197–236, which includes a large bibliography. See also D. I. Polemis, “*Τα ελληνικά έντυπα του εν Μάλτα*

- τυπογραφείου της Αγγλικανικής Ιεραποστολής" ("Books in Greek Printed by the Anglican Mission on Malta"), *O Eranistis* 8 (1970): 153–168; idem, "Από την δραστηριότητα του εν Μάλτα ελληνικού τυπογραφείου της Αποστολικής Εταιρείας του Λονδίνου" ["Of the Activities of the London Missionary Society's Greek Print Workshop on Malta"], *O Eranistis* 10 (1972–73): 213–240.
- 16 For example, see G. N. Moschopoulos, *Ιστορία της Κεφαλονιάς*, τ. 1, *Από τα αρχαία χρόνια ως το 1797* (*History of Cephalonia*, Vol. 1, *From Antiquity to 1797*) (Athens, 1985), 152–153; Zapandi, 143; Machairas, 132–138.
- 17 From the rich bibliography on Greeks in Southern Italy, see N. Katramis, *Η εν Νεαπόλει ελληνική εκκλησία* (*The Greek Church in Naples*) (Zante, 1866); Sp. P. Lambros, "Οκτώ ανέκδοτα έγγραφα, ὡν πέντε ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας καὶ τῆς Κάτω Ἰταλίας" ("Eight Previously-Unpublished Documents, Five of Which are from Sicily and Southern Italy"), *Neos Ellinonimion* 7 (1910): 26–48; idem, "Μετανάστευσις Ἑλλήνων ἰδίως Πελοποννησίων ἀποίκων εἰς τὸ Βασίλειον τῆς Νεαπόλεως" ("Greek, and Chiefly Peloponnesian, Colonists in the Kingdom of Naples"), *Neos Ellinonimion* 8 (1911): 377–461; M. Dendias, "Ἀπουλία καὶ Ξιμῆρα. Γλωσσικαὶ καὶ ἱστορικαὶ σχέσεις τῶν ἐλληνικῶν αὐτῶν πληθυσμῶν" ("Apulia and Himara. Linguistic and Historical Links between these Greek Populations"), *Athina* 38 (1926): 72–109; X.A. Sideridis, "Ἡ Ἡπειρώτις οἰκογένεια Περέ" ("The Rere Family of Epirus"), *Ipeirotika Chronika* 3 (1928): 160–168; D. Lambikis, *Ἑλληνισμός τῆς Νοτίου Ἰταλίας* (*Grecia Salentina*) (*The Greeks of Southern Italy [Grecia Salentina]*) (Athens, 1933); P. P. Kalonaros, *Εἰκόνες ἀπὸ τὸν Ἑλληνισμόν τῆς διασποράς. Οἱ Μανιάτες τῆς Κορσικῆς — Οἱ Ἑλληνόφωνοι τῆς Ἰταλίας* (*Images from the Greeks of the Diaspora. The Maniates of Corsica — The Greek-Speakers of Italy*) (Athens, 1937), 27–60 (hereafter Kalonaros 1937); idem, *Μεγάλη Ἑλλάς* (*Magna Grecia*) (Athens, 1944), 7–110 (hereafter Kalonaros 1944); I. A. Thomopoulos, "Κάτω-ἰταλικά ἐλληνικά τοπωνύμια" ("Greek Place Names in Southern Italy"), *Ellinika* 16 (1958–1959): 70–76; I. K. Hassiotis, *Σχέσεις Ἑλλήνων καὶ Ἰσπανῶν στα χρόνια τῆς Τουρκοκρατίας* (*Relations between Greeks and Spaniards During the Period of Turkish Rule*) (Thessalonica, 1969), 26–29, 43–45; idem, "Ἑλληνικοὶ ἐποικισμοὶ στὸ βασίλειο τῆς Νεάπολης κατὰ τὸν δέκατο ἑβδόμο αἰῶνα" ("Greek Settlements in the Kingdom of Naples during the seventeenth Century"), *Ellinika* 22 (1969): 116–162; A. Meryanou, *Ὁ Ἑλληνισμός στὴν Κάτω Ἰταλία. Ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχαιοτάτων χρόνων μέχρι σήμερα* (*The Greeks of Southern Italy: From Antiquity until the Present Day*) (Athens: 1974); idem, *Ταξιδεύοντας στὰ ἐλληνόφωνα χωριά τῆς Κάτω Ἰταλίας* (*Traveling through the Greek-Speaking Villages of Southern Italy*) (Athens: Akritas, 1980); I. K. Hassiotis, "Sull'organizzazione, incorporazione sociale e ideologia politica dei Greci a Napoli (dal XV alla metà del XIX sec.)", *Επιστημονικὴ Επετηρίδα τῆς Φιλοσοφικῆς Σχολῆς τοῦ Ἀριστοτελείου Πανεπιστημίου Θεσσαλονίκης* (*Yearbook of the Philosophy Faculty of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki*), 20 (1981): 409–452; *Ἑλληνισμός καὶ Κάτω Ἰταλία. Ἀπὸ τὰ Ἰόνια νησιά στὴν Grecia Salentina* [*Hellenism and Southern Italy. From Ionian Islands to Grecia Salentina*], Vols. 1–2 (Corfu: Ionian University, 2002).
- 18 From the rich bibliography on Mani, see Ap. B. Daskalakis, *Ἡ Μάνη καὶ ἡ Οθωμανικὴ Αυτοκρατορία. 1453–1821* (*The Mani and the Ottoman Empire, 1453–1821*) (Athens, 1928); K. Mertziou, "Ἡ Μάνη εἰς τὰ ἀρχεῖα τῆς Βενετίας (1611–1674)" ("The Mani in the Venetian Archives (1611–1674)"), *Lakonikai Spoudai* 1 (1972): 83–173; K. Dokos, "Ἐπαναστατικὰ κινήσεις εἰς Μάνην πρὸ τῆς ναυμαχίας τῆς Ναυπάκτου καὶ ἡ ἐναντὶ αὐτῶν στάσις τῆς Βενετίας καὶ Ἰσπανίας (1570–1571)" ("Revolutionary Movements in the Mani Prior to the Battle of Nafpaktos and the Venetian and Spanish Stance towards Them [1570–1571]"), *Lakonikai Spoudai* 1 (1972): 212–266; A. Pardos, "Ἡ Μάνη στὸ

- μάτι του κυκλώνα. Άγνωστες πτυχές των συνεννοήσεων με το ισπανικό βασίλειο της Νεάπολης (1639–1648)” (“The Mani at the Eye of the Storm: Previously-Unknown Aspects of Agreements Made with the Spanish Kingdom of Naples [1639–1648]”), *Eoa kai Esperia* 1 (1993): 191–240. See also E. P. Alexakis, *Τα γένη και η οικογένεια στην παραδοσιακή κοινωνία της Μάνης* (*Clans and Family in the Traditional Society of Mani*) (Athens, 1980).
- 19 See among others K. K. Spiliotakis, “Νεώτερα στοιχεία περί της μετοικήσεως των Μεδίκων της Μάνης εις Τοσκάνην (1670–1671)” (“New Data Relating to the Medici’s Move from the Mani to Tuscany [1670–1671]”), *Lakonikai Spoudai* 1 (1972): 199–211; Z. N. Tsirpanlis, “Οι Μανιάτες της Τοσκάνης και της περιοχής του Τάραντα (β’ μισό του 17ου αι.)” (“The Maniates of Tuscany and the Taranto Region [Second Half of the 17th century]”), *Lakonikai Spoudai* 4 (1979): 105–159; Th. I. Papadopoulos, “Μανιάτες έποικοι στην Ιταλία τον 17ο αιώνα” (“Maniot Settlers in Italy in the 17th Century”), *Lakonikai Spoudai* 4 (1979): 396–474; idem, “Μανιάτες έποικοι στην Ιταλία τον 17ο αιώνα” (“Maniot Settlers in Italy in the 17th Century”), *Lakonikai Spoudai* 6 (1982): 182–258; D. B. Vayakakos, “Μετακινήσεις Μανιατών προς την Γένοβαν κατά τον 17ον αιώνα” (“Immigrations of Maniates to Genoa in the 17th Century”), *Lakonikai Spoudai* 9 (1988): 504–511; Pardos, *op.cit.* For specific information on Maniates in Southern Italy, see note 17 above.
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Reconstituting Community: Cultural Differentiation and Identity Politics in Christian Orthodox Communities during the Late Ottoman Era

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- 2 Cf. N. Pantazopoulos, “Οι κοινοτικές ρίζες του μικρασιατικού ελληνισμού” (“The Communal Roots of Hellenism in Asia Minor”), in *Εισηγήσεις Επισημονικού Διημέρου Αφιερωμένου στη Μνήμη του καθηγητή Μ. Αναστασιάδη (Papers Presented at a Symposium Held in Memory of M. Anastasiades)* (Athens: Enosis Smyrnaion, 1986), 67–119 (hereafter Pantazopoulos); idem, *Ο ελληνικός κοινοτισμός και η νεοελληνική κοινοτική παράδοση (Communal Organization and the Greek Communities)* (Athens: Parousia, 1993); A. Vakalopoulos, *Σύγχρονα βαλκανικά εθνολογικά προβλήματα. Η πορεία του Γένους (Modern Ethnological Issues in the Balkans: The Advancement of the Greek Nation)* (Athens: Vaniat, 1992), 105–108; G. Kontogiorgos, *Κοινωνική δυναμική και πολιτική αυτοδιοίκηση. Οι ελληνικές κοινότητες της Τουρκοκρατίας (Social Dynamics and Self Rule: The Greek Communities during the Period of Ottoman Domination)* (Athens: Nea Synora, 1982), 30–38.
- 3 M. Todorova, “Realia. Qu’est ce qu’il y a des hors texte?” in M. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 162–166.
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- 5 P. Konortas, *Οθωμανικές θεωρήσεις για το Οικουμενικό Πατριαρχείο 17^{ος}–20^{ος} αιών (Ottoman Perspectives on the Orthodox Patriarchate)* (Athens: Alexandria, 1998), 318 ff. (hereafter Konortas).
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- 7 Konortas, 133–134.
- 8 D. Stamatopoulos, “Οθωμανικές μεταρρυθμίσεις και Οικουμενικό Πατριαρχείο. Πολιτικοί ανταγωνισμοί για την εφαρμογή των εθνικών κανονισμών, 1858–1878” (*Ottoman Reforms and the Orthodox Patriarchate*) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Thessaloniki, 1998).
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- 10 The issue of middle-class respectability as a dominant mode of social representation is discussed in G. L. Mosse, *Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and Abnormal Sexuality in Modern Europe* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1985).
 - 11 Scarlatos Byzantios, *Η Κωνσταντινούπολις ή περιγραφή τοπογραφική, αρχαιολογική και ιστορική της περιωνύμου ταύτης μεγαλουπόλεως* (Constantinople: A Topographical, Archaeological and Historical Description of this Famous City) (Athens, 1869), 423–424; Alexandros Paspatis, *Υπόμνημα περί του Γραικού Νοσοκομείου του Επταπυργίου* (A Memorandum Regarding the Christian Orthodox Hospital of Yedi Kule) (Constantinople, 1861), 254–258 (hereafter Paspatis).
 - 12 See for example, Konstantinos Stamatziades “Λόγος εκφωνηθείς κατά την επετηρίδα τελετή της εν Σταυροδρομίω Φιλοπτώχου Αδελφότητος των Κυριών” (“A Discourse Addressed to the Annual Meeting of the Philanthropic Society of the Ladies of Pera”) in *Πρακτικά της εν Σταυροδρομίω Αδελφότητος των Κυριών* (Proceedings of the Society of the Ladies’ Brotherhood of the District of Pera) (Constantinople 1872), 28–40; Houamanzis “Περί επαιτείας” (“On Vagrancy”), *op. cit. Neologos* 29.10 (February 1874), 8.20 (February 1874); “Περί Εργασίας υπό υγιεινήν και κοινωνικήν άποψιν” (“On the Value of Labor from a Hygienic and Social Perspective”), *Neologos* 9.21 (February 1876).
 - 13 “On Vagrancy.”
 - 14 H. Exertzoglou, *Εθνική ταυτότητα στη Κωνσταντινούπολη. Ο Ελληνικός Φιλολογικός Σύλλογος Κωνσταντινουπόλεως, 1861–1912* (National Identity in Constantinople in the 19th Century) (Athens: Nefele, 1996) (hereafter Exertzoglou), 121–131.
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 - 16 Paspatis, 41–49, 317–326.
 - 17 *Ibid.*, 138–144.
 - 18 Panagiotis Salabantas, “Περί εκλογής ξένης τροφού” (“How to Choose a Wet Nurse”), *Chronos* (1871), 111.
 - 19 R. Davison, “The Advent of the Principal of Representation in the Government of the Ottoman Empire,” in *idem, Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774–1923* (London: Saqi Books, 1990), 96–111.
 - 20 R. Davison, *Reforms in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), 125–131; R. Clogg, “The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire” in B. Braude and B. Lewis, *op. cit.*, 194–6 (hereafter Clogg).
 - 21 Papastathis, 98–99.
 - 22 The names of the representatives of local parishes in the interim electoral body and the names of the elected members of the Mixed Council were published in the local Greek press. In the period 1865–1873, five such elections took

- place. Among those elected, one could find members of rich and influential families such as Aristachi, Karatheodori, Mavrogeni, Archigeni, Kalliades, and Zografos. See election results in *Anatolikos Aster*, 24 March 1865, 29 March 1867, 19 March 1869, 17 March 1871, 21 March 1873.
- 23 On the issue of Muslim immigration, see K. Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830–1914, Demographic and Social Characteristics* (Madison, WI: Wisconsin University Press, 1985); A. Toumarkine, *Les Migrations des Populations Musulmanes, Balkaniques en Anatolie, 1876–1913* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1995). On Christian Orthodox immigration, see K. Tsoukalas, *Εξάρτηση και αναπαραγωγή, Ο ρόλος των σχολικών μηχανισμών στην Νεώτερη Ελλάδα* (*Dependency and Social Reproduction: The Role of School Mechanisms in Modern Greece*) (Athens: Themelio, 1977), 287–311; B. Sfyroeras, “Μεταναστεύσεις και εποικισμοί κυκλαδίων εις Σμύρνην κατά την Τουρκοκρατίαν” (“The Immigration of Islanders to Smyrna during the Period of Ottoman Domination”), *Mikrasiatika Chronika* 10 (1963): 164–199; A. Vakalopoulos, “Les Villes Grecques dans le Cadre de l’Empire Ottoman,” paper presented at the AIESEE conference on *Istanbul à la Jonction des Cultures Balkaniques, Méditerranéennes, Slaves et Oriental*, 1973, 64–80; Anagnostopoulou, 218–239; Augustinos, 26–34; Clogg, 195–196.
 - 24 The Orthodox community of Salonica adopted a similar system of local representation. See D. Stamatopoulos, “Εθνικοί ανταγωνισμοί και κοινοτική ανασυγκρότηση” (“Nationalist Competition and the Reorganization of Communities”), *Valkanika Symmikta* 1 (1998): 51–96; see also G. Moutafis, “Η δημογεροντία της Θεσσαλονίκης στο κοινωνικό της πλαίσιο” (“The Council of Elders in Salonica and Its Social Context”), in *Πρακτικά συμποσίου: Η διαχρονική πορεία του κοινοτισμού στη Μακεδονία* (*The Diachronic Advancement of Communal Organization in Macedonia: Proceedings of a Symposium*) (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1991), 239–254.
 - 25 Ch. de Scherzer, *La Province de Smyrne. Consideree au Point de Vue Geographique, Economique et Intellectuel* (Vienna, 1873); E. Frangaki Syrret, “The Economic Activity of the Greek Community of Izmir,” in D. Gondicas and Ch. Issawi (eds.), *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism. Politics and Society in the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1999), 17–44.
 - 26 S. Solomonides, *Η Εκκλησία της Σμύρνης* (*The Orthodox Church in Smyrna*) (Athens: 1960), 296–7.
 - 27 *Οργανικός Κανονισμός της εν Σμύρνη Ορθοδόξου Κοινότητος* (*The Organic Regulations of the Orthodox Community of Smyrna*) (Smyrna, 1878), Article 2.
 - 28 On the council of elders and the local power struggle in the Christian Orthodox community of Izmir in the nineteenth century, see A. Diamantopoulos, “Βασίλειος Μητροπολίτης Σμύρνης” (“Basil Metropolitan of Smyrna”), *Mikrasiatika Chronika* 2 (1939): 148–198. See also K. Lameris, “Περί του θεσμού των επί τουρκοκρατίας Δημογεροντιών” (“On the Institution of the Council of Elders during the Period of Ottoman Domination”), *Mikrasiatika Chronika* 3 (1940): 109–114; Anagnostopoulou, 325–348.
 - 29 *Κανονισμός της Ορθοδόξου Ελληνικής Κοινότητος Σμύρνης* (*The Regulation of the Greek Orthodox Community of Smyrna*) (Smyrna, 1910), Article 25.
 - 30 *Ibid.*
 - 31 *Οργανικός Κανονισμός της εν Σμύρνη Ορθοδόξου Ελληνικής Κοινότητος* (*The Organic Regulation of the Greek Orthodox Community of Smyrna*) (Smyrna, 1888), Articles 4 and 32.
 - 32 This trend was further strengthened by the Fundamental Regulation of the Christian Orthodox Millet of 1902. See Papastathis, 132–144.
 - 33 See a detailed list of educational and cultural associations in Kyriake Mammone, “Σωματειακή οργάνωσις του Ελληνισμού Α’” (“The Greek Associations in Asia Minor, Part One”), *Journal of the Historical and Ethnological*

- Association of Greece 28 (1983): 63–105; idem, “Σωματειακή οργάνωσις του Ελληνισμού Β’” (“The Greek Associations in Asia Minor, Part Two”), *Journal of the Historical and Ethnological Association of Greece* 28 (1985): 55–160; idem, “Σωματειακή οργάνωσις του Ελληνισμού Γ’” (“The Greek Associations in Asia Minor, Part Three”), *Journal of the Centre of Asia Minor Studies* 6 (1986–87): 155–217.
- 34 The Greek Literary Association in Constantinople financed a large number of provincial schools; in the period 1872–1877, the Association distributed 5,300 Ottoman pounds to various local schools in Macedonia, Thrace, and Asia Minor. The philanthropic brotherhood “Love Each Other,” which was established by the Patriarch Joachim III with the help of a number of influential Greek bankers in Istanbul, distributed approximately 4,500 Ottoman pounds in the period 1880–1881, mostly for the same purpose. See *Ekklesiastike Alethia* (26 May 1882). Educational expenses rose even more when the Greek national state decided to subsidize the Orthodox school network, particularly in the Macedonian provinces. See S. Voure, *Εκπαίδευση και εθνικισμός στα Βαλκάνια. Η περίπτωση της βορειοδυτικής Μακεδονίας, 1878–1914* (*Nationalism and Education in the Balkans: The Case of Northwestern Macedonia, 1878–1914*) (Athens: Paraskenio, 1992); E. Belia, *Εκπαίδευση και αλτρωτική πολιτική: Η περίπτωση της Θράκης 1856–1912* (*Education and Irredentism: The Case of Thrace, 1856–1912*) (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1995).
- 35 On this issue, see E. Kanner, “Φτώχεια, φιλανθρωπία και κοινωνικός έλεγχος στην ορθόδοξη κοινότητα της Κωνσταντινούπολης 1750–1908” (“Poverty, Philanthropy, and Social Control in the Greek Orthodox Community of Constantinople”) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Athens, 2000).
- 36 A. Singer, *Constructing Ottoman Beneficence: An Imperial Soup Kitchen in Jerusalem* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002); E. Ginio, “Living on the Margins of Charity: Coping with Poverty in an Ottoman Provincial City,” in M. Bonner and M. Ener (eds.), *Poverty and Charity in the Middle Eastern Context* (Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 2003); N. Ozbeck, “The Politics of Poor Relief in the Late Ottoman Empire,” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 21 (1999): 1–33.
- 37 Manuel Gedeon, the well-known chronicler of the Orthodox Church, published the registry book (κώδιξ) of one of the oldest fraternities, the Fraternity of St. Spyridon and Santa Matrona, founded in 1816. Manuel Gedeon “Γηραιός Αδελφότητος Ιστορία” (“On the History of an Old Brotherhood”), *Ekklesiastike Alethia* (10 March 1907): 154–156. According to another source, the charitable work of local fraternities was non-existent as their members were involved in preparing the annual commemoration of local saints and dead members of the fraternity. D. Christides-Serraïos, *Σχολεία Κωνσταντινουπόλεως* (*The Schools of Constantinople*) (Constantinople, 1851), 91–92.
- 38 M. Kouroupi, “Η Φίλεργος Εταιρεία Κωνσταντινουπόλεως 1866–1878” (“The Philergos Association of Constantinople 1866–1878”), *Journal of the Centre of Asia Minor Studies* 5 (1984–85): 241–274.
- 39 Ten years later, the Fraternity board asserted that the experiment had paid its debt. “These are the wonders of work. Most of the girls coming to seek employment here are of no education and have a bad upbringing. Once they realize the benefits of work they become decent and likable and that without reprehending or reproaching them.” *Εκθεσις των πεπραγμένων της εν Σταυροδρομίου Φιλοπτόχου Αδελφότητος των Κυριών* (*Annual Proceedings of the Philanthropic Society of the Ladies of Pera for the Year 1887*) (Constantinople, 1888), 10.

The 'Old' Diaspora, the 'New' Diaspora, and the Greek Diaspora in the Eighteenth through Nineteenth Centuries Vienna

- 1 For a characterization of the black diaspora, see J.E. Harris (ed.), *Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora* (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1993, second edition), especially G. Shepperson, "African Diaspora. Concept and Context," 41–49. For an overview of the debate surrounding the African diaspora, see H. Dorsch, *Afrikanische Diaspora und Black Atlantic: Einführung in Geschichte und aktuelle Diskussion* (Münster: Lit-Verlag, 2000).
- 2 Ph. Curtin, *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1984). The term "trade diaspora" was originally proposed by the anthropologist Abner Cohen, in order to describe "a nation of socially interdependent, but spatially dispersed communities." See A. Cohen, "Cultural Strategies in the Organization of Trading Diasporas," in C. Meillassoux (ed.), *The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 267.
- 3 J. Armstrong defined as "mobilized diasporas" those ethnic groups that held positions as economic or social intermediaries in multiethnic political formations with a low modernization level. See J.A. Armstrong, "Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas," *American Political Science Review* 70.2 (1976): 393–408.
- 4 "Auxiliary diasporas" were defined by R. Cohen as those trade minorities (the Chinese in Southeast Asia, the Lebanese in the Caribbean and West Africa, or the Indians in East Africa) that were favored by colonial expansion and managed to attain a relatively privileged position in colonial societies. The term "imperial diasporas" refers to European colonialists. R. Cohen, *Global Diasporas. An Introduction* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997), 84–85 and 66–67.
- 5 While discussing Caribbean identities, Stuart Hall remarks: "One can only think here of what is uniquely — 'essentially' — Caribbean: precisely the mixes of colour, pigmentation, physiognomic type; the 'blends' of tastes that is Caribbean cuisine; the aesthetics of the 'cross-overs', of 'cut-and-mix'..., which is the heart and soul of black music." S. Hall, "Cultural Identity and Diaspora," in J. Rutherford (ed.), *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990), 235–236. P. Gilroy writes about the formation of an African diaspora consciousness as a process of complex social and cultural interaction between Africa, Europe, and the Americas: *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
- 6 J. Clifford, "Diasporas," *Cultural Anthropology* 9 (1994): 308.
- 7 The debate on which groups, living under what circumstances, constitute diasporas is still valid in the field of political science. See for example, W. Safran, "Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return," *Diaspora* 1 (1991): 83–99.
- 8 H. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994); Ch. Höller, "Dazwischen, daneben, danach. Interview mit Homi K. Bhabha," *Springerin* 1 (1998): 35–37.
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Greek Diaspora in Southern Russia in the Eighteenth through Nineteenth Centuries

- * This paper draws on five years of research funded by the Research Committee of the University of Crete, the results of which have been published in Greek; this book has also been published in 2001 by Lexington Books and the Vryonis Center in the United States, under the title *Diaspora Merchants in the Black Sea: The Greeks in Southern Russia 1775–1861*.
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Central and Peripheral Communities in the Greek Diaspora: Interlocal and Local Economic, Political, and Cultural Networks in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries

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- 31 Op. cit., 364, 374.
- 32 See Z. Acs, “Marchands grecs en Hongrie aux XVI^e–XVII^e siècles”, *Études Historiques Hongroises* 1990, published on the occasion of the 18th International Congress of the Historical Sciences by the National Committee of Hungarian Historians (Budapest, 1990), Vol. 2, *Ethnicity and Society in Hungary*, Ferenc Glatz (ed.), 41–58.
- 33 Ch. Laskaridis, “Η συμβολή των Ελλήνων της Νίζνας στην πολιτιστική και οικονομική ανάπτυξη της Ουκρανίας” (“The Contribution of the Nizna-Greeks to the Cultural and Economic Development of Ukraine”), *Dodoni* (History and Archaeology, in Memory of Sotiris Dakaris) 26 (1997): 405.
- 34 Op. cit., 408, 421–423.
- 35 Op. cit., 408; Cf. Grigorij Arš, “Οι Έλληνες στη Ρωσία” (“The Greeks in Russia”), in *Μουσείο της Φιλικής Εταιρείας–Οδησός (The Catalogue of the Museum of Filiki Hetaireia in Odessa)* (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for Culture, 1994), 13–17; *idem*, “Έλληνες διανοούμενοι. Έμποροι ευεργέτες της εθνικής παιδείας στη Ρωσία (18^{ος}–19^{ος} αιώνες)” (“Greek Intellectuals. Merchant Benefactors and National Education in Russia [18th–19th centuries]”), in *Χίλια χρόνια Ελληνισμού–Ρωσίας. Διεθνές Εμπορικών Επιμελητήριον–Εθνική Ελληνική Επιτροπή (The Greek-Russian Millenium. International Chamber of Commerce-National Greek Committee)* (Athens, 1994), 182–189; see also E. A. Terendieva, *Η Ελληνική κοινότητα στην Ουκρανία. Οι Έλληνες του Νέζιν το διάστημα 17^ο έως 19^ο αιώνα (The Greek Community in Ukraine. The Greeks of Nježin, 17th–19th Centuries)* (Post-graduate paper, Department of History and

- Archaeology, School of Philosophy, Athens University, 1997); *Ποδβижники й меценати. Грецькі підприємці та громадські діячі в Україні XVII–XIX ст. Історико-біографічні нариси / Διαφωτιστές και ευεργέτες. Έλληνες επιχειρηματίες και κοινωνικοί παράγοντες του 17^{ου}–19^{ου} αι. στην Ουκρανία. Ιστορικό-βιογραφικά δοκίμια* (Enlighteners and Benefactors. Greek Businessmen and Social Factors in the Ukraine, 17th–19th Centuries. Historical-Biographical Essays) (in Ukrainian with Greek Precis) (Kiev, 2001).
- 36 Lazarides, *op. cit.*, 407.
 - 37 Halm, *op. cit.*, 400.
 - 38 *Op. cit.*, 443.
 - 39 See the bibliography in O. Katsiardi-Hering, “Das Habsburgerreich: Anlaufpunkt für Griechen und andere Balkanvölker im 17.–19. Jahrhundert”, *Österreichische Osthefte* 38.2 (1996): 175–176.
 - 40 J. Amstadt, *Die k.k. Militärgrenze 1522–1881* (Ph.D. dissertation, Würzburg, 1969); K. Kaser, *Freier Bauer und Soldat. Die Militarisierung der agrarischen Gesellschaft in der kroatisch-slawonischen Militärgrenze (1535–1881)* (Graz, 1986); Z. Janjetovi, “Die Konflikte zwischen Serben und Donau-Schwaben”, *Südost-Forschungen* 58 (1999): 119–168; see also the interesting article by A. Helmedach, “Bevölkerungspolitik im Zeichen der Aufklärung. Zwangsumsiedlung und Zwangsassimilierung im Habsburgerreich des 18. Jhs, eine noch ungelöste Forschungsaufgabe”, *Comparativ*, 6.1 (1966): 41–62.
 - 41 I. H. Tarnanidis, *Τα προβλήματα της Μητροπόλεως των Καρλοβικίων κατά τον ΙΗ' αιώνα και ο Jovan Rajić (1726–1801)* [*The Problems of the Metropolis of Carlowitz during the XVIII Century and Jovan Rajić [1726–1801]*] (Thessaloniki 1972).
 - 42 Katsiardi-Hering, *supra* note 7, p. 85–98; Katsiardi-Hering, “Habsburgerreich”, *op. cit.*, 176–179.
 - 43 Florinsky, *Russia*, *op. cit.*, 335ff.
 - 44 R. P. Bartlett, *Human Capital. The Settlement of Foreigners in Russia 1762–1804* (Cambridge, England and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 34–43; D. Brandes, “Die Ansiedlung von Ausländer-Gruppen an der unteren Wolga und in Neurussland unter Katharina II: Plan und Wirklichkeit”, in E. Hübner, Jan Kusber, Peter Nitsche (eds.), *Russland zur Zeit Katharinas II. Absolutismus-Aufklärung-Pragmatismus* (Köln: Böhlau, 1998), 303–314; see also V. Karydis, “The Mariupol Greeks: Tsarist Treatment of an Ethnic Minority ca. 1778–1859”, *Journal of Modern Hellenism* 3 (1986): 57–74.
 - 45 Bartlett, *op. cit.*, 19–20.
 - 46 *Op. cit.*, 19; S. K. Batalden, *Catherine II's Greek Prelate Eugenios Voulgaris in Russia, 1771–1806* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, New York: Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1982), 36.
 - 47 Halm, *Österreich und Neurussland*, 290–291; Florinsky, *Russia*, *op. cit.*, 557.
 - 48 A. D. Ferguson, “Russian Land Militia and Austrian Militärgrenze. (A Comparative Study)”, *Südost-Forschungen* 13 (1954): 139–158. On settlements in Russia, see V. Kardassis, *Έλληνες ομογενείς στη Νότια Ρωσία, 1775–1861* [The Greeks of Southern Russia, 1775–1861] (Athens, 1998), 41–45 (hereafter Kardassis).
 - 49 Bartlett, *Human Capital*, 24.
 - 50 Batalden, *Eugenios Voulgaris*, 37.
 - 51 P. Herlihy, *Odessa: A History, 1794–1914* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986); Kardassis; H. K. Hassiotis, “Οι παλαιότερες ελληνικές εστίες στη Μοσχοβία και την Κριμαία” (“The Oldest Greek Centres in Moscovia and the Crimea”, in: H. K. Hassiotis, *Οι Έλληνες της Ρωσίας και της Σοβιετικής Ένωσης. Μετοικεσίες και εκτοπισμοί. Οργάνωση και ιδεολογία* (*The Greeks of Russia and the Soviet Union: Migration and Deportation*) (Thessaloniki, Vania, 1997), 63ff, (hereafter: Hassiotis).
 - 52 Hassiotis, 58.

- 53 Ö. Füves, "Die Bekanntesten geadelten Griechen in Ungarn", *Balkan Studies* 5 (1964): 319.
- 54 G. S. Laios, *Simon Sinas* (Athens: Academy of Athens, 1972).
- 55 Batalden, *Eugenios Voulgaris*, 40, 42–43.
- 56 *Ibid.*, 53; for an analysis of the issue of religion and identity, see also G. L. Bruess, *Religion, Identity and Empire: A Greek Archbishop in the Russia of Catherine the Great* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, New York: Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1997).
- 57 See: *Times Literary Supplement* (March 2000, 4–5), Presentation of M.W. Daly, *The Cambridge History of Egypt, Vol. II, Modern Egypt from 1577 to the End of the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, England and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
- 58 Ch. Hadgiiossif, "La colonie grecque en Égypte (1833–1856)", Doctorat de troisième cycle. Université de Paris / Sorbonne (Paris IV), École Pratique des Hautes Études, IV section, 1980.
- 59 Kardasis, 120, compares the two regions.
- 60 Katsiardi-Hering, "La presenza dei Greci a Trieste".
- 61 E. Sifnaiou, "Επαγγελματική ηθική και κοινωνική αγαθοεργία των Ελλήνων επιχειρηματιών στη Ν. Ρωσία" ("The Greek Business Community in Southern Russia: Professional Ethics and Social Benefaction"), *Ta Historika* 32 (2000): 119.

A Land Adored Yet Feared: The Land of Israel in Jewish Tradition

- * Translated from Hebrew by Yaffah Murciano.
- 1 H.N. Bialik, "מכתב קטן לי כתבה" ("A Small Letter She Wrote to Me") in כל כתבי ח'נ ביאליק (*The Collected Works of H.N. Bialik*) (Tel Aviv: Devir, 1962), 70.
- 2 "One who relinquishes [his life] in his mother's bosom [the Land of Israel] cannot be compared to one who relinquishes [his life] in a stranger's bosom" (Jerusalem Talmud, *Kil'ayim* 9c); "He abandoned his mother's bosom and embraced a stranger's bosom" (*ibid.*, *Mo'ed Qatan* 3:1).
- 3 The first quotation is from the blessing after a meal; the second is Gen. 28:17 (and see Rashi's commentary *ad loc.*).
- 4 Note that Philo of Alexandria drew a distinction between holy city and homeland. Jerusalem, for example, is the metropolis and holy city for the Jew, but one's homeland is the place where he and his parents were born in exile. See A. Kasher, "ירושלים כ'מטרופוליס' בתודעתו הלאומית של פילון" ("Jerusalem as 'Metropolis' in Philo's National Consciousness"), *Cathedra* 11 (1979): 45–56.
- 5 See R. Otto, *The Idea of the Holy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 12–40; M. Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1958), 384; D. Shulman, *Tamil Temple Myths* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 42–43. Cf. M. Douglas, *Purity and Danger* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966).
- 6 Following the Babylonian exile, the national center of gravity shifted from the Land to the City and the Temple (the "holy ground" mentioned in Zech. 2:16 refers also to Jerusalem). See M. Weinfeld, "ירושת הארץ, זכות וחובה: תפיסת ההבטחה במקורות מימי בית ראשון וימי בית שני" ("Inheriting the Land, Privilege and Obligation: The Concept of Promise in Sources From First- and Second-Temple Times"), *Zion* 49 (1984): 126–127; R.L. Wilkin, *The Land Called Holy: Palestine in Christian History and Thought* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), 18–19. The Bible refers to "the holy mount" and to "Jerusalem, the holy city," but does not refer explicitly to the Land of Israel as the Holy Land. However, early allusions to the Holy Land can be found

- in verses such as Exod. 15:13, Isa. 57:13, and Ps. 78:54. Explicit references to the Land of Israel as the Holy Land first appear in rabbinic and Hellenistic Jewish literature. On various aspects of the sacred place in the Bible, see S. Japhet, "Some Biblical Concepts of Sacred Place," in B.Z. Kedar and R.J.Z. Werblowsky (eds.), *Sacred Space: Shrine, City, Land; International Conference in Memory of Joshua Prawer* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 55–72.
- 7 On the transfer of motifs and themes in the literature of the sages from the shrine and Jerusalem to the entire Land of Israel, see H. Kosowsky, "קדושה העליה לרגל בימי ראשונה" ("First Sanctity"), *Sinai* 2 (1938): 73–80; S. Safrai, *העליה לרגל בימי ראשונה* (*Pilgrimage in the Second Temple Era*) (Tel Aviv: Akademon, 1965), 151–155; Z. and H. Safrai, *קדושת ארץ ישראל וירושלים – קווים להתפתחותו* ("The Holiness of the Land of Israel and Jerusalem — Outline of an Idea's Development") in A. Oppenheimer, Y. Gafni, and M. Stern (eds.), *יהודים ויהדות בימי בית שני, המשנה והתלמוד: מחקרים לכבודו של שמואל ספראי* (*Jews and Judaism in the Second Temple, Mishna and Talmud Periods: Shmuel Safrai Jubilee Volume*) (Jerusalem: Yad Ben Tzvi, 1993), 344–371.
 - 8 R. Yehudah HaLevi, "דבריך במוך" ("Your Words in Myrrh") in *כל שירי רבי* (*Poems*), Y. Zemora edition (Tel Aviv: Mahbarot le-Sifrut, 1946), Vol. 1, 12.
 - 9 The emotional and existential commitment to the Land also gave rise to such duality: longing, on the one hand; fear of desolation and disillusionment, on the other. See below.
 - 10 Y. Ta-Shema, "הערה על אודות יחסם של קדמוני אשכנז לערך העלייה לארץ ישראל" ("A Note on Attitudes of the Early Sages of Ashkenaz toward Immigration to the Land of Israel"), *Shalem* 6 (1995): 315–318. The "mountain" referred to in the Torah is Mount Sinai, the locus of divine revelation. The author, one of *Hasidei Ashkenaz* (medieval Ashkenazi pietists), interpreted it as referring to the Temple Mount, and, by extension, to the entire Land of Israel.
 - 11 E. Schweid, *מולדת וארץ יעודה* (*Homeland and a Land of Promise*) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1979), e.g., 89.
 - 12 This process had already begun in the Babylonian exile. See J. D. Levenson, *Theology of the Program of Restoration of Ezekiel 40–48* (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1976); J.Z. Smith, *To Take Place: Toward Theory in Ritual* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 8–10.
 - 13 *Supra*, n. 1.
 - 14 Y. Gafni points out that almost all rabbinic statements in praise of the Land, its centrality, and its distinctive qualities were made in the wake of the failure of the Bar-Kokhva Revolt and the decline of Jewish settlement in the Land. See Y. Gafni, "מעמדה של ארץ ישראל בתודעה היהודית בעקבות מרד בר כוכבא" ("The Land of Israel in Jewish Consciousness Following the Bar-Kokhva Revolt") in A. Oppenheimer and U. Rappaport (eds.), *מרד בר כוכבא: מחקרים חדשים* (*Bar Kokhva Revolt: New Studies*) (Jerusalem: Yad Ben Tzvi, 1984), 227–232; *idem*, "העלאת מתים לקבורה בארץ: קווים לראשיתו של המנהג והתפתחותו" ("Importation of the Dead for Burial in the Land of Israel: Outlines of the Beginning of the Custom and Its Development"), *Cathedra* 4 (1977): 113–120.
 - 15 One can, of course, find in the literature sporadic references to this phenomenon, but there is no systematic discussion of it as a characteristic of Jewish history. For an interesting manifestation of this tendency among the Safed kabbalists, see M. Pachter, *ארץ ישראל בספרות המוסר והדרוש של חכמי צפת במאה הט"ז* ("The Land of Israel in the Moral and Homiletic Literature of Sixteenth-Century Safed") in M. Halamish and A. Ravitzky (eds.), *ארץ בני פלטיין של מלך: טעם, זohar* (*The Land of Israel in Medieval Jewish Thought*) (Jerusalem: Yad Ben Tzvi, 1991), 313–316; Z. Zohar, *החיים היהודיים בארץ ישראל על פי כתבים של חכמים ספרדים-מזרחים מארץ ישראל 1849–1777* ("The Denizens of a King's Palace: The Meaning of Jewish Life

- in the Land of Israel in the Writings of Sephardi-Oriental Sages 1777–1849”), in A. Ravitzky (ed.), *ארץ ישראל בהגות היהודית בעת החדשה* (*The Land of Israel in Modern Jewish Thought*) (Jerusalem: Yad Ben Tzvi, 1998), 331–334.
- 16 See, for example, the works of Yehudah Amichai, Chaim Goury, Zelda, Dahlia Ravikovitch, Avigdor Hameiri, Eyal Megeed, and others. S. Y. Agnon’s stories likewise often allude to the theme of dread. See also Chaim Goury, “עקבות הברזל” (“Footsteps of Iron”), *Davar*, December 3, 1993: “It’s not just any piece of land, mountains and valleys that can be turned into a Holy Land... Here, there is a constant divine vigilance.... Here, not only are sins severely punished, mistakes are not pardoned either.”
 - 17 A.B. Yehoshua, *Between Right and Right* [translated by Arnold Schwartz] (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981). Cf. E. Keinanà, “אבא מגרש את אמא” (“Father Divorces Mother”), *Yedi’ot Aharonot*, October 31, 1980.
 - 18 Although Yehoshua regards the physical fear of enemies and economic hardship in the Land of Israel as conscious and manifest (*supra*, n. 17, 41–44), he does not perceive what I term “metaphysical fear” of the Land in the same way.
 - 19 A. Ravitzky, *Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism* (translated by Michael Swirsky) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
 - 20 Cf. R. Moses Nahmanides, “דרשה לראש השנה” (“Sermon for the New Year”) in *כתבי רמב”ן* (*The Writings of Nahmanides*), H. D. Chevel edition (Jerusalem, 1963), 249.
 - 21 See the discussion below of R. Israel of Shklov’s surprise at Maharam’s statement: “Concerning Maharam’s statement that it is ‘a Land that consumes its inhabitants,’ the question immediately arises: [How could he endorse] words that were spoken by the scouts?” and the justification R. Israel provides for the remark (פאת השולחן) (*Pe’at ha-Shulhan*) [Jerusalem, 1959], 1:15, 8a). In light of the statements by Maharam, by Yesha’ayah HaLevi Horowitz (the Shelah; see *infra*), and by R. Israel of Shklov, it is necessary to correct the premise that Shimshon Raphael Hirsch was the first in Jewish literature to describe the Land of Israel as one “that consumes its inhabitants” (Y. Heineman, *טעמי המצוות בספרות ישראל* (*Reasons for the Commandments in Jewish Literature*), Vol. 2, [Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization, 1956], 158, on Hirsch’s concern that the natural advantages of the Land could lead to a moral decline of its inhabitants). See also R. Moshe Hagiz, *שפת אמת* (*Sefat Emet*) (Vilna, 1876) (photocopied edition: Jerusalem, 1966), 33b. See also *infra*, note 126, on R. Nahman of Bratslav and Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Lyady.
 - 22 Or of the nature and climate of the Land, according to the comments *ad loc.* of Nahmanides and Hayim ben ‘Atar (*Or ha-Hayim*).
 - 23 *Sifra*, *Aharei Mot*, 13; Nahmanides, *Commentary on the Pentateuch*, Lev. 18:25; Num. 35:33.
 - 24 See the commentaries of R. David Qimhi (Radaq) and R. Meir Loeb b. Yehiel Michael (Malbim) *ad loc.*
 - 25 R. Meir of Rothenburg, *שו”ת מהר”ם* (*Responsa*), E. M. Bloch edition (Berlin, 1891), 5. Cf. Shim’on ben Tzemah Duran, *ספר התשב”ץ* (*Sefer ha-Tashbetz*) (Lvov, 1858), 51b. In this and subsequent quotations, I have added my own punctuation and written out the abbreviations in full.
 - 26 A. Grossman, “זיקתה של יהדות אשכנז הקדומה אל ארץ ישראל” (“The Affinity of Early Ashkenazi Jewry to the Land of Israel”) *Shalem* 3 (1981): 57–92; E. Kanarfogel, “The Aliyah of ‘Three Hundred Rabbis’ in 1211: Tosafist Attitudes toward Settling in the Land of Israel,” *JQR* 76 (1986): 191–215; E. Reiner, “עלייה, 1517–1099, ועלייה לרגל לארץ ישראל, 1099–1517” (“Aliyah and Pilgrimage to the Land of Israel, 1099–1517”) (Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1988), 91–118; A. Grossman, “זיקתו של מהר”ם מרוטנבורג אל ארץ ישראל” (“The Affinity

- of the Maharam from Rothenburg to the Land of Israel"), *Cathedra* 84 (1997): 65–84.
- 27 Y.M. Ta-Shema, "עניני ארץ ישראל" ("Regarding the Land of Israel"), *Shalem* 1 (1974): 82; idem, "A Note," 317–318. See also E. Kanarfogel, *Peering Through the Lattices: Mystical, Magical, and Pietistic Dimensions in the Tosafist Period* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2000). Kanarfogel maintains that although Maharam was one of the outstanding Tosafists in erudition and acuity, he was greatly influenced as well by Ashkenazi pietism with respect to asceticism and mysticism. This combination of influences is also evident in his attitude toward the Land of Israel: his yearning for the Land is driven by halakhic and normative factors, while his dread of the Land is based on metaphysical and mystical factors.
 - 28 Yesha'ayah HaLevi Horowitz (Shelah), *שני לוחות הברית* (*Shenei Luhot ha-Berit*) (Warsaw, 1863) (photocopied edition: Jerusalem, 1963), Vol. 2, 11a. See Babylonia Talmud, *Sotah* 35a.
 - 29 Horowitz, *Shenei Luhot ha-Berit*, Vol. 1, 56a.
 - 30 Y. Elboim, *פתיחות והסתגרות: היצירה הרוחנית-ספרותית בפולין ובארצות אשכנז בשלהי המאה השש-עשרה* (*Openness and Insularity: Late Sixteenth-Century Jewish Literature in Poland and Ashkenaz*) (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1990), 210; idem, "תורת ארץ ישראל ב'שני לוחות הברית' לר' ישעיה הורוביץ," in Ravitzky (ed.), *The Land of Israel in Modern Jewish Thought*, 94–112; E.E. Wolfson, "השפעת האר"י על השל"ה" ("The Influence of Isaac Luria on the Shelah"), *Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought* (*Lurianic Kabbala*) 10 (1992): 30.
 - 31 *Supra*, n. 28. Being a stranger in the Land is thus a permanent, existential condition, and there is no difference in that regard between the patriarch Jacob and King David.
 - 32 Schweid, *Homeland and a Land of Promise*, 25–26.
 - 33 These are the very qualities usually associated with exile! See Y. Be'er, *גלות* (*Exile*) [translated from German by Y. Eldad] (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1980); G. Scholem, *דברים בגו* (*Devarim be-Go*) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1976), 190; A. Eisen, *Galut* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1986).
 - 34 Shelah, Vol. 2, 11a.
 - 35 See my comments on Nahmanides' Rosh Ha-Shanah sermon, in my article: "הציבי לך ציונים לציון: גלגולו של רעיון" ("Set Up Markers for Zion: The Evolution of an Idea"), in Halamish and Ravitzky (eds.), *The Land of Israel in Medieval Jewish Thought*, 11–12; A. Ravitzky, *על דעת המקום* ('*Al Da'at ha-Maqom: Studies in Jewish Philosophy and Its History*) (Jerusalem: Keter, 1991), 45.
 - 36 Shelah, Vol. 3, 75b, alluding to Hos. 14:10.
 - 37 Rafael Berdugo, *מי מנוחות* (*Mei Menuhot*), Vol. 1 (Jerusalem: Makhon ha-Ketav, 1900), 20b. See D. Manor, "ארץ ישראל בהגותם של חכמי מרוקן במאה ה-18" ("The Land of Israel in the Thought of Eighteenth-Century Moroccan Sages") in Ravitzky (ed.), *The Land of Israel in Modern Jewish Thought*, 359–380. Berdugo served as rabbi of the town of Meknes. In addition to the reviews cited by Manor, see also Y. Maymeran, *חופש הבחירה בהגותו של רבי אברהם אזולאי* (*Free Will in the Thought of Rabbi Avraham Azulai*) (Jerusalem: Machon Beney Issachar, 1993), 77–89; S. Bar Asher, "The Jews of North Africa and the Land of Israel in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: The Reversal in Attitude toward 'Aliyah from 1770 to 1860," in L. A. Hoffman (ed.), *The Land of Israel: Jewish Perspectives* (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), 303.
 - 38 Alluding to Rashi's commentary on Gen. 28:19.
 - 39 *Mei Menuhot*, Vol. 1, 20b. Cf. *ibid.*, 16b; *Mei Menuhot*, Vol. 2 (Jerba, 1942), 114a. These comments by Berdugo show the influence of the sixteenth-century Safed sages, such as R. Mosheh Alshekh, *תורת משה* (*Torat Mosheh*) (Venice,

- 1601), 274 and R. Elijah da Vidas, *ראשית חכמה* (*Reshit Hokhmah*) (Venice, 1579) and *שער התשובה* (*Sha'ar ha-Teshuvah*), Ch. 6, 180b. See Pachter, "The Land of Israel," 307, 310.
- 40 Rafael Berdugo, *רב פנינים* (*Rav Peninim*), printed with a Passover Haggadah, *פה, פה, המורכב* (*Peh Yesharim ha-Murkav*) (Tel Aviv : Dov S.Y. Ner ha-Ma'arav, 1975), 74–75. See also S. Bar Asher, "The Jews of North Africa and the Land of Israel," 303.
- 41 Such as Nahmanides; Manor, "The Land of Israel," 372; Ravitzky, 'Al Da'at ha-Maqom, 45; Ele'azar Azikri, *ספר חרדים* (*Sefer Haredim*), 61a; Shelah, Vol. 1, 76a (following Azikri's example). See also Yitzhak Farhi, *טוב ירושלים* (*Tuv Yerushalayim*) (Jerusalem: Hotza'at Tuv Yerushalayim, 1969), 91; Avraham Danzig, *ספר שערי צדק* (*Sefer Sha'arei Zedeq*) (Vilna, 1812); author's introduction (A. Morgenstern, *משיחיות ויישוב ארץ ישראל* (*Messianism and the Settlement of the Land of Israel*) [Jerusalem: Yad Ben Tzvi, 1985], 69). Other sages interpreted this metaphor in a positive light. See for example Elish'a Gallico, *פירוש מגילת אסתר* (*Commentary on the Scroll of Esther*) (Venice, 1583), 6b: "For the Land of Israel is a Land over which the eyes of our God roam from the beginning of the year... [see Deut. 11:12], and it is the palace of the King of the Universe, whose providence benignly and assiduously hovers over it."
- 42 *Mei Menuhot*, Vol. 1, 20b. Cf. *ibid.*, Vol. 5, 128a.
- 43 *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, 114a; 128a.
- 44 As noted, Maharam tried to immigrate, and Horowitz actually did immigrate, to the Land of Israel. On Berdugo's time and place, see E. Bashan, *"יחסם של חכמי מרוקו במאות הי"ח–י"ט לחובת העלייה לארץ-ישראל"* ("The View of Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Moroccan Sages Regarding the Obligation to Immigrate to the Land of Israel"), *Vatikin* 1 (1975): 35–45; Bar Asher, "The Jews of North Africa and the Land of Israel," 297–315.
- 45 It follows that the act of sanctifying a place in that sense is also an act of creation. According to Eliade, any house built by a religious man follows this principle; namely, it goes back to the paradigmatic mold of creation. M. Eliade, *The Myth of the Eternal Return* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1954); *idem*, *Images and Symbols* (Paris: Gallimard, 1952), 33–72, 471–495. On the sacralization of place, see also M. Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane* [translated from the French by W. R. Trask] (New York and London: Harcourt Brace, 1959), 20–67; *idem*, *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, 367–387.
- 46 Naturally, he is referring here to an existential, concrete home, not a homeland in the historical/social sense. According to Eliade, building an actual house is, in itself, equivalent to creating a cosmos by imitating the paradigmatic act of creation.
- 47 For a comprehensive critique of Eliade's teachings, see, for example, D. Carrasco and J.M. Law (eds.), *Waiting for the Dawn: Mircea Eliade in Perspective* (Niwot, CO: University Press of Colorado, 1991). An extensive critical literature on Eliade has been published in recent years; for details, see Y. Dan, *על הקדושה : דת, מוסר ומיסטיקה ביהדות ובדתות אחרות* (*On Sanctity: Religion, Ethics and Mysticism in Judaism and Other Religions*) (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1997), 166–168.
- 48 J.Z. Smith, *Map is Not Territory: Study in the History of Religion* (Leiden: Brill, 1978), xv, 93–103; *idem*, *To Take Place*. Cf. L. Dummont, *Homo Hierarchicus* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970); J. Neusner, "Map without Territory: Mishnah's System of Sacrifice and Sanctuary," *History of Religion* 19 (1979): 124.
- 49 See B. Halpern Amaru, "Land Theology in Philo and Josephus," in Hoffman (ed.), *The Land of Israel*, 65–93.
- 50 R. Shatz, *החסידות כמיסטיקה* (*Hasidism as Mysticism*) (Jerusalem: Magnes Press,

- 1968), 168–170; *idem*, “היסוד המשיחי במחשבת החסידות” (“The Messianic Element in Hasidic Thought”), *Molad* 1 (1967–1968): 111–195; M. Piekarz, *הסידות פולין* (*Ideological Trends of Hasidism in Poland During the Interwar Period and the Holocaust*) (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1990), 226; M. Saperstein, “The Land of Israel in Pre-Modern Jewish Thought,” in Hoffman (ed.), *The Land of Israel*; A. Green, “The Tzaddiq as Axis Mundi in Later Judaism,” *JAAR* 45 (1977): 327–347. See, however, articles by M. Idel and A. Goshen-Gottstein in Ravitzky (ed.), *The Land of Israel in Modern Jewish Thought*, 256–300.
- 51 Menahem Ha-Meiri, *Beit ha-Behirah*, Ketubot, 111a (A. Sofer edition, [Jerusalem: Defus Merkaz, 1947], 505). For a more radical philosophical outlook, see the responsum of R. Shelomoh b. Shim'on b. Tzemah Duran (Rashbash) to R. Hagai ben Al-Zuk, *שאלות ותשובות* (*Responsa*) (Constantinople, 1546) § 3. This point was raised by S. Rosenberg, *בהגות ארץ-ישראל* (*The Link with Eretz Israel in Jewish Philosophy — A Clash of Viewpoints*), *Cathedra* 4 (1977): 90; I. Twersky, *ארץ ישראל וגלות במשנתו של הרמב"ם* (“Land and Exile in Maimonides”) in Halamish and Ravitzky (eds.), *The Land of Israel in Medieval Jewish Thought*, 93.
- 52 Isaac of Acre, *אוצר חיים* (*Otzar Hayim*), ms. Moscow-Ginzburg 775, 198a (Cf. 94a). M. Idel, “ארץ ישראל והקבלה במאה השלוש-עשרה” (“The Land of Israel and the Kabbalah in the Thirteenth Century”), *Shalem* 3 (1981): 126, note 40; *idem*, Y. Prawer and H. Ben Shamaï (eds.) *ספר ירושלים, התקופה הצלבנית והאיונית* (*The History of Jerusalem — Crusaders and Ayyibids*) (Jerusalem: Yad Ben Tzvi, 1991), 281; E. Gottlieb, *מחקרים בספרות הקבלה* (*Studies in the Literature of Kabbalah*) (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1976), 242–243.
- 53 Moshe Hagiz, *Sefat Emet*, 14a. Cf. the ironic quip attributed in the Jerusalem Talmud to R. Nathan: “For out of Babylon shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from the Tigris River” (Jerusalem Talmud, *Nedarim*, 6, 8). M.A. Tanenblatt, “רב מקים מרכז רוחני מחוץ לארץ-ישראל” (“Rav Establishes a Spiritual Center outside the Land of Israel”) in Y. Klausner, R. Mahler and D. Sedan (eds.), *ספר היוכל לכבוד נ.מ. גלבר* (*N.M. Gelber Jubilee Volume*) (Tel Aviv, 1963), 74.
- 54 Unlike neutralization, which is usually an ideological response, the kind of dread discussed here is basically an existential and ontological response.
- 55 Z. Gurewitz and G. Aran, “על המקום: אנתרופולוגיה ישראלית” (“Concerning Place: Israeli Anthropology”), *Alpayim* 4 (1992): 9–44; *idem*, “Never in Place: Eliade and Judaic Sacred Places,” *Archives de sciences sociales des religions* 87 (1994): 1–17.
- 56 The Shelah’s comments cited above, on the sense of impermanence required of the Land’s inhabitants, offer a good example. Of course, the Shelah sought to fashion such a consciousness *a priori*, and did so openly and deliberately.
- 57 D. Schwartz, *ארץ הממשות והדמיון: מעמדה של ארץ ישראל בהגות הציונית הדתית* (*Land of Israel in Religious Zionist Thought*) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1997), 17–21, 71–80.
- 58 Regarding Gurewitz and Aran’s thesis, note that this sort of perception of the Land’s inherent sanctity appears frequently in Jewish sources, especially in mystical and Hasidic literature. But it was rejected by various schools of thought, especially the Maimonidean. See J.D. Levenson, *Sinai and Zion* (Minneapolis, MN: Winston Press, 1985); M. Fax, “The Holiness of the Holy Land,” in J. Sacks (ed.), *Tradition and Transition: Essays Presented to Chief Rabbi Sir Immanuel Jakobovits to Celebrate Twenty Years in Office* (London: Jews’ College Publications, 1986), 155–170.
- 59 See *Mekhilta*, Bo, Vol. 1, 2: “Until the Land of Israel was chosen, God could have spoken words of revelation in any land; once the Land of Israel was chosen, all the other lands were disqualified.... Until the Temple was chosen, the *shekhinah* could have resided throughout Jerusalem; once the Temple

- was chosen, [the remainder of] Jerusalem was disqualified." For numerous parallels, see Z. and H. Safrai, "The Holiness of the Land of Israel," 335.
- 60 Habad Hasidism was particularly troubled by this idea. For example, its last leader, R. Menahem Mendel Schneersohn, insisted that Torah classes be held on weekdays, too, and not only on the Sabbath and festivals. He likewise made a point of playing down the distinctive holiness of the synagogue, on the grounds that all places are holy. See A. Ravitzky, *Messianism*, 184–6.
- 61 Avraham Ibn 'Ezra, *Commentary* on Ecclesiastes 5:1 (published in various editions of the rabbinic Bible). One would expect to find this kind of religious perception mainly in pantheistic, immanentist or neoplatonic philosophies (Ibn 'Ezra was an adherent of the last of these), but it does not on that account necessarily contradict the kind of primordial religious feeling that Eliade attempts to describe.
- 62 Ravitzky, "Set Up Markers," 16–27; idem, "'Al Da'at ha-Maqom", 50–60. The discussion there focused on antinomian developments in the Diaspora that emerged, paradoxically, as a result of the exclusive emphasis placed on religious life in the Land of Israel (particularly by Nahmanides). What we are talking about here, however, is not transgression of the Law, but a legitimate exemption due to distance (such as the exemption from observing the commandments contingent on the Land).
- 63 S. Safrai, *בימי הבית השני ובימי המשנה: מחקרים בתולדות ישראל* (*In Times of the Temple and the Mishnah*) (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1994), Vol. 2, 628–632; N. 'Aminoah, "לחולדות הכרעת הדין ב'מצוות התלויות בארץ'" ("On the History of the Legal Determination Regarding 'Commandments Contingent on the Land'"), *Or ha-Mizrah* 24 (1981), 42–51.
- 64 Babylonian Talmud, *Sotah* 14a. For a radical reading of this statement, see S. Rawidowicz, *עיונים במחשבת ישראל* (*Hebrew Studies in Jewish Thought*) (Jerusalem: Reuven Mas, 1969), Vol. 1, 113.
- 65 Babylonian Talmud, *Bava Batra*, 91a.
- 66 Rashbam's commentary on *Baba Batra*, *ibid.*, printed in standard editions of the Talmud; J.D. Bleich, *Contemporary Halakhic Problems* (New York: Ketav, 1977), 7.
- 67 Reiner, "Aliyah and Pilgrimage," 95–98.
- 68 E. Kanarfogel, "The Aliyah of 'Three Hundred Rabbis' in 1211," 191–215; Reiner, *ibid.* Israel Jacob Yuval has recently claimed that they were also motivated by messianic considerations: "Political and Utopian Messianism in the Middle Ages" in S.N. Eisenstadt and M. Lissak, (eds.), *ציונות וחזרה להיסטוריה* (*Zionism and the Return to History: A Reappraisal*) (Jerusalem: Yad Ben Tzvi, 1999), 82–99.
- 69 *Sefer ha-Tashbetz*, Vol. 3, §200. See also the disagreement of R. Yosef Mi-Trani (Maharit) in *שאלות ותשובות* (*Responsa*) (Lvov, 1861) Vol. 2, §28. Elsewhere, Duran adopts Nahmanides' view that the very act of residing in the Land of Israel is itself a biblical positive commandment (Joseph of Trani, *Responsa*, Vol. 3, §288). Cf. *ibid.*, Vol. 1, §21, and R. 'O. Yosef, *ממצות יישוב ארץ-ישראל בזמן הזה* ("The Commandment of Settlement in Eretz Israel in These Days"), *Torah she-be-'al Peh* 1 (1969): 35–42.
- 70 Gafni, "The Land of Israel in Jewish Consciousness."
- 71 For example, Babylonian Talmud, *Ta'anit*, 10a.
- 72 H. Brody (ed.), *Selected Poems of Jehudah Halevi* (translated by Nina Salaman) (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1924), 3.
- 73 See articles by A. Melamed, D. Schwartz and Y. Shavit in Ravitzky (eds.), *The Land of Israel in Modern Jewish Thought* and articles by Melamed and Schwartz in Halamish and Ravitzky (eds.), *The Land of Israel in Medieval Jewish Thought*.
- 74 "How greatly did the patriarchs strive to live in the country, whilst it was

- in the hands of pagans" Yehudah HaLevi, *Kuzari*, Vol. 2, 20 (translated by I. Heinemann, *Three Jewish Philosophers* [New York: Meridian Books, 1960], 68).
- 75 Shelomon Alkabetz, *ברית הלוי* (*Responsum to R. Yosef Caro*), Third Principle (Lvov, 1863), 41; M. Halamish, "קווים להערכתה של ארץ-ישראל בספרות הקבלה" ("Some Characteristics of the Land of Israel in the Geronese School of Kabbalah"), in Halamish and Ravitzky (eds.), *The Land of Israel in Medieval Jewish Thought*, 218; B. Zack, *בשערי הקבלה של רבי משה קורדובירו* (*Kabbalah of R. Mosheh Cordevero*) (Beersheba: Ben Gurion University, 1995), 301–302.
 - 76 Y. Levinger, *הרמב"ם כפילוסוף וכפוסק* (*Maimonides as Philosopher and Codifier*) (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1992), 93–94; H. Kreisel, *ארץ-ישראל ונבואה* ("The Land of Israel and Prophecy in Medieval Jewish Philosophy") in Halamish and Ravitzky (eds.), *The Land of Israel in Medieval Jewish Thought*, 44–45.
 - 77 Interestingly, Maimonides does speak of Jerusalem as intrinsically holy. This distinction between the Land as a whole and Jerusalem in particular is a weighty topic, beyond the scope of this article.
 - 78 See S. Rosenberg, "The Link with Eretz Israel," 82; E. Schweid, *Homeland and a Land of Promise*, 68–78.
 - 79 Maimonides, *Commentary on the Mishnah*, Introduction to *Pereq Heleq* (*Sanhedrin*, chapter 10).
 - 80 Maimonides, *Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Melakhim* (Laws of Kings) 11:4 (in the uncensored text). A. Ravitzky, "Maimonides on the Days of the Messiah" in J.L. Kraemer (ed.), *Perspectives on Maimonides* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 221–256; idem, "'Al Da'at ha-Maqom", 74–104.
 - 81 H. H. Ben Sasson, "בין שיטה ערוכה לכוחות חיים" ("Between Theory and Practice"), *Cathedra* 4 (1977): 96.
 - 82 Attributed to R. Nahman of Bratslav. See R. Nahman of Bratslav, *ליקוטי מהר"ן* (*Likutei Moharan Tanyana*) (Jerusalem and New York: Bratslav Research Institute, 1985), §115, but it may be seen as a typical expression of an attitude that surfaced repeatedly over the ages.
 - 83 Yehonatan Eybeschuetz, *אהבת יהונתן* (*Ahavat Yehonatan*) (Warsaw, 1875), 'Ekev 72b. Cf. idem, *יערות דבש* (*Ya'arot Devash*) (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute, 1984), Vol. 1, 74a.
 - 84 Y. Eybeschuetz, *Ahavat Yehonatan, Va-Ethanan*, 74a; A. Ravitzky, "Set Up Markers," in Halamish and Ravitzky (eds.), *The Land of Israel in Medieval Jewish Thought*, 31; idem, "'Al Da'at ha-Maqom", 65; idem, *Messianism*, 229–230.
 - 85 In other words, he combines the normative, ontological, and eschatological dimensions.
 - 86 Needless to say, they were not suppressed in the *haredi* anti-Zionist literature.
 - 87 Mishnah, *Makot*, 3, 16; *Avot, Qinyan ha-Torah*, end; *Avot de-Rabi Natan*, end.
 - 88 E.E. Urbach, *The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs* (translated by Israel Abrahams) (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1975), 366 *et seq.*
 - 89 "Le-zakat," which conveys the sense of "to purify," also means "to win in a legal proceeding," as Shlomoh Na'eh recently suggested.
 - 90 D. Schwartz, "מה הוה ליה מימר? יוחי בהם" ("He Shall Live by Them"), in Y. Gafni and A. Ravitzky (eds.), *קדושת החיים וחירוף הנפש* (*Sanctity of Life and Martyrdom: An Anthology of Articles in Memory of Amir Yekuti'el*) (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 1992), 73; A. Marmorstein, "Judaism and Christianity in the Middle of the Third Century," *Hebrew Union College Annual* 10 (1935): 250–251; E.P. Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism* (London: S.C.M., 1977), 110–116.
 - 91 *Tosafot, Ketubot*, 110b, s.v. "Hu Omer la-'Alot."
 - 92 *Sifrei, Ha'azinu*, par. 32 (Finkelstein edition, 383). Cf. *Tanhuma, Pinhas*, 13.
 - 93 *בעלי התוספות* (*Hagahot Mordekhai*), *Ketubot*, §313; E.E. Auerbach, *מרדכי* (*The Tosafists*) (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1968), 108.

- 94 Some sages tried to restrict the force of this dictum to R. Hayim's time, attributing it "to the special circumstances that then pertained" (R. Raphael Trebitsch, **צה ואדום** [*White and Ruddy*] [Constantinople, 1740], 7).
- 95 Judah HaLevi, *Kuzari*, end of sec. 5 (Heinemann trans.), 127.
- 96 Z. Harvey, "שאלת הישיבה בארץ-ישראל אצל ריה"ל, רמב"ן והראי"ה קוק" ("The Question of Dwelling in the Land of Israel in HaLevi, Nahmanides and Kook"), in Y. Ne'eman (ed.), **ארץ ישראל וירושלים** (*The Land of Israel and Jerusalem*) (Jerusalem: Yad ha-Rav Nisim, 1992), 1–40. Y. Silman attributed this about-face to the disparity between HaLevi's earlier and latter philosophy (**בין פילוסוף לנביא**) [*From Philosopher to Prophet*] [Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, 1985], 139). In any event, the literary result is the same. See also Y. Levinger, "ספר הכוזרי ומשמעותו" ("The Kuzari and Its Significance"), *Tarbitz* 46 (1981): 472–482.
- 97 Be'er, *Exile*, 48.
- 98 On possible contexts for HaLevi's *Songs of Zion*, see A. Doron, **הזיקה** "The Affinity to the Land of Israel in Judah Ha-Levi's Poetry", *Proceedings of the Eighth World Congress on Jewish Studies* (Jerusalem, 1982), Vol. 3, 159–164.
- 99 R. Eli'ezer ben Shelomoh of Metz (Re'em), R. Hayim's colleague at Rabenu Tam's academy, proposed a similarly radical idea; he interpreted the verse: "They shall not dwell in your Land lest they make you sin against Me," which was directed against idolaters, as being directed as well against sinful Jews! As he himself puts it: "Although this passage speaks of the seven [Canaanite] nations, its wording, 'lest they make you sin,' teaches that it includes all those who lead others astray" (**ספר יראים**) [*Sefer Yere'im*] [Vilna, 1902] §315 (86), 174b). Re'em was speaking, however, of a time in which "the Jews had the upper hand" in the Land of Israel.
- 100 R. Yosef Mi-Trani (Maharit), *Responsa*, Vol. 2, §28; Cf. idem, **חידושי מהרי"ט** (*New Interpretations*) *Ketubot*, 110b (appendix to Maharit, *Responsa*, Vol. 1); Jacob Lorbeerbaum of Lissa, **נתיבות למשפט** (*Netivot la-Mishpat*) on the *Shulhan 'Arukh*, *Even ha-'Ezer*, *Ketubot*, §75. A.Z. Hirsch Eisenstadt, **פתחי תשובה** (*Pithei Teshuvah*) on the *Shulhan 'Arukh*, *ibid.*; R. Israel of Shklov, *Pe'at ha-Shulhan*, Vol. 1, 15, 8a. But see Hayim Yosef David Azulai, *Responsa*, **יוסף אמיץ** (*Yosef Ometz*) (Jerusalem: A. Weinberger, 1961) §52, 75: "The fact that none of the *rishonim* mention R. Hayim's opinion as recorded by the Tosafists.... proves that it was rejected. But to say it was a student's gloss is far-fetched."
- 101 The citations are too numerous to list. See for example, R. Hayim Benveniste, **כנסת הגדולה** (*Keneset ha-Gedolah*) (Jerusalem: Makhon HaKthav, 1984); *Even ha-'Ezer*, Vol. 2, §75, 33; R. Hayim Palaji, *Responsa*, **נשמת כל חי** (*Nishmat Kol Hai*) (Jerusalem: Yeshivat Hedva Hayim, 1988), §49, 202–214.
- 102 Yosef de Leon, **מגילת אסתר על ספר המצוות לרמב"ם** (*Megilat Ester on Maimonides' Book of Commandments*), *Positive Commandments IV* (Jerusalem: 1959 edition), Vol. 2, 42.
- 103 Mosheh Isserles, **דברי משה על הטור** (*Divrei Mosheh 'al ha-Tur*) *Even ha-'Ezer*, *Ketubot*, §75; idem, **דברי משה הארוך** (*Divrei Mosheh ha-Arokh*) §75 (printed with the Jerusalem Institute's edition of the *Tur* [Jerusalem, 1993], p. 9).
- 104 David b. Shemuel HaLevi, **טורי זהב** (*Turei Zahav*) on the *Shulhan 'Arukh*, *Even ha-'Ezer*, *Ketubot*, §75.
- 105 Yehezq'el Landau, *Responsa*, **נודע ביהודה** (*Nod'a bi-Yhudah*) (Jerusalem, 1961), Vol. 2, *Yoreh De'ah*, §206. Unlike Rema and Taz, who quoted R. Hayim in a formal and conceptual halakhic context, R. Landau referred to him in a concrete context: "[As to] what I wrote in defense of the Tosafists themselves who are buried abroad, my sharp-witted son, our Rabbi and teacher, Samuel, replied that there is no reason for surprise that the Tosafists

- did not immigrate to the Land of Israel, as they themselves said in *Tosafot Ketubot*... that in these days there is no obligation to dwell in the Land of Israel, since we cannot meticulously observe the commandments contingent on it."
- 106 Shelomoh HaKohen (Maharshakh), *Responsa* (Venice, 1592), Vol. 2, §119: "There is no biblical or rabbinic commandment at the present time to immigrate to the Land of Israel. As the Tosafists wrote... And R. Hayim was of the opinion that in these times, there is no commandment to dwell in the Land of Israel." Cf. *ibid.*, Vol. 2, §41; E. Rivlin, "פרק בתולדות ארץ ישראל" ("A Chapter in the History of the Land of Israel"), *Mada'ei ha-Yahadut* 1(1926): 104–106.
 - 107 Hayim Shabetai, *Responsa on Even ha-'Ezer* (Salonika, 1651), Vol. 3, §61.
 - 108 Tzedakah Hotzin, *Responsa*, צדקה ומשפט (*Tzedakah u-Mishpat*), Vol. 1 (Jerusalem: Keren Hotza'at Sifrei Rabanei Bavel, 1926); *Yoreh De'ah*, §6, 32b. See also the sources specified by R. Hayim Benveniste, *Keneset ha-Gedolah*.
 - 109 As the great compiler, R. Hayim Benveniste put it: "Since there is a controversy among the sages, who can coerce an unwilling [spouse] to immigrate?" (*Keneset ha-Gedolah*).
 - 110 Shalom Dov Baer Schneersohn, אגרת בדבר המוסד הקדוש קופת הרמבה"נ (*A Letter Concerning the Holy Institution of the Rabi Meir Ba'al ha-Nes Fund*) (no known place or publisher, 1907), 19–21; Y. Salmon, "החברה היהודית, 'עמדת החברה' – עיונות" ("The Posture of Russian-Polish Hassidic Society vis-a-vis Zionism"), *Eshel Be'er Shev'a* 1(1976), 395–396; *idem*, "עיונות – ראשונים" (*Religion and Zionism*) (Jerusalem: Zionist Library, 1970), 266.
 - 111 Yoel Teitelbaum, "Essay on Settling in the Land of Israel," ויואל משה (*Va-Yo'el Mosheli*) (Brooklyn: Jerusalem Publishing, 1961), § 65–67, 263–265.
 - 112 R. Moshe Feinstein, אגרות משה (*Igrot Mosheh*) (New York: M. Feinstein, 1956), *Even ha-'Ezer*, § 120, 253.
 - 113 Comment of Rabad on Maimonides, *Mishneh Torah*, *Hilkhot Beit ha-Behirah* (Laws Pertaining to the Temple) 6:16, as interpreted by Hatam Sofer.
 - 114 Moshe Sofer, שו"ת חתם סופר (*Hatam Sofer Responsa*) (Vienna, 1895), *Yoreh De'ah*, § 233, 93b.
 - 115 *Ibid.*, *Responsum* 234, 95a. See also the interesting use of this source by R. Yitzhak Ya'akov Weiss, late president of the Religious Court of the Jerusalem Haredi Community, in שו"ת מנחת יצחק (*Responsa Minhag Yitzhak*) (Jerusalem: Defus ha-Hinukh, 1985), 9, §108, 179.
 - 116 R. Israel of Shklov, *Pe'at ha-Shulhan*, relying on Shelah, Vol. 1, 75b. It is noteworthy that R. Nahman of Bratslav turned the phrase "a Land that consumes its inhabitants" into something protective and elevating: "For when we enter the Land, which represents faith, we shall be consumed by it, that is, we shall become part of its essence... This is why our sages of blessed memory said that anyone who dwells in the Land of Israel lives without sin, for it is a Land that consumes its inhabitants, that is to say, one who settles there is consumed by it, becoming part of its holy essence" (ליקוטי מוהר"ן (*Likutei Moharan*), [Jerusalem and New York: Bratslav Research Institute, 1985] §129. Cf. *ibid.*, 47; 187). See also articles by M. Halamish and A. Elkayyam in A. Ravitzky (ed.), *The Land of Israel in Modern Jewish Thought*, on R. Shneur Zalman of Lyady, on the one hand, and Natan of Gaza, on the other, each of whom reinterpreted the concept of "a Land that consumes its inhabitants."
 - 117 R. Israel of Shklov, *Pe'at ha-Shulhan*, according to Maharit.
 - 118 Nahmanides, *Commentary on the Pentateuch*, Gen. 1:1; Lev. 18:25; Num. 35:33; "Sermon for the New Year" in *Writings*, 250–251; "דרשה על דברי קהלת" ("Sermon on Ecclesiastes"), *ibid.*, 200–201.
 - 119 R. Israel of Shklov, *Pe'at ha-Shulhan*.

- 120 Cf. Shelah, *supra*: "Even though it was the scouts [who] spoke that verse, they intended to speak ill, but uttered words of sanctity regarding the profane. But it is profane for them only [and not for us]." See also Babylonian Talmud, *Sotah*, 35b.
- 121 M.K. Silver, Y. Salmon, and Y. Bartal, "עקיבא יוסף שלזינגר — הציוני הראשון?" ("A.J. Schlesinger — The First Zionist?"), *Cathedra* 73 (1995): 84–114; M.K. Silver, "The Emergence of Ultra-Orthodoxy: The Invention of a Tradition" in J. Wertheimer (ed.), *The Uses of Tradition* (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America and Cambridge: Harvard University Press [dist.], 1992).
- 122 'Aqiva Yosef Schlesinger, *בית יוסף החדש* (*Beit Yosef ha-Hadash*) (Jerusalem, 1875), 94.
- 123 Avraham Bornstein (the Admor of Sochaczew), *אבני נזר* (*Avnei Nezer*) (Pietrikov, 1912), *Yoreh De'ah*, §454. The author related seriously to this concern, but ruled against it: "We do not take into account divine considerations when a halakhic precept is at stake."
- 124 *Mekhilta*, Bo, 12.
- 125 S. Assaf, "מגילת יוחסין של משפחת אלטשול" ("The Genealogy of the Altschul Family"), *Reshumot* (New Series) 4 (1947): 67.
- 126 A. Morgenstern, "שתי מסורות על ראשית עליית תלמידי הגר"א" ("Two Traditions Concerning the Immigration to Eretz Israel (Palestine) in the Circle of Rabbi Eliyah of Vilna"), *Shalem* 6 (1992): 195–222.
- 127 G. Scholem, *שבתי צבי והתנועה המשיחית בימי חייו* (*Sabbatai Tzevi — The Mystical Messiah 1626–1676*), (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1957), Vol. 2, 478. Shapira, who came to the Land of Israel from Cracow, is regarded by scholars as the representative *par excellence* of the Polish kabbalistic stream. See G. Scholem, "התנועה השבתאית בפולין" ("The Sabbatean Movement in Poland") in *בית ישראל בפולין* (*The Jews of Poland*), Vol. 2, (Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization, 1954), 36–40; A. Ravitzky, "Maimonides on the Days of the Messiah," 221–256; Y. Liebes, "יונה בן אמיתי כמשיח בן יוסף" ("Jonah ben Amitai as Messiah ben Joseph"), *Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought* 3, *Tishbi Volume* Part 1 (1984): 273–283.
- 128 Natan Shapira, *טוב הארץ* (*Tuv ha-Aretz*) (Jerusalem, 1891) (photocopied edition, no publisher, 1976), 19a.
- 129 Mishnah, *Sanhedrin* 10:1; *Book of the Zohar*, 3, 266b; 2, 23a; 40b; 59b; M. Idel, "על ארץ ישראל במחשבה היהודית המיסטית" ("Eretz Israel in Jewish Mystical Thought") in Ravitzky (ed.), *The Land of Israel in Modern Jewish Thought*, 197–198.
- 130 Shapira, *Tuv ha-Aretz*.
- 131 I consulted with Bracha Zack, author of *משה קורדובירו* (*The Kabbalah of Rabbi Mosheh Cordovero*) (Beersheba: Ben Gurion University, 1995). I thank Bracha Zack and Judah Liebes for their advice concerning the material discussed here.
- 132 *Pirquei de-Rabi Eli'ezer*, 34.
- 133 Shapira, *Tuv ha-Aretz*, 10a-b.
- 134 El'azar Azikri, *Sefer Haredim*, 60b; Pachter, "The Land of Israel," 314–315.
- 135 Avraham Azulai, *חסד לאברהם* (*Hesed le-Avraham*) (Jerusalem: Ha-Makhon, 1996) Section 3, Subsection 12, 121. Azulai's book was largely inspired by Cordovero, while Nathan Shapira's book was largely inspired by Azulai. See Y. Tishbi, "ר' אברהם אזולאי לקבלת הרמ"ק ולקבלת האר"י" ("R. Avraham Azulai's Attitude towards the Kabbalah of Luria and of Cordovero"), in *חקרי קבלה ושלוחותיה* (*Studies in Kabbalah and Its Branches*) (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1982), 255–267; B. Zack, "ספר 'חסד לאברהם' לר' אברהם אזולאי" ("On the Sources of the R. Avraham Azulai's Book, 'Hesed le-Avraham'"), *Qiriyat Sefer* 56 (1981): 164–175; B. Zack, "The Influence of

- Cordovero on Seventeenth-Century Jewish Thought," in I. Twersky and B. Septimus (eds.), *Jewish Thought in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Center for Jewish Studies, 1987), 365–379.
- 136 I know of no writer who quoted the "harsh" statement in Cordovero's name; all attributed it to Azikri alone.
- 137 *Sefer Haredim*, 60b.
- 138 Shelah, 105b; M. Halamish, "Some Characteristics of the Land of Israel" in Halamish and Ravitzky (eds.), *The Land of Israel in Medieval Jewish Thought*, 220; Y. Dan, *ספרות המוסר והדרוש* (*Hebrew Ethical and Homiletical Literature in the Middle Ages and Early Modern Period*) (Jerusalem: Keter, 1975), 241; R. J. Z. Werblowsky, "O Felix Capula: A Cabbalistic Version," in S. Stein and R. Loewe (eds.), *Studies in Jewish Religious and Intellectual History Presented to Alexander Altmann on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press in association with the Institute of Jewish Studies, London, 1979), 356.
- 139 "Sefer Haredim did not mention people who profane the Sabbath, or eat forbidden food, or commit other similar serious offences, but only mentioned this one offence, namely indulging in feasting and revelry... and since the book specified this one offence, and was so anxious to prevent such an offence taking place in the Land of Israel, it must be [addressing] only a completely God-fearing person, who never sins, and never ceases to study the Holy Law" (Y. Teitelbaum, *Va-Yo'el Mosheh*, §40, 241. Cf. *ibid.*, § 133, 345).
- 140 Eli'ezer Papo, *Pele Yo'etz*, Vol. 1, "גוף" ("Body"), 106: "Any sagacious person should mortify his body and subject it to all manner of affliction, in order to purify his soul and give pleasure to his Creator." See *ibid.*, "סורים" ("Tribulations"), 299: "Great is the merit of one who rejoices in suffering and accepts it lovingly... Moreover, if he afflicts himself, and mortifies his body to atone for his sins, every little bit goes toward the great reckoning, and his actions show that he loves his Creator."
- 141 See the following note.
- 142 *Ibid.*, "דיבור" ("Speech"), 120: "The master, author of *Sefer Haredim* has already written that the pure man has collected all the biblical precepts and all divinely inspired rabbinic enactments... it is my intention to copy his holy work and expand it with God's help."
- 143 *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, "ארץ ישראל" ("The Land of Israel"), 33.
- 144 *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, "צפוי" ("Anticipated"), 527.
- 145 *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, "גלות" ("Exile"), 95.
- 146 *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, "Anticipated", 527. Cf. *ibid.*, Vol. 1, "גאולה" ("Redemption"), 85.
- 147 Yehudah Alkalai, "מנחת יהודה" ("Minhat Yehudah") in Y. Werfel (ed.), *כתבי הרב יהודה אלקלעי* (*The Writings of Rabi Yehudah Alkalai*) (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1944), 203.
- 148 *Ibid.*, 212.
- 149 Y. Katz, *יהודיות לאומיות* (*Jewish Nationalism*) (Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization, 1983), 308–356.
- 150 J. Lebel, "חולה אהבת ירושלים: ר' יהודה אלקלעי — הרקע הפוליטי והקהילתי לפועלו" ("Lovesick for Jerusalem: Rabi Yehudah Alkalai — The Political and Communal Context of His Activity"), *Pe'amim* 40 (1989): 25.
- 151 Babylonian Talmud, *Sanhedrin* 97b. See also Papo (*supra*, n. 140), on the power of each individual's repentance to hasten the redemption.
- 152 Ravitzky, *Messianism*, 30.
- 153 *Pele Yo'etz*, "מעשר" ("Tithe"), Vol. 2, 387. Cf. *ibid.*, "צדקה" ("Charity"), 514.
- 154 "Minhat Yehudah," p. 203. Papo, in contrast, taught that the individual's worship of God (and not his settling the land) was the most important consideration, and should be the yardstick for determining where to live:

- "A person should choose in which city he will dwell... and should strive to live in the Land of Israel... He who aspires to dwell in our Land, should choose the best place: he should settle in the Holy City of Jerusalem, may it be speedily rebuilt, unless he thinks that in another city he will have more peace of mind to worship God, may He be blessed. In such a case, even dwelling outside the Land of Israel is preferable to dwelling in the Land of Israel" (*Pele Yo'etz*, "דירה" ("Habitat"), Vol. 1, 144).
- 155 Ravitzky, *Messianism*, 213.
- 156 Eshtori Ha-Parhi, *כפתור ופרח* (*Kaftor va-Ferah*) (Jerusalem, 1897), 197.
- 157 Israel Ze'ev HaLevi Horowitz, *נחלה לישראל* (*Nahalat le-Israel*) (no publisher, 1882). Horowitz quotes R. Avraham of Kalisk: "When one first comes to the Land, his [spiritual] level declines / / / but in due course, he regains his level, and easily surpasses it," and confirms this: "We who live here in the Holy Land see with our own eyes that this is true."
- 158 A.D. Gordon, *גורדון כתבי א.ד. גורדון* (*Collected Works*), Vol. 1 (Jerusalem: Devir, 1952), 521–522. Gordon also admitted his personal difficulty in identifying with the landscape of this beloved but alien country. See A. Shapira, *אור החיים ב"יום קטנות": משנת א.ד. גורדון ומקורותיה בקבלה ובחסידות* (*Kabbalistic and Hasidic Sources of A.D. Gordon's Thought*) (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1996), 253–255.
- 159 *Supra*, n. 17.

Spain, Greece or Jerusalem? The Yearning for the Motherland in the Poetry of Greek Jews

- 1 On the term *Dhimmi* and the court trials of Jews under Islam rule see Bat Ye'or, *בני חסות — הדמים* (*The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians under Islam*) (Jerusalem: Kana, 1985).
- 2 Avraham Aharon Capon was a Bulgarian Jewish intellectual, who was born in Bucharest in 1853 and died in Bosnia in 1931. He was a prolific writer in Bulgaria's Ladino press, having published volumes of poetry, literary works, and plays. His work and personality were discussed by M. D. Gaon, *יהודי ישראל המזרח בארץ ישראל* (*The Eastern Jews in Eretz Israel*) (Jerusalem: Defus Azriel, 1928), 746 (hereafter M. D. Gaon, *The Eastern Jews in Eretz Israel*).
- 3 The poem was published in the second volume of *Poesias*, written by Avraham Aharon Capon in Vienna in 1922. The first volume includes a rhymed text of King Solomon's Proverbs. The second volume contains Capon's poetry; it opens with "A España," which sets the theme for the entire book.
- 4 On his life, see M. D. Gaon, *The Eastern Jews in Eretz Israel*, 142–143.
- 5 H. Bijarano. "Los judios españoles de oriente: lengua y literatura popular," *Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza* 9 (1885): 23–27.
- 6 S. Refael, *אספר שיר: מחקר בשירי הקופלאס* (*I Shall Tell a Poem: A Study of the Judeo-Spanish (Ladino) Coplas*) (Jerusalem: Carmel, 2004), 55–94.
- 7 See the following publications: "שירי ציון ברפרטואר העממי של יהודי שאלוניקי" ("Poems on Zion in the Folk Repertoire of the Salonikan Jews"), *Shorashim ba-Mizrah* 5 (2003): 132–138; "The Longing for Zion in Judeo-Spanish (Ladino) Poetry" in M. Rozen (ed.), *The Last Ottoman Century and Beyond: The Jews in Turkey and the Balkans*, Vol. 2 (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Goldstein-Goren Diaspora Research Center, 2002), 207–218; "התחיה, מאסף ציוני בלאדינו לנשים" ("Ha-Tehiyah — A Ladino Anthology for Zionist Women in Salonika"), *Peamim* 82 (2000): 81–93; "ב'אמוס אה פאליסטינה יהודי שאלוניקי בדרכם לארץ האבות" ("Vamos a Palestina — Salonikan Jews on their Way to Eretz Israel"), in A. Mizrahi and Aharon ben David (eds.) *עדות — עדות לישראל* (*The Tribes — Evidence of Israel*) no Place: no publisher, (2001): 325–338.

- 8 All these songs had a great circulation among Ladino speakers. The reader can find full texts to the poems “ir mi quero madre” (see Proyecto Folklore de Kol Israel, CSIC, Madrid, 173/1, 186/6, 189/3, 253/6, 317/9); “palestina ermoza y santa” (see Isaac Levy, *Chants Judéo-espagnols* (London: World Sephardi Federation, 1959–1973), 317–319, “en pasando por la tierra santa” (see Proyecto Folklore de Kol Israel, CSIC, Madrid 5/1, 32/13, 104/1, 105/7, 149/8, 150/11, 174/1), “por tus recordos yerushalayim” (see Proyecto Folklore de Kol Israel, CSIC, Madrid 75/6, 223/8).
- 9 Textual translation: “There in the distance under another sky/ there is a land, there is a mother.”
- 10 Textual translation: “But the sea is furious and the boat is small/ With each rowing we find some suffering.”
- 11 Textual translation: “Your beauty amazes us/when the day begins to lighten.”
- 12 Textual translation: “I wish to go to Jerusalem mother/ And eat its weeds and be full of them.”
- 13 Yosef Mercado Cobo was born in 1870 in Seres, near Salonika, and died in 1940. He was a teacher, researcher, and lecturer at the Greek University of Salonika. He left a large and comprehensive body of philosophic and literary works which have not yet claimed the level of scholarly attention they deserve. For details on him and his life, see David Recanati (ed.), *זכרון שאלוניקי* (*A Memoire of Salonika*), Vol. 2, (Tel Aviv: Ha-Va‘ad le-Hotza’at Sefer Qehilat Saloniki, 1986), 460–461 (first volume published in 1972).
- 14 Textual translation: “You are in a sad state/ Oh, rivers of Jordan, mounts of Carmel/Forests of Lebanon, hills of Sharon/Where Zion are your giants?/Kings, prophets and lovers.”
- 15 On this subject see A. Nar, “Evraiki ke Rebetiko” (“On Jews and Rebetiko”) in Raphael Gatenio (ed.), *Judeoespaniol: The Evolution of a Culture* (Thessaloniki: Etz Haim Foundation, 1999), 139–165.
- 16 On this subject, see M. Hoch, *קולות מתוך החושך* (*Voices from the Dark*) (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2002), 261, on Jewish music at the time of the Holocaust (hereafter, Hoch, *Voices from the Dark*). In his book, Hoch studied poetic models — musical, textual, and melodic — during the Holocaust, and among others, he brings the example of the song of the Greek partisans that was sung by Salonikan Jews.
- 17 These two poems are translated into Hebrew in Hoch, *Voices from the Dark*, 222, 224, as part of his discussion of Greek poetry written in Greek by Holocaust survivors who were natives of Salonika.
- 18 J. Améry, *מעבר לאשמה ולכפרה* (*Beyond Guilt and Atonement*) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 2000), 102 (published originally in German: *Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne: Bewältigungsversuche eines Überwältigten* [Munich: Szesny, 1966]).

Breaks and Continuities in German-Jewish Identity

- 1 M.A. Kaplan, *Jewish Feminist Movement in Germany: The Campaigns of the Jüdischer Frauenbund, 1904–1938* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979).
- 2 B. Pappenheim, *Sisyphus-Arbeit. Reisebriefe aus den Jahren 1911 und 1912* (Sisyphean Labors: Travel letters from the years 1911 and 1912) (Leipzig, 1924), 77.
- 3 “If bringing psychoanalysis into the world is something that deserves credit, it’s not me that deserves the credit for it ... I was a student ...when another Viennese physician, Dr. Josef Breuer, applied this procedure to a girl afflicted with hysteria ...” Sigmund Freud in Octave Mannoni, *Sigmund Freud* (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1971), 43. See also: M. Brentzel, *Ann O.: Bertha Pappenheim: Biographie* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002).

- 4 D. Boyarin, "Anna O(rthodox): Bertha Pappenheim and the Making of Jewish Feminism," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, special issue on *Experience, Representation, and Gender*, edited by G. M. Jantzen, 80.3 (Autumn, 1998): 65–87.
- 5 Pappenheim, *Sisyphus-Arbeit*, 139.
- 6 *Ibid.*, 142.
- 7 *Ibid.*, 143.
- 8 F. Oppenheimer, "Stammesbewusstsein und Volksbewusstsein" (*Ethnic Consciousness and National Consciousness*), *Die Welt*, February 18, 1910.
- 9 L. Holländer, "Central-Vereins deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens," in *Jüdisches Lexikon* (Berlin: Jüdischer verlag, 1927), Vol. 1, 1291f.
- 10 The premiere work on this subject is R. Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). See also S. Sassen, *Migration, Siedler, Flüchtlinge. Von der Massenauswanderung zur Festung Europa* (*Migration, Settlers, Refugees: From Mass Emigration to Fortress Europe*) (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer 1996), 78ff.
- 11 E. R. Huber (ed.), *Dokumente zur deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte*, Vol. 3, *Deutsche Verfassungsdokumente 1900–1918, Dritte neubearbeitete Auflage* (Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln: W. Kohlhammer, 1990), 69–75; here, 70f.
- 12 K. Thedieck, *Deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit im Bund und in den Ländern. Genese und Grundlagen der Staatsangehörigkeit in deutschlandsrechtlicher Perspektive* (Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt, 1989), 43.
- 13 C. Sartorius, "Erwerb und Verlust der deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit," in G. Inschütz and R. Thoma (eds.), *Handbuch des deutschen Staatsrecht*, Vol. 1 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1930), 258–273.
- 14 Sassen, *Migration*, 80.
- 15 R. Grawert, *Staat und Staatsangehörigkeit* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1973). See also D. Gosewinkel, *Einbürgern und Ausschließen. Die Nationalisierung der Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001), 278–327.
- 16 J. Toury, "Der Prozess der Lokal-Emanzipation — Herausbildung jüdischer Bürgerrechte in deutschen Ortschaften," in *idem*, ed., *Deutschlands Stiefkinder. Ausgewählte Aufsätze zur deutschen und deutsch-jüdischen Geschichte, Schriftenreihe des Instituts für Deutsche Geschichte, Universität Tel Aviv 18* (Gerlingen: Bleicher, 1997), 127–158; W. E. Mosse, "From 'Schutzjuden' to 'Deutsche Staatsbürger Jüdischen Glaubens': The Long and Bumpy Road of Jewish Emancipation in Germany," in P. Birnbaum and I. Katznelsohn, *Paths of Emancipation: Jews, States, and Citizenship* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 59–93.
- 17 Y. Weiss, "The Racialisation of the Jews — Historical Anthropology of the Nuremberg Laws," *Simon Dubnow Institute Yearbook*, 1 (2002): 201–215.
- 18 J. Améry, "Über Zwang und Unmöglichkeit, Jude zu sein," in *Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne. Bewältigungsversuche eines Überwältigten* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1970), 99–119.
- 19 H. Lavsky, *New Beginnings. Holocaust Survivors in Bergen-Belsen and the British Zone in Germany, 1945–1950* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2002).
- 20 M. Krauss, "Jewish Remigration: An Overview of an Emerging Discipline", *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook*, XLIX (2004): 107–120.
- 21 W. Jacobmeyer, *Vom Zwangsarbeiter zum heimatlosen Ausländer: Die Displaced Persons in Westdeutschland 1945–1951* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985).
- 22 D. Pinto, "The Jewish Challenges in the New Europe," in Daniel Levy and Yfaat Weiss (eds.), *Challenging Ethnic Citizenship: German and Israeli Perspective on Immigration* (New York: Berghahn, 2002), 239–252.
- 23 R. Salamander, "Man kann nicht Wurzeln in Nichts schlagen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 27, 1999.

The Metamorphosis of Pre-Dubnovian Autonomism into Diaspora Jewish Nationalism

- * Translated from Hebrew by Yaffah Murciano. I am particularly indebted to my mentor, Professor Mattityahu Mintz, who agreed to read through this article and offered wise and perceptive comments, and to my colleague, Dr. Rachel Menkin, who carefully read the manuscript and shared her insights with me, and who showed exceptional generosity in sharing with me valuable sources with which I was not acquainted.
- 1 This idea fits into the broader category of ideologies known as "consociationalism," which aims to combine democracy and national pluralism. See A. Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); J. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 77–78, 135–142. See also A.D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, second edition (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983), 442–446; S. Ryan, *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations* (Aldershot, UK, Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth, 1995), 6–14.
 - 2 At the same time, it should be noted that new developments, such as the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the rise of multiculturalism, and the strength of American Jewry has led a new generation of researchers to reevaluate their approach to diaspora nationalism, which has been the subject of renewed interest. For example, a new monograph has been written about national autonomy in Ukraine. See H. Abramson, *A Prayer for the Government, Ukrainians and Jews in Revolutionary Times, 1917–1920* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1999), which partly discusses Mattityahu Mintz's main theses on Jewish autonomy in the Ukrainian People's Republic. See M. Mintz, של *עיונים במהותה ובתפועולה* ("Studies of the Essence and Operations of the Secretariat for Inter-Nationality Matters of the General Ukrainian Secretariat in 1917"), *Shvut* 8 (1981): 72–80; idem, *לכחינת* ("Analysis of Relationships between the Zionist Organization and the Ukrainian National Movement in 1917"), *Shvut* 11 (1985): 44–52; idem, *זמנים חדשים, זמירות חדשות*, *בר בורוכוב, 1914–1917* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1988), 55–74; idem, *יהודים ליחידות אוקראיניות* ("The Question of the Conscription of Jews into the Ukrainian National Units in 1917 as Reflected in the Protocols of the Temporary National Jewish Council"), *Shvut* 14 (1990): 55–74. On Noyekh Prilutski, the leader of Polish Folkism, see K. Weiser, "The Politics of Yiddish: Noyekh Prilutski and the Folkspartey in Poland 1900–1926" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 2001). On Galician Zionism, see Joshua Shanes, "National Regeneration in the Diaspora: Zionism, Politics and Jewish Identity in Late Habsburg Galicia, 1883–1907" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2002) (hereafter Shanes, "National Regeneration"), which focuses on the political activity of the Jewish national organizations which aimed at turning the Jews into a sovereign nation in Austria.
 - 3 In the second half of the 1880s, Dubnov began expressing embryonic ideas of non-territorial Jewish nationalism. Thus, for example, in 1885, he pointed out for the first time that the national feeling among Jews was based on unity of religion and common historical memories of both a glorious and troubled past. (*Voskhod*, 1885, No. 9, 19 (b)), Y. Slutzki, *העיתונות היהודית, רוסית במאה התשע עשרה* (*The Russian-Jewish Press in the Nineteenth Century*) (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1970) (hereafter Slutzki, *Russian-Jewish Press*). His famous doctrine of diasporic nationalism began to crystallize around 1894. In 1894, he noted that he was beginning to focus on "a clarification of the

- historical development of the Jewish national idea in its broader sense" and wrote of "the idea of Jewish spiritual nationalism" (*Niedelnaia Chronika Voskhoda*, 1894, No. 18, 490–491); Slutzki, *Russian-Jewish Press*, 154 and also Simon Dubnov, *Dos Bukh fun main Lebn*, Vol. 1 (Buenos Aires 1961) (hereafter Dubnov, *Dos Bukh*); see also Renée Poznanski, "Introduction," (hereafter Poznanski, "Introduction") in Simon Dubnov, *Lettres sur le judaïsme ancien et nouveau* (translated from Russian and annotated by Renée Poznanski) (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1989), 22–23 (hereafter Dubnov, *Lettres*); Robert Seltzer, "Coming Home: The Personal Basis of Simon Dubnow's Ideology," *AJS Review* 1 (1976): 283–97 (hereafter Seltzer, "Coming Home"); idem, "Graetz, Dubnow, Baron," *Jewish Book Annual* 48 (1990–1991), 175–176. Dubnov explained his outlook in a number of essays that were published between 1897 and 1907 in Voskhod. In 1907, the essays were compiled systematically into a book and published in Russian: S. M. Dubnov, *Pisma o Starom i Novom Ievreistvo*, 1897–1907 (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvennaia pol'za, 1907). Dubnov supervised the abridged and updated translation into Hebrew by Avraham Levinson, which was published in 1937, S. Dubnov, *מכתבים על היהדות הישנה והחדשה* (*Essays on Ancient and Modern Judaism*) (Tel Aviv: HaHoqer al Yad Devir, 1937). This translation served as the basis for the abridged translation into English, edited and prefaced by Koppel Pinson; see Simon Dubnov, *Nationalism and History: Essays on Old and New Judaism* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1958). A direct translation into Yiddish from the 1907 Russian version was published: S. Dubnov, *Brivn vegn altn un naeim ydntum* (Meksike 1959). Renée Poznanski translated the essays into French (Dubnov, *Lettres*), adding a preface and notes, and compared the essays originally published in Voskhod with the later versions in the 1907 book. Given the scholarly appendages to this book, I will be referring to the French version. On the various translations and their ideological and historiographical significance, see Poznanski, "Introduction," 39–47. On Dubnov's concepts, see in particular, Dubnov, *Lettres*, 83–109, 121–140, 169–201; Poznanski, "Introduction," 48–63; Seltzer, "Coming Home," 296–301. See also Natan Rotenstreich, "על יסודות דובנוב" "On the National and Historical Conceptions of Dubnov" in *ספר שמעון דובנוב* (*Simon Dubnov in Memoriam: Essays and Letters*) (Jerusalem: Areret 1954); idem, *המחשבה היהודית בעת החדשה* (*Essays on Jewish Philosophy in the Modern Era*), Vol. 1 (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1987) (hereafter Rotenstreich, *Essays*); M. Mintz, *לאומיות ויהדות של מיעוטים* ("Jewish Nationalism in the Context of Multinational States") (hereafter Mintz, *Multinational States*) in J. Reinharz, G. Shimoni & Y. Salmon (eds.), *לאומיות ופוליטיקה יהודית, פרספקטיבות חדשות* (*Jewish Nationalism and Politics: New Perspectives*) (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 1996), 207–210 (hereafter Reinharz, *Jewish Nationalism*); R. Poznanski, "Dubnov and the Diaspora," in K. Groberg and A. Greenbaum (eds.), *A Missionary for History: Essays in Honor of Simon Dubnov* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 1998), 5–10. For a bibliography of Dubnov's works, see K. Groberg, "Works about Simon Dubnov: A Bibliography," in *ibid.*, 137–157.
- 4 B. Dinaburg (Dinur), "שמעון דובנוב, ליובלו השבעים וחמשת" ("Simon Dubnow, on his 75th Anniversary"), *Zion* 1 (5696): 95–128 (hereafter Dinaburg, "Simon Dubnov").
 - 5 Seltzer, "Coming Home," 285, 287–288, 294, 297.
 - 6 D. Weinberg, *Between Tradition and Modernity: Haim Zhitlovski, Simon Dubnow, Ahad Ha-Am, and the Shaping of Modern Jewish Identity* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1996), 178–189 (hereafter Weinberg, *Tradition and Modernity*).
 - 7 J. Veidlinger, "Simon Dubnow Recontextualized: The Sociological Conception of Jewish History and the Russian Intellectual Legacy," *Simon Dubnow Institute Yearbook*, Vol. 3 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2004), 411–427.

- 8 Dubnov, *Lettres*, 11; Poznanski, "Introduction," 54; N. Mayzil, ד"ר חיים זשיטלבווסקי, צו זיין הונדערטסטן (Dr. Hayim Zhitlovski on his Centenary: 1865–1965) (New York: Eikopf, 1965), 87–88 (hereafter, Mayzil, Dr. Hayim Zhitlovski); J. Jacobs, *On Socialists and 'The Jewish Question' after Marx* (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 140–141 (hereafter Jacobs, *On Socialists*).
- 9 Dinaburg, "Simon Dubnow."
- 10 Weinberg, *Tradition and Modernity*.
- 11 Introductory essay by J. Frankel, "S.M. Dubnov, Historian and Ideologist," in the English translation of Sophie Dubnov-Erlich's biography of Simon Dubnov; see S. Dubnov-Erlich, *The Life and Work of S.M. Dubnov, Diaspora Nationalism and Jewish History* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), 17.
- 12 S. W. Baron, *History and Jewish Historians* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1964), 78.
- 13 Dubnov, *Dos Bukh*, 118.
- 14 On the Russian Jewish intelligentsia and its various currents, see Slutzki, *Russian-Jewish Press*. On the centrality of intellectual elites (who failed to join the hegemonic elites) in fashioning national movements, see M. Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe. A Comparative Analysis of the Special Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations* (translated by Ben Fowkes) (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985) and compare Hroch's analysis with a similar typology in Józef Chlebowczy, *On Small and Young Nations in Europe* (translated from the Polish by Janina Dorosz) (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolinski Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1980), 19.
- 15 Adolf (Abraham) Fischhof was born in Alt-Ofen, a suburb of Budapest, to a German-speaking Jewish family. He received a secular and Jewish education, and studied medicine in Vienna. He was one of the pillars of the Liberal Constitution Party. W. Cahnman, "Adolf Fischhof and his Jewish Followers," *LBIYB* 4 (1959): 111–139 (hereafter Cahnman, "Adolf Fischhof and his Jewish Followers"); idem, "Adolf Fischhof als Verfechter der Nationalität und seine Auswirkung auf das jüdisch-politische Denken in Österreich," *Studia Judaica Austriaca* 1 (1974): 78–91; idem, "Adolf Fischhof and the Problem of the Reconciliation of Nationalities," *East European Quarterly* 12 (1978): 43–56 (hereafter Cahnman, "Adolf Fischhof and the Problem of the Reconciliation"). Also N.M. Gelber, 1918–1875, תולדות התנועה הציונית בגליציה, *The History of the Zionist Movement in Galicia, 1875–1918* (Jerusalem: R. Maas, 1958), 524 (hereafter Gelber, *Galicia*); Michael Graetz, מליברליזם לתורה לאומית, "From Liberalism to Nationalism: Adolf Fischhof (1816–1893) and His Theory of Autonomism" in S. Almog, I. Bartal, et. al. (eds.), קובץ מאמרים שי לשמואל, תמורות בהיסטוריה היהודית החדשה: קובץ מאמרים שי לשמואל, אטינגר (Transition and Change in Modern Jewish History, Essays Presented in Honor of Shmuel Ettinger) (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 1987).
- 16 A. Fischhof, *Oesterrich und die Bürgschaften seines Bestandes* (Wien 1869). According to R. Kann, *The Multinational Empire, Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1848–1918*, Vol. 2 (New York: Octagon Books, 1950), 145, 147 (hereafter Kann, *Multinational Empire*).
- 17 Kann, *Multinational Empire*, 143–149; Cahnman, "Adolf Fischhof and the Problem of the Reconciliation," 48–49.
- 18 Alfred Tezner and Alfred von Offermann. Both liberals, they proposed structural changes to the Austrian administration as a means of resolving national tensions. Tezner advocated federalization based on national principles, while Offermann proposed a system of national parliaments that would focus on cultural issues; Kann, *Multinational Empire*, 150–153.

- 19 Karl Renner (1870–1950), a senior member of the Austrian Social Democrat Party. From 1907, he was a member of the Austrian parliament. Between the two world wars he served in various political capacities until, in 1945, he became the President of Austria. Until the end of the First World War, Renner continued to refine the governmental model he had created by divorcing the territorial government system from its national component; Rudolf Springer [Karl Renner], *Der Kampf der Österreichischen Nationen um den Staat* (Wien, 1902); Rudolf Springer [Karl Renner], *Grundlagen und Entwicklungsziele der Österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie* (Wien, 1906), 28–42, 54–63, 132–136, 208; J. Hannak, *Karl Renner und seine Zeit, Versuch einer biographie* (Wien: Europa Verlag, 1965), 89–94; H. Schroth (ed.), *Karl Renner, Eine Bibliographie* (Wien-Frankfurt-Zürich: Europa Verlag, 1970), 15–17. Neither Fischhof nor Renner related to the Jewish national question in their works on the minorities in Austria, unlike Otto Bauer, whose ideas on personal autonomy were inspired by Renner. Bauer totally denied the Jews the right to personal national autonomy since, according to him, the Jews were not a nation. Bauer's position ushered in an era of fascinating and far-reaching debate among the various Social-Democratic streams. On the debates on the national question among Austrian Social-Democrats, and the attitude toward the Jewish question, see A. Barkai, "הסוציאל דמוקראטיה האוסטרית והשאלה היהודית" ("Austrian Social-Democracy and the Jewish Question") *Baderekh* 1 (1967): 127–163; E. Silberner, "הסוציאליזם המערבי ושאלת היהודים – מחקר בתולדות עשרה המחשבה הסוציאליסטית המאה שתשעה עשרה" (*Western Socialism and the Jewish Question*) (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1955), 271–286; E. Silberner, "Austrian Social Democracy and the Jewish Problem," *Historia Judaica* 13 (1951): 121–140; R. Wistrich, "Austrian Social Democracy and the Problem of Galician Jewry," *LBIYB* 26 (1981): 89–124; Jacobs, *On Socialists*, 86–117.
- 20 Dubnov mentions Renner in the 1906 edition, but not in an essay published in 1897. According to Dubnov himself, he was not acquainted with Renner's thought at the time his essays were published as a book; see also Dubnov, *Lettres*, 112.
- 21 J. Bloch, *Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben* (Wien and Leipzig: R. Lowit, 1922), 53–53, 58 (hereafter Bloch, *Erinnerungen*).
- 22 Bloch, *Erinnerungen*, 57–58.
- 23 Cahnman, "Adolph Fischhof and his Jewish Followers," 131.
- 24 J. Fischer, "תולדות החכם המפואר גבר רב פעלים הנודע במרחקים היקר והנכבד בעיני בני יהודה ובעיני עמים אחרים, אשר קנה לו שם תהילה בחכמת ענייני הממשלות, הרופא המהלל מו"ה אברהם פישוהוף נ"י, המכונה דאקטאר אדאלף פישוהוף" (*Biography of the Glorious, Wise, Enterprising, Famous, and Beloved Savant Respected by the Sons of Judah and by other Nations, who is Renowned for his Wisdom in Matters of Government, the Illustrious Physician, our Master Avraham Fischhof*) (Vienna, 1885), 14–20 (hereafter Fischer, *Biography*).
- 25 G. Bader, *Maine Zikhroines* (Buenos Aires: Tsentral-farband fun Poylishe Yidn in Argentine, 1953), 246 (hereafter Bader, *Maine Zikhroines*).
- 26 On Odessa during Smolenskin's stay there, see S. Zipperstein, *The Jews of Odessa, A Cultural History, 1794–1881* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985). On the Maskilic environment in Odessa see S. Zipperstein, "1871–1794: מאפיינים תרבותיים: ההשכלה היהודית באודסה," ("The Jewish Haskalah in Odessa, Cultural Characteristics, 1794–1871") in Emmanuel Etke, *הדת והחיים* (*Religion and Life*) (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 1993), 89–108; M. Zalkin, *ההשכלה היהודית באימפריה הרוסית במאה התשע* (*A New Dawn, The Jewish Enlightenment in the Russian Empire in the Nineteenth Century*) (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2000), 45–47.
- 27 On Smolenskin see Y. Kloizner, "פרץ בן משה סמולנסקין" ("Peretz Son of Moshe Smolenskin") in Peretz Smolenskin, *מאמרים* (*Articles*), Vol. 1 (Jerusalem: Keren

- Smolenskin Jerusalem, 1925), 3–32 (hereafter Smolenskin, *Articles*); idem, *היסטוריה של הספרות העברית החדשה* (*History of Modern Hebrew Literature*) (Jerusalem: Ahiasaf, 1955), 18–229; C. Freundlich, *Peretz Smolenskin, His Life and Thought* (New York: Bloch Publishing, 1965) (hereafter Freundlich, *Peretz Smolenskin*).
- 28 On national struggles in Austria, see in particular Arthur J. May, *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1867–1914* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951); Kann, *Multinational Empire*. On the identity crises of Austrian Jewry, see Marsha Rozenblit, *The Jews of Vienna, 1867–1914, Assimilation and Identity* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1983), 147–164.
- 29 Freundlich, *Peretz Smolenskin*, 107.
- 30 Fischer, *Biography*.
- 31 S. Feiner, "כפירתו של סמולנסקין בהשכלה ושורשי ההיסטוריוגרפיה היהודית הלאומית" ("Smolenskin's Confrontation with the Haskalah Movement and the Roots of Jewish Nationalist Historiography") *Zionism* 16 (1991): 11–15 (hereafter Feiner, *Smolenskin's Confrontation*).
- 32 I. Barzilai, "Smolenskin's Polemic Against Mendelssohn in Historical Perspective," *PAAJR* 53 (1986): 11–48; S. Feiner, "Towards a Historical Definition of the Haskalah," in Shmuel Feiner and David Sorkin (eds.), *New Perspectives on the Haskalah* (London, UK, Portland, OR: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2001), 202.
- 33 Smolenskin, "עַת לַעֲשׂוֹת" ("Time to Do") in *Articles*, Vol. 1, 178.
- 34 Feiner, *Smolenskin's Confrontation*, 9–11.
- 35 Smolenskin, "עַם עוֹלָם" ("Eternal People") in *Articles*, Vol. 1, 1–163. "Am 'Olam" can be translated as "Eternal People" as well as "Universal People." On his book 'Am 'Olam and its influence on the East European Jewish intelligentsia, see Bentzion Dinaburg (Dinur), "עַל 'עַם עוֹלָם' וְהַשְׁפָּעָתוֹ" in S. Brimen (ed.), *סֵפֶר סְמוֹלֵנְסְקִין* (*Smolenskin's Book*) (Jerusalem: Ahiasaf, 1952), 83–86; on this book, see also Freundlich, *Peretz Smolenskin*, 141–218.
- 36 "Because the Jewish people is not dependent on laws alone. Even if a Jew ceases to obey the laws, we still consider him a Jew and a brother, provided he is loyal to us [...] We must proclaim on high: We are brothers, members of a single nation, and not members of a single faith, we are one nation." Peretz Smolenskin, "Time to Do," 192.
- 37 "Time to Do," in *Articles*, Vol. 1, 205.
- 38 Smolenskin, "עַת לַטַּעַת" ("Time to Plant") in *Articles*, Vol. II, 28–29; Rotenstreich, *Essays*, Vol. 1, 217–218; Feiner, *Smolenskin's Confrontation*, 14–15.
- 39 P. Smolenskin, "פֶּתַח דְּבָר" ("Introduction"), *הַשְׁחָר* (*The Dawn*) (Vienna, 1868); idem, "Time to Do," 170–174; idem, "Time to Plant," 286–289; idem, "שְׁאֵלָה" "שְׁאֵלַת הַחַיִּים — הַיְּהוּדִים" ("The Jewish Question, a Question of Life") in *Articles*, Vol. 3, 8–9, 12–13.
- 40 "We are one nation, even though we lack a kingdom and land, and even if we despaired of ever finding a kingdom and land, we should still remain one nation in spirit," Smolenskin, "Time to Do" in *Articles*, Vol. 1, 192. Or: "I reiterate that those who say 'The Jews have ceased being a nation since they lost their sovereignty over their land' do betray their nation," "Am Olam," 4. See also Freundlich, *Peretz Smolenskin*, 124.
- 41 Freundlich, *Peretz Smolenskin*, 128–140; Feiner, *Smolenskin's Confrontation*, 17–18, 21–23, 27–31; idem, *Haskalah and History, The Emergence of a Modern Jewish Historical Consciousness* (translated by Chaya Naor and Sondra Silverton) (Portland, OR: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2002), 318–322 (hereafter Feiner, *Haskalah and History*).
- 42 "Just as many nations began to decline, their sun began to set, their kingdom waned and they were enslaved or captured by the enemy, or went missing and were presumed dead or died of hunger, so, too the Jews. It was a bitter

- experience for them to leave the land of their desire, their crowning glory, to go into exile to a foreign people that hated them, that afflicted them, and yet, this bitterness did not contaminate their *soul*" (emphasis in the original, M.S.). P. Smolenskin, "The Jewish Question, a Question of Life," 15.
- 43 Smolenskin, "The Jewish Question, a Question of Life," 11.
- 44 A. D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism, second edition* (London, UK: Holmes & Meier 1983), 241–254. In an attempt to place the Jewish national movement in the context of all national movements, Shimoni divides the Transformist category into two: Ethnocentrists and Integrationists. The Ethnocentrist group, which existed in Eastern Europe, is the one that interests us for the purposes of our discussion. It was a group of *maskilim* who advocated change, such as Smolenskin, and who adopted the cultural parameters of the dominant culture without severing their ties with their Jewish ethnic roots. G. Shimoni, "הלואומיות היהודית כלאומיות אתנית" ("Jewish Nationalism as an Ethnic Nationalism") in Reinhartz, *Jewish Nationalism*, 87–89.
- 45 G. Shimoni, *האידיאולוגיה הציונית* (*The Zionist Ideology*) (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2001).
- 46 *Ibid.* See also Dinaburg's laconic comment in "Simon Dubnow," 122, note 106; Freundlich, *Peretz Smolenskin*, 148.
- 47 Smolenskin, "Time to Do," 193.
- 48 Idem, "'Am 'Olam," 203.
- 49 Idem, "Time to Do," 204.
- 50 Nathan Birnbaum was a member of one of the societies he founded. Birnbaum initially espoused a Palestino-centrist national approach. Later, he advocated diaspora nationalism and in the early twentieth century, became a fervent supporter of Jewish autonomy in Austria. Joachim Doron, *הגותו הציונית של נתן בירנבאום* (*The Zionist Thinking of Nathan Birnbaum*) (Jerusalem: HaSifriyah haTzionit, 1988), 10, 26–32 (hereafter Doron, *Nathan Birnbaum*).
- 51 A. Gaisbauer, *Davidstern und Doppeladler, Zionismus und jüdischer Nationalismus in Österreich, 1882–1918* (Wien: Bau, 1988), 66, n. 68 (hereafter Gaisbauer, *Davidstern und Doppeladler*). Joseph Samuel Bloch, the famous Viennese rabbi who supported Fischhof's views, approved the establishment of the society, as did Smolenskin.
- 52 Gaisbauer, *Davidstern und Doppeladler*, 66 n. 68.
- 53 J. Kohn, *Assimilation, Antisemitismus und Nationaljudentum* (Wien: L. Rosner, 1894).
- 54 *Ibid.*, 5.
- 55 *Ibid.*, 19–20.
- 56 *Ibid.*, 6–7.
- 57 *Ibid.*, 8.
- 58 *Ibid.*, 9–11.
- 59 *Ibid.*, 12.
- 60 *Ibid.*, 19.
- 61 *Ibid.*, 20.
- 62 *Ibid.*, 22–24.
- 63 *Ibid.*, 21.
- 64 Although Jews sat on the Austrian parliament, Kohn was referring to a member of parliament with a Jewish national consciousness.
- 65 *Ibid.*, 21–24.
- 66 Cahnman, "Adolf Fischhof and His Jewish Followers," 137–139; Gaisbauer, *Davidstern und Doppeladler*, 459–460; from 1897 to the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Herman Kaddisch (1861–1934), a member of the Austrian Reichsrat for his constituency, worked to obtain personal national autonomy for the Jews. After the collapse of the Austrian Empire, he used his influence in the Romanian parliament. *Ibid.*, note 45.

- 67 Dr. Bloch's *Oesterreichische Wochenschrift*, 14 October 1898, 746.
- 68 Gaisbauer, *Davidstern und Doppeladler*, 184–185, 460.
- 69 Ibid., 462–463.
- 70 R. Manekin, "יהודי גליציה, או 'אוסטרים' ? דילמת הזהות של יידישן, 'פולנים', או 'אוסטרים' ? דילמת הזהות של יהודי גליציה, 1851–1848 ("Daitchen, Poles or Austrians? The Identity Dilemma of Galician Jews (1848–1851"), *Zion* 68 (2003): 223–262.
- 71 E. Mendelsohn, "Jewish Assimilation in L'viv: The Case of Wilhelm Feldman," in A. S. Markovits and Frank Sysyn (eds.), *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism, Essays on Austrian Galicia* (Cambridge, MA: Distributed by Harvard University Press for the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1982), 99–110; idem, "From Assimilation to Zionism in Lvov: the Case of Alfred Nossig," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 49 (1971): 521–534; idem, *Painting a People: Maurycy Gottlieb and Jewish Art* (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press and Hanover: University Press of New England, 2002), 6–17.
- 72 Rachel Manekin, "הברית החדשה: יהודים אורתודוקסים ופולנים קתולים בגליציה, 1883–1879) ("The New Covenant: Orthodox Jews and Polish Catholics in Galicia (1879–1883"), *Zion* 64 (1999): 157–172; idem, "Politics, Religion and National Identity: The Galician Jewish Vote in the 1873 Parliamentary Elections," *Polin* 12 (1999): 100–119.
- 73 M. Rosenfeld, "Die jüdische Bevölkerung Galiziens bis 1910," *Zeitschrift für Demographie und Statistik der Juden* 11 (1915): 98–101; Ibid., *Zeitschrift für Demographie und Statistik der Juden* 12 (1916): 18–21; idem, *Polen und Juden* (Berlin: R. Lowit, 1917), 7–9, 24–26, 42–44.
- 74 See for example A. Chomet, "Di Tzionistische Bavegung in Torne," in idem (ed.), *Torne Kyem un Churvn fun a yidisher Shtet* (Tel Aviv: Landsmanschaftn fun torner yidn, 1954); Gelber, *Galicia*, 138–139.
- 75 E. Mendelsohn, "וילהלם פלדמן ואלפרד נוססיג: התבוללות וציונות בלבוב" ("Wilhelm Feldman and Alfred Nossig — Assimilation and Zionism in Lvov"), *Gilad* 2 (1975); Shanes, "National Regeneration", 71–72.
- 76 See for example, the composition of the "Miqra Qodesh" society, N.M. Gelber, "Mikra Koidesh' un di Ershte Tzionistische Kraizn in Galitzie (1881–1890)," in *Galitzianer Ydn Yoivl Bukh* (Buenos Aires, 1966), 156–157; Shanes, "National Regeneration", 78.
- 77 Gelber, *Galicia*, 139–140.
- 78 Bloch, *Erinnerungen*, 77–80; Shanes, "National Regeneration", 61–67.
- 79 *Der Kantchik oder Kines nokh Tisho b'ov* (Lvov: 1890), 31 (hereafter *Der Kantchik*).
- 80 Gelber, *Galicia*, 128.
- 81 "For the money we pay, we are entitled to demand that our children be educated in Yiddish, and we are entitled to demand, not only from the Education Board but also from the government, that schools be set up for our children that will teach them their language and religion," *Der Kantchik*, 25.
- 82 Gelber, *Galicia*, 174–169.
- 83 Ibid., 171.
- 84 Ibid., 182.
- 85 Mordechai Ehrenpreis, "Vos mir Viln," *Yidisher Folks-Kalender* 5656 (Lvov: 1895), 2.
- 86 Editorial announcement, *Yidisher Folks-Kalender* 5656, 93.
- 87 Gaisbauer, *Davidstern und Doppeladler*, 66–68.
- 88 Ibid., 66–67; Gelber, *Galicia*, 265, 275.
- 89 Shanes, "National Regeneration", 85.
- 90 Ibid., 71.
- 91 E. Bauer, "יעדי האינטליגנציה היהודית-פולנית" ("The Goals of the Polish Jewish Intelligentsia"), *Zion* 68 (2003): 345 (hereafter Bauer, "Goals").
- 92 Smolenskin, "Time to Do," 202–205.
- 93 Bauer, "Goals," 345–346.

- 94 On Sokolow see Bauer, "Goals," 346 and also Y. Kloizner, של "שלושת המרכזים של הספרות העברית החדשה בפולניה" ("Three Centers of Modern Hebrew Literature in Poland"), *Moznayim* 11 (1900): 220; on Smolenskin, see Smolenskin, "Time to Do," 170–178.
- 95 C. Drezner, "חיים ז'יטלובסקי, תיאורתיקן הלאומיות הגלוית בויקתה לסוציאליזם" (Hayim Zhitlovsky, "Theoretician of Diasporic Nationalism in the Socialist Context") (Ph.D. dissertation, Jerusalem, 1975) (hereafter Drezner, "Hayim Zhitlovsky").
- 96 O. Janowsky, *The Jews and Minority Rights (1898–1919)* (New York: AMS Press, 1966), 51–57 (hereafter: Janowsky, *Minority Rights*).
- 97 H. Zhitlovsky, *יהודי ליהודים* (*From One Jew to Other Jews*) (Jerusalem: Hamol, 1967), 25.
- 98 Ibid., 31.
- 99 Ibid., 18; I do not know if such a debate actually took place. However, this is of little consequence. What matters here is that this observation, whether true or false, shaped his consciousness.
- 100 Ibid., 18.
- 101 Ibid., 31.
- 102 H. Zhitlovsky, *Gezamelte Shriftn* (Warsaw: 1928–1935) (hereafter Zhitlovsky, *Gezamelte Shriftn*); the article "Zionism adar Socialism?" was written in May 1898.
- 103 Zhitlovsky, *Gezamelte Shriftn*, 73. The word nation in English, as in many other Romance languages such as French (nation), Spanish (nación), and Italian (nazione), inter alia, signifies both state and nation. This semantic ambiguity has led to confusion in the political struggles between nations and peoples and to erroneous interpretations of the phenomenon in the research. On this issue, see Walker Connor's article: "A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group is a....," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1 (1978): 377–400.
- 104 Zhitlovsky, *Gezamelte Shriftn*, 73.
- 105 Ibid., *Gezamelte Shriftn* 71–74.
- 106 Drezner, "Hayim Zhitlovsky".
- 107 Mayzil, *Dr. Hayim Zshilovski*, 87–88; Poznanski, "Introduction," 54–47.
- 108 Dubnov, *Dos Bukh*, 150; *Voskhod*, 8 (1883), 39, according to Dubnov, *Lettres*, 182, no. 28.
- 109 P. Smolenskin, "משפטי עמי" ("The Laws of My People"), *Ha-Shahar* 12 (1884): 6–8.
- 110 *Voskhod* 9 (1887): 10–11, according to Yehuda Slutzki, "קריטיקוס" ("Criticus"), *He-'Avar* 8 (1961): 53.
- 111 Dubnov, *Lettres*, 301.
- 112 Dubnov, *Dos Bukh*, 297; on Silberbusch, see *Leksikon fun der Nayer Yidisher Literatur*, Vol. 2 (New York: Driter Band, 1960), 606–607.
- 113 Dubnov, *Lettres*, 113–114.
- 114 *Voskhod*, 51 (1893): 1345–1346; *Voskhod* 53 (1894): 1240, according to Slutzki, *Russian-Jewish Press*, 174, 352, notes 23–25.
- 115 *Voskhod* 51 (1895): 1394, according to Slutzki, *Russian-Jewish Press*, 172.
- 116 Dubnov, *Lettres*, 105–107.
- 117 Dubnov, *Dos Bukh*, 296; on Bader's positive attitude toward the 1891 program, see Bader, *Maine Zikhroines*, 398.
- 118 Dubnov, *Lettres*, 291–296, 301, 315.
- 119 Dubnov, *Dos Bukh*, 206; two years earlier, in 1886, Dubnov wrote a positive critique of Sokolow's book *Eretz Hemdah*, which was published in Warsaw in 1885, Slutzki, *Russian-Jewish Press*, 153, 350, notes 105–6.
- 120 Dubnov, *Lettres*, 199–201.
- 121 Mintz, *Multinational States*, 201.
- 122 Dubnov, *Lettres*, 199–201.

- 123 Y. Peled, **התפתחות המצע הלאומי של הכונד, 1903–1893** (*Class and Ethnicity in the Pale: The Political Economy of Jewish Worker's Nationalism in Late Imperial Russia*) (Tel Aviv: HaKibbutz HaMeuhad, 1997), 61–69; J : Frankel, **נבואה ופוליטיקה סוציאליזם, לאומיות ויהודי רוסיה, 1917–1862** (*Prophecy and Politics, Socialism, Nationalism and the Russian Jews, 1862–1917*) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1989) (hereafter Frankel, *Prophecy*); J : Zimmerman, *Poles, Jews and the Politics of Nationality, The Bund and the Polish Socialist Party in Late Imperial Russia, 1892–1914* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004).
- 124 In fact, all of them, except for the S.S. or "Territorialists" before 1911, and to a certain extent Vinaver's Popular Group. For a general description of autonomism, see Janowsky, *Minority Rights*, 68–130.
- 125 M. Mintz, **בר ברוכוב וניצני העימות על אודות הפלשתינו-צנרטים בין פועלי ציון, "בר ברוכוב וניצני העימות על אודות הפלשתינו-צנרטים בין פועלי ציון בארץ ישראל"** (*Ber Borokhov and the Rise of the Palestinocentrism Controversy between Po'alei-Zion in Russia and Po'alei Zion in Eretz Israel*), *Shorashim* 1 (1979): 320–324. Idem, editor, preface, and comments, **ועידת קרקוב של מפלגת הפועלים הסוציאלי-דמוקראטית היהודית, תעודות** (*The Cracow Convention of the Jewish Socialdemocratic Workers Party Po'alei Zion in Russia, August 1907, Documents*) (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1979), 176–177.
- 126 Zhitlovsky's influence was evident here. See Y. Shihor, **"סיעת ווזרוז'דניה, התפתחותה האידאולוגית והארגונית"** (*The Ideological and Organizational Development of the Vozrozhdeniye Faction*) (M.A. thesis, Tel Aviv University, 1970); Frankel, *Prophecy*, 138–140; M. Mintz, **בר ברוכוב, המעגל, הרשון, (1900–1906)** (*Ber Borokhov, Circle One, (1900–1906)*) (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, HaKibbutz HaMeuhad, 1976), 318–327; A. Greenbaum, introduction and comments, **תנועת 'התחייה' ('וורוז'דניה) ומפלגת הפועלים היהודית, (מפ"ס), מבחר כתבים** (*The 'Vozrozhdenie' Movement and the 'Jewish Socialist Party'*) (Jerusalem: Merkaz Dinur, 1988), X–XV; M. Mintz, **שלוש תעודות מימי פולמוס 'וורוז'דניה' ערב ועידת פולטאוה של מפלגת הפועלים היהודית** (*Three Documents from the Time of the Vozrozhdeniye Debate, on the Eve of the Poltava Conference of the Jewish Social Democratic Workers Party — Po'alei Zion*), *Zionut* 5 (1978): 310–334.
- 127 Z. Jabotinsky, **"על עריסתה של תוכנית הלסינגפורס"** (*On the Birth of the Helsingfors Program*) in A. Goldstein, et. al. (eds.), **ספר אידלסון** (*The Book of Idelson*) (Tel Aviv: Va'ad le-Hotza'at Sefer Idelson, 1946), 83–88; Yitzhaq Greenbaum, **"יובל שנשכח (50 שנה לועידת הלסינגפורס)"**, *He-'Avar* 5 (1957): 11–18; A. Raphaelli (Tzentzifer), **"ועידות ארציות של ציוני רוסיה"** (*National Committees of the Russian Zionists*) in B. Qatzir, **קובץ לקורות התנועה הציונית ברוסיה** (*Collection on the History of the Zionist Movement in Russia*) (Tel Aviv: Masada in Cooperation with the Public Committee for the History of the Zionist Movement in Russia, 1964), 76–104; Y. Maor, **מראשיתה, ועד ימינו** (*The Zionist Movement in Russia, From Its Origins to Our Day*) (Jerusalem: Zionist Library, 1986), 315–320; A. Orbach, **"Zionism and the Russian Revolution of 1905: The Commitment to Participate in Domestic Political Life,"** *Bar-Ilan* 24–25 (1989): 7–23.
- 128 Doron, *Nathan Birnbaum*, 105.
- 129 M. Acher [Nathan Birnbaum] **"Um die Nationale Gleichberechtigung der oesterreichischen Juden,"** *Die Welt*, 1906, 21, S. 8–11.
- 130 S. Unger, **1914–1904 פועלי ציון בקיסרות האוסטרית, (Po'alei-Zion in the Austrian Empire 1904–1914)** (Beer Sheva: Ben Gurion University, 2001), 131–175; idem, **"תנועת הפועלים היהודית בגליציה ערב מלחמת העולם הראשונה"** (*The Jewish Workers' Movement in Galicia on the Eve of World War*), *Gal'ed* 10 (1987), 121–146.

- 131 M. Mintz, "Work for the Land of Israel and 'Work in the Present': A Concept of Unity, a Reality of Contradiction" in J. Reinharz and A. Shapira (eds.), *Essential Papers on Zionism* (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 161–170; Gelber, *Galicia*, 517–544; Shanes, *National Regeneration*, 164–215; Gaisbauer, *Davidstern und Doppeladler*, 461–522.
- 132 M. Mintz, "מקומה של תנועת הפועלים היהודית בפוליטיזציה של העם היהודי" ("The Place of the Jewish Workers' Movement in the Politicization of the Jewish People"), *Iyunim bi-Tqumat Israel, Studies on Zionism, the Yishuv and the State of Israel* 8 (1998): 253–265.
- 133 Mintz, *Multinational States*, 201–224.
- 134 The term was evidently coined by Dubnov in 1901.

Does Money Talk? The Struggle Between American Zionists and the Yishuv in the Early 1940s

- 1 B. Kimerling, "פרדיגמה לניתוח יחסי הגומלין שבין מדינת ישראל ליהדות ארה"ב" ("A Paradigm for Analyzing the Relationship between the State of Israel and the Jews of the United States"), *Yahadut Zemanenu* 4 (1988): 4. About the increasing scope of the American Zionist movement, see D. Shapira, "תהליכי בנינה של מועצת החירום הציונית כזרוע הפעולה הציבורית והמדינית של הציונות האמריקנית, 1944–1938" ("The Process of Establishing the Zionist Emergency Council as the Public and Political Executive Body of the American Zionist Movement, 1938–1944") (Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1979), 31–32 (hereafter, Shapira, "Emergency Council"); A. Gal, "גוריון-לקראת מדינה יהודית, ההיערכות המדינית נוכח הספר הלבן ופרוץ המלחמת העולם השנייה 1941–1938" (*David Ben Gurion: Preparing for a Jewish State*) (Sedeh Boker: ha-Merkaz le-Moreshet Ben-Gurion, 1985), 15–39 (hereafter, Gal, *Preparing for a Jewish State*); S. Halperin, *The Political World of American Zionism* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1961), 20–28, 189–217 (hereafter, Halperin, *American Zionism*); Y. Bauer, *My Brother's Keeper* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1974), 223–301 (hereafter, Bauer, *My Brother's Keeper*).
- 2 L. Yahil, *1945–1932 גורל יהודי אירופה* (*The Fate of the Jews of Europe, 1932–1945*) (Jerusalem: Schocken, 1987), 27.
- 3 Halperin, *American Zionism*, 20–28.
- 4 Gal, *Preparing for a Jewish State*, 2.
- 5 In 1939, Ben Gurion spent 19 days in the United States. That visit served as a prelude for a much longer stay between October 1940 and January 1941. Ten months later, Ben Gurion came to the United States for another long stay, from the end of November 1941 to mid-September 1942. In addition to his long sojourns in the United States from the end of the 1930s and onward, Ben Gurion stayed in the United States during the First World War, one of the more important periods in his life and his development as politician. About Ben Gurion's stay in the United States see Gal, *Preparing for a Jewish State*, 5. S. Tevet, *חיי דוד בן-גוריון — קינאת דוד* (*The Jealousy of David — The Life of David Ben Gurion*) (Jerusalem: Schocken, 1987), 289.
- 6 About Weizmann's recognition of the importance of the American Zionist Movement, the growing importance of the United States and the relative weakening of Britain, see Norman Rose, "Weizmann, Ben Gurion, and the 1946 Crisis in the Zionist Movement," *Studies in Zionism* 11.1 (1990): 30, 31.
- 7 Y. Bauer, *1945–1939 דיפלומטיה ומחתרת במדיניות הציונית* (*Diplomacy and the Underground in Zionist Policy, 1939–1945*) (Merchavia: Sifriat Po'alim, 1963), 67; Chaim Weizmann, *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, Vol. 20 (Rehovot: Yad Chaim Weizmann, 1975), 118 (hereafter Weizmann, *Letters and Papers*).

- 8 Of the importance of the financial support of American Jewry for the Jews of Eastern Europe and Zionist activity in Palestine, see Shapira, *Emergency Council*, p. 606. On financial aid distributed by the Joint among Jews in Eastern Europe, see Bauer, *My Brother's Keeper*.
- 9 See for example the demand by Louis Lipsky, the president of the American Zionist Organization after Brandeis' fall, for more authority for American office holders in the Zionist establishment. See a letter by Lipsky to Eli'ezer Kaplan, the treasurer of the Jewish Agency, 23 September 1942, in the Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem (from here on CZA), S58/35.
- 10 Gal, *Preparing for a Jewish State*, 70–71.
- 11 Kaplan to the Smaller Action Committee of the Zionist Executive Committee, 26 April 1940. Kaplan explained that "young" referred to people who were between forty and forty-five years old.
- 12 In another case, Kaplan mentioned the change in the organization of the American Jewish community: local communities wanted to be independent and to take an active, real role in Zionist public activity. See Eli'ezer Kaplan in his speech summing up his visit in the United State at the American Executive of the United Palestine Appeal, 7 November 1945, CZA, A-112/123. See more about these issues in note 107 of this article.
- 13 See for example conditions set by Hadassah for allocating more money for security. Kaplan was unwilling to link the monetary allocation to conditions set by Hadassah. See Eli'ezer Kaplan at the Jewish Agency Executive, 15 June 1941, CZA, S-100.
- 14 For a full, detailed description of the role of the American Zionists in the political plans of Ben Gurion, see Allon Gal, *David Ben-Gurion and the American Alignment for a Jewish State*, translated by D. S. Segal (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1991). For a comprehensive survey of Zionist activities in the United States focusing on areas of increased involvement and on contributions to the Zionist effort, see David H. Shpiro, *From Philanthropy to Activism, The Political Transformation of American Zionism in the Holocaust Years 1933–1945* (Oxford, New York: Pergamon Press, 1994); N. Oryan, *מנהיגותו של הרב אבא הלל סילבר, 1949–1939* ("The Leadership of Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver in the American Arena, 1939–1949") (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Tel Aviv, 1982); A. Ilan, *אמריקה, בריטניה וארץ ישראל, 1946–1949* ("The Conflict between Activists and Moderates in the Leadership of the American Zionist Movement in the 1940s — The Clash of Stephen Wise and Abba Hillel Silver"), *Zionism* 9 (1984): 358–317; idem, *תוכנית החלוקה ושליחת* ("The Partition Plan and the Mission of Dr. Nachum Goldman to Washington in the Summer of 1946 — The American Perspective"), *Zionism* 5 (1978): 227–261; M. Kedem, *פעולתו* ("The Political Activity of Chaim Weizmann during the Second World War") (Ph.D. dissertation, Bar Ilan University, 1979) (hereafter Kedem, *The Political Activity of Weizmann*). See also Shapira, *Emergency Council*; David H. Shpiro, "The Political Background of the 1942 Biltmore Resolution," *Hertzl Year Book* 8 (1978): 166–175; Melvin I. Urofsky, *American Zionism, From Herzl to the Holocaust* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1975).
- 15 On the importance of American money for the budget of the Zionist Movement see the letter by Levitov, the head of the Organizational Department of the Zionist Executive to Ben Gurion 8 March 1938, Ben Gurion Archive, Sedeh Boqer (hereafter, BGA), correspondence. According to Ussishkin, the head of the Jewish National Fund, the United States was the only place where one could increase the income of the Zionist Funds. See

- Menahem Ussishkin to the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem, 11 June 1941, CZA, S-100.
- 16 Christopher Sykes, *מבולפור ועד בוויין – מאבקים על ארץ ישראל* (*Crossroads to Israel*) [translated into Hebrew by Shlomo Gonen] (Tel Aviv: Ma'arakhot, 1966), 193.
 - 17 Kedem, "The Political Activity of Weizmann", 70. Ben Gurion diary, 6 May 1936, BGA.
 - 18 Shapira, *Emergency Council*, 148.
 - 19 On the involvement of the heads of the Appeal in the United States in the reallocation of the Zionist budget because of the special security situation in 1939 see letter from Eli'ezer Kaplan to Louis Lipsky, one of the heads of the Zionist Organization of America and its president in the 1920s after the defeat of Brandeis, 4 May 1939, CZA, F1335/38. On Lipsky, see L. Lipsky, *Memories in Profile* (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1975). On education and other social issues see a letter from Ben Gurion to the Va'ad ha-Po'el Executive, 24 January 1939, BGA, letters. On budget allowance for minority groups in Palestine see for example Eli'ezer Kaplan to the Zionist Executive, 15 June 1941, CZA, S100.
 - 20 Letter by Eli'ezer Kaplan to Louis Lipsky, 4 May 1939, CZA, F1335/38.
 - 21 Letter by Eli'ezer Kaplan to the members of the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem, 4 June 1940, CZA, F-1186/38.
 - 22 See in this context the criticism by Rose Jacobs, a past president of Hadassah and a member of the Jewish Agency Executive, on the functioning of the Zionist Executive. Rose Jacobs, 1938, CZA, 43 375/A.
 - 23 Eli'ezer Kaplan at the Jewish Agency Executive, 24 March 1939, CZA, S-100.
 - 24 A letter from Ben Gurion to the Va'ad ha-Po'el Executive, 24 March 1939, BGA, letters.
 - 25 Ben Gurion was aware of the length of time needed to collect the material, and for that reason asked his correspondents not to hold the material until all the requested answers were collected, but to send him each answer as it arrived from the institution involved. See Ben Gurion's letter to the Vaad ha-Po'el Executive, 24 January 1939, BGA, *loc. cit.*
 - 26 Letter from Eli'ezer Kaplan to Louis Lipsky about opening a branch of Bank ha-Po'alim, 12 October 1938, CZA, 53/38–S.
 - 27 Eli'ezer Kaplan, 12 October 1938, CZA, *loc. cit.*
 - 28 Eli'ezer Kaplan, 12 October 1938, CZA, *loc. cit.*
 - 29 Letter by Kaplan, 4 May 1939, CZA, *loc. cit.*
 - 30 Letter by Eli'ezer Kaplan, 4 May 1939, CZA, *loc. cit.*
 - 31 Eli'ezer Kaplan at the Jewish Agency Executive, 15 June 1941, CZA, S-100.
 - 32 Ussishkin at the Jewish Agency Executive, 15 June 1941, CZA, *loc. cit.*
 - 33 Shapira, a member of the Zionist Executive and a leader of the Mizrachi, at the Jewish Agency Executive, 15 April 1941, CZA, *loc. cit.*
 - 34 Kaplan offered a long list of institutions and bodies: the University, the Technion, the School of Fishing, the Conservatory, the Seminary, Social Assistance, the Ta'asiyah Bank, the 'Amal school, and the Medical Federation. See Eli'ezer Kaplan at the Jewish Agency Executive, 20 January 1940, CZA, S-100.
 - 35 Eli'ezer Kaplan at the Jewish Agency Executive, 20 January 1920, CZA, *loc. cit.*
 - 36 Yitzhaq Ben Tzevi, the future second president of the State of Israel. On the Va'ad Leumi in the 1930s, see B. Eliav (ed.), *היישוב בימי הבית הלאומי* (*The Yishuv at the Time of the National Homeland*) (Jerusalem: Keter, 1976), 188–196.
 - 37 A telegram from Ben Tzevi to Shlomo Goldman, 22 May 1939, BGA, correspondence.
 - 38 It seems that Ben Gurion thought that the telegram sent by Ben Tzevi was concealed from him intentionally. Letter from Ben Gurion to the Va'ad Leumi

- Executive, 23 May 1939, BGA, correspondence. In his telegram to Goldman, Ben Tzevi mentions a similar request for aid that he sent to the Zionists of South Africa. That request did not raise any reaction in the Zionist Executive. The difference in reactions was apparently due to Ben Gurion's feeling that it was crucially important to maintain control over the Zionist funding system in the United States. As to the request to South Africa, see the telegram of Ben Tzevi to Goldman, 22 May 1939, *loc. cit.*
- 39 Ben Gurion, 2 January 1939, Diary, BGA.
 - 40 A letter from Kaplan to the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem, 24 July 1938, BGA, correspondence. Apparently the "show" was the Palestinian building at the New York Fair that was planned for 1939 under Weisgal. See M. Weisgal, *עד כאן* (*Here and No Further*) (Jerusalem: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1972), 113–115.
 - 41 Rose Jacobs at the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem, 22 May 1938, CZA, S-100. About Rose Jacobs, see J. Antler, *The Journey Home: Jewish Women and the American Century* (New York: Free Press, 1997), 203–214.
 - 42 Rose Jacobs, 22 May 1938, CZA, *loc. cit.* Apparently Jacobs meant the Kibbutz of 'Ein ha-Shofet, which was established in 1937 by groups of Ha-Shomer ha-Tza'ir from Poland and the United States. At first, members of the Kibbutz were settled in Ju'arah.
 - 43 Ben Gurion, 22 May 1938, CZA, *loc. cit.*
 - 44 Eli'ezer Kaplan, 22 May 1938, CZA, *loc. cit.*
 - 45 Yitzhaq Gruenbaum, 22 May 1938, CZA, *loc. cit.*
 - 46 Minutes of the Directorate of Qeren Hayesod in the United States, 27 February 1946, microfilm of the Abba Hillel Silver Archive in Cleveland (hereafter, Abba Hillel Silver Archive), 1/1082.
 - 47 A telegram from the Executive of Po'alei Zion to Silver, 20 March 1946, Abba Hillel Silver Archive 1/1082.
 - 48 According to Silver and Neumann, there was a close connection between the General Zionist Party in Palestine and the Zionist Organization of America. For example, see the letter from Emanuel Neumann, Silver's assistant, to Rose Jacobs, 21 February 1940, CZA, A-71/375.
 - 49 The leadership of Mapai in Palestine was trying to strengthen the opposition of the American branch of Po'alei Zion to Silver, whose power in the United States was on the rise, in preparation for the 22nd Congress. This telegram might be a part of the same development. See Ben Gurion to the Executive of Mapai, 17 December 1945, Archive of the Labor Party in Beit Berl, 25.
 - 50 Eli'ezer Kaplan to the Jewish Agency Executive, 10 February 1946, CZA, S-100. The Zionist Organization of America had a majority in the Directorate of the Qeren Hayesod in the United States.
 - 51 For example, setting aside \$100,000 via mutual assistance organizations under the supervision of two members of the Jewish Agency Executive. See the Jewish Agency Executive 9 June 1946, CZA, S-100.
 - 52 Eli'ezer Kaplan to the Jewish Agency Executive, 9 June 1946, CZA, *loc. cit.*
 - 53 Eli'ezer Kaplan to the Jewish Agency Executive, 9 June 1946, CZA, *loc. cit.*
 - 54 A letter from the Central Office of Qeren Qayemet le-Israel to Eli'ezer Kaplan, 2 February 1943, CZA, S-469/53–Aleph.
 - 55 Telegram from the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem to Silver, 27 March 1946, Abba Hillel Silver Archive, 1/1082.
 - 56 Speech by Kaplan given to the members of the Directorate of the United Palestine Appeal, 11 July 1945, CZA, A-112/123.
 - 57 As stated before, American Zionists were in control of the committees that managed Qeren Hayesod and Qeren Qayemet le-Israel. This may have been the reason that Kaplan tried to increase control of the Zionist Executive over even the preliminary stage of money collection.

- 58 Kaplan's speech, 11 July 1945, CZA, *loc. cit.*
- 59 Emanuel Neumann was present at the meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem on 10 February 1946. Neumann claimed that the request for allocation was addressed to the Joint Executive of Qeren Hayesod and the National Jewish Fund, which was legal, unlike a direct request to the United Appeal that would have been illegal. See Emanuel Neumann to the Jewish Agency Executive, 10 February 1946, CZA, S-100. Neumann knew that American Zionist control of the Directorate of Qeren Hayesod would ensure a positive answer to a request by the Zionists of America. At the next meeting, Kaplan insisted that Neumann take part in the meeting and that the decision to refuse the allowance was reached in a democratic manner.
- 60 The World Union was a unifying framework for Mapai and for parties outside of Palestine that identified with Mapai both in ideology and in organizational structure.
- 61 M. Avizohar (ed.), **דוד בן גוריון, לקראת קץ המנדט, זיכרונות מן העיזבון: 29 ביוני, 1946, מרס 1947** (*David Ben Gurion, Towards the End of the Mandate, Memories from His Legacy: June 29, 1946–March 1947*) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1993), 240.
- 62 Letter from Israel Goldstein to Emanuel Neumann, 20 March 1947, CZA, A-335/123.
- 63 The criticism came up at a fundraising evening for the United Palestine Appeal that Goldstein attended in Nashville. Letter from Goldstein to Neumann, 20 March 1947, CZA, *loc. cit.*
- 64 Goldstein turned to Neumann as one who took a central part in the planning and execution of money transfers from the Appeal to the Zionist Organization of America. This shows that Newman's words at the meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem against the transfer of money to the Zionist Organization of America was contrary to his own actions in the United States; he may have been unwilling and/or unable to oppose the majority opinion at the Jewish Agency Executive. See Neumann to the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem, 10 February 1946, CZA, S-100.
- 65 Kaplan goes on to say that money can only be spent with the approval of the Jewish Agency Executive and Qeren Hayesod. One can understand from his words that approval was a mere formality, and that in fact, the Zionists of America were acting independently. See Eli'ezer Kaplan to the Jewish Agency Executive, 12 January 1941, CZA, S-100.
- 66 Mosheh Shertok at the Jewish Agency Executive 7 May 1944, CZA, S-100. On another occasion, Rabi Berlin, a member of the Jewish Agency Executive, criticized the budget of the Emergency Fund. Berlin claimed that the share of Political Department was up to \$604,000 and was supposed to go up to \$1,000,000. Berlin was also opposed to the high salaries of officeholders in the Zionist Organization of America. See Berlin to the Jewish Agency Executive, 16 January 1944, CZA, S-100. Rabi Berlin (Bar Ilan) lived in Palestine but was the Honorary President of the Mizrahi organization in the United States. See Gal, *Towards a Jewish State*, p. 88.
- 67 Mosheh Shertok at the Jewish Agency Executive, 7 May 1944, CZA, *loc. cit.*
- 68 Letter from Eli'ezer Kaplan to Louis Lipsky, 4 May 1939, CZA, 1335 F-38.
- 69 Kaplan letter, 4 May 1939, CZA, *loc. cit.*
- 70 Memorandum by Izidor Breslau, 15 August 1940, Archive of the Jewish American Historical Society, P-1/501. About Breslau see Gal, *Towards a Jewish State*, 69.
- 71 Gal, *Towards a Jewish State*, 69.
- 72 Haifa was bombed on 24 July 1940, and in 9 September 1940 Tel Aviv was severely damaged by bombs. The bombings shook the Jews of America. See Gal, *Towards a Jewish State*, 73, 74.
- 73 One gets the impression from the memorandum that Breslau was concerned

- that he was not included in the decision about establishing the bank, but was not fundamentally opposed to it. Unlike Robert Szold, Breslau was present at the event and did not act decisively to stop it.
- 74 Telegram from Kaufmann to Kaplan 13 September 1940, Central Jewish Archive in Cincinnati, 1/4, central MSS COL — 203. One can infer Kaplan's disapproval of the bank from his opposition to the initiative to establish an American Institute for Investment in Palestine. This initiative came up at the Conference of the American Zionists in 1941 at the end of Kaufmann's term. See Eli'ezer Kaplan to the Jewish Agency Executive, 7 September 1941, CZA, S-100.
 - 75 Wise was one of the most important Zionist leaders in the United States and a very close associate of President Roosevelt. For more on Wise, see M. I. Urofsky, *A Voice that Spoke for Justice: The Life and Times of Stephen S. Wise* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1982).
 - 76 Szold was very active in economic areas, was treasurer of the Zionist Organization of America until 1943, and was very close to Ben Gurion. See an interview with Szold, 22 February 1977, BGA oral history. Ben Gurion was opposed to the American Zionist claim for independence. Szold's actions in the bank affair closely paralleled Ben Gurion's view of America's Zionists and their standing in the Zionist movement. On the relationship between Szold and Ben Gurion see an interview with Szold, 23 February 1977, BGA, oral history. Emanuel Neumann told Silver of his conversation with Szold, in which he himself warned Szold not to collaborate too closely with Ben Gurion. See letter from Neumann to Silver, 17 September 1943, CZA, 123/91–A. Szold was also a close political ally of Ben Gurion: he supported a strong opposition to Britain, unlike Brandeis. See letter from Szold to Wise, 29 November 1940, CZA, A-54/406. Szold's position was also close to that of Ben Gurion vis-à-vis the position of American Zionists, as is clear from his support for sending emissaries from Palestine to the United States, unlike most of the Zionist leaders of the United States. Dov Yosef, a member of the Zionist Executive who was very active in American affairs, said that when he was leaving, Szold came and thanked him for stayed with them and informing them on the events in Palestine, and encouraged more such visits. See Dov Yosef to the Jewish Agency Executive, 13 April 1941, CZA, S-100. Taken together, this evidence indicates that although Szold was an associate of Brandeis and his group, his primary allegiance was to Ben Gurion. Szold was described by Ben Gurion as one of the only two American Zionists who were unreservedly Zionist and who considered Palestine not through the prism of loyalty or disloyalty to the United States. See Ben Gurion to Mapai Central Office 19 February 1941, Archive of the Labor Party at Beit Berl, 23.
 - 77 To repeat, at that time there were more and more signs of a growing distance between Wise and Brandeis, making it all the more likely that Wise would oppose the bank initiative, which, as will be seen below, was apparently connected to Brandeis. See for example the labeling of Wise as "deserter" by Brandeis. See letter from Shlomo Goldman to Szold, 18 April 1940, CZA, A-124/243. Wise welcomed Brandeis' retirement from the High Court, but not, he said, because Frankfurter was joining the High Court, as he was not supposed to be a substitute for Brandeis. See a letter from Wise to Roosevelt, 20 February 1939, CZA, A-243. Brandeis' associates were strongly opposed to Wise's intention to run for the office of President of the Zionist Organization of America in place of Goldman. Indeed, Brandeis supported the candidacy of Kaufmann. See letter from Breslau to Shlomo Goldman, 11 June 1940, Archive of the Jewish American Historical Society, P-1/501.
 - 78 One can explain Dikstein's involvement in establishing the bank by noting that he was not involved with the political side of American Zionism and thus was not aware of the far-reaching potential consequences of such a bank.

- Dikenstein himself noted that he was not a political person and did not get involved in politics in the United States, preferring rather to observe. See Abraham Dikenstein to the Mapai Central Office, 12 March 1945, Archive of the Labor Movement in Beit Berl, 24. The bank was not mentioned at all in his report to the Mapai Central Office, though many other economic matters were discussed in detail. Moreover, Dikenstein clearly opposed independence for American Zionists; he worked to establish economic institutions with the same aims as the bank, such as "The America-Palestine Trade Company," which was supposed to centralize imports by institutions of the Histadrut (Federation of Labor) from the United States and to acquire credit within the American program to build up foreign trade. See Abraham Dikenstein to the Mapai Central Office, 12 March 1945, Archive of the Labor Party in Beit Berl, *loc. cit.*
- 79 Letter from Albert Epstein to Abraham Dikenstein, 16 September 1940, Central Jewish Archive in Cincinnati, *loc. cit.*
 - 80 Letter from Albert Epstein to Abraham Dikenstein, 16 September 1940, Central Jewish Archive in Cincinnati, *loc. cit.*
 - 81 Letter from Albert Epstein to Abraham Dikenstein, 16 September 1940 Central Jewish Archive in Cincinnati, *loc. cit.*
 - 82 Letter from Abraham Dikenstein to Robert Szold, 14 September 1940, Central Jewish Archive in Cincinnati, *loc. cit.*
 - 83 Letter from Abraham Dikenstein to Robert Szold, 14 September 1940, Central Jewish Archive in Cincinnati, *loc. cit.*
 - 84 On the passivity of American Zionists during the 1920s, see H. L. Feingold, *A Time for Searching: Entering the Mainstream 1920–1945* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 185–186.
 - 85 There was a later attempt to influence the structure of the Yishuv by establishing a bank: Bernard Roosevelt, a member of the General Zionist Party and an old political associate of Neumann, turned to Silver in early 1947. Roosevelt suggested taking over the Qupat 'Am Bank so that the General Zionist Party would have their own bank like the Mizrahi and the Labor party. The bank would have become a central tool for improving the state of the General Zionist Party in the Yishuv. Roosevelt offered a detailed document, spelling out the structure of the bank and means of taking it over. Roosevelt wrote this document after being in touch with representatives of the bank's management to ensure their collaboration in the takeover attempt. See letter from Bernard Roosevelt to Silver, 16 January 1947, Abba Hillel Silver Archive, 1/238.
 - 86 See letter from Eli'ezer Kaplan to Louis Lipsky regarding the activities of Bank ha-Po'alim in the United States, 12 October 1938, CZA, S-53 85.
 - 87 E. Friesel, **1922–1917 : לאחר הצהרת בלפור : המדיניות הציונית** (*Zionist Policy after the Balfour Declaration: 1917–1922*) (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1977), 226–250 (hereafter Friesel, *Zionist Policy after the Balfour Declaration*). See also Y. Metzger, **1921–1919 הון לאומי לבית לאומי**, (*National Capital for the National Home, 1919–1921*) (Jerusalem: Yad Ben Tzvi, 1979). There is voluminous literature about Brandeis. See for example A. Gal, *Brandeis of Boston* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980); E. Friesel, "Brandeis' Role in American Zionism Historically Reconsidered," in J. S. Gurock (ed.), *American Jewish History*, Vol. 8 (New York, NY: Routledge, 1998), 92–117; Ph. Strum, *Brandeis: Beyond Progressivism* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993).
 - 88 H. Levsky, **1921–1918 ועד הצירים , יסודות התקציב למפעל הציוני**, (*The Monetary Foundations of the Zionist Enterprise, Va'ad ha-Tzirim 1918–1921*) (Jerusalem: Yad Ben Tzvi, 1981), 15–31.
 - 89 Eli'ezer Kaplan to the Jewish Agency Executive, 16 August 1940, CZA, S-100.
 - 90 Kaplan pointed out Kaufmann's connection to bankers. Kaufmann was described as somebody with a great reputation in monetary circles, who had

the respect and personal appreciation of bank managers. See Kaplan to the Jewish Agency Executive, 16 August 1940, *loc. cit.*

- 91 See the summary of the position taken by the American Zionist leadership in preparation for Weizmann's visit to the United States, March 1921. Friesel, *Zionist Policy after the Balfour Declaration*, 433–537.
- 92 Letter from Breslau to Brandeis, 16 May 1940, Archive of the Jewish American Historical Society, p-1/501.
- 93 Letter from Breslau to Brandeis, 3 July 1940, Archive of the Jewish American Historical Society, p-1/501.
- 94 Letter from Arthur Lourie to Joseph Lynton, 17 September 1941, CZA, S-471/53.
- 95 Letter from Arthur Lourie, 14 September 1941, CZA, *loc. cit.*
- 96 At the same time, Brandeis continued cooperating with the Zionist leadership, as can be seen from his contacts with Weizmann and Ben Gurion. Louis Lipsky, one of Weizmann's associates in the United States, remarked that Weizmann decided to come to an understanding to cooperate with Brandeis' group, against Lipsky's opinion, who nevertheless acted according to Weizmann's instructions. See letter from Lipsky to Weizmann, 24 June 1938, BGA, correspondence. Weizmann also asked for Brandeis' intervention with President Roosevelt. See letter from Weizmann to Brandeis, 19 April 1939, in Weizmann, *Letters and Papers*, Vol. 19, 39–40. David Ben Gurion turned to Brandeis and asked for his cooperation in spite of the political differences between them. See letter from Ben Gurion to Brandeis, 27 October 1938, BGA, correspondence. Ben Gurion met with Brandeis and expressed his strong satisfaction with the talk and its results. See Ben Gurion 8 January 1939, BGA, diary. Gal remarked on the close connection between Ben Gurion and Brandeis; see Gal, *Towards a Jewish State*, 15–17. On the other hand, there are signs of tension and differences of opinion between Weizmann and elements of the American Zionist movement that were close to Brandeis. See for example Weizmann's opposition to the Young Turks group, which was close to Brandeis; letter from Weizmann to Weizgal, 13 October 1940, Archive of the American Jewish Historical Society, P-1/501.
- 97 Memorandum of Izidor Breslau about his conversation with Brandeis, 15 October 1940, Archive of the American Jewish Historical Society, p-1/501.
- 98 The expression "in some fashion" illustrates that even in international affairs, the authority of the Executive would not be absolute; rather, it would be open to the considered opinion of the American Zionists, as can be seen more and more clearly toward the end of the memorandum. Breslau, 15 September 1940, Archive of the Jewish American Historical Society, *loc. cit.*
- 99 Breslau, 15 September 1940, Archive of the Jewish American Historical Society, *loc. cit.* (part III).
- 100 Breslau, 15 September 1940, Archive of the Jewish American Historical Society, *loc. cit.* (part IV).
- 101 Even Histadrut fundraising was considered "philanthropic" by Ben Gurion. "Even in the Histadrut Appeal, where the potential for a national element is most prominent, philanthropic considerations are important and perhaps primary." Ben Gurion, 12 January 1939, BGA, diary. About the Histadrut Appeal, see Gal, *Towards a Jewish State*, 78–86.
- 102 Shapira, *Emergency Council*, 148.
- 103 One can find a similar opposition in the words of many members of the Jewish Agency Executive. Eliyahu Dubkin, a member of the Jewish Agency Executive and head of the absorption department, claimed that Americans always did as they liked, and that therefore they should be asked to agree beforehand to decisions of the Executive, and only then be notified of the Executive's opinion. Eliyahu Dubkin to the Jewish Agency Executive

- 3 November 1940, CZA, S-100. In another meeting, he suggested opposing the decision of the Appeal, otherwise the Zionist Executive would have to keep changing its budget according to the influence of outsiders. He recognized that money from the United States was now the main source for the budget. Eliyahu Dubkin to the Jewish Agency Executive, 24 February 1941, CZA, S-100.
- 104 Ben Gurion diary, 17 September 1942, BGA, Diary.
- 105 Ben Gurion to the Smaller Action Committee in Jerusalem, 14 January 1941, CZA, 1855/25.
- 106 Shapira, *Emergency Council*, 148.
- 107 These issues are too large to cover in this article and should be discussed separately. For example, regarding the question of more American office holders, see Rose Jacobs to the Jewish Agency Executive, 24 March 1940, S-100. Regarding the demand for control over political activity in the United States, see Brandeis' memorandum cited above, and also the minutes of the Emergency Council meeting, 29 December 1941, Central Jewish Archive, Cincinnati, Ohio, 1/5 Mss Col-203. On criticism of how the Zionist institutions functioned, see Ben Gurion's reaction to such criticism, Ben Gurion to the Jewish Agency Executive, 22 May 1938, CZA, S100. On opposition to the position of emissary from Palestine in the United States, see letter from Eliyahu Dubkin, member of the Jewish Agency Executive and the person in charge of aliyah, to Eli'ezer Kaplan, 28 August 1938, BGA, correspondence. On the demand to enlarge the independent Zionist infrastructure in the United States, see letter from Abba Hillel Silver, head of the Emergency Council, to Hayim Weizmann, president of the Zionist movement, 3 March 1944, CZA, Z-391/5. On the issue of giving more authority to American office holders and consulting with them in general and in the American arena in particular, see letter from Louis Lipsky to Eli'ezer Kaplan, 23 September 1942, CZA, S-58/35.

Greek Orthodox Church Networks and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism 1899–1947

- 1 A. Schmemmann, *Η αποστολή της Εκκλησίας στο σύγχρονο κόσμο* (*Church, World, Mission*) (Athens: Akritas, 1993), 138–143.
- 2 R. Clogg, "The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire," in B. Braude and B. Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire* (London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982), 194.
- 3 Ph. Fargues, "Demographic Islamization: Non-Muslims in Muslim Countries," *SAIS Review*, 21.2 (Summer-Fall 2001): 108–109.
- 4 D. Hopwood, *The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine 1843–1914* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 7.
- 5 From the mid-15th century onwards, the Patriarchs of Jerusalem resided in Constantinople and their election was in fact voted on internally by the elite of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The Patriarch of Constantinople, Agathagelos, intervened in the election of the successor to Polycarpus who died in Constantinople in 1827. M. I. Gedeon, *Πατριαρχικοί πίνακες* (*Patriarchate's Catalogues*) (Athens, 1996, 1st edition 1886), 703; see also A. Bertram and H. C. Luke, *Report of the Commission Appointed by the Government of Palestine into the Affairs of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem* (London: Oxford University Press, 1921), 168–169.
- 6 Th. Stavrou, *Russian Interests in Palestine 1882–1914: A Study of Religious and Educational Enterprises* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1963), 206–210.

- 7 D. Kushner, "Ali Ekrem Bey, Governor of Jerusalem, 1906–1908," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28/3 (1996): 352–353.
- 8 E. Kedourie, *The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies* (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 1984), 328.
- 9 Q. Shomali, "Palestinian Christians: Politics, Press and Religious Identity 1900–1948" in A. O'Mahony (ed.), *Christian Heritage in the Holy Land* (London: Scorpion Cavendish, 1995), 228–229.
- 10 E. Podeh, "The Emergence of the Arab State System Reconsidered," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 9.3 (November 1998): 51.
- 11 It is of some interest to note that the nationalist-secular Arab historians of the 1970s attributed great significance to early Palestinian Arab journalism, which was treated as a prototype of "Palestinian Arab awareness." M. Reinkowski, "Late Ottoman Rule over Palestine: Its Evaluation in Arab, Turkish and Israeli Histories, 1970–1990," *Middle Eastern Studies* 35.1 (January 1999): 67.
- 12 A. Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 245–247, 263–278.
- 13 E. Kedourie, *op. cit.*, 318–319, 339–340.
- 14 S. Khuri and N. Khuri, *Khulasat ta'rikh kanisat Urshalim al urthudhuksiya* (Jerusalem, 1925), *passim*.
- 15 *Filastin*, 16 October 1931; see "Patriarcat orthodoxe de Jerusalem," *Echos d'Orient* 31 (1932): 91.
- 16 Y. Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian Arab National Movement, 1929–1939*, Vol. 2 (London: Frank Cass, 1977), 12.
- 17 E. Kedourie, *op. cit.*, 332–333.
- 18 17 June 1932, Jerusalem to Athens, "Visit of the Arab Orthodox Executive Committee to High Commissioner," 7103/B/36/1932, Archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AYE).
- 19 C. E. Dawn, "From Ottomanism to Arabism: The Origin of an Ideology" in A. Hourani, Ph. Khoury and M. C. Wilson (eds.), *The Modern Middle East: A Reader* (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 381.
- 20 M. Davie, *La millat grecque orthodoxe de Beyrouth, 1870–1940. Structuration interne et rapport à la Cité* (Ph.D. dissertation, Paris, 1993), 313.
- 21 Z. Ghazzal, *L'économie politique de Damas durant le XIX siècle* (Damascus: Institut Français de Damas, 1993), 143–144.
- 22 B. Abu Manneh, "The Establishment and Dismantling of the Province of Syria, 1865–1888" in J. Spagnolo (ed.), *Problems of the Modern Middle East in Historical Perspective* (London: Ithaca Press, 1992), 11, 13, 26.
- 23 S. Roussos, "Diplomacy and Communal Identity: Greece and the Greek Orthodox in Syria and Lebanon (1919–1940)," *Chronos History Journal* 1.1 (1998), *passim*.
- 24 A. Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, 276.
- 25 A. Kitroeff, *The Greeks in Egypt, 1919–1937. Ethnicity and Class* (London: Ithaca Press, 1989), 156–157.
- 26 T. Philipp, *The Syrians in Egypt 1725–1975* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1985), 153.
- 27 D. Kitsikis, *Propagande et pressions en politique internationale. La Grèce et ses revendications à la Conférence de la Paix (1919–1920)* (Paris: P.U.F, 1963), 441–442.
- 28 The Anglo-Hellenic League, *The Present Danger to the Ecumenical Patriarchate* (London, 1925), *passim*.
- 29 R. Pinon, "Chronique de la Quinzaine," *Revue des Deux Mondes* (1 August 1923): 712.
- 30 S. Roussos, "Greece and the Arab Middle East: The Greek Orthodox Communities in Egypt, Palestine and Syria 1919–1940" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1994), 220–240.
- 31 T.H. Papadopoulos, *Studies and Documents Relating to the History of the Greek Church and People under Turkish Domination* (London: Variorum, 1990), 149.

- 32 *Περί Επιτροπής προς Ενίσχυση Ελληνικής Εκκλησίας και Παιδείας* (Committee for the Support of the Greek Church and Education) (hereafter EEEEEP), Vasilko Diatagma, 3 April 1893, Article 9, ST/(EEEEEP)/1896, AYE.
- 33 The budget of the Committee for the year 1896 was set by Secret Enactment No. 8 of the Cabinet on 5 June 1896 and it allowed for a total amount of 449,270 drachmas.
- 34 10 June 1900, Athens to Jerusalem, 1314/EEEEEP/K/66.2/1/1900; 19 November 1900, Jerusalem to Athens, 3099/K/66.2/2/1900, AYE.
- 35 In July 1896 the President of the Committee was A. D. Kyriakos and in November of the same year Dionysios Stefanou was appointed President with Spyridon Lambrou as member; 6 July 1896, EEEEEP/236/ST/1896.
- 36 Karolides maintained that the Arab Orthodox were originally Greeks, who had been Arabized and forgotten their Greek language. In 1908, he published a book supporting these views. The book was translated into Arabic and taught in the Patriarchate's schools in Palestine. P. Karolides, *Περί της εθνικής καταγωγής των Ορθόδοξων Χριστιανών της Συρίας και της Παλαιστίνης* (Athens, Jerusalem, 1908), *passim*.
- 37 13 April 1900, Jerusalem to Athens, 1052/EEEEEP/K/66.2/1/1900, AYE.
- 38 14 October 1900, Beirut to Athens, 2683/EEEEEP/K/66.2/2/1900, AYE.
- 39 8 July 1908, Jerusalem to Athens, Draft Proposal of the Patriarchate of Alexandria on the affairs of the Patriarchate of Antioch, 3338/15.1/EEEEEP/A29/3/1908, AYE.
- 40 24 November 1908, Beirut to Athens, 7748/EEEEEP/15.1/1908, AYE.
- 41 8 August 1929, Archimandrite Arsenios Kakoyiannis to Venizelos, B/36, AYE.
- 42 S. Roussos, "Greece and the Arab Middle East", 176–180.

Center and Diaspora in the Struggle for Human Rights: the State of Israel and the Jewish 'Desaparecidos' in Argentina during the Military Regime (1976–1983)

- 1 See: L. Roniger and M. Sznajder, *The Legacy of Human-Rights Violations in the Southern Cone: Argentina, Chile and Uruguay* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 16–18.
- 2 Comisión Nacional Sobre la Desaparación de Personas, *Nunca Más — Informe*, Buenos Aires 1984.
- 3 *Ibid.*, 69–75.
- 4 Comisión de Solidaridad con los Familiares, *La violación de los derechos humanos de argentinos judíos bajo el régimen militar (1976–1983) — Informe*, Barcelona, March 1999, 71.
- 5 This figure was presented initially by CONADEP in 1985. In September 2001 the Secretary of Human Rights of the Argentinean Ministry of Justice published an updated number of approximately 15,000 disappeared.
- 6 For the activity of UN organs see: I. Guest, *Behind the Disappearances: Argentina's Dirty War against Human Rights and the United Nations* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990).
- 7 Cavallo was extradited to Spain in June 2003.
- 8 Among the critics see M. Zohar, *שלה את עמי לעזאזל* (*Let My People Go to Hell*) (Tel Aviv: Tzitrin, 1990); L. Senkman, *מילוט יהודים בארגנטינה בעת השלטון הצבאי 1983–1976* ("Spiriting Jews out of Argentina during the Military Regime 1976–1983") in D. Sharfman (ed.), *אור לגויים? מדיניות החוץ של ישראל*, *A Light unto the Nations? Israel's Foreign Policy and Human Rights* (Tel Aviv: Ha-Qibbutz ha-Meuhad, 1999), 91–118. For a defense of Israel's actions, see J. Barromi, "Israeli Policies towards Argentina and Argentinian Jewry during the Military Junta," *Israel Affairs* 5.1 (1998): 27–44.

- 9 See T. Thun, *Menschenrechte und Aussenpolitik: Bundesrepublik Deutschland-Argentinien 1976–1983* (Bremen: Periferia, 1985). For Holland's official attitude see M. Baud, *El padre de la novia. Jorge Zorreguieta, la sociedad argentina y el régimen militar* (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2001), 159–167.
- 10 This law assures every Jew the right to receive Israeli citizenship without any restriction. Accordingly, under the law, every Jew is a potential Israeli citizen.
- 11 Senkman, *op. cit.*, 94–95, 101–102. Jewish Agency Archive, Department of Immigration, Immigration from Argentina, box 670 file 899, letters from Recanati to Dominitz 17.12.1976, Wolberg to Dominitz 11.1.1977, Dominitz to Recanati 28.1.1977.
- 12 Matzpen was an extreme left-wing anti-Zionist organization active during the 1970s and 1980s.
- 13 Zohar, *op. cit.*, 61.
- 14 A discussion of the legal situation is based upon A. Appel, "אחריות המדינה לגורל אזרחיה ולגורלם של יהודים באשר הם" ("Responsibility of the State for the Fate of its Citizens and of Jews Wherever They Be"), *הכנסת, מרכז מחקר ומידע*, נייר רקע לדיון בוועדת העליה, הקליטה והתפוצות (Background Paper of the Center for Research and Information of the Knesset, for Discussion in the Knesset Committee on Immigration, Absorption, and the Diaspora) (Jerusalem, June 2000).
- 15 See *חוקים: חוק העונשים (תיקון מס' 39) (חלק מקדמי וחלק כללי)* (Thirteenth Knesset, Laws: Penal Code (Amendment 39) (Introductory and General Sections) 5754–1994), Knesset Archives; *Knesset Debates*, Session 246 — 17 Av 5754, 25 July 1994, 183–184.
- 16 Appel, *op. cit.*, 3–7, summarizes the articles for and against the Amendment by Professors Shaham, Feller, and Kremnizer that were published (in Hebrew) in *Pelilim* 5:1 (1996), 5–99.
- 17 *הכנסת ה־15, מושב שני, ועדת העליה, הקליטה והתפוצות* (Fifteenth Knesset, Second Session, Committee on Immigration, Absorption, and the Diaspora), Protocol 83, 3 July 2000, 8–9.
- 18 *Ibid.*, 23.
- 19 Barromi, *op. cit.*, 42.
- 20 See *דברי הכנסת* (Knesset Debates), 82, 1971 (Ninth Knesset, second session, 8 March 1978); 86, 3111 (Ninth Knesset, third session, 20 June 1979); 87, 531–532 (Ninth Knesset, fourth session, 20 November 1979); 95, 408 (Tenth Knesset, third session, 29 November 1982); 96, 1269 (*ibid.*, 9 February 1983); 97, 2810–2828 (*ibid.*, 29 June 1983); 101, 1728–1739 (Eleventh Knesset, first session, 20 February 1985); 101, 1905 (*ibid.*, 4 March 1985). The background for the debate conducted in June 1983 was an appeal presented to the High Court of Justice by Israeli relatives of missing Jews in Argentina. See the testimony of Luis Jaimovich, Interview no. (216)12, Oral History Division, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
- 21 See the statements made by Foreign Ministry representatives to the Knesset Committee on Immigration, Absorption, and the Diaspora: Fifteenth Knesset, second session, 20 November 1999, Protocol 30, 8–9; Protocol 50, 21 February 2000, 13.
- 22 See, for example, the statement made by Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir in reply to the parliamentary question of MK Yitzhaq Berman in the Knesset, 18 January 1984. See also the statements of Rabbi Michael Melchior, the Minister for Social Affairs and the Diaspora, and MK Na'omi Blumenthal to the Knesset Committee on Immigration, Absorption, and the Diaspora at the sessions listed in the previous note.
- 23 See the protocol cited in n. 12, above, 5–7.
- 24 See the statement by Prof. Natan Lerner at the session of the Knesset Committee on Immigration, Absorption, and the Diaspora, 21 February 2000 (above, n. 17), 7, 19–20.

- 25 See a description of the establishment of the Commission and its Final Report: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/desaparecidos/commitispen.html>.
- 26 Zohar, *op. cit.* (above, n. 8), 68. State of Israel Archive (SIA) JTZ (Foreign Affairs), 7042/9, Schmorak to Foreign Affairs Ministry in Jerusalem, 16.9.1981 (memorandum for the meeting of Shamir [Israeli Foreign Minister] and Camilión [Argentinean Foreign Minister]); Schmorak to Director General, Foreign Affairs Ministry and Director of Latin America, 17.12.1982.
- 27 See lists of detainees and disappeared received from the United States Embassy on different occasions: Argentine Information Center, Partial List of Victims of Repression in Argentina, 1977; Argentina: Individuals Abducted or Under Arrest as of March 1978, SIA-JTZ 7042/1. See also lists made by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith — ADL, id. 7041/12.
- 28 See Zohar, *op. cit.*, 52, who notes the possibility that many of the Jews did not approach Israeli or Jewish institutions.
- 29 Oral testimony of Pinhas Avivi, who then served as consul at the Israeli Embassy. He also related that after his release from jail, in part through the intervention of the government of Israel, journalist Jacobo Timerman was displeased when embassy officials brought him an Israeli passport.
- 30 "Desaparecidos judíos: por qué no aparece un Garzón israelí?" *Mundo Israelita* (Buenos Aires), 5 November 1999.
- 31 Testimony presented by Mr. Avi Ben Shlomo, to the Israeli Inter-Ministerial Commission on the Disappeared Jews in Argentina, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/desaparecidos/BenShlomoa.html> (Hebrew).
- 32 See lists of detainees and disappeared received from the United States Embassy, "Option to Israel (Law 21,650 and previous laws)," SIA-JTZ 7042/1. Of the 57 people approved for visas, 19 went to Israel (2 of them stayed in Europe in their way to Israel), and 8 used visas to other countries obtained after their liberation.
- 33 See H. Avni, "The Spanish Speaking World and the Jews" in R. S. Wistrich (ed.), *Terms of Survival — The Jewish World Since 1945* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 377.
- 34 As an example, see the report of the meeting between Ambassador Ram Nirgad and Chief of the Navy Massera, in which they talked about anti-Semitism in the different branches of the Armed Forces and the Police: SIA-JTZ, 8478/1, 25.8.1976. See also the report on the meeting between Ambassador Dov Schmorak and a group of generals: Idem, 8794/4.
- 35 Zohar, *op. cit.*, 68.

Jewish Diaspora and the Privatization of Israeli Society

- 1 On the negation of the Diaspora in the Israeli ethos, see O. Almog, דיוקן הצבר — (*The Sabra — A Profile*) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1998), 124–152; A.B. Yehoshua, בזכות הנורמליות: חמש מסות בשאלת הציונות (*The Case for Normality: Five Essays on Zionism*) (Jerusalem: Schocken, 1980); A. Rubinstein, מהרצל עד גוש אמונים ובחזרה (*From Herzl to Gush Emunim and Back*) (Jerusalem: Schocken, 1980).
- 2 On post-Zionism, see P. Ginossar and A. Bareli (eds.), פולמוס בזמננו: גישות מחקריות ואידאולוגיות (*Zionism: A Contemporary Controversy — Research Trends and Ideological Approaches*) (Kiryat Sde Boqer: Ben Gurion University Press, 1996); Y. Weitz (ed.), בין חזון לרביזיה: מאה שנות היסטוריוגרפיה ציונית (*From Vision to Revision: One Hundred Years of the Historiography of Zionism*) (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 1977); D. Michman (ed.), פוסט-ציונות, ושואה: הפולמוס הציבורי הישראלי בנושא הפוסט-ציונות בשנים 1993–1996 ומקומה

- של סוגיית השואה בו (Post-Zionism and the Holocaust: The Role of the Holocaust in the Public Debate on Post-Zionism in Israel, 1993–1996) (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University, 1997). On the "Critical Sociologists" see U. Ram (ed.), *החברה הישראלית: היבטים ביקורתיים* (Israeli Society: Critical Perspectives) (Tel Aviv: Breirot Publishers, 1993); U. Ram, *The Changing Agenda of Israeli Sociology: Theory, Ideology, and Identity* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995). B. Morris, "The New Historiography: Israel Confronts its Past," *Tikkun* 6 (1988): 14–23. B. Morris, *1948 and after: Israel and the Palestinians* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1990), 27–34; I. Pappé, "ההיסטוריה החדשה של הציונות: העימות האקדמי והפומבי" ("The New History of Zionism: The Academic and Public Debate"), *Kivunim* 8 (1995): 39–47; Y. Sheleg, "על הקרב על 'הציונות': הקרב על 'הציונות' (Zionism: Fighting for the Rating)," *Qol ha-Ir*, October 6, 1995; D. Margalit, "פוסט-ציונות ואנטי-ציונות: דיון בהשתתפות היסטוריונים" ("On Zionism, Post-Zionism and Anti-Zionism: An Historians' Discussion"), *Ha'aretz*, October 15, 1995.
- 3 A. Raz-Krakotzkin, "גלות בתוך ריבונות: לביקורת 'שלילת הגלות' בתרבות הישראלית" ("Exile within Sovereignty: Towards a Critique of the 'Negation of Exile' in Israeli Culture"), *Theoria u-Viqoret* 4 (1993): 23–55, 5 (1994): 113–132 (hereafter Raz-Krakotzkin, "Exile within Sovereignty"); D. Boyarin and J. Boyarin, "אין מולדת לישראל: על המקום של היהודים" ("The People of Israel has No Motherland: On the Place of the Jews"), *Theoria u-Viqoret* 5 (1994): 79–103 (hereafter Boyarin and Boyarin, "No Motherland"); Y. Peled, "גלות דה-לוקס: על 'הרהביליטציה של הגלות אצל בווארין ו-ראז-קראקוצקין'" ("Luxurious Diaspora: On the Rehabilitation of the Concept of Diaspora in Boyarin and Raz-Krakotzkin"), *Theoria u-Viqoret* 5 (1994) (hereafter Peled, "Luxurious Diaspora"): 133–139; Y. Yonah, "הווייה חסרת מוצא" ("Reality without a Solution"), *Ha'aretz*, December 24, 2003.
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- 35 See for example E. Schweid, "The Rejection of the Diaspora in Zionist Thought: Two Approaches," *Studies in Zionism* 5 (1984): 43–70 (hereafter Schweid, "Rejection of the Diaspora"); *idem*, "Israel, the Diaspora"; Gorni, "Attitude to the Diaspora"; Laor, "Notes".
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- 44 *Ibid.*, 11.
- 45 Gorni, "Attitude to the Diaspora." For a revised English version, see Y. Gorni, "Shlilat Ha-Galut: Past and Present," in A. Gal and Alfred Gottschalk, *Beyond Survival and Philanthropy: American Jewry and Israel* (Cincinnati, OH: Hebrew Union College Press; Detroit, MI: Distributed by Wayne State University Press, 2000), 41–58 (hereafter Gorni, "Shlilat Ha-Galut"); and cf Y. Gorni, *שלילת הגולה ומרכזיותה של ישראל: בין נחום גולדמן לדוד בן גוריון* ("The Negation of the Diaspora and the Centrality of Israel: Between Nahum Goldmann and David Ben Gurion"), *Gesher* 49 (2003): 19–34.
- 46 Gorni, "Shelilat ha-Galut," 51.
- 47 *Ibid.*, 51–53.
- 48 This argument is more fully developed in Gutwein, "Privatization of the Holocaust" (see note 4); Gutwein, "Left and Right Post-Zionism" (see note 12); D. Gutwein, *זהות נגד מעמד: רב-תרבותיות כאידיאולוגיה ניאור-ליברלית* ("Identity vs. Class: Multiculturalism as a Neo-Liberal Ideology"), *Theoria u-Viqoret* 19 (2001): 242–257.

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- 1 Ch. Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition" in A. Gutmann (ed.), *Multiculturalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 63.
- 2 In classical Greek sources of course we find the verb *διασπείρω* in active and passive forms and their derivatives, especially participles. Such forms occur in Herodotus (3, 13–14), Thucydides (I. 11), in Sophocles's *Electra* and *Trachiniai*, in Xenophon's *Hellenika* (I, 25) and in Plato's *Republic* (455d). The abstract noun, *διασπορά*, however, is absent from Greek literature during the classical period.

- 3 Plutarch, *Moralia* 1105 a.
- 4 Deuteronomy 28:25; Psalms 146:2; Jeremiah 15:7.
- 5 In the quotation I am slightly amending the authorized version in order to restore the flavor of the original, which uses the term *diaspora* and the collective name of the *Hellenes*. In the authorized version, the rendering reads: "Will he go unto the dispersion of the Gentiles, and teach the Gentiles?"
- 6 For full bibliographical data see Th. I. Papadopoulos, *Ελληνική βιβλιογραφία (1466–1800)* (Greek Bibliography [1466–1800]), Vol. I (Athens, 1984), 102 (nos. 1369–1371).
- 7 Iosipos Moisiodax, *Ηθική φιλοσοφία* (Moral Philosophy) (Venice, 1761), Vol. I, xiv. Cf. P. M. Kitromilides, *The Enlightenment as Social Criticism. Iosipos Moisiodax and Greek Culture in the Eighteenth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 49–50.
- 8 Moisiodax, *Moral Philosophy*, Vol. I, xviii.
- 9 Iosipos Moisiodax, *Απολογία* (Apology) (Vienna, 1780), 83.
- 10 Gregorios Phatseas, *Γραμματική γεωγραφική* (A Geographical Grammar) (Venice, 1760), Vol. I, vi.
- 11 V. Papaefthymiou, *Ιστορία συνοπτική της Ελλάδος* (A Concise History of Greece) (Vienna, 1807), iii: "Addressed to the most honorable brotherhood of Romaioi-Vlachoi of Vienna."
- 12 Cf. P. M. Kitromilides, "Από τον Μοισιόδακα στον Ρήγα" ("From Moisiodax to Rhigas"), *Ελληνικά* (Hellenika) 51 (2001): 101–108.
- 13 As defined by Traian Stoianovich, "The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant," *The Journal of Economic History* 20 (1960): 234–313; *Idem*, *Between East and West. The Balkan and Mediterranean Worlds*, Vol. 2 (New Rochelle, N.Y.: A.D. Caratzas, 1992), 1–77.
- 14 For a very useful and learned survey see Olga Katsiardi-Hering, "Εκπαίδευση και διασπορά" ("Education and Diaspora"), in *Νεοελληνική παιδεία και κοινωνία. Πρακτικά Διεθνούς Συνεδρίου αφιερωμένου στη μνήμη του Κ. Θ. Δημαρά* (Modern Greek Culture and Society. Proceedings of the International Conference in Memory of K. Th. Dimaras) (Athens: OMED, 1995), 153–177, esp. at 159.
- 15 A correspondent hiding behind the initials E. P. in the Greek journal *Ερμής ο Λόγιος* (Learned Mercury) 6 (1816): 359.
- 16 Papaefthymiou, *A Concise History of Greece*, xvi–xvii.
- 17 For details see Katsiardi-Hering, *op. cit.*, 163–168.
- 18 This was reflected in the manual of vernacular Greek grammar written in 1820 by Michael Boïtatzi, a teacher in the Greek school in Vienna who continued earlier projects undertaken by Michael Papageorgiou in 1768 and 1772 and by D. N. Darvaris in 1785.
- 19 This too was connected with an initiative by Michael Boïtatzi in 1813. For bibliographical details see Ph. Iliou, *Ελληνική βιβλιογραφία του 19ου αιώνα (1801–1818)* (Greek Bibliography of the 19th Century) (Athens: Elia, 1997), 358–359.
- 20 The pertinent evidence is recorded in detail in the list of members of the community compiled by A. Xanthopoulou-Kyriakou, *Η ελληνική κοινότητα της Βενετίας (1797–1866)* (The Greek Community of Venice [1797–1866]) (Thessaloniki: Aristotelian University of Thessaloniki, 1978), 238–266.
- 21 See Olga Katsiardi-Hering, *Η ελληνική παροικία της Τεργέστης (1751–1830)* (The Greek Colony in Trieste [1751–1830]) (Athens: Idrima Saripoulou, 1986), Vol. I, 67–117.
- 22 See S. Loukatos, "Ο πολιτικός βίος των Ελλήνων της Βιέννης κατά την Τουρκοκρατίαν και τα αυτοκρατορικά προς αυτούς προνόμια" ("The Political Life of the Greeks in Vienna during the Ottoman Period and the Imperial Privileges Accorded to Them"), *Δελτίον της Ιστορικής και Εθνολογικής Εταιρείας της Ελλάδος* (The Bulletin of the Historical and Ethnological Society of Greece) XV (1961), 287–350, especially 304–309.

- 23 A case in point was that of the anonymous patriot who wrote the treatise *Hellenic Nomarchy Being a Discourse on Freedom*, published in Italy, probably in Livorno, in 1806. This was an eloquent call for revolt, using fervent patriotic language in a frequently florid style. Nevertheless, several awkward lexical and syntactical constructions suggest that the author was not entirely comfortable in Greek, which he probably learned growing up in the diaspora. On the work and its significance in Greek political thought, see P. M. Kitromilides, “Bridges to the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. The Assimilation of Italian Culture as a Problem in Greek Historiography” in Chrysa Maltezou and G. Ortalli (eds.), *Italia-Grecia: temi e storiografie a confronto* (Venice: Università Ca’ Foscari di Venezia, 2001), 37–46, esp. 44–45.
- 24 E.g. John A. Armstrong in his seminal article, “Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas,” *American Political Science Review* 70 (1976): 393–408.
- 25 E.g. by John Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 206–213, and Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 101–109. Cf. A. D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford, England, New York, NY: B. Blackwell, 1986), 114–119.

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